Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756

by David Blackmore

  It is likely that this development owed something to the techniques introduced by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in the 1630s, but British infantry developed those techniques and took them to a new level. This development occurred in isolation and was not matched by anything similar in Europe, where the use of this new method of fighting by troops from Britain achieved dramatic results. When English armies took to the field in the years immediately after the Civil War they employed this technique against Spanish troops at the battle of the Dunes in the presence of French allies. After the restoration of the monarchy, at Ameixial they again used it against Spanish troops, this time in the presence of Portuguese allies. The impact on friend and foe alike was considerable and nothing quite like it had been seen before on a European battlefield. It was not, however, adopted by any other European army and there are a number of possible reasons for that. It did not solve the issue of combining effective fire with sustainable fire, which was the real problem. It might simply not have suited the way other armies chose to fight, but it might also be a reflection of the limited influence of Britain and its army in the second half of the seventeenth century. Chandler describes the British infantry of the 1680s as ‘amateur and immature’.1

  One of the key developments in the way British infantry delivered its firepower occurred in 1689 following the Glorious Revolution and the accession to the thrones of England and Scotland of William III. It has long been assumed that the introduction of platoon firing to British infantry took place in Flanders where the Duke of Marlborough was leading an English contingent as part of a Dutch army. It is now possible to demonstrate that platoon firing was also almost simultaneously introduced to the Scottish Army and to William’s English troops campaigning in Ireland. Furthermore, the precise form that it took has also now been identified and it is different in many aspects from the form that platoon firing is usually stated as having first taken. For instance, the platoons were not at first organised into firings. The great benefit of this new technique was that it allowed the same organisation and formation to deliver fire in a manner that was both sustainable and effective, and at a rate that could easily be controlled. As such it was a perfect development for British infantry with their preference for close-range fire followed by an assault and it also proved effective against cavalry.

  During the course of the Nine Years War the pike was replaced by the bayonet, the matchlock musket by the firelock (or flintlock) musket and the cartridge replaced the bandoleer. By the start of the War of the Spanish Succession a battalion, now consisting of twelve companies or platoons of hatmen and two platoons of grenadiers, could fire one of its platoons every few seconds and still have the first platoon that fired reloaded and ready to fire again by the time all the others had fired. Over the course of half a century the firepower of British infantry had effectively doubled.

  If the original form of platoon firing was different from the form that is usually described, it is now possible to say when that more usually recognised form, which organised the platoons into firings, was introduced. It is also possible to demonstrate that it was still not organised quite as is usually described. The introduction of firings took place in Ghent, where the British infantry were quartered during the winter of 1706–7. Organised by Major General Ingoldsby, there is some evidence to suggest that the idea had its origins in the Royal Regiment of Ireland. Whatever its exact origins it is clear from manuscript evidence that it did not at first take what might be called the classic form referred to by modern historians, in which a battalion formed three firings, each of six platoons. In their first form the firings made use of fifteen platoons, six in the first two firings and three in the third. It was this form that was employed in the oft-quoted engagement at Malplaquet in 1709 between the two ‘rival’ Royal Regiments of Ireland in the British and French armies. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession a battalion was forming in fourteen platoons with a first firing of six platoons and the second and third of four platoons. This is the form described in the official drill manual of 1728.2 The form with eighteen platoons is just one of the many variations suggested by Humphrey Bland in 1727 and appears in Kane’s book of 1745.3 It only becomes the usual form at the insistence of the Duke of Cumberland in the 1740s. It would appear that the belief that the early form of platoon firing was as described by Kane has arisen because Kane’s book was a history of the War of the Spanish Succession. It has been assumed that the attached drill was of the period of that war whereas it represents the views Kane held in the 1730s.

