Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane History)

by Ian Kershaw

  2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf[= MK], 876–88oth reprint, Munich, 1943, 742; trans. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, London, 1969, trans, by Ralph Manheim, with an introduction by D. C. Watt (= MK Watt), 597.

  3. One country with no illusions about Hitler was the Soviet Union. At his meeting with the United States’ Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, on 4 February 1937, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim M. Litvinov, had commented ‘that Hitler’s policy had not changed from that which he had announced in his book Mein Kampf; that he was dominated by a lust for conquest and for the domination of Europe; that he could not understand why Great Britain could not see that once Hitler dominated Europe he would swallow the British Isles also’. In Davies’s view, Litvinov ‘seemed to be very much stirred about this and apprehensive lest there should be some composition of differences between France, England, and Germany’ (Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow, New York, 1941, 59–60).

  4. See Dirks and Janßen, 58–72, for a summary of the Wehrmacht’s aims in the rearmament programme.

  5. Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Legende-Mythos-Wirklichkeit, 3rd paperback edn, Munich/Esslingen, (1971), 1976, 374, 455–6; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Hitler’s Private Testament of May 2, 1938’, in JMH, 27 (1955), 415–19, here 415. In 1942, Hitler referred to his testament four years earlier and his fears at the time that he had cancer (Picker, 222 (29 March 1942)).

  6. IMG, xxviii.367, Doc. 1780-PS (Jodl-Tagebuch).

  7. See Gerhard Botz, Der 13. März 38 und die Anschluß-Bewegung. Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Österreichs 1918–1945, 5–14; Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National Socialism, London/Basingstoke, 1981, 4–10.

  8. Walther Hofer (ed.), Der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1933–1945, Frankfurt am Main (1957), 1974, 28.

  9. MK, 1; MK Watt, 3.

  10. See Kube, 233, where it is suggested that this arose from internal rivalries in the Austrian party, and was also an indication that Göring had received no equivalent commission from Hitler to operate in Austrian affairs and was acting quasi-independently.

  11. Weinberg II, 278–9.

  12. Weinberg II, 122; Martens, 122.

  13. Borthwick Institute, York, Papers of 1st Earl of Halifax, 410.3.6, ‘Conversation with Herr Hitler – 19th November 1937’, Fols.13, 16; 410.3.3 (vi), ‘Lord Halifax’s Diary. Visit of the Lord President to Germany, 17th to 21st November, 1937’, Fol.9; Confidential Memo., Fol.4. Hitler, Halifax noted in his diary (Fol. 12), struck him ‘as very sincere, and as believing everything he said’. Halifax’s notes made in the train en route from Berlin to Calais on 21 November (Fol.1) stated: ‘Unless I am wholly deceived, the Germans, speaking generally, from Hitler to the man in the street, do want friendly relations with Great Britain. There are no doubt many who don’t: and the leading men may be deliberately throwing dust in our eyes. But I don’t think so…’ See also The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days, London, 1957, 187.

  14. Weinberg II, 288.

  15. Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 (= ADAP) D, I, N0.80, 106; DGFP, D, I, 80, 129–31; TBJG, 1/3, 369 (15 December 1937); Weinberg II, 287–8; Kube, 241.

  16. Weinberg II, 289.

  17. Kube, 216.

  18. See Kube, 212–14.

  19. See Kube, 235–6 for Göring’s emphasis on political and military, not just economic motives for Anschluß.

  20. Stefan Martens, ‘Die Rolle Hermann Görings in der deutschen Außenpolitik’, in Franz Knipping and Klaus-Jürgen Müller (eds.), Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn, 1984, 75–92, here 80; Kube, 216, 224ff.

  21. Kube, 225–7, 229–30, Schmidt, 352–3.

  22. Kube, 232, 236–7.

  23. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 401.

  24. Papen, 401; and see Kube, 238–9.

  25. Kube, 240. Halifax had been ‘immensely entertained’ at meeting Göring, whose personality he found ‘frankly attractive’, like a combination of ‘film star, great landowner… Prime Minister, party-manager, head gamekeeper…’ (Borthwick Institute, Halifax Papers, 410.3.3 (vi), Fol.21, Diary of Halifax’s visit to Germany; an abbreviated version of his meeting with Göring is in Halifax, 190–91).

  26. Martens, Göring, 122.

  27. TBJG, 1/3.369 (15 December 1937). ‘Papen unfolds a plan to bring down Schuschnigg,’ Goebbels recorded. ‘The cat doesn’t leave the mouse alone. But that’s good. Schuschnigg is getting too strong and cheeky (frech)’.

