Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane History)

by Ian Kershaw

  121. For the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ‘Zur Struktur der NS-Außenpolitik 1933–1945’, in Funke, 137–85, here 162–4.

  122. Fox, 182–3, suggests this was only in autumn 1935.

  123. Martin, 459; Fox, 185; Hartmut Bloß, ‘Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich’, in Funke, 407–29, here especially 409–11.

  124. Martin, 460; Fox, 177.

  125. Fox, 180–81.

  126. Martin, 461–2 and n.34, 40; Weinberg I, 344–5; Fox, 199–204. The planned coup d’état by junior officers followed elections in February 1936 with an outcome which did not satisfy the army, engaged in conflict with the navy over allocation of resources and strategic planning for expansion. The conflict lasted into the summer before a compromise gave equal weight to the navy’s pressure for expansion to the south and the army’s strong preference for a continental policy looking to expand northwards. Eventually, adventurist elements in the government were able to advance towards a pact, but the disruption following the army revolt held matters up for some time.

  127. Höhne, 368; Martin, 464 n.54 for Italy’s joining on 6 November 1937.

  128. See Weinberg I, 347.

  129. Domarus, 668.

  130. IMG, xxv.404, 409, Doc. 386-PS.

  131. Die kirchliche Lage in Bayern nach den Regierungspräsidentenberichten 1933–1943, vol.i, ed. Helmut Witetschek, Mainz, 1966, 193.

  132. Domarus, 668; Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945, Mainz, 1980, 15.

  133. Schmidt, 348.

  134. Schmidt, 342–6. See also the extensive account of Lloyd George’s visit by Thomas Jones, who accompanied him on his trip to Germany and noted how impressed he was with Hitler (Jones, 241–52). Just over a year later, Lloyd George wrote to a friend: i have never doubted the fundamental greatness of Herr Hitler… I have never withdrawn one particle of the admiration which I personally felt for him… I only wish we had a man of his supreme quality at the head of affairs in our country today.’ Cit. Martin Gilbert, Britain and Germany between the Wars, London, 1964, 102. And see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.1: The Gathering Storm, London 1948, 224–5: ‘No one was more completely misled than Mr Lloyd George, whose rapturous accounts of his conversations make odd reading today. There is no doubt that Hitler had a power of fascinating men…’

  135. Schmidt, 350; TBJG, I/3, 119, 142 (21 April 1937,12 May 1937). See Lansbury’s comment in a private letter written on 11 May 1937: ‘… A soft word, a tiny recognition of Hitler’s position by diplomats, would make all the difference… He will not go to war unless pushed into it by others.

  136. He knows how a European war will end.’ Cit. Gilbert, 102. Lansbury had roundly condemned Hitler in the book he had published the previous year (George Lansbury, My England, London, n.d. (1936), 193–6).

  137. Schmidt, 349–50.

  138. André François-Poncet, Souvenirs d’une ambassade à Berlin, Septembre 1931-Octobre 1938, Paris, 1946, 262.

  139. Cit. Ludwig Volk, ‘Kardinal Faulhabers Stellung zur Weimarer Republik und zum NS-Staat’, Stimmen der Zeit, 177 (1966), 173–95, here 187.

  140. Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942, ed. Percy Ernst Schramm, Stuttgart, 1963, 478 (26 July 1942).

  141. August Kubizek, Adolf Hitler, mein Jugendfreund, 5th edn, Graz/Stuttgart, 1989, 275.

  142. Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef. Aus dem Nachlaß der Sekretärin von Adolf Hitler, ed. Anton Joachimsthaler, Munich/Vienna (1985), 4th edn, 1989, 47, 60.

  143. Schroeder, 54, 58.

  144. Below, 20.

  145. Schroeder, 269.

  146. Schroeder, 55–6.

  147. See Schroeder, 269 and 78: ‘Before dictation I didn’t exist for him, and I doubt that he often saw me sitting at the typewriter.’

