Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756

by David Blackmore

  On another occasion at Quebec: ‘An Indian Swam over . . . with an intention as we suppose to Scalp a Centry, but on the Centry running up to him and presenting his piece to his breast he got down on his knees threw away his knife and deliver’d himself up.’68

  Gradually the British infantry began to acquire a degree of ascendancy over their irregular opponents. One officer recorded that small parties were constantly attacked by the enemy who was always repulsed, but not without casualties. He added: ‘These skirmishes had indeed the good effect of using our men to the woods, and familiarising them with the Canadians and Indians, whom they soon began to despise.’69 By October 1759, after the fall of Quebec, an NCO was able to record that ‘By this time our small reconnoitring detachments began to appear terrible among the skulking parties of Canadians and Indians.’ He described how the Indians would not face them in the open, but would lie in ambush at the edges of woods, firing and then rushing out to attack. At length the Indians ‘learned us to be as good hunters as themselves’ so that a small number of British were often able to see off larger numbers of Indians. He gave as an example an incident where a sergeant with a corporal and twelve men was cut off from his regiment by a large body of enemy irregulars. Four days later the party returned having lost only two men.70

  The competence of the British infantry in Indian fighting was most notably demonstrated at the fight at Bushey Run on 5 and 6 August 1763. The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 February 1763 had brought an end to hostilities between Britain and France, but in North America an Indian uprising, Pontiac’s War, broke out on the western frontier. Colonel Bouquet was leading a relief column to Fort Pitt when his convoy was surrounded and pinned down by Indians near a stream that gave its name to the battle. Bouquet and his men took up a position on a hill where they constructed a makeshift breastwork with bags of flour. Of the first day of the battle Bouquet remarked on ‘the cool and steady behaviour of the Troops, who did not fire a Shot without orders, and drove the enemy from their Posts with fixed Bayonets’. Robert Kirk of Montgomery’s Highlanders wrote that when charged with bayonets the Indians ran away, but, as Bouquet wrote, only to return to the attack. On the second day of the fight British casualties were mounting and Bouquet’s force was short of water. He therefore contrived to lure the Indians into an unfavourable position. He weakened part of his defensive perimeter, which the Indians mistook for an indication of retreat and attacked vigorously. However, Bouquet had used the withdrawn infantry to make a flanking move against the Indians. As they attacked they were caught in the open where they received the full fire of four companies followed by a bayonet charge. Bouquet referred to the ‘irresistible Shock of our Men, who rushing in among them, killed many of them, and put the rest to flight’.71 Kirk wrote: ‘we met them with our fire first, and then made terrible havock amongst them with our fixt bayonets.’72

  Platoon fire was also shown to be effective against Indians under the right circumstances. During some of the low-level skirmishing at Quebec, ‘the Rangers, Light Infantry and advanced parties continued popping with the enemy . . . Captain Campbell . . . ordered a part of his Company to fire a volley at them, when the firing almost ceased.’73 Again, in 1761 during a campaign against the Cherokee, in the midst of skirmishing between light infantry and Indians, a regularly formed battalion took decisive action: ‘A close Fire from the Regiment for some Minutes, and Orders punctually executed of throwing a Platoon of Fire into every Bush where the least smoke appeared, saved the Lives of a number of brave Fellows, drove the Indians back to great Distance.’74

  Whilst success against Indians and French-Canadian irregulars enabled the British Army to prosecute the war, it was in open battle against French regulars that the outcome of the war was decided. In July 1759 British forces were besieging Fort Niagara when a French relief force approached. This force of some 800 French regulars and militia and 300 Indians was opposed by 464 British regulars, mostly of the 46th, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eyre Massey at La Belle Famille. Seeing that the French had regulars Massey ordered his front rank to fix bayonets, an indication that bayonets were considered inappropriate against irregulars, presumably because of the difficulties of getting in close enough to use them and the negative effect on accuracy of the weight of a bayonet on the muzzle of the musket. In another indication of the influence of irregular warfare Massey ordered his whole line to lie down. Massey estimated that the French, who advanced in column along a road, fired twice in their advance, about five hundred rounds; then, when his men ‘could almost reach them with our Bayonets’ he gave the order to fire. Massey described the troops that met the French head on as a grand division and wrote that it fired seven rounds standing. As he wrote that he ‘gave the Word for the Whole to Fire’, it would seem most likely that he fired as a grand division. With his light infantry, 108 men, covering his left flank this grand division probably numbered about 225, supported by the grenadiers of the 46th and a piquet of the 44th, about 125 men, who were covering the right flank. At the same time his grenadiers outflanked the French ‘and by their pouring in all their fire, on the Enemy’s Flanks, kill’d great numbers, and in my opinion was the occasion of breaking them’. Massey’s force then advanced and fired another eight rounds, ‘by constant firing’, making fifteen in all, and then charged with the bayonet.75