  The organisation of platoons into firings was undoubtedly an effective development, but part of its strength in the form it took at the end of the War of the Spanish succession was because each platoon was also a company. This meant that each platoon was of a big enough size for its fire to be effective and that the men were under the command of their own company officers. Subsequently, however, the number of companies was reduced from thirteen to ten, which meant that companies had to be broken up to form platoons. Furthermore, Cumberland insisted not only on the increased number of platoons, but also that officers were posted to platoons by seniority, meaning that men were frequently commanded by officers they did not know. These changes made the management of a battalion’s fire a far more complex business and the effectiveness of firings began to be questioned.

  Leaving aside these difficulties, however, it is informative to compare the orders given by Montrose for the battle at Tippermuir in 1644 and the remarks made by La Fausille on how the infantry fought at Laffeldt in 1747.4 Although divided by over a century, they are, in essence, the same. Both describe defeating the enemy by the close-range delivery of fire followed by an immediate assault.

  Despite early difficulties with platoon firing at Dettingen, caused by inexperience and a lack of training, it served its purpose well through the rest of the War of the Austrian Succession. The exceptions were the battles of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745–6 when the complexities of firings were not able to cope with the rapidity of the Highland charge. Instead Cumberland reverted to using alternate fire in order to deliver the fire of his battalions more quickly and this was used to devastating effect at Culloden. Against a more conventional enemy the use of standard platoon firings continued to be effective.

  By the start of the Seven Years War, however, the adherence to the use of platoon firings was being widely questioned and challenged by officers such as James Wolfe. They were advocating the adoption of the Prussian version of platoon fire, which was simply a version of alternate fire using eight fire units, platoons, companies or subdivisions. Eventually, following the resignation of Cumberland the British infantry was free to adopt this system and it became part of the official regulations in 1765 after being in widespread use during the Seven Years War. In essence it was little different from the alternate fire in use before 1706, and so raises the possibility that the introduction of firings was a mistake, given that the army subsequently returned to using alternate fire.

  Bland spelt out the objection to the early form of alternate fire. As it involved twelve companies, with six companies firing in succession in each wing, an unacceptably broad portion of the front of a battalion could be left unloaded at any time, and thus vulnerable to attack.5 The advantage of organising the platoons in firings was that the available fire was spread across the whole battalion rather than being concentrated at just one point in each wing. This worked well when platoons were whole companies and there were just fourteen platoons. As the number of platoons increased and the number of companies was reduced the whole process became increasingly complex and the firepower of an individual platoon decreased. That there was some recognition of this is clear from Cumberland’s introduction of subdivisions comprising two platoons as a fire unit. The advantages of alternate fire by companies over the use of platoons in firings were that it was simpler, companies remained together under their own officers, there was no complex order of firing, and the basic fire unit became larger. Furthermore, Bland�
��s objections were no longer valid for two reasons. Firstly, the rate of fire of the infantry had increased dramatically with improved drill, priming from cartridges and steel ramrods, which meant that the companies were unloaded for a shorter time. Secondly, only eight fire units were involved, rather than fourteen, which meant that, proportionately, any unloaded part of a battalion’s front was smaller.

  Throughout all the changes and argument about the best way to deliver effective fire two things did not change. One was the range, thirty yards or less, at which it was preferred to open fire. The second was the use of the bayonet to finish what firepower had started. Those arguments that did occur were simply about the best way to deliver the fire of a battalion; the doctrinal debates going on in Europe appear to have passed by the British Army with little effect.

  There is no doubt that British infantry throughout the period under consideration was largely successful on the battlefield, often against considerable odds. On the few occasions when they were beaten there were often other factors at play and they soon recovered from those setbacks. Examples of this were Prestonpans, against the Jacobites in 1745, and Monongahela, against irregulars in 1755.