  148. Below, 31. Hermann Döring, who referred to himself as ‘manager’ (Verwalter) of the Berghof, spoke of Hitler as ‘extremely strict’ (‘unwahrscheinlich streng’) about cleanliness and organization, and the atmosphere as tense when he was present, with everyone alert to his rapid changes of mood (BBC Archives, London, ‘The Nazis: A Warning from History’, transcript of roll 242, pp.22, 27–9).

  149. Schroeder, 269.

  150. Schroeder, 78, 81.

  151. Schroeder, 38–9, 58, 289–90, n.18.

  152. Schroeder, 326 n.99.

  153. Schroeder, 55. See Willi Schneider, ‘Hitler aus nächster Nähe’, 7 Tage. Illustrierte Wochenschrift aus dem Zeitgeschehen, Nr.42, 17 October 1952– Nr.1, 2 January 1953, here Nr.42, 8, for Hitler’s high expectations and Kannenberg’s nervousness.

  154. Below, 10, 28; Schroeder, 269.

  155. Schroeder, 37–46; Below, 29–30.

  156. Below, 18, 29–32.

  157. Schroeder, 48.

  158. Below, 29, 31. The Reich Chancellery had been renovated by Troost and Speer after 1933. The Neue Reichskanzlei was begun by Speer in 1938 and completed on 7 January 1939.

  159. Below, 29, 31–2; Schroeder, 47.

  160. Below, 20.

  161. Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with the Truth, London, 1995, 113.

  162. Below, 32.

  163. Below, 28–9, 32.

  164. Schroeder, 79.

  165. Below, 32–3.

  166. TBJG, I/3, 378 (22 December 1937).

  167. Below, 33.

  168. Below, 33–4.

  169. Domarus, 606.

  170. Below, 22–3; see Schroeder, 170–96. And for Hitler’s dislike of Berlin, see Tb Irving, 268 (25 July 1938).

  171. Schroeder, 317 n.326.

  172. Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler was my Friend, London, 1955, 162–3.

  173. Schroeder, 167.

  174. Sereny, 109.

  175. See Sereny, 110. Enthused by Resi Iffland as Brünnhilde in the Bayreuth performance of Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, Hitler had told Goebbels that summer of ‘his preference for large wome’ (TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937)).

  176. Nerin E. Gun, Eva Braun-Hitler. Leben und Schicksal, Velbert/Kettwig, 1968, 74–8; Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Legende, Mythos, Wirklichkeit, 3rd paperback edn, Munich, 1973, 325–69; John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1976, 375–7.

  177. Gun, 78–9; Maser, 362–3, 368–9, 369m; Toland, 377–8.

  178. Domarus, 677; Speer, 87–93, especially 90.

  179. In August 1938, after a lengthy conversation with Hitler about his marital problems with Magda, Goebbels would note in his diary: ‘The Führer is like a father to me’ (TBJG, I/6, 44 (16 August 1938).

  180. TBJG, I/3, 266 (14 September 1937).

  181. See Sereny, 109, 138–9, 156; and Joachim C. Fest, Speer. Eine Biographie, Berlin, 1999, 459ff.

  182. TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937).

  183. Sereny, ch.5.

  184. See Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928, Stuttgart, 1961, 129–30 for his views on the USA. In his view, only a strong, racially purified Germany, built up on the principles of National Socialism, could combat the USA in the contest for world hegemony that would inevitably occur in the distant future. See also Milan Hauner, ‘Did Hitler want a World Dominion?’, JCH, 13 (1978), 15–32, especially 24.

  185. See TBJG, I/3, 104, 115, 119, 236, 261, 316, 321, 325 (10 April 1937, 17 April 1937, 20 April 1937, 15 August 1937, 10 September 1937, 28 October 1937, 2 November 1937, 4 November 1937). See in general on Hitler’s monumental building plans, and their connection with his Utopian goals of domination, Jochen Thies, Architect der Weltherrschaft. Die ‘Endziele’ Hitlers, Dusseldorf, 1976; and Jochen Thies, ‘Hitlers European Building Programme’, JCH, 13 (1978), 413–31.

