The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  Two complementary ways of looking at interpersonal conflict have arisen from this perspective. One takes an information-processing approach, in which each phase of the interpersonal problem-solving process is analyzed against an ideal standard (for example, Dodge, 1980; Spivack and Shure, 1976). The individual goes through an internal problem-solving process in determining how to engage with the other. More effective strategies are equated with success at achieving some predetermined outcome. The phases are (1) identifying the problem, (2) generating alternative strategies, (3) evaluating consequences, and (4) using new or different strategies for resolution. It is important to note that these phases may be executed well or poorly and may lead to a decision to engage in contentious, collaborative, or any other type of tactics. Although these phases have been drawn from cognitive psychology, research has shown them to be applicable to the realm of social problems (see review by Rubin and Krasnor, 1986). If collaborative tactics are chosen by both parties, a joint problem-solving process may then occur that can be described with the same four phases.

  The other approach emphasizes general social competencies such as communication skills, skills in finding common ground, and other social skills that are discussed in various chapters in this book. From this perspective, one of the primary social cognitive tasks that conflict presents to the individual is social perspective coordination. In other words, how do I understand the other’s perspective and develop an understanding of the situation that accounts for both that perspective and my own? Within this framework, a model of interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS) has been described that depicts a developmental progression in the ability to coordinate social perspectives in conflict, ranging from an egocentric inability to differentiate subjective perspectives (i.e., mine from yours) to the ability to coordinate the self’s and the other’s perspectives in terms of the relationship between them, or from a third-person viewpoint (Selman, 1980; Yeates, Schultz, and Selman, 1991). The functional steps of the INS model are similar to the steps articulated in information-processing approaches—that is, defining the problem, generating alternative strategies, selecting and implementing a specific strategy, and evaluating outcomes—but the INS model integrates additional developmental levels of perspective taking (egocentric, unilateral, reciprocal, and mutual) that underlie each of the functional steps (Selman, 1980). Here are descriptions adapted from Selman (1980) and Weitzman and Weitzman (2000):

  At the egocentric level, which is characterized by impulsive, fight-or-flight thinking, the other is viewed as an object and the self is seen as being in conflict with the external world. The types of behaviors that might be seen at this level are whining, fleeing, ignoring, hitting, cursing, or fighting.

  At the unilateral level, which is characterized by obeying or commanding the other person, although the other is now understood to have interests, the self is seen as the principal subject of the negotiation, with interests separate from the other. The types of behaviors typically seen at this level are threatening the other person, going behind the other’s back, avoiding the problem, or waiting for someone else to help.

  At the reciprocal level, which is characterized by exchange-oriented negotiations and attempts at influence, the needs of the other are appreciated but considered after the needs of the self. Typical behaviors are accommodation, barter, asking for reasons, persuasion, giving reasons, and appealing to a mediator.

  At the mutual level, which is characterized by collaborative negotiations, the needs of both the self and the other are coordinated, and a mutual, third-person perspective is adopted in which both sets of interests are taken into account. The types of behaviors that might be seen at this level are various forms of collaboration to develop satisfaction of mutual goals simultaneously.

  In our work, we have used the INS model to explain the nature of everyday conflict in the lives of adults (Weitzman, 2001; Weitzman, Chee, and Levkoff, 1999; Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000). Our research has revealed some discontinuity between strategy choice and its social cognitive foundation. For example, in a study with elderly women, we found that although many women articulated reciprocal or mutual social perspective-taking skills, many of these same women opted for strategies associated with the unilateral level (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000). Similarly, Yeates, Schultz, and Selman (1991) have shown that although the essential sequence of problem-solving steps is stable across conflict contexts, perspective taking often is not. Cultural norms (e.g., where older women are socialized to yield, particularly to men, rather than press to get their needs met), perceived power differentials between the parties in conflict, and other contextual factors may lead to the use of less sophisticated strategies, regardless of perspective-taking ability.

  So even though the basic steps of individual problem solving remain fairly constant across situations, good, collaborative outcomes do not. The key issue this research brings to light is that an individual’s decision whether to coordinate his or her perspective with that of the other person is a central aspect of the conflict resolution process, one that may be highly relevant for training.

  Critiques

  There are also some serious critiques of problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution, and they deserve some attention here as well. For simplicity, we summarize them here as the Bush and Folger critique and the skeptic’s critique.

  The Bush and Folger Critique.

  Bush and Folger (1994) argue that problem solving, an orientation they see as underlying a “satisfaction story” of mediation (focusing only on satisfying the disputants and not taking advantage of the broader opportunities inherent in mediation), is narrow and mechanistic in that it assumes that conflict is a problem. This is seen as at odds with widely held values in the dispute resolution field to the effect that because of its capacity for stimulating growth and leading to change, conflict is a good thing.