  28. Papen, 408–9; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, John Toland Collection, Tape 53, Side B (Toland interview with Kurt Schuschnigg, 11 September 1971). Kurt Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, London, 1947, 18, dates Papen’s approach to early 1938. But in his subsequent interview, he makes clear that the invitation to Berchtesgaden, passed on by Papen in January, followed an earlier approach.

  29. Papen, 409–10.

  30. Papen, 412; Weinberg II, 289–91. On 26 January, Papen told Schmidt that Hitler would like Schuschnigg to come to Berchtesgaden on 15 February (Papen, 410). When, precisely, the date for the meeting was altered is unclear. But Papen was sent to Vienna to confirm it on 5 February, the day after he had been dismissed as ambassador to Vienna. Papen claimed he had again recommended the meeting, after initially suggesting one at the time that the Austrian police confiscated the papers of Gauleiter Tavs – revealing the plans for actions to provoke German intervention – at the raid on the Vienna party headquarters (Papen, 408–9). The raid took place on 25 January (Pauley, 195–6; Weinberg II, 288). Papen had then issued an invitation to Schuschnigg, endorsed by Hitler, on 27 January (Pauley, 195). This was the invitation to the rearranged meeting, which Papen implausibly claimed Hitler had forgotten and had to be reminded of (Papen, 408). The original invitation, again at Papen’s suggestion and with Hitler’s approval, had been agreed to by the Austrian chancellor on 8 January (Weinberg II, 289).

  31. Pauley, 196; Weinberg II, 288.

  32. Weinberg II, 278, 290; Papen, 413.

  33. Weinberg II, 290.

  34. Keppler’s report to Hitler, describing the terms agreed on 2 February between Schuschnigg and Seyß-Inquart, is in ‘Anschluß’ 1938. Eine Dokumentation, ed. Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Vienna, 1988, 149–50. See also Papen, 411–12, 420; Weinberg II, 292.

  35. Papen, 418, 420.

  36. Papen, 413. However, according to his later testimony, Schuschnigg, aware that the Blomberg–Fritsch affair had created serious tension between Hitler and the army, had mistakenly taken the news that three generals would be in attendance as an indication that they would be exerting a restraining influence (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, John Toland Collection, Tape 53, Side B (Toland interview with Kurt Schuschnigg, 11 September 1971)).

  37. Below, 84.

  38. Papen, 413. Below, 84 for Hitler’s tension at the visit.

  39. Kurt Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem in Rot-Weiß-Rot, Zurich, 1946, 38.

  40. Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 40–2.

  41. Papen, 414–17. For the terms, see DGFP, D, I, No.294–5, 513–17; see also Gehl, 174.

  42. Papen, 420. Schuschnigg was given three days to comply (Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 49; Papen, 420; Below, 85). Hitler had retired to the Obersalzberg to prepare his speech (Below, 83).

  43. Below, 85; Papen, 415.

  44. Keitel, 177; Papen, 417.

  45. Papen, 418–19; Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 49.

  46. Papen, 420; Domarus, 790; Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 51–2.

  47. Keitel, 178 and n.26. Jodl and Canaris were involved with Keitel in setting up the manoeuvres. See IMG, xxviii.367 (D0C.1780–PS, Jodl-Tagebuch), entry for 13 February 1938.

  48. Keitel, 178.

  49. Below, 85.

  50. Tb Reuth, 1208 (16 February 1938).

  51. Below, 85; Tb Reuth, 1209 (16 February 1938).

  52. Der unbekannte Dr Goebbels. Die geheimen Tagebücher
1938, ed. David Irving (= Tb Irving), London, 1995, 53 (17 February 1938); Der Spiegel (= Tb Spiegel), 31/1992, 102.

  53. Below, 86.

  54. Domarus, 803.

  55. ADAP, D, I, Dok.328, p.450; Kube, 243; Pauley, 198.

  56. Papen, 403–4; Pauley, 194–201; also Weinberg II, 288–90.

  57. Domarus, 801. The speech had been toned down somewhat from its draft (Pauley, 203).

  58. Pauley, 202–4.

  59. Papen, 422–3; John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1977, 438–9.

  60. Weinberg II, 294.

  61. Domarus, 804.

  62. Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission. Berlin, 1937–1939, London, 1940, 116–17.

  63. Pauley, 205. Hitler had demanded a plebiscite in his meeting with Henderson on 3 March – though, of course, only on his terms (Henderson, 116–17).

