The Punjab Story

by Amarjit Kaur

  Whenever the Akalis found their agitation flagging or losing momentum they came out with a new demand to keep it going. The delay also acted in favour of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale whose violent methods further alienated the Hindus. The government clearly failed to foresee the direction in which the situation was developing and by not acting in time caused great grief to the Sikhs and much harm to the national integrity.

  The second important reason is that if a correct assessment had been made of Bhindranwale’s role and his religious fanaticism, and if it was realized that no compromise with him was possible, action against him should have been taken much earlier. One must not forget that Bhindranwale had been taken into custody by the then chief minister, Darbara Singh, but was released under mysterious circumstances. Worse still, he (Bhindranwale) was allowed to travel all over India with an armed bodyguard like a conquering hero. This established his image in Punjab as a man with whom the government was reluctant to tangle. It added to his charisma as a religious and popular leader.

  If one is to believe Harkishan Singh Surjeet, and I see no reason to disbelieve him, he had claimed, both from public platforms and in writing, that many discussions were held between the Akali party and the central government when differences were narrowed down considerably and decisions were practically arrived at, but at the last minute talks were broken off by the government. As a result the moderate Akali leadership, eager to end the crisis, was forced to return to Amritsar empty-handed each time, where it was jeered at by the Bhindranwale group who said, ‘Well, if you go with a begging bowl what do you expect? Unless you can stand up to this government you’ll get nothing.’ Slowly and steadily, the Akalis found themselves losing credibility among the Sikh masses, and Bhindranwale’s influences increasing. My conviction is that if Sant Harchand Singh Longowal’s position had not been weakened by these unfruitful negotiations, he and the others would have been able to control Bhindranwale. All the same it is a pity that the head of the SGPC, Gurcharan Singh Tohra, permitted Bhindranwale to shift from Guru Nanak Niwas to Akal Takht and entrench himself there.

  Another glaring anomaly in the government’s decision was to cloak the Operation Bluestar in such secrecy. In my opinion when an action is to be taken against a section of your own people, as against a foreign enemy, it is wiser to take the nation into confidence rather than be secretive. Before embarking on such an unprecedented operation it should have been realized that whatever the circumstances, the Sikhs would be hurt badly if the Golden Temple complex was assaulted. It was essential, therefore, to try and create a favourable public opinion amongst the Sikhs by informing them that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that no other course was possible. To convince them a conclave of Sikh saints and prominent Sikhs could have been called and they could have been asked to persuade Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale to vacate the temple complex. Even the Jathedars of the five Takhts could have been invited to this conclave and asked to issue a Hukumnama against storing of arms in the Golden Temple. Only if these efforts had failed then and only then should the final step have been taken. There is every likelihood that Bhindranwale would have found it difficult to go against the Hukumnama and the whole tragedy would have then been avoided. To counter this argument it may be suggested that there would have been adverse reactions from the villages where Sant Bhindranwale was extremely popular and even venerated. Groups of armed villagers would have started marching towards Amritsar and it would have become very difficult to control them. This happened in any case when rumours of impending army action and the damage to the Golden Temple complex by the army spread. The army, however, was able to prevent these crowds from entering Amritsar city mostly by show of force. Only on few occasions fire had to be opened. The fear of mass Sikh peasantry entering the town of Amritsar to burn and pillage it, was entirely unfounded. It is beyond one’s comprehension why a popularly elected government tried to act surreptitiously in an hour of national crisis. If the government believes that the majority of the Sikhs are nationalists why did it not give them a chance to prove themselves? It will take a long time before this anguish and sense of alienation begins to fade and the Sikhs once again feel that they are a part of the Indian nation.

  One of the strongest features of the Sikh community before this action was that despite being a minority, very few actually felt that they did not belong to the national mainstream, as they have lived harmoniously with all other communities; the fact that they looked different or had a different religion was never a consideration for them to feel apart. Now they do. And this is highly unfortunate both for the Sikhs and for the integrity of the country.

