The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)
Page 36
Group Decision Making and Commitment
Viewing negotiation as joint decision making opens up the possibility of exploring such decisional biases as overconfidence and lack of perspective taking—processes about which there is knowledge in the decision-making domain—that may alter performance and dispute resolution behavior (Bazerman and Neale, 1986).
Behavioral Decision Making.
One prominent, and particularly helpful, approach to understanding group decision making is known as behavioral decision making (BDM). BDM emphasizes rational negotiation, with the goal of making decisions that maximize one’s interests (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). Bazerman, Neale, and their colleagues have conducted an extensive program of research based on this approach (Bazerman and Neale, 1986; Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989; Mannix and Neale, 1993; Neale and Bazerman, 1992; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992; Valley, White, Neale, and Bazerman, 1992). Their findings are informative in terms of understanding conflict and working to resolve it. From a behavioral decision theory perspective, negotiation is seen as “a multiparty decision making activity where the individual cognitions of each party and the interactive dynamics of multiple parties are critical elements” (Neale and Bazerman, 1992, p. 157). The approach aims at being both descriptive and prescriptive, and it works with such concepts as the perceptions of the negotiators, their biases, and their aspirations.
Bazerman and Neale (1992) offer a list of seven pervasive decision-making biases that interfere with the goal of negotiating rationally to maximize one’s interests. The first is “irrationally escalating your commitment to an initial course of action, even when it is no longer the most beneficial choice” (p. 2). Possible causes of this bias include the competitive irrationality that can ensue when winning becomes more important than the original goal and also the biases in perception and judgment resulting from our tendency to seek information that confirms what we are doing and avoid information that challenges us.
The second bias is “assuming your gain must come at the expense of the other party, and missing opportunities for tradeoffs that benefit both sides” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). Earlier, we discussed some of the benefits of approaching mixed-motive conflict as potentially integrative rather than purely distributive. Bazerman and Neale argue that “parties in a negotiation often don’t find these beneficial trade-offs because each assumes its interests directly conflict with those of the other party” (p. 16). They call this mind-set the mythical fixed pie.
The third bias is “anchoring your judgments upon irrelevant information, such as an initial offer” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). (For more on anchoring, see our earlier discussion in the “Anchors, Frames, and Reference Points” section.)
The fourth is “being overly affected by the way information is presented to you” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). This refers to the effect of framing, discussed earlier. Bazerman and Neale suggest that a mediator who wants to encourage parties to compromise should work to help the parties see the conflict in a positive frame, one emphasizing gains rather than losses.
The fifth bias, “relying too much on readily available information, while ignoring more relevant data” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), has obvious implications for the quality of decisions. Bazerman and Neale urge negotiators to work to counteract this bias. Similarly, we urge mediators to be on the lookout for this tendency, both in disputants and in themselves.
The sixth bias, “failing to consider what you can learn by focusing on the other side’s perspective” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), takes a somewhat different slant on perspective taking from those presented earlier. In their version, emphasis is on gaining information about the other side’s motives by paying attention to their actions and taking their perspective into account.
The final bias, “being overconfident about attaining outcomes that favor you” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), is a particularly important one. Through anchoring on one’s own initial proposal, failing to learn from considering the other side’s perspective, distorting one’s perceptions of the conflict situation in order to feel better about oneself, and focusing too strongly on information that supports one’s position and ignoring information that challenges it, parties to a dispute often become overconfident in their ability to win; as a result, they miss out on opportunities to create integrative solutions. Thus, mediators in court-connected mediation programs may be faced with two parties, each absolutely certain that if they fail to settle the dispute, the judge or jury will find in their favor.
Let us now briefly discuss a number of other findings from the work of Bazerman, Neale, and their colleagues.
Power Imbalance.
In an experimental study of the effects of power imbalance and level of aspiration, Mannix and Neale (1993) found that in a negotiation with integrative potential, (1) higher joint gains were achieved when power was equal than when unequal; (2) higher joint gains were achieved when aspirations were high rather than low; and (3) when power was unequal, higher joint-gain solutions tended to be driven by the offers of the low-power party. That is, in unequal power situations, the high-power party was less likely to initiate a joint-gain solution. As a result, the onus of generating and selling a joint-gain solution appeared to fall on the low-power party.
Interpretations of Fairness.
Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found a tendency among negotiators, in a simulation of a collective bargaining process, to make “egocentric interpretations of fairness.” That is, participants tended to assess fairness with a bias toward their own interests. This led to discrepancies between what each party saw as fair, each side tending to an interpretation benefiting themselves. Furthermore, “the more people disagreed in terms of their perception of a fair settlement wage, the longer it took them to reach a settlement” (p. 184). Perhaps more surprising, providing the subjects with more background information, which might be expected to reduce bias, served only to exacerbate the self-serving nature of fairness assessments. (For more on biases, see chapter 11.)