  This success was largely due to the infantry’s efficiency with firelock and bayonet and their adherence to their tactical doctrine. A factor of some importance in achieving this success was the character of the soldiers themselves. The doctrine that they executed required a considerable amount of confidence and the counter-intuitive recognition that it was safer to ignore the fire of the enemy and reserve a battalion’s fire until the range was reached at which it would have the most and the quickest effect. They could also display considerable resilience if not downright stubbornness. At both Marston Moor and Naseby Royalist infantry put up very stubborn resistance. The battle of Fontenoy may have been a defeat, but the British infantry were not beaten, as French cavalry discovered to their cost. At Monongahela the infantry only broke after three hours when all their ammunition was expended, saying they would fight if they could see their enemy. At Minden the 12th Foot had suffered 302 rank and file killed and wounded out of 480 and eighteen officers killed and wounded out of twenty-seven, and yet were still prepared to fight.

  If the infantry’s performance at Dettingen was initially less than ideal it is perhaps not surprising. The last major battle for the British Army had been Malplaquet in 1709, thirty years earlier, and thus the vast majority of the army had never seen action – the small minority who had were senior officers who had been junior officers in 1709. Nonetheless, as the actions and comments of officers like Wolfe make clear, the army was at least familiar with the theory of their doctrine – what they had to do was relearn confidence in it. Relearn because although the techniques for the delivery of an infantry battalion’s fire underwent a number of changes between 1642 and 1765 the underlying tactical doctrine did not. This can be summarised as reserving fire until within a range of thirty yards, then delivering fast and accurate fire to overwhelm the enemy’s resolve, before driving them off with a vigorous bayonet charge.

  Since this doctrine had lasted and been effective for such a long time, the question arises: did it continue after the period covered by this book? All the indications are that it did. Lawrence Spring in his work on the American War of Independence clearly establishes the combined use of firepower and the bayonet by the British Army.6 The actions of British infantry in stopping and defeating French columns at La Belle Famille and Quebec are precursors to any number of battles in the Peninsular War and Waterloo.

  Indeed it is worth considering the words of one modern British infantry NCO: ‘The sight of men jumping out of the Warrior with incoming fire hitting the vehicles yet still no hesitance to go forward is because of the self-belief in their ability, and the knowledge that the only way to stop the incoming fire is to fire back and close with and kill the enemy.’ CSM Falconer was writing of his time in Basra in 2004 and yet he expressed an underlying doctrine that would be recognised by any British infantryman from 1642 to 1765. He also wrote about the ‘confidence that the soldiers had in the system and themselves’.7

  The long-term success of British infantry in combat was the result of the adherence to a simple but very effective combat doctrine. It was born in the nationwide strife of the English Civil Wars. It was honed and improved in the cockpit of Europe. It was adapted to overcome Scottish Highlanders and North American Indians. Changes in the practices and procedures of its application sought only to improve the delivery and effectiveness of that doctrine. The professionalism and confidence with which it was applied made Britain’s redcoats a force that repeatedly succeeded against numerically superior enemies.

  With the understanding of doctrine and practice established it is now possible to look again at well-known narratives and understand why events unfolded as they did. The apprehension of the French about getting into a firefight with British infantry becomes understandable. The defeat of the Jacobites at Culloden, instead of a heroic defeat, begins to look like an inevitability. The brutal effectiveness of British infantry in combat is revealed.

  Notes

  Chapter 1

  1 Frank McLynn, 1759: The Year Britain became Master of the World (London, 2005).

  2 McLlynn, 1759, p. 276.

  3 The Hon J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, vol. ii (London, 1899), p. 381.

  4 Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. ii, pp. 508–12; Piers Mackesy, The Coward of Minden: The Affair of Lord George Sackville (London, 1979).

  5 Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier (Oxford, 1958), pp. 154–60.

  6 John Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795 (Oxford, 1981), p. 272.

  7 Stuart Reid, Wolfe: Career of General James Wolfe from Culloden to Quebec (Staplehurst, 2000), p. 133.

  8 For example; Matthew H. Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only (University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).

  9 There were three distinct periods of war, 1642 to 1646, 1648 and 1649 to 1651.

  10 Houlding, Fit For Service, pp. 45–57.

  Chapter 2

  1 Colonel Drummond to Colonel Monck, 15 June 1658 in C. H. Firth, (ed.), The Clarke Papers (London, 1899), vol. iii, p. 154.