  I went to Amritsar on 6 July, visited the Golden Temple and talked to the army authorities and others who were there during the army operation. The damage to the entire complex was much beyond what was reported in the media news or the press. It was difficult not to feel hurt and to control one’s anguish. It is not easy to rationalize when your deepest sentiments are injured.

  I consider that the Operation was put through in a great rush. Detailed reconnaisance and deliberate planning was not done. The army has blamed the intelligence authorities for lack of information but what stopped the army from confirming, rejecting or supplementing the information given by personal reconnaisance by the concerned commanders and other key personnel? These reconnaisances could have or should have been done before the main forces came on the scene. June 5 was not a sacrosanct date. In fact it was a bad choice. That year 3 June was Guru Arjan Dev’s martyrdom day. On that day a large number of Sikh devotees visited the Golden Temple. That was the day when curfew was imposed in the entire city. When the city administration realized that it was the fifth guru’s martyrdom day they first lifted the curfew for sometime and then reimposed it. It is now believed by people that many of the devotees were not able to come out and later were killed during the military action. This could have been avoided if the Operation was undertaken a few days later. With all the time at their disposal, when the government decided to go ahead with this Operation they did so in a great hurry, which resulted in many more deaths and much more damage to the complex. Had more time been permitted for planning and preparation, a way could have been found to deal with the extremists occupying the Akal Takht from the back through the built-up area. As it was, some of the high buildings around the complex had been occupied by the CRPF and BSF before the army arrived. More could have been occupied by them to give army personnel suitable jumping-off places to surround the Akal Takht from the rear. But, the army did not seem to have enough time to consider these possibilities.

  The plan which was executed seems to have underrated the resistance the army was likely to meet or was so much influenced by the other considerations that it suffered from adhocism. I do not wish to question the army’s competence or the commanders’ ability. I have always felt and still feel that under the circumstances and the compulsions imposed on them they completed a difficult assignment successfully and with great care. The fault mainly lies in not permitting them enough time which was required for proper planning and preparation. I did raise the question of outflanking the Akal Takht. I was told that the area was so heavily built up, that it was not feasible to infiltrate through such an area. I maintain that an attack by infiltration from behind the Akal Takht together with the frontal attack should have been attempted in order to get the defenders facing two or three directions. As it happened the troops had to go through the Parikrama and came under prearranged fire wherever they went. It appeared that the army simply did not have the time to consider these possibilities before they actually ringed the temple complex. Once they did so, it became difficult to hide the onset of the action. The troops could have come in only after a preliminary survey had been made by small parties moving about as devotees. Launching the Operation in such a tremendous hurry was, of course, a political decision. It was a mistake that should have been avoided to reduce bloodshed.

  Given the
constraints of time and other restrictions, one cannot fault the army for using direct approaches and depending on superior firepower as against tactical manoeuvre. They realized that the Operation consisted of two distinct parts: one, of getting Bhindranwale and his men out of Akal Takht and two, bringing Longowal, Tohra and their men safely out of Guru Ramdas Serai. The latter operation was simpler. The troops did meet with some resistance possibly from the armed members of the Babbar Khalsa. They were able to overcome this by the use of superior fire power and took the two leaders into custody together with two or three hundred others who were all unarmed. The White Paper has claimed that Bhindranwale’s men succeeded in killing several of these people. I doubt it. There is always some confusion in a battle. These people after being taken into custody were collected in the courtyard of Teja Singh Samundari Hall. Either a grenade thrown by someone or a shell fired by the army landed amongst this group which caused casualties. The army understandably reacted violently and spread into Teja Singh Samundari building where they entered each room after first spraying it with bullets. This resulted in further casualties. It is unlikely that Bhindranwale was planning internecine murders at this stage while he was fighting for his life in the Akal Takht complex.