Preferences in Different Types of Relationships.
Finally, in a study that bears directly on our earlier discussion of problem solving, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) found that people’s preferences for doing better than the other in disputes depended strongly on the nature of the relationship between the parties. The researchers manipulated two aspects of the dispute relationship: whether it was a business or personal dispute and whether the relationship between the parties was positive, negative, or neutral. They found that although parties (across combinations of dispute type and relationship) did not like outcomes in which they did more poorly than the other, there were substantial differences in how much parties preferred an outcome in which they did better than the other. First, in a negative relationship, disputants tended to like doing better than the other, while in a positive or neutral relationship, disputants tended to dislike doing better than the other (up to a certain high amount of gain, after which their preferences begin to rise again). Similarly, in business disputes, participants liked doing better than the other, but in personal disputes, they disliked doing better than the other (again, up to a point). Significantly, these two tendencies reinforced each other; in business disputes, the preference for doing better was substantially enhanced in a negative relationship.
This study may have profound implications for the problem-solving approaches we have discussed. In particular, it tells us that in certain situations (such as a business dispute or negative relationship) people may be highly motivated to create a large difference between what they and their negotiating partners receive. Such motivation runs directly counter to the goal of the cooperative problem-solving approaches: to engage parties in maximizing mutual gain.
UNDERSTANDING PROBLEM SOLVING AND DECISION MAKING IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS
Our simple model of the interaction of problem solving and decision making in conflict resolution (figure 9.1) offers a framework for integratin
g what we know about these processes. In this section, we take a brief walk through the PSDM model, illustrating some of the ways these findings and perspectives can be used to enhance our understanding of conflict.
The PSDM Model Revisited
We have proposed that problem solving and decision making be viewed as integral parts of the cooperative conflict resolution process. We have also suggested that decision making takes place both during and after problem solving and that at each point, some decisions are made by the parties as individuals and some by the parties together.
Both problem-solving and decision-making approaches to conflict resolution, be they conscious designs of the professional mediator or spontaneous behaviors by the most naive of disputants, fundamentally work with the basic dynamics of cooperation and competition, as discussed at greater length in other parts of this book (see chapter 1). Briefly, if conflict is approached as a cooperative endeavor in which the parties see their outcomes as positively correlated, people tend to work hard to create a resolution that maximizes both parties’ outcomes. The goal becomes to do as well as possible for both self and other, rather than to engage in the kind of destructive win-lose struggle that exemplifies competitive, contentious conflict.
In the kind of integrated view we are taking, cooperative conflict resolution consists of four general phases: (1) diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. The left-hand part of the PSDM model (figure 9.1) is concerned primarily with phases 1 and 2, with both problem solving and decision making taking place. The right-hand part of the model, labeled “Decision making after,” is concerned primarily with phases 3 and 4, where the solutions generated must be selected and committed to. As indicated in the model, if it becomes clear during phases 3 or 4 that an adequate solution has not been generated, it is necessary to return to the problem-solving process, looking for further solutions and, if necessary, reconsidering the original diagnosis.
Diagnosis
Diagnosis is the first part of the problem-solving process. Perhaps the first step in diagnosis involves an important decision: determining what kind of conflict you are in. A fundamental problem in conflict resolution in applied work is determining those few conflicts that really are not amenable to a constructive, integrative approach.
Determining What Kind of Conflict You Are In.
Often we are working to convince our students and those we train that most of the conflicts initially appearing to be unalterably competitive, zero-sum situations by their nature are in fact at worst mixed motive. Many of us even take an initial, dogmatic stance with students that there are virtually no cases in which collaborative approaches are impossible, in an effort to break them of the common tendency to respond competitively (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). (At least the first author of this chapter knows he is guilty of this.) Yet we know from practical experience, as well as some of the research findings discussed earlier, that this is not the case. It would seem naive to deny that there are situations in which power-wielding, contentious tactics are warranted. Books such as Bazerman and Neale’s that alert readers to common biased misperceptions and urge them to look more closely are an important start. A set of empirically and theoretically justified principles, guidelines, or frameworks are badly needed to help identify those cases that really are immutably contentious.
This would serve at least two aims. It would be an indispensable tool for conflict resolution efforts both in the first person and by a third-party intervenor. It would also give us the ability to say to our students, “Here’s how you know a case that really can’t be transformed into a ‘mutual problem to be solved collaboratively.’ If it doesn’t meet these criteria, the potential is in there somewhere. Now let’s work on how to find it.”