  2 H. L. Blackmore, British Military Firearms, 1650–1850 (London, 1961), p. 24. Bore size refers to the number of balls that can be made for a firearm from a pound of lead. Thus a 12-bore musket fired a lead ball weighing one-twelfth of a pound.

  3 Walter M. Stern, ‘Gunmaking in Seventeenth Century London’, Journal of the Arms and Armour Society, 1:5 (1953–6), p. 64.

  4 William Barriffe, Military Discipline: Or the Young Artillery Man (London, 1635).

  5 Roger, Earl of Orrery, A Treatise of the Art of War (London, 1677), pp. 30–1.

  6 Orrery, Art of War, pp. 31–2.

  7 Henry Hexham, The First Part of the Principles of the Art Military (Delft, 1642), pp. 12 and 16.

  8 Sir James Turner, Pallas Armata (London, 1683), p. 216; Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), p. 184; Richard Elton, The Compleat Body of the Art Military (London, 1668), pp. 192–3.

  9 Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635) p. 27.

  10 Elton, Compleat Body, pp. 192–3.

  11 Robert Ward, Animadversions of Warre (London, 1639) pp. 259–76.

  12 Anon., Generall Lessley’s Direction and Order for the Exercising of Horse and Foot (London, 1642).

  13 Anon., A True Description of the Discipline of War both for Horse and Foot (no place, no date).

  14 Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), pp. 190–5; Elton, Compleat Body, p. 52.

  15 Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), pp. 186–9; Elton, Compleat Body, p. 52.

  16 Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), p. 21.

  17 Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), p. 201.

  18 William S. Brockington, Jr. (ed.), Monro: His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment Called Mac-Keys (Westport, CT, 1999), pp. 322–3.

  19 William Watts, The Swedish
Intelligencer, The Second Part (London, 1632) p. 124; William Watts, The Swedish Discipline, Religious, Civile and Military (London, 1632), pp. 80–2.

  20 William Barriffe, Military Discipline: Or the Young Artillery Man (London, 1639), p. 373.

  21 Brigadier Peter Young, Edgehill, 1642: The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton, 1967); C. L. Scott, Alan Turton and Dr Eric Gruber von Arni, Edgehill: The Battle Reinterpreted (Barnsley, 2004).

  22 Although only nine at the time of the battle, James II had considerable opportunity to talk to other eyewitnesses and as a competent soldier in his adult years he would have understood clearly what he was told. The memoirs were probably commenced after 1660, but writing continued up to 1685. They appear to have been complete by 1696. A. Lytton Sells, The Memoirs of James II (Bloomington, 1962), pp. 13–23.

  23 Rev. J. S. Clarke (ed.), The Life of James the Second King of England, etc, Collected out of Memoirs Writ of his Own Hand (London, 1816), vol. i, p. 12.

  24 Young, Edgehill, p. 307.

  25 Clarke, James II, p. 14.

  26 Clarke, James II, p. 14.

  27 Young, Edgehill, p. 308.

  28 Barriffe, Military Discipline (1639), p. 371.

  29 Elton, Compleat Body, p. 139.

  30 Sir Richard Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections upon the Reign and Government of King Charles the Ist and K. Charles the IId (London, 1721), p. 84.

  31 Scott et al, Edgehill, pp. 118–24.

  32 John Gwynne, Military Memoirs of the Great Civil War (Edinburgh, 1822) p. 24.

  33 Gwynne, Memoirs, p. 55. The usual length of a pike was sixteen feet.

  34 Charles E. H. Chadwyck Healey (ed.), Bellum Civile: Hopton’s Narrative of his Campaign in the West (London, 1902), p. 102. It should be noted that the phrase ‘charging their pikes’ means to bring it horizontal to the position for combat, not that an assault was made against someone’s pikes. The word charge at this time is also frequently used to mean delivering fire, just as loading can be referred to as charging a firearm and an individual load is referred to as a charge.