  64. Pauley, 206; Dieter Wagner and Gerhard Tomkowitz, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. The Nazi Annexation of Austria, 1938, London, 1971, 15–19, 25–6. The relevant section of Schuschnigg’s speech, proclaiming the referendum, is printed in ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 221–2. See also Galeazzo Ciano, Tagebücher 1937/38, Hamburg, 1949, 121–3, entries for 9–10 March 1938.

  65. Below, 89; see also Domarus, 818, for Hitler’s post facto comments to Ward Price, a journalist on the Daily Mail who had interviewed him a number of times in earlier years, in Linz on 12 March, that he had acted because of Schuschnigg’s betrayal, which he had at first not believed. Hitler told the Reichstag on 18 March that he thought the rumours of the referendum were ‘fantastic’ and ‘incredible’ (Domarus, 829).

  66. Tb Irving, 97 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 102–3.

  67. Tb Irving, 97–8 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 103, 105.

  68. Helmut Michels, Ideologie und Propaganda. Die Rolle von Joseph Goebbels in der nationalsozialistischen Außenpolitik bis 1939, Frankfurt am Main etc., 1992, 380.

  69. Tb Irving, 98 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; see also David Irving, Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996, 242–3; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 68–9.

  70. Kube, 244.

  71. Janßen/Tobias, 175–6.

  72. Tb Irving, 99 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105.

  73. IMG, x.566; Keitel, 178 and n.27; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 51–5.

  74. Tb Irving, 99–100 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; Tb Reuth, 1212–13 (11 March 1938); Irving, Goebbels, 243.

  75. Tb Reuth, 1213 (11 March 1938).

  76. Tb Irving, 101 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 106.

  77. Papen, 427; Kube, 244 n.87. The dramatic events of 11 March are meticulously described in Ulrich Eichstädt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler. Geschichte des Anschlusses Österreichs 1933–1938, Wiesbaden, 1955, 378–422.

  78. ADAP, D. I, 468–70, no.352 (quotation, 469).

  79. IMG, xxxiv, 336–7, Doc.102–C; Domarus, 809.

  80. Papen, 428.

  81. IMG, ix. 333; trans. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 12 vols., Nuremberg, 1946–9, xii.735.

  82. IMG, ix. 333. See Papen, 438: ‘The course of events in the Reich Chancellery on March 11, 1938, revealed the extent to which Goering had become the dominating personality among those who advocated the “total” solution.’

  83. IMG, xvi.131–2; Tb Irving, 101–2 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92,106; Toland, 444; Pauley, 208.

  84. IMG, xxxi.355–6, 358, 361, Doc. 2949–PS; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, ed. Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Washington, 1946–8, v.629–31, 635; Tb Irving, 101–3 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 106–7. Goebbels does not mention the demand to withdraw the plebiscite, and has Göring reporting that all demands were met, then posing a further – and almost identical – ultimatum for half an hour later. His own entry appears garbled.

  85. Pauley, 208.

  86. NCA, v.970, 982, D0C.3254–PS; see also IMG, xvi.199 (testimony of Michael Skubl, pointing out Seyß’s embarrassed stance, and the impression he gave of being led rather than leading).

  87. Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).

  88. See Below, 89, who was told on returning to the Reich Chancellery on the early evening of 11 March that the next day ‘Austria will be coordinated’.

  89. DBFP, Series 3,1, 13, Doc. 25.

  90. Geyl, 189.

  91. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).

  92. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).

  93. Below, 89–90.

  94. Shirer, Berlin Diary 82–3.

  95. Pauley, 211. The Nazi Party in Austria had by this time around 164,000 members, more than twice as many as in 1933, when the NSDAP had been outlawed. With the Party proscribed, and in the absence of free elections, the level of its overall support in the population on the eve of the Anschluß can only be estimated. But in 1932, in regional elections, the NSDAP had already won around a fifth of the vote. See Gerhard Botz, ‘Austria’, in Detlef Mühlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements, London/New York/Sydney, 1987, 242–80, here 251. Assuming more than a doubling by 1938, in line with the level of increase in Party membership, it could be guessed that Nazi supporters (of differing levels of commitment) formed at least two-fifths of the population by the time the Anschluß crisis broke. Gerhard Botz’s estimate of 25–35 Per cent of the population who were enthusiasts for the Anschluß in 1938 may be too low (Gerhard Botz, Der 13.März 38 und die Anschluß-Bewegung. Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Österreichs 1918– 1945, Vienna, 1978, 27).

  96. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938); Pauley, 213; text in Domarus, 81 n.120.