  The securing of the main Golden Temple complex was the crucial task. To overcome the resistance here three to four infantry battalions and two commando groups were employed. They had to be supported by mortar, artillery and tank fire. Although the entry of troops took place from various directions, eventually they all had to traverse over the Parikrama around the Golden Temple and the Sarovar. While approaching the prepared defences over this area troops had to assault over open ground bereft of all cover. This is where they suffered most of the casualties. The commando groups who led the first assault suffered the most. Once inside the quadrangle there was little or no room for manoeuvre. The Akal Takht lies well back and dominates all frontal approaches. It was not easy to close in with the defences located there and the troops had to use tank fire liberally to destroy most of the defences before they could overcome the resistance. The attack started after dark on 5 June. All other areas were cleared of the defenders by the morning of 6 June, but the Akal Takht defences were overcome only by 1 o’clock on the night of 6-7 June. From all accounts the fighting was bitter and no quarters were given or asked.

  It is also clear that the army did not expect such resistance from all sides. To save lives first an armoured personnel carrier was used which was disabled as it came close to the Akal Takht defences. Later tank lights were used to blind the defenders to help the infantry close in. This move also failed. Eventually the tanks were brought into the Parikrama and were used to destroy the prepared defences of Akal Takht.

  The casuality figures as given out by the authorities are 84 killed and 230(?) wounded on the army side and 493 killed and 86 wounded on the other side. The ratio of killed to wounded is very high as far the army is concerned whereas the ratio from the extremist side would indicate that either they fought to the bitter end or no mercy was shown.

  Though the main operation ended with the fall of the Akal Takht defences, mopping up operations continued for the next three days. Suicide squads of Bhindranwale’s followers had to be cleared out from the neighbouring buildings. During these operations much damage was caused to private property and many innocent people lost their lives. Unfortunately, dead bodies by the hundreds lay in the open inside the complex which were finally cleared after three days with the help of municipal committee vans. All those killed in the complex were cremated en masse. Relations were not permitted to claim the dead bodies. No proper record of those killed has been drawn up and made available to the public so far. This has led to many rumours, where the numbers of killed have been greatly exaggerated.

  It was claimed that the Golden Temple was not damaged during the operations because strict instructions had been issued to the army not to fire in that direction whatever the provocation. In actual fact the Golden Temple had more than 250 bullet marks which I saw with my own eyes. I also saw that there were no prepared defences inside the Golden Temple. There were defences in other parts of the complex – brick-and-mortar and sandbag breast works and bunkers – but none inside the temple. If there was fire from the Golden Temple it would have been certain mobile light machine-gun teams who must have gone there temporarily. Chances are that in the heat of the battle some small arm fire was directed on Harmandir Sahib in spite of the instructions to the contrary. It is understandable. What is not understandable, however, is why the information about the damage was kept a secret. Such secrecy only resulted in the loss of credibility of the government-controlled media.

  Besides the destruction of Akal Takht, the loss of the historic library is even more poignant. The building either caught fire or was set on fire and its contents entirely destroyed. Steel shelves containing valuable manuscripts and books lie twisted out of shape in the backyard. The building is being fast repaired but all the ancient handwritten texts and granths, some of them inscribed in the gurus’ own hands, have been irretrievably lost. The whole library, in fact, is a burnt out shell. The controversy surrounding the destruction of the library is unfortunate. While the army claims that it caught fire on the morning of 6 June when fighting was in progress, the temple sevadars and granthis present during the Operation maintain that it was set on fire on 7 June.

  It was the use of tanks which eventually enabled the army to overcome the resistance. Without the use of tanks it would have been very difficult and expensive in human lives to capture the Akal Takht. The sequence of events in this Operation shows that plans had to be modified as the situation developed. Maybe the army tried its best to restrain the use of heavier weapons till it was forced to do so. On the other hand it was possibly due to lack of information and incorrect appreciation that the army had to react to unexpected situations. The government’s insistence on speed and secrecy – very good weapons in fighting an enemy – caused more damage and confusion when dealing with a section of its own citizens.