  We happen to share those values, but we believe there is a fundamental error in this critique. That is, Bush and Folger (1994) cast what the problem-solving mediator does as looking to solve problems in the first of the two senses we offered at the beginning of this chapter: problems as obstacles, difficulties, or predicaments, that is, “bad things.” The result is that their argument frames problem-solving approaches to mediation as more or less equivalent to the settlement-oriented style described by Kressel and colleagues (1994). This misses the fact that the work of Kressel and colleagues, Zubek and colleagues (1992), and others has found substantial differences between such approaches. Cooperative problem-solving approaches in mediation are working on a problem-as-puzzle model, which is very much consistent with the values of conflict as opportunity. If conflict is to be taken as an opportunity for change and growth, it is imperative that disputants move beyond fighting and take full advantage of the power of collaboration to develop new and better alternatives. That is the essence of problem-solving approaches. They can lead to transformation and empowerment of others as this approach becomes a general, personal orientation to resolving conflict.

  The Skeptic’s Critique.

  There is a skeptic’s critique often heard out in the field—during training or in conversation among practitioners—that says, “This is fine on paper, but it isn’t realistic.” In detail, it goes something like this. People are angry and do not want to solve problems, work with each other, or talk to each other. What may help to persuade those holding this view of problem solving is that research and practical experience are firm in their conclusions. People do respond better to problem-solving approaches than settlement-oriented ones, they reach agreement more often and faster, they report being more satisfied, and both agreements and satisfaction hold up better in the long run.

  Another critique argues that people often do not know what actually constitutes “the problem,” and even when they think they do know, each side often has a very different problem in mind. Recall, however, that an essential part of what problem-solving approaches do is attempt to get the parties to focus on i
dentifying the issues at the heart of their quarrel (in other words, to diagnose the nature of their conflict), and do not assume that those central, underlying issues are already known. They then ask the parties to treat the collection of issues (or needs or interests or other types of concern) on the table as a mutual problem to be solved collectively. Note that there is no assumption here that the parties have the same basic issues in mind as they approach the negotiating table, and they do not define their conflict in terms similar enough even to give it the same name. The core of problem-solving approaches is helping parties see their own interest in finding solutions that meet not only their needs but those of the other as well. That is often hard to do, and so there is this challenge: What kind of solution can we come up with such that my needs, which are A, B, and C, and your needs, which are X, Y, and Z, can all be met at least acceptably well? It is this puzzle that is the problem to be solved.

  DECISION MAKING

  Consider again, briefly, our simple PSDM model (figure 9.1). We suggested that decision making is going on both during and after the problem-solving process. At both of those points, there are decisions that each party makes individually and decisions made by the parties together. In the following discussion, we look first at the individual as decision maker and then at group decision making.

  First, we offer a broad summary. Many of the theorists whose work is mentioned here define the negotiation process itself in decision-making terms (e.g., Bazerman and Neale, 1986; Kahneman, 1992; Zey, 1992). Some taking this view conceptualize each party as a decision maker (e.g., Kahneman, 1992; Mann, 1992), while others focus on the conflict resolution process as one of joint decision making (e.g., Bennett, Tait, and Macdonagh, 1994; Brett, 1991). It is possible, on the one hand, to think of the negotiator as someone with a series of decisions to make in the course of a negotiation, ultimately leading to the decision of whether to agree to a particular solution. On the other hand, one can also think about the process of negotiation as one of joint decision making, in which two or more parties with differing interests must jointly reach a decision—the resolution they ultimately agree to. In fact, many clients, when engaging a third-party mediator, describe their conflicts precisely as decision-making problems in which people are having a hard time making a decision together.

  The Individual as Decision Maker

  The emphasis here is on the problem of choice among alternatives, be they alternative agreements or alternative actions to take along the way. Many theories of decision making emphasize the notion of rational choice and are built on the notion of expected utility. The expected-utility principle has been traced as far back as the eighteenth-century to theorist Bernoulli (Abelson and Levi, 1985). The idea is that risky decisions involve choices in which we cannot be certain of what will happen as a result of our choice (as when a negotiator decides to hold out for a larger concession). For each option, we have to consider (1) the likelihood (expectation) that making this choice will get us what we hope it will and (2) the value, or utility, we attach to that outcome. Assuming that both the probability and the utility can be expressed as numbers, the expected utility for each option, then, is the product of probability and the associated utility. Thus “the expected-utility principle says that preferences between options accord with their relative expected utilities” (Abelson and Levi, 1985, p. 244). In conflict resolution, this principle would imply that people’s preferences among outcomes, possible settlements, or offers will be determined rationally according to the expected-utility principle.

  Various limits to this approach have been discovered, however, and they have led to a number of useful ideas. Here we briefly summarize a few of the key findings and theories.

  Anchors, Frames, and Reference Points.