Identifying the Problem or Problems.
The next step in diagnosis is to develop an understanding of what the conflict is about—whether in substantive interests, values, or other types of concerns—that lends itself to problem solving. This involves identifying each side’s real concerns (getting past initial positions or bargaining gambits) and developing a common understanding of the joint set of concerns of each party. Some questions that might be asked or investigated at this stage include
What do I want?
Why do I want it?
What do I think are the various ways I can satisfy what I want?
What does the other want?
Why?
What are the various ways the other believes he or she can satisfy his or her wants?
Do we each fully understand one another’s needs, reasons, beliefs, and feelings?
Is the conflict based on a misunderstanding, or is it a real conflict of interests, beliefs, preferences, or values?
What is it about?
Finally, during the diagnosis phase, social perspective coordination is important. To arrive at a joint diagnosis, parties have to be willing and able to appreciate the other as a person, with concerns of his or her own, and coordinate these concerns with the party’s perspective so as to create the joint diagnosis.
Identifying Alternative Solutions
Once the parties have reached a joint diagnosis, the next step is to begin generating alternative solutions that may meet each party’s goals at least acceptably well. One of the most commonly mentioned approaches to doing this is brainstorming. Here, the emphasis is on generating as many creative ideas as possible, hoping to encourage parties to think of the kinds of mutually acceptable solutions that have eluded them. Most brainstorming sessions employ a “no evaluation” rule: during the brainstorming session, no comments on proposed ideas are allowed, in the hope of encouraging parties to think of as many ideas as they can, no matter how silly or impractical. Once a list of alternatives is on a blackboard or newsprint, parties are often able to begin sorting through them and find options that are workable.
A list of other techniques is suggested by Treffinger, Isaksen, and Dorval (1994). For example, they recommend “idea checklists,” lists of idea-stimulating questions such as, “What might you do instead?” or “What might be changed or used in a different way?” (p. 43). They also recommend using metaphors or analogies to stimulate creativity and blending active strategies (like brainstorming) with reflective strategies (such as built-in down time, for thinking things over).
In our earlier discussion of decision making, we emphasized research concerned with decision making under conditions of risk. Risk taking is important in this context in at least two ways. The research we have reported focused on the willingness to hold to a position and risk impasse—a risky decision that works against cooperative conflict resolution. But there are other kinds of risks where such a course of action is desirable. For example, offering a concession (or an apology!) can feel like a risk if you are not sure it will be reciprocated. In building trust where it is lacking between parties in conflict, it is often necessary to get one of the parties to take a risk and demonstrate trust in order to persuade the other party to begin trusting.
Social perspective coordination is important here as well. To create viable solutions that meet each party’s concerns, it is helpful—if not essential—for parties to be able to grasp and appreciate the importance of the other’s perspective and choose to engage in the search for solutions that satisfy the other’s concerns.
Evaluating and Choosing
Once a set of possible alternative solutions has been identified, the next task is to evaluate the various options and choose among them. This involves a variety of individual decisions: about preferences among the advantages the options offer, about which seem fairer, which are likely to last, and so on. As the parties make these decisions, such factors as stress, anchors, frames, and reference points may all play a role in interfering with reasonable, rational decision making. Procedures such as Janis and Mann’s decisional balance sheet exercise (1977) may be helpful here, as ma
y the recommendations offered by Bazerman and Neale (1992) for overcoming biases.
There are also, at this stage, group decisions to be made, primarily as to which option is chosen. Several of the behavioral decision-making findings are important here, largely as things that negotiators as well as mediators and other third parties should look out for. Integrative solutions, for example, are more likely if power is relatively equal, and they tend to be driven by the low-power party if it is not (Mannix and Neale, 1993). There is a tendency to egocentric interpretations of fairness (Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992), which can add a sense of moral justification, and thus intractability, to a party’s sense of need. Also, people are less interested in doing better than the other (a competitive goal) when the relationship is personal and when it is positive (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989). Again, procedures such as that of Janis and Mann (1977) may be helpful.
Committing to a Choice
Finally, once a mutually agreeable solution has been found, the decision must be made to enter into agreement. Trust and the attendant risks are important factors. It is critical that parties be willing to put mutual satisfaction before the goal of “doing better than the other.” Social perspective coordination is important again, and here the issue of choosing to act on the social understanding gained is crucial; it is not enough just to understand; understanding must be translated into willingness to act. Among the key factors suggested by our work with elderly women (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000) for encouraging this translation are beliefs that the agreement will really work and be abided by and that the costs, emotional and otherwise, will not be too high.