  Massey’s force was considerably outnumbered – by about two to one without counting the Indians accompanying the French. Massey’s own Iroquois allies did not engage the French until they were already retreating. Because he had detached his grenadiers and light infantry to cover his flanks the main assault of the French pitted approximately 800 French against 225 men directly to their front and perhaps 125 on Massey’s right flank. When numbers were evenly matched British battalions appear to have usually found it necessary only to fire once or twice before charging with the bayonet. Here, outnumbered four to one, the main body of the 46th fired seven times, perhaps fifteen hundred rounds. If the grenadiers and piquet on his right did the same that would have been another seven or eight hundred rounds and, although Massey reported that half the grenadiers were killed or wounded, he expressed the view that this fire into the French flank was decisive. The initial fire of the British infantry was clearly sufficient to stop the French attack in its tracks, probably helped by the French advancing in column so that the head of the column attracted the main weight of the British fire. The heavy casualties suffered by the grenadiers might have been a consequence of them facing the long flank of the French column from which fire was returned while the main British body faced the relatively narrow head of the column. The disparity in numbers meant it took longer, perhaps two or three minutes – less if tap-loading – to deliver the fire to cause sufficient casualties to break the French. Massey had to rely on his firepower in order to avoid being overwhelmed by French numbers. When the French began to retreat, a further eight rounds per man were fired and Massey’s reference to ‘constant fire’ suggests that he switched from volleys of the whole body together to firing by subdivisions or platoons. When Massey was sure that the French were sufficiently broken he then sent them on their way with a bayonet charge.

  The battle that effectively decided the outcome of the war in North America was fought on the Plains of Abraham, in front of Quebec, on 13 September 1759. Wolfe had contrived to land his army upstream of Quebec under cover of darkness and Montcalm, the defender of Quebec, marched out to meet him. The decisive action was between six of Wolfe’s battalions and seven of Montcalm’s. In Wolfe’s six battalions facing Quebec there were a little more than seventeen hundred muskets and Montcalm’s numbered a little under two thousand, but supported by about fifteen hundred irregulars. Five other British battalions were covering Wolfe’s flanks and rear.76 At least one of Wolfe’s battalions was drawn up in two ranks, Anstruther’s 58th on the extreme left of the line. An account by a soldier in that battalion also recorded that the files were three feet apart. No other account mentions this and
it is possible that the 58th was forced to spread itself so thin in order to cover the ground between the main line and the position of the battalions protecting its left flank. Elsewhere, although not specifically mentioned, it seems probable that the infantry were formed two deep with files at a more conventional spacing, in accordance with Amherst’s general orders.77

  As the French advanced they began firing at the British line from about a hundred yards away or more; this fire was steadfastly ignored.78 According to Knox, the 43rd at least was ordered to lie down.79 At least four of Wolfe’s six battalions reserved their fire until the French were less than forty yards away. One battalion, the Louisbourg Grenadiers, are recorded to have waited until the range was less than twenty yards.80 Wolfe had ordered that the muskets should be loaded with two balls.81 Townshend, commanding the battalions covering the left flank described the fire of the British line: ‘it was regular proved effect and constant – they were routed in three discharges’, while Lieutenant Fraser with the 78th wrote that the firing continued for six or eight minutes.82 Johnson with the 58th wrote: ‘we poured in such a discharge; and which we continued, with such a regular briskness, as was visible to all, by the good effect it produced.’83 Humphreys with the 28th wrote that the firing ‘was so well continued, that the enemy everywhere gave way’.84 Knox recorded ‘a well timed, regular, and heavy discharge of our small arms, such as they could no longer oppose, hereupon they gave way, and fled with precipitation’, adding:

  The forty-third and forty-seventh regiments, in the center, being little affected by the oblique fire of the enemy, gave them, with great calmness, as remarkable a close and heavy discharge, as ever I saw performed at a private field of exercise, insomuch that better troops than we encountered could not possibly withstand it: and, indeed, well might the French Officers say, that they never opposed such a shock as they received from the center of our line, for they believed every ball took place, and such regularity and discipline they had not experienced before; our troops in general, and particularly the central corps, having levelled and fired,-comme une coup de canon.85

  This firing was followed by a general advance with the bayonet, or, in the case of Fraser’s 78th Highlanders, the broadsword.86 The fighting was not over – some French fought a rearguard action as they withdrew into Quebec – but the battle was won, although Wolfe himself was killed in the moment of victory. The French commander, Montcalm, was also killed and Quebec surrendered on 18 September 1759.

  The battle of Quebec was won by a classic combination of firepower and the bayonet. The French attack was met at a range of less than forty yards with the fire of approximately seventeen hundred muskets, each loaded with two balls and wielded by soldiers who were arguably better shots than any British soldiers before. Townshend’s three discharges would have delivered about five thousand rounds, or ten thousand balls, at the two thousand French attacking the British line. All the eyewitnesses are clear that the firing was continued after the initial volley. Three of them make use of the word ‘regular’, suggesting that after an initial full battalion volley the firing continued by subdivisions employing alternate fire. It is perhaps little wonder that one French officer wrote: ‘Our troops gave the first fire, the British the second, and the affair was over.’87