  It turns out that anchors, frames, and reference points can influence decision-making processes in such ways that people do not make the kinds of choices that the “rational” decision-making model predicts. The description here follows Kahneman (1992), whose excellent review is recommended to those interested in pursuing these ideas in detail.

  The reference point in a negotiation is the point above which the party considers an outcome to be a gain and below which any outcome is considered a loss. In a given negotiation, several reference points might be available to a party: the status quo, the party’s opening offer, the other side’s initial offer, a settlement reached in a comparable case, and so on. Depending on which reference point a party has in mind, a given outcome might be seen (or framed) as a gain or a loss. The central finding here is that people tend to be loss averse: avoiding loss is more important than achieving gain, and “concessions that increase one’s losses are much more painful than concessions that forgo gains” (Kahneman, 1992, p. 298). As a result, when faced with a possible loss, people become more willing to take risks rather than accept a large loss. For example, one may be inclined to risk impasse, rather than make an offer accepting a large loss. By contrast, if there is a possibility of gain, people tend to be less willing to take a risk (perhaps of impasse) in the hope of yet larger gains. If a decision is framed negatively (as one between losses), then people tend to be more risk prone than if it is framed positively (as one between gains). There is an important exception to this effect: if the goods being lost or gained are desirable only, or mainly, to be used in exchange (money kept for spending, goods kept for trading), then giving them up may not be viewed as a loss, and concessions may not be as painful (Kahneman, 1992).

  Anchors are salient values that influence our thinking about possible outcomes, much like reference points. The difference is that whereas reference points define the neutral point between gains and losses, anchors may be anywhere along the scale and are often at the extremes. One of the most striking of anchoring effects is that negotiators are often unduly influenced by an anchor that they clearly know to be irrelevant—such as an outrageously low offer. Kahneman defines anchoring effects as “cases in which a stimulus or message that is clearly designated as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases the [perceived] normality of a possible outcome” (1992, p. 308). There are a great many subtleties to the effects of anchors. The critical point for conflict resolution is recognizing their existence and developing methods for coping with their influence.

  Impact of Stress.

  Conflict often produces psychological states, such as stress, and affective (emotional) reactions that include anxiety, anger, and elation (Mann, 1992), thus introducing another set of barriers to “rational” decision making. From the perspective of Janis and Mann’s conflict theory of decision making (1977), there are important linkages among stress, conflict, and coping patterns (Janis, 1993; Mann, 1992). According to Mann, “the model is founded on the assumption that decisional conflict is a source of psychological stress. The task of making a vital decision is worrisome and can cause anxiety reactions such as agitation, quick temper, sleeplessness or oversleeping, loss of appetite or compulsive overeating, and other psychosomatic symptoms” (p. 209).

  From this perspective come a number of interesting findings. Cognitive functioning in decision making declines under stress; time pressure increases stress and thus negatively affects decision making, as well as reduces the willingness to take risks; and mood has predictable effects on risk taking: when in a good mood (compared to a neutral mood), people are more risk seeking when the risk is low but less risk seeking when risk is high. This pattern appears to reflect the fact that in a good mood, people think more about loss under high-risk situations, but they think less about loss when risk is low (Mann, 1992).

  Another View of Risk.

  In the previous sections, we discussed some of the impact of framing, stress, emotion, and mood on risk taking. Taking a slightly different view, Hollenbeck and his colleagues have argued that much of the research on risky decision making is limited in that it uses decisions that are static: they involve a one-shot decision with no future implications, no effect of past performance, and a high degree
of specificity about outcomes and probabilities (Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Phillips, and Hedlund, 1994). By contrast, most decisions in conflict situations do not meet these conditions. Hollenbeck and colleagues conducted an experiment in which they varied these conditions and found that giving a general do-your-best goal instead of a specific goal actually reversed the framing effect that Kahneman and Tversky (1984) described. Hollenbeck and colleagues conclude that to better understand the conditions that lead to risk taking, we need to know more about dynamic contexts, and we cannot freely generalize findings from static settings.

  An Applied Approach.

  Approaches such as that of Janis and Mann (1977) are close in flavor to problem-solving approaches in being analytical and depersonalizing the conflict. In this approach, a decision maker fills out a “decisional balance sheet,” listing all outcomes, weighting and summing costs and benefits, and thus analyzing the relative costs and benefits of each choice in order to make a decision. If the parties are willing to undertake the process together, they may be able to arrive at a decision they can agree to accept. But this approach makes some serious errors (as do others like it). In particular, it assumes that preferences on all issues can be translated into a common currency. This may be workable in some circumstances, as in a divorce mediation, for weighing relative preferences for the pots and pans on the one hand and a painting on the other. But it may be much less workable for weighing relative preferences for the house, on the one hand, and custody of the children, on the other, since the house and the children do not readily convert into a common currency.