  97. TWC, xii.729.

  98. Pauley, 213; Kube, 246; Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Eichstädt, 411.

  99. Keitel, 178; Papen, 430. Jodl had found Brauchitsch on the night of 11 March ‘in a completely desolate mood’ (‘in einer vollkommen desolaten Stimmung’), fearing international repercussions (IMG, xv.442; Keitel, 178, n.27).

  100. IMG, xxxi.369, Doc. 2949–PS; Domarus, 813; and see Tb Spiegel, 107, for Goebbels’s reaction.

  101. Domarus, 811.

  102. Shirer, 83.

  103. Pauley, 214; Toland, 450.

  104. Keitel, 179.

  105. Tb Irving, 104 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Domarus, 814 (‘Freundschaftsbesuch’ in DNB-Meldung, 12 March 1938). The official version had German troops crossing the border at 8a.m. (Domarus, 814).

  106. Domarus, 814, has Hitler landing at 10a.m.; Keitel, 179 has a 6a.m. departure from Berlin; Below, 91, has Hitler leaving at 8 and landing at 10.

  107. Below, 91; Keitel, 179. For Bock, see the sketches by Horst Mühleisen, ‘Fedor von Bock – Soldat ohne Fortune’, in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.), Die Militärelite des Dritten Ketches, Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1995, 6–82, and Samuel W. Mitcham Jr, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock’, in Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), Hitlers militärische Elite. Von den Anfängen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn, Darmstadt, 1998, 37–44; and Generalfeldmarshall Fedor von Bock. The War Diary, 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen PA, 1996, 16–17.

  108. Tb Irving, 104 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107. See Papen, 438, for Hitler’s orders for draft legislation to be prepared to make him head of both states in personal union.

  109. Domarus, 816–17.

  110. Below, 91; Tb Irving, 106 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Domarus, 817; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 194–5.

  111. Below, 91.

  112. Below, 92.

  113. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, New York (1952), Da Capo Press edn, 1996, 50–56, here 56.

  114. Domarus, 817–18 and n.139; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 198–201.

  115. Tb Irving, 107 (14 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107. Gerhard Botz, Nationalsozialismus in Wien. Machtübernahme und Herrschaftssicherung 1938/39, 3rd edn, Buchloe, 1988, 71, suggests that delays in getting the troops to Vienna and the wish to be sure of reac
tions abroad were responsible for the postponement of Hitler’s arrival in Vienna. But Guderian, who was in charge of the motorized units to enter Austria, later corrected the widely read, but misleading, account of military inefficiency and tank breakdowns, allegedly prompting fury from Hitler, as the reason (Guderian, 54–5; Churchill, i.242 (who probably derived his information from a usually well informed British witness of events in Vienna, G. E. R. Gedye, Fallen Bastions. The Central European Tragedy, London, 1939, 315–16. Gedye had been the Daily Telegraph’s correspondent in Austria for twelve years)).

  116. See Schroeder, 85; Below, 92.

  117. Below, 92.

  118. Domarus, 819.

  119. As suggested by David Irving, Führer und Reichskanzler. Adolf Hitler 1933–1945, Munich/Berlin, 1989, 91.

  120. Schuschnigg was by this time, while nominally free, in effect under house arrest. See Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, 59–60.

  121. Franz Jetzinger, Hitlers Jugend, Vienna, 1956, 131–3, 136 (photo); Domarus, 821; Below, 93, for the visit to Leonding.

  122. Domarus, 821; there is no record of any prior telephone conversation with Mussolini (see Keitel, 179, n.32), though it is likely that the telegram followed such a call, to ensure the Duce’s approval for the final step of full Anschluß.

  123. Domarus, 822.

  124. Below, 92; Domarus, 820–21 for the law. A first draft had already been drawn up before Stuckart left Berlin (Erwin A. Schmidl, März 38. Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich, Vienna, 1987, 214).

  125. Kube, 248 and n.118. Stuckart flew at midday on 13 March to Vienna to discuss the draft with Keppler and representatives of the Austrian government (Schmidl, 214).

  126. ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 330–31.

  127. Tb Irving, 107, 108–9 (14–15 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107, 110, entry for 14 March (dealing with events of the previous day) has ‘The Anschluß is practically there. The Führer is staying in Linz on Sunday’ (‘Der Anschluß ist praktisch da. Der Führer bleibt Sonntag in Linz’). The entry for 15 March (reporting on ‘yesterday’) has: ‘Anschluß completed. Election on 10 April… The Austrian armed forces under the Führer’s command’ (‘Anschluß vollzogen. Am 10.April Wahl… Die österreichische Wehrmacht dem Führer unterstellt’). This suggests that the signing of the Anschluß legislation took place in the evening of 13 March.