  In April 1760 the French attempted to recapture Quebec and Murray, commanding the British defenders, decided to meet the French in battle, outside Quebec at Sainte Foy. The British were heavily outnumbered and this, combined with tactical errors by Murray, resulted in defeat. The British battalions had been forced to form in two ranks with three feet between files in order to cover their front, but this was too thin and they were overwhelmed by French numbers, particularly when their supporting artillery began to run out of ammunition.88 A small spotlight was thrown on the character of infantry combat in this battle when Lieutenant Eubele Ormsby of the Grenadier Company of the 35th was subsequently tried by court martial, accused of cowardice.89 Ormsby’s company was involved in fierce fighting for control of a windmill on the British right flank. He described how the company first fired in a regular manner with the front rank kneeling. Other soldiers described the subsequent advance to the windmill in confusion and small bodies, and how Ormsby had directed them where to fire. One told the court martial that he lost all his ammunition and went to get more, but without saying how or from where – presumably the officers of the court knew and this was not considered worthy of mention. Another said he had fallen behind the company in order to change his flint.

  From the record of this court martial small snippets of information can be gleaned about the minutiae of the management of British infantry fire. The company was divided into two platoons that at times operated separately, although in close proximity to each other. There appears to have been some means for soldiers to replenish their ammunition, although this could simply have been taking it from the dead and wounded. When a soldier needed to change a flint he appears to have just fallen out and got on with it. Ormsby was cleared by the court martial.

  Following the battle, Quebec held out until relieved by the Royal Navy. On 8 September 1760 Montreal surrendered and the war with France in North America was over. In the absence of cavalry and the limited participation of artillery, save in siege warfare, it was a war won by the infantry. Following serious initial setbacks the infantry had adapted to a completely new form of warfare: irregular bush fighting. It learned from allies and enemies and achieved at least parity – and occasionally superiority – over enemies raised knowing only that form of warfare. This was done, however, without any change in the infantry’s traditional combat doctrine. The efficiency of the firepower of a battalion was replaced with the efficiency of the individual. The adaptability of the infantry allowed individual marksmanship to replace volume and speed of fire as the prime desirable quality. In the case of the light infantry this objective was pursued with the assistance of specially adapted firelocks and other equipment and specialist training. The object was still to overwhelm and disrupt the enemy with firepower and then to close with the bayonet, broadsword or tomahawk to disperse him and drive him off. This was not always easily achieved, particularly when actually getting to grips with an enemy such as the Indians who would simply retire in the face of superior firepower, but the end result was the same. When the infantry could get at their irregular opponents with the bayonet, as at Bushy Run, the Indians had no answer to it.

  When it came to more conventional, European-style combat the infantry were arguably better than ever. Not only did they adopt the alternate-fire system with all its advantages of speed and simplicity, but they were, at the least, competent marksmen and the effectiveness of their fire can only have been increased, particularly at the short ranges they continued to prefer. The British, as Knox put it, ‘do not expend their ammunition at an immense distance; and if they advance to engage, or stand to receive the charge, they are steady, profoundly silent and attentive, reserving their fire until they have received that of their adversaries, over whom they have a tenfold advantage’.90

  The campaigns in North America also saw the appearance of the two-deep lines as part of the tactical repertoire of British infantry. Its success against the French at La Belle Famille and Quebec was an early forerunner of the way the infantry would fight under the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War. However, despite this increased reliance on firepower the infantry also retained their penchant for close-quarter combat. At both La Belle Famille and Quebec it was the bayonet that completed the work that firepower had begun and sealed the victory. Even at Sainte Foy a French officer remarked how the British infantry had ‘advanced upon us with their bayonets, which, according to custom, threw us into confusion, and compelled us to give up the contest’.91

  Chapter 9

  Conclusion

  Amongst modern writers of military history there is a widely held consensus that the infantry of Britain’s armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries repeatedly achieved a high level
of effectiveness and superiority over their enemies in firepower and relied on that firepower to win battles. Although that assessment is justified by the narrative of the history of the British Army, there has not, until now, been a sufficiently searching investigation to explain how that superiority was first achieved and then maintained over such a long period.

  That explanation is now established and it identifies the tactical doctrine and battlefield combat techniques of British infantry and analyses their effectiveness, starting with the English Civil Wars and then tracing a continuous line of development of doctrine and technique up to 1765, in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War. In identifying that line of development, previously unrecognised aspects of doctrine and technique have been discovered, and times pinpointed when key changes were brought about, such as the introduction of the organisation of platoons into firings. As a consequence of this detailed analysis some long-held misconceptions have been identified and corrected, such as that concerning the form that platoon firing first took.

  At the start of the period under consideration the first armies to engage in the English Civil Wars did so in a completely textbook manner, employing long-established methods of delivering musket fire. At Edgehill in 1642 it was found that the level of fire generated, although sustainable, was insufficient to force a conclusion in a firefight between infantry regiments. There was subsequently a very rapid, nationwide change, which appears to have started within weeks of Edgehill, to delivering the infantry’s fire in very short, sharp bursts at very close range, followed by an immediate assault. This was found to be a very effective technique against both cavalry and infantry and became used almost to the exclusion of other, earlier ways of delivering fire and meant that infantry could defend themselves against cavalry without resorting to squares or other all-round defensive formations.