Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane History)

by Ian Kershaw

  237. TBJG, I/3, 211 (24 July 1937).

  238. TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937).

  239. TBJG, I/3, 370 (15 December 1937), for the view that the Russian threat was at least partially removed through the Japanese victory over China.

  240. TBJG, I/3, 198 (10 July 1937).

  241. TBJG, I/3, 378 (22 December 1937); see also 385 (28 December 1937).

  242. TBJG, I/3, 351 (30 November 1937).

  243. See Wright and Stafford, ‘Hitler, Britain, and the Hoßbach Memorandum’, 100 and 120 n.167.

  244. TBJG, I/3, 200 (13 July 1937). See also Goebbels’s own comments (p.252) on 3 September 1937.

  245. TBJG, I/3, 177 (18 June 1937). Goebbels was still sceptical after the effusive expressions of mutual friendship following Mussolini’s state visit in September (TBJG, I/3, 283 (29 October 1937), 285 (1 October 1937)).

  246. Schneider, Nr.42, 8, where the elaborate organization of the receptions for Mussolini in Munich and Berlin is also described.

  247. Domarus, 737; Hauner, Hitler, 121.

  248. TBJG, I/3, 281 (28 September 1937). See also 282–3 (29 November 1937), 2.84–5 (1 October 1937).

  249. Joseph Goebbels. Tagebücher 1924–1945, 5 vols., ed. Ralf Georg Reuth, Munich, 1992 (Tb Reuth), iii.1100, n.88. See Norbert Schausberger, ‘Österreich und die nationalsozialistische Anschluß-Politik’, in Funke, 728–56, here 744–8.

  250. Schausberger, ‘Österreich’, 746.

  251. Schausberger, ‘Österreich’, 744; Geyl, 157.

  252. TBJG, I/3, 201 (13 July 1937).

  253. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).

  254. TBJG, I/3, 266 (14 September 1937). In October, Hitler hinted to the Aga Khan that Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, and the Corridor figured in German revisionism (Schmidt, 382).

  255. TBJG, I/3, 369 (15 December 1937).

  256. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. Starting World War II, 1937–1939, Chicago/London, 1980 (= Weinberg II), 289, and 287, where it is pointed out that foreign visitors were also starting to expect action against Austria in the near future. The economic gains from the seizure of assets in Austria were an attractive proposition with the German armaments economy under strain (Schausberger, in Funke, 744–8; and the fuller account in Norbert Schausberger, Der Griff nach Österreich. Der Anschluß, Vienna/Munich, 1978, ch.6).

  257. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).

  258. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).

  259. Wright/Stafford, 102.

  260. TBJG, I/3, 307 (20 October 1937). ‘This temporary state must disappear,’ (Dieser Saisonstaat muß weg) he had entered in his diary the previous day (306 (19 October 1937)).

  261. TBJG, I/3, 327 (6 November 1937).

  262. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939, Düsseldorf, 1973, 446–7.

  263. Kube, 195. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, in his Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940, (1969), 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1988, 243; and General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Boppard am Rhein, 1980, 249, has Hitler summoning the meeting.

  264. Friedrich Hoßbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, Wolfenbüttel/Hanover, 1949, 219; Wright/Stafford, 82, for the second part of the meeting dealing with rearmament questions. Following the discussion of the raw materials issue, new allocations to the navy were agreed. Instead of 45,000 tons of steel, the navy would receive its full complement of 75,000 tons. (Dülffer, Marine, 447; Hoßbach, 219; Weinberg II, 41; Wright/Stafford, 123 n.200 on Hitler speaking from notes.)

  265. Walter Bußmann, ‘Zur Entstehung und Überlieferung der “Hoßbach-Niederschrift”’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 373–84, here 377; Wright/Stafford, 82.

  266. IMG, xxv, 402–13, Doc. 386-PS. Hoßbach, 217–20, relates how he made the notes on the meeting. And see Müller, Heer, 243ff.; Müller, Beck, 249ff.; Dülffer, Marine, 448–51; Hermann Gakenholz, ‘Reichskanzlei 5. November 1937’, in Richard Dietrich and Gerhard Oestreich (eds.), Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung. Festgabe für Fritz Hartung, Berlin, 1958, 459–74. Bußmann, Wright/Stafford, and Bradley F. Smith, ‘Die Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 329–36, have removed any doubts about the authenticity of the document.