  186. TBJG, I/3, 119 (20 April 1937). Hitler had revealed his schemes for the rebuilding, including the gigantic hall, a few days earlier (TBJG, I/3, 115 (17 April 1937)).

  187. TBJG, I/3, 236, 316 (15 August 1937, 28 October 1937).

  188. TBJG, I/3, 261 (10 September 1937).

  189. David Irving, The Secret Diaries of Hitl
er’s Doctor, paperback edn, London, 1990, 31.

  190. Irving, Doctor, 34.

  191. Irving, Doctor, 35.

  192. Irving, Doctor, 30, 36.

  193. Irving, Doctor, 38.

  194. TBJG, I/3, 177, 224 (18 June 1937, 3 August 1937).

  195. Irving, Doctor, 38.

  196. Irving, Doctor, 18.

  197. Domarus, 745.

  198. Domarus, 661–768; Milan Hauner, Hitler. A Chronology of his Life and Time, London, 1983, 116–23.

  199. Domarus, 667. Following his speech, the Reichstag, without formalities, unanimously renewed the Enabling Act for a further four years (Domarus, 676). In this same speech, Hitler advanced the German demand for colonies (Domarus, 673). The colonial question would be raised on a number of occasions during 1937 (see, for example, TBJG, I/3, 46 (16 February 1937)), but largely for tactical reasons. (See Domarus, 759.) Hitler told Goebbels that he had consciously included colonial demands in his proclamation to the Reich Party Rally in order to demonstrate greater assertiveness to the outside world (TBJG, I/3, 258 (8 September 1937). His unchanged interest was not in the reacquisition of colonial territory in Africa, but in a continental empire in eastern Europe. See Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich, 501–2; Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945, Stuttgart, 1995, 640; and Hauner, Hitler, 120 for Hitler’s reported comments in The Times, 13 September 1937, on the colonial question.

  200. Domarus, 690.

  201. Domarus, 705–6.

  202. Domarus, 765. For Hitler’s plans for Berlin, see Speer, 87–90; Thies, Architekt, 95–8. The metaphor of a ‘thousand-year Reich’ was a play on the chiliastic religious traditions of the coming heavenly Reich associated with millenarian mystics such as Joachim di Fiore. Wolfgang Benz, Hermann Graml, and Hermann Weiß (eds.), Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart, 1997, 435, 757; Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Berlin, 1998, 607.

  203. Domarus, 715–32, here 717.

  204. For Hitler’s use of the term in this speech, see Domarus, 730.

  205. Domarus, 728, 731.

  206. Schroeder, 78–9.

  207. TBJG, I/3, 45 (16 February 1937).

  208. See Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 1933– 1945, Oxford, 1983, 216.

  209. On the struggle over denominational schools, see, especially, Franz Sonnenberger, ‘Der neue “Kulturkampf”. Die Gemeinschaftsschule und ihre historischen Voraussetzungen’, in Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Anton Grossmann (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol.3, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt, Munich/Vienna, 1981, 235–327; see also Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 209ff.

  210. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, ch.5; John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933–1945, London, 1968, 206—13; Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler’s Power, Princeton, 1969, especially ch.5 and 8; Elke Fröhlich, ‘Der Pfarrer von Mömbris’, in Martin Broszat and Elke Fröhlich (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol.6, Die Herausforderung des Einzelnen. Geschichten über Widerstand und Verfolgung, Munich/Vienna, 1983, 52—75.

  211. For the trials and the orchestrated campaign of defamation against the Catholic clergy, see Hans Günter Hockerts, Die Sittlichkeitsprozesse gegen katholische Ordensangehörige und Priester 1936/1937, Mainz, 1971. The trials and publicity were often counter-productive in strongly Catholic regions. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 196.