  Much has been said about the quantum of weapons and preparation of defences by the extremists. When I visited the Golden Temple with my wife in December 1983 and spent two hours one evening and two the following morning, I could see no defences of any description. As a devotee I visited various parts of the temple as well as Baba Atal Gurdwara. There were no signs of any defensive preparation anywhere. Bhindranwale was living in Guru Nanak Niwas at the time. I next visited the Golden Temple on 24 February 1984, by which time he had moved into the Akal Takht building. I saw people carrying weapons in the Parikrama area but there were no fortifications. The top of the Langar building had been fortified with sandbags and I was told there were periodic firings from the CRPF and hence the sandbags had been put up for protection. The defences did not appear very formidable, as anything on top of a building can be knocked off quite easily.

  When I visited the temple again on 6 July, exactly a month after the Operation, I saw some of the defences which might have been built over, but a large number had been left to show to the people how the defences had been built by the terrorists. It was obvious that in a period of three months – between March and June – much had been done and the defences had been well sited. I knew Maj Gen Shabeg Singh, who had served under me during the Bangladesh Operation in 1971. He had not lost his professional touch. From the account of the battle as narrated bv Maj Gen K.S. Brar the extremists had taken every advantage of their defensive positions and fought valiantly and skilfully.

  So far it has not been possible to assess the strength of the extremists in the Golden Temple complex. It is possible that quite a few of the Babbar Khalsa who were deployed towards Nanak Niwas would have esscaped. In the main complex quite a number of the devotees got trapped because of the curfew on 3 June 1984. Everybody inside the temple was not an extremist or terrorist. From the figures that the army has released – 493 terrorists killed, 86 wounded and more than 1500 taken pr
isoner – it is clear that many of them were devotees or those who had come to join the peaceful shahidi jathas The number of weapons seized, though large, would indicate that these were insufficient to equip a force of more than 2,000 people. The number of weapons seized from all parts of the temple complex, including the Sarovar, were about 1000, which included over a 100 pistols. This only reinforces the argument that a large number of devotees got trapped. It has been mentioned that the terrorists refused to let them out. This is unlikely. It appears that while the army was broadcasting a message asking the people to come out, shabad kirtan was in progress and not many heard the army appeal. Also from 4 June onwards continuous firing was going on which forced people to stay indoors. This was confirmed by some of the people who were with Sant Longowal at that time. They only came to know about the appeal at about 5.30 p.m. on 5 June through a messenger. Sant Longowal deputed somebody to check the information but before anyone could get out heavy firing restarted and people went back indoors.

  The use and stocking of firearms inside the Golden Temple is reprehensible and inexcusable. I make no excuse for Bhindranwale and his followers for preaching and practising violence as this is against the tenets of Sikhism. There is, however, a need to correct the picture that has been painted by the media that sophisticated weapons were found inside the temple. The first thing to remember is that in a war weapons get lost! In both the wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, a large number of weapons were picked up by people and never accounted for. With the large-scale smuggling going on across Punjab-Pakistan border some gunrunning must have taken place. Since 1960, the government has been issuing arms to certain reliable people living close to the border for security purposes. So there have been a lot of unaccounted weapons in circulation in Punjab, used often in family feuds, property disputes and dacoity. Their buying and selling has been a lucrative trade. Another point to note is that of the weapons seized inside the temple, only 60 self-loading rifles bear foreign markings. The rest are all of Indian origin. Further, there were no medium machine-guns or mortars. There were, however, a large number of light machine-guns. Ammunition for both the light and medium machine-guns is the same, but a medium machine-gun has a higher and more sustained rate of fire. There were two rocket launchers with the terrorists but only one was used. It is obvious, therefore, that there were not so many sophisticated weapons. Quite a lot, yes; but the impression that has been built up in the public mind of foreign governments deliberately arming the terrorists with a view to overthrowing the government is grossly overdone.