  267. See Wright/Stafford, 84.

  268. See Weinberg II, 39 n.74 for the generally understood notion that Austria would be taken over from the outside, and Papen’s comments to a Hungarian minister in Vienna in May that both Austria and Czechoslovakia would disappear. Hitler’s view that little was to be gained at that time by a rapprochement with Britain, and his strong preference for close ties with Italy, figured in the confidential reports on press briefings by Georg Dertinger and Dr Hans Joachim Kausch. See Wright/Stafford, 91–5.

  269. Wright/Stafford, 82–4.

  270. Hoßbach, 219; Müller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 85.

  271. Bussmann, 378.

  272. Weinberg II, 39.

  273. Müller, Beck, 501.

  274. IMG, xxv. 412–13; Müller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 99; Gackenholz, 469–72. Hoßbach, 219, recalled that the meeting became heated in the exchanges between Blomberg and Fritsch on the one hand and Göring on the other, with Hitler saying little. According to Müller, 244 (though without source for the assertion), the discussion with Göring concerned above all the technical questions of armaments issues. In Hoßbach’s record of the meeting, Göring’s only intervention was to suggest cutting down Germany’s military involvement in Spain in the light of Hitler’s comments (IMG, XXV.413).

  275. Wright/Stafford, 99.

  276. Wright/Stafford, 103.

  277. IMG, xiv, 44–5; Erich Raeder, Mein Leben von 1935 bis Spandau 1955, Tübingen/Neckar, 1957, 149–50; Müller, Heer, 245; Dülffer, 450 n.56. But Raeder’s testimony at Nuremberg and his memoirs are often unreliable (Dülffer, Marine, 450 n.56; Weinberg II, 40; Wright/Stafford, 101, 107; Gackenholz, 470). Göring, Raeder claimed, had told him before the meeting that Hitler’s remarks were solely aimed at stirring the army to speed up rearmament. (Göring also declared at Nuremberg that this was the purpose of the meeting (Wright/Stafford, 77).) He was expecting, therefore, some exaggeration for effect.

  278. Müller, Heer, 246 n.193.

  279. Müller, Beck, 254.

  280. Müller, Beck, 498–501 (text), 254–61 (commentary).

  281. Gackenholz, 471; Müller, Heer, 246.

  282. Müller, Heer, 247 (Neufassung des Aufmarschplanes ‘Grün’, 21 December 1937). Blomberg stated after the war that he and Fritsch had wanted to express their doubts about the possibility of implementing Hitler’s plans in the light of the opposition of Britain and France, but added that those present at the meeting agreed when leaving the room that Hitler’s remarks were not to be taken seriously (IMG, xl, 406). This was probably an indirect reference to an exchange of views with Raeder, who was of the same opinion.

  283. Karl-Heinz Janßen and Fritz Tobias, Der Sturz der Generäle. Hitler und die Blomberg–Fritsch-Krise 1938, Munich, 1994, 38; Speer, 83.

  284. Janßen/Tobias, 35. For the film Hitlerjunge Quex, see Welch, 59—74.

  285. Janßen/Tobias, 59–60.

  286. Janßen/Tobias, 34–5.

  287. Janßen/Tobias, 16. At the end of 1944, Blomberg was to send Hitler a letter expressing his disgust and shame at the military plot against him (TBJG, II/14, 333 (2 December 1944)).

  288. Janßen/Tobias, 30.

  289. Janßen/Tobias, 38–41.

  290. Janßen/Tobias, 27–8.

  291. Janßen/Tobias, 56–7 (where it is convincingly argued that the call did not come from the Gestapo, as often presumed).

  292. Janßen/Tobias, 45–7, 51.

  293. Janßen/Tobias, 27, 51–2.

  294. Wiedemann, 112.

  295. TBJG, I/3, 414 (26 January 1938).

  296. Hoßbach, 124.

 
; 297. TBJG, I/3, 415–16 (27 January 1938).

  298. Janßen/Tobias, 54–5; TBJG, I/3,419 (29 January 1938).

  299. Janßen/Tobias, 86–8, 91, 93–7.

  300. Hoßbach, 127; Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (single vol. edn), Zürich, n.d. (1954?), 258; Janßen/Tobias, 90. This speaks directly against the well-versed argument that Fritsch’s dismissal was a consequence of his objections to Hitler’s remarks at the meeting on 5 November 1937, noted by Hoßbach. For this interpretation, see Peter Graf Kielmansegg, ‘Die militärisch-politische Tragweite der Hoßbach-Besprechung’, VfZ, 8 (1960), 268–75.