  212. TBJG, I/3, 5 (5 January 1937), 10 (14 January 1937), 37—8 (9 February 1937).

  213. See Conway, 206—7, where the reasons for Hitler’s decision are regarded as unclear. Goebbels’s diary entries indicate that he, not Hitler, took the initiative, and that Hitler eagerly seized upon the suggestion for elections as a way out of the problem, to end the damaging discord. It proved a miscalculation. See Conway, 206–13.

  214. TBJG, I/3, 55 (23 February 1937). Hitler indicated again to Goebbels in June that he was considering the separation of Church and State. Goebbels added that the clergy would do well not to provoke the Führer any further (TBJG, I/3, 181 (22 June 1937)). However, Hitler was concerned that in the event of a separation of church and state Protestantism would then be destroyed and provide no counter-weight against the Vatican (TBJG, I/3, 359 (7 December 1937). See Hans Günter Hockerts, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik im neuen Licht der Goebbels-Tagebücher’, APZ, 30 July 1983, B30, 23–8, here 29.

  215. TBJG, I/3, 77 (13 March 1937).

  216. TBJG, I/3, 97, 105 (2 April 1937, 10 April 1937).

  217. TBJG, I/3, 129, 143, 156–7, 162 (1 May 1937, 12 May 1937, 29 May 1937, 2 June 1937).

  218. TBJG, I/3, 119 (21 April 1937).

  219. Conway, 209. ‘We’ve got the swine and won’t let him go again,’ noted Goebbels (TBJG, I/3, 195 (4 July 1937); see also 194, 196, 198 (3 July 1937, 6 July 1937, 10 July 1937)). Hitler’s order for the detention of Niemöller (Conway, 209) was almost certainly sanction for actions requested by the Gestapo. Niemöller’s fundamental opposition to Nazism had undergone a pronounced course of development since his initial enthusiasm in 1933. For most Protestant clergy, opposition on church matters was compatible with conformity – often enthusiastic approval – in other areas of Nazi policy. See the contributions by Günther van Norden, ‘Widerstand in den Kirchen’, and Helmut Gollwitzer, ‘Aus der Bekennenden Kirche’, in Löwenthal and Mühlen, Widerstand und Verweigerung 111–28, 129–39; the critical assessment by Shelley Baranowski, The Confessing Church, Conservative Elites, and the Nazi State, Lewiston/Queenston, 1986; and, for the penetration of the thinking even of prominent Protestant theologians by Nazi ideas, Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians under Hitler, New Haven/London, 1985.

  220. TBJG, I/3, 258 (8 September 1937).

  221. In the event, the exclusion was carried out by police decrees since a law would have drawn too much public attention. TBJG, I/3, 354 (3 December 1937).

  222. TBJG, I/3, 351 (30 November 1937).

  223. Hildegard von Kotze and Helmut Krausnick (eds.), ‘Es spricht der Führer’. 7 exemplarische Hitler-Reden, Gütersloh, 1966, 147–8.

  224. David Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988), 1–20, here 15.

  225. Domarus, 727–30; Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1972, 173; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews. The Years of Persecution, 1933–39, London, 1997, 184–5.

  226. Otto Dov Kulka, ‘“Public Opinion” in National Socialist Germany and the “Jewish Question”’, Zion, 40 (1975), 186–290 (text in Hebrew, abstract in English, documentation in German), 272–3. And see Michael Wildt, Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935 bis 1938. Eine Dokumentation, Munich, 1995; and Lutz Hachmeister, Der Gegenforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Führers Alfred Six, Munich, 1998, ch.V. The SD had originally been established under the direction of Reinhard Heydrich in 1931 to carry out surveillance on the Nazi Party’s political opponents. Much of this was undertaken by the Gestapo after 1933, when the SD’s main role increasingly centred upon the gathering of information and production of reports on ideological ‘enemies’ (such as the Churches), the ‘Jewish Question’, and soundings of opinion.

  227. Kulka, 274. See also BA, R58/991, Fols.71a-c, Vermerk of SD Abt. II 112, 7 April 1937. The SD’s work was assisted by volunteers, such as the expert in Hebrew – a long-standing party member – who, while in Leipzig, had on his own initiative put together a register of all ‘full–, three-quarter, half–, and quarter-Jews’ in the area and now proposed to do the same for Upper Silesia, then for the whole of Silesia. He also offered to teach Hebrew to SD members. It was recommended that the SD should make use of his offer. BA, R58/991, Fol.46. See also Friedländer, 197ff.

  228. The numbers of Jews emigrating from Germany had, in fact, not fluctuated massively since the first massive wave of emigration in 1933, despite the varying intensity of Nazi persecution. In 1937, there was even a decline compared with the rate
of the previous year. By the Nazis’ own standards, emigration pressure had not been adequate; more than two-thirds of the Jewish population of 1933 still remained in Germany. According to the statistics of the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden, the organization established in 1933 to coordinate and represent Jewish interests in the ever-worsening conditions, 37,000 Jews fled the country in 1933, 23,000 in 1934, 21,000 in 1935, 25,000 in 1936, and 23,000 in 1937. Werner Rosenstock, ‘Exodus 1933–1939. A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Germany’, LBYB, 1 (1956), 373–90, here 377; Herbert A. Strauss, ‘Jewish Emigration from Germany. Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (I)’, LBYB, 25 (1980), 313–61, here 326, 330–32.

  229. Adam, 172–4.

  230. Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 1933–1939, Urbana/Chicago/London, 1970, 159–60.

  231. Hermann Graml, Reichskristallnacht. Antisemitismus und Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1988, 167.

  232. Adam, 174ff.

  233. See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, Munich, 1969, 432–3.

  234. TBJG, I/3, 26 (28 January 1937). He spoke again in late February of his expectation that the showdown would follow in five or six years’ time (TBJG, I/3, 55 (23 February 1937)).

  235. TBJG, I/3, 25–6 (28 January 1937). Frick came back to his notions of Reich Reform, but, despite Blomberg’s support, found no favour with Hitler. Frick had raised the issue in connection with a law of 26 January 1937 to regulate the regional government and administration of Greater Hamburg, which he saw as a step to more comprehensive Reich Reform (Günter Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates: Eine politische Biographie, Paderborn etc., 1992, 149).

  236. TBJG, I/3, 158–9 (31 May 1937); Domarus, 696–7. According to Goebbels, Hitler was sorely disappointed in Raeder and Blomberg, who would have been satisfied with diplomatic protests (TBJG, I/3, 162 (2 June 1937)). Naval intelligence, which only reported the incident to Hitler at lunchtime on 30 May, though the news had come in on the Saturday evening, was seen as having failed miserably. Goebbels thought that Raeder would not be long in office (TBJG, I/3, 158 (31 May 1937), 162 (2 June 1937)). The American journalist William Shirer was informed that Hitler had been ‘screaming with rage all day’ and wanted to declare war on Spain (Shirer, 63). Goebbels – possibly echoing Hitler’s own opinion – expressed the view soon afterwards that Blomberg was weak and ‘a puppet in the hands of his officers’. Hitler’s own anger at Wehrmacht officers wanting to intervene in police matters, ‘where they understood not the slightest thing’, was also mentioned in the same entry (TBJG, I/3, 181 (22 June 1937)). By September, Göring, too, was expressing anger at the Wehrmacht leadership, which Goebbels saw on the way to becoming a ‘state within a state’ (TBJG, I/3, 257 (8 September 1937)). See also Goebbels’s comments along the same lines, TBJG, I/3, 316, 322 (28 October 1937, 2 November 1937), after Hitler, in a rage, had criticized monarchical tendencies in the Wehrmacht.