  301. Janßen/Tobias, 86–7.

  302. Gerhard Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel, ed. Hildegard von Kotze, Stuttgart, 1974, 20–21. Engel’s notes, though having the appearance of contemporary diary entries, were, in fact, compiled after the war, taken both from memory and, he claimed, from notes made at the time but subsequently lost. Since Engel was in Hitler’s immediate entourage for a period of five years, his notes remain of value though should not be taken as an authentic diary record.

  303. Hoßbach, 125–7; Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, (single vol. edn), 258–61; Janßen/Tobias, 99.

  304. Hoßbach, 126–7; Wiedemann, 117–18.

  305. Hoßbach, 127; Janßen/Tobias, 100.

  306. Wiedemann, 117–18. See TBJG, 1/3, 417 (28 January 1938): ‘He was thus able to prepare himself. Who knows here what’s true and false! In any case, the situation is impossible. It’s being further investigated. But after that Fritsch will also have to go.’

  307. Hoßbach, 127–8; Janßen/Tobias, 101–2.

  308. Jaßen/Tobias, 102–3.

  309. Hoßbach, 128–9; Below, 65; Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Verbrecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW, ed. Walter Görlitz, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1961 (=Keitel), 104ff.

  310. Janßen/Tobias, 91. Schmidt had been in custody since 1935, and was sentenced in December 1936 to seven years’ imprisonment for numerous cases of blackmail and infringement of the laws on homosexuality. His criminal record stretched back to 1929. Janßen/Tobias, 91–2 and 277 n.33.

  311. Janßen/Tobias, 104–5.

  312. See the account of the extraordinary meeting in Hoßbach, 129–30; also Janßen/Tobias, 106.

  313. Janßen/Tobias, 108.

  314. Goebbels wrote: ‘Here is word against word: that of a homosexual blackmailer against that of the head of the army. And the Führer does not trust Fritsch any longer’ (TBJG, I/3, 421 (30 January 1938)).

  315. Janßen/Tobias, 109–16, especially 113–14.

  316. TBJG, I/3, 421 (30 January 1938).

  317. Janßen/Tobias, 120–21. A second HJ boy was also looked after by Fritsch for a month (Janßen/Tobias, 101).

  318. Janßen/Tobias, 122–3.

  319. TBJG, I/3, 417 (28 January 1938).

  320. The idea of separate ministries for the branches of the armed forces possibly came initially from Raeder (Janßen/Tobias, 126). As late as 31 January, Hitler and Goebbels were still discussing possible successors to Fritsch, with the Propaganda Minister favouring Beck {TBJG, I/3, 423 (1 February 1938)).

  321. Janßen/Tobias, 125–6. See Hoßbach, 132 n.i (the post-war comments by Fritsch’s defender, Graf v.d. Goltz, of a conversation he had had in June 1945 with Blomberg); see also Keitel, 105 n.184; Below, 67.

  322. Janßen/Tobias, 128–32. The sarcastic comment about Himmler was made after the war while in British internment by Field-Marshal Ewald von Kleist.

  323. Janßen/Tobias, 126–7.

  324. IMG, xxviii.358, Doc. 1780-PS, Jodl-Tagebuch; Keitel, 106–9; Janßen/Tobias, 127. Keitel and Jodl worked out the organizational structure (Janßen/Tobias, 136). Blomberg’s recommendation of Keitel had scarcely been enthusiastic. Hitler had asked who was in charge of Blomberg’s staff. Blomberg mentioned Keitel’s name, but dismissed the possibility of using him. ‘He’s nothing but the man who runs my office,’ he said. ‘That’s exactly the man I am looking for,’ Hitler replied (Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–1945, London, 1964, 13).

  325. Janßen/Tobias, 136.

  326. Müller, Heer, 636.

  327. Janßen/Tobias, 140.

  328. TBJG, I/3, 424 (1 February 1938). Hitler had hinted to Keitel and Brauchitsch that the reshuffle was aimed at heading off the negative impression that could be prompted abroad at the departure of Blomberg and Fritsch (Keitel, 112).

  329. TBJG, I/3, 423–4 (1 February 1938).

  330. IMG, xxviii.362, Doc. 1780-PS, Jodl-Tagebuch (31 January 1938): ‘Führer will die Scheinwerfer von der Wehrmacht ablenken, Europa in Atem halten… Schußnig [sic] soll nicht Mut fassen sondern zittern.’

  331. Janßen/Tobias, 150; Domarus, 783, has sixty military posts, including fourteen generals, as well as Blomberg and Fritsch. General Liebmann remarked of the senior army officers removed, that there could be no doubt that they were all figures who in some way were ‘uncomfortable’ (‘unbequem’) for the Party {IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416, Liebmann memoirs).

  332. Janßen/Tobias, 199–200. Brauchitsch told the generals that he had accepted the post ‘only unwillingly and with considerable reservations’ (‘nur widerstrebend und unter erheblichen Bedenken’) (IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416, Liebmann memoirs).

  333. TBJG, I/3, 424 (1 February 1938).

  334. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Die “Reichsregierung” im Führerstaat. Stellung und Funktion des Kabinetts im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem’, in Günther Doeker and Winfried Steffani (eds.), Klassenjustiz und Pluralismus, Hamburg, 1973, 187–223, here 200–201.

  335. Janßen/Tobias, 154.

  336. TBJG, I/3, 431 (5 February 1938); Domarus, 783. Hitler told his generals on 5 February that, for prestige reasons both at home and abroad, he could not possibly disclose the real reason for Blomberg’s dismissal (IfZ, ED 1, Fol.415, Liebmann memoirs).

  337. Janßen/Tobias, 79. Hitler’s view of Blomberg, as disclosed to his generals in early February 1938, was less favourable. He described him as a weak character (‘einen schwachen Charakter’) who in every critical situation, especially during the occupation of the Rhineland, had lost his nerve (IfZ, ED 1, Fol.415, Liebmann memoirs).

  338. Janßen/Tobias, 182.

  339. Janßen/Tobias, 148.

  340. Janßen/Tobias, 247–9.

  341. Domarus, 728.

  342. DBS, v.9–22; and see Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’. Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford, (1987), paperback edn, 1989, 129–30.

  343. TBJG, I/3, 434 (6 February 1938).

  344. Towards the end of 1944, in the wake of the bomb-plot against him, Hitler would once more refer to the Fritsch case. He was, according to Goebbels, more convinced than ever that Fritsch had been the head of the generals’ conspiracy – in its early stages – ‘and that the indictment against him for homosexuality was in the last resort correct’ (TBJG, II/14, 333 (2 December 1944)).

  345. IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416, Liebmann memoirs: ‘Der Eindruck dieser Eröffnungen – sowohl der über Blomberg, wie der über Fritsch, war geradezu niederschmetternd, besonders deshalb, weil Hitler beide Sachen so dargestellt batte, dass über die tatsächliche Schuld kaum noch ein Zweifel bestehen konnte. Wir alle hatten das Gefühl, dass das Heer – im Gegensatz zur Marine, Luftwaffe und Partei – einen vernichtenden Schlag erlitten hatte.’ See also Janßen/Tobias, 153 and 294 n.31 for the date of 5 February and not, as Liebmann, Fol.416, has it, the 4th.

  346. TBJG, I/3, 434 (6 February 1938). In speaking to the generals, Hitler had mentioned that during the Rhineland crisis, when Blomberg’s nerve had deserted him, of all his advisers only the ‘thick-skulled Swabian Neurath’ had been in favour of holding out. (‘Von alien seinen Beratern sei damais nur der “dickschädelige Schwabe Neurath” für Durchhalten gewesen.’) (IfZ, ED 1, Liebmann memoirs, Fol.415.) Neurath was able to be so sanguine about the plans to remilitarize the Rhineland because the Foreign Office had received accurate intelligen
ce indicating that the French would not resort to military action in such an event (Zach Shore, ‘Hitler, Intelligence, and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine’, JCH, 34 (1999), 5–18).

  347. TBJG, I/3, 434 (6 February 1938).

  348. Domarus, 792.-804, here especially 796–7, 799–800.

  349. Domarus, 797. See Janßen/Tobias, 157.

  CHAPTER 2: THE DRIVE FOR EXPANSION

  1. Plainly implied in numerous speeches in the later 1920s, emphasizing Germany’s ‘lack of space’ (Raumnot) equivalent to the needs of its population, man’s eternal struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, and analogies with the eastern colonization during the Middle Ages or the attainment and defence of the British Empire. See e.g. Hitler. Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen: Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933, ed. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 5 vols, in 12 parts, Munich/London/New York/Paris, 1992–8 (=RSA), II/2, 447 (6 August 1927), 546 (16 November 1927), 554 (21 November 1927), 733 (3 March 1928), 778 (17 April 1928).