Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

by Farhan Mujahid Chak

  military elites to improve various types of economic controls, while providing

  financial-industrial groups with expansion without any competitive pressure. 11

  In essence, the military-bureaucratic elites provided a vital link between the

  local financial-industrial groups and international capitalists through a series

  of state-sponsored economic policies.

  However, much more still needed to be done financially to secure the

  hegemony of the military-bureaucratic elites. And this came in the form of the

  Military Assistance Program (MAP) from the United States.12 Although

  140

  Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

  signed in 1954, there were no sizable financial or military shipments to Pakistan

  until 1956. Since then, however, the United States has been the major supplier

  of military equipment and services. There were times that ‘Pakistan was

  described as the most “allied ally” of the United States and to the chagrin of

  others, one of the client states of Asia’.13 Actually, with the MAP agreement, Pakistan was able to acquire funds and sophisticated war technology, which

  allowed the military establishment to penetrate even deeper into the political

  superstructure. 14 In 1958, when the higher civil bureaucracy assumed effective political power, the generals found it opportune to enter the political arena

  openly. As Ahmed notes, ‘Quite symbolic of this significant change was the

  dismissal of the national government, the dissolution of the national parliament

  and the appointment of a member of the Armed forces as a Minister in the

  new government’.15

  Thus, the military assistance programme (MAP) tilted economic power

  towards the military-bureaucratic elite, thereby altering the domestic state of

  affairs. By providing desperately needed funds, the United States was able to

  secure a foothold for itself, as well as anchor the military’s internal position.

  And by the late 1950s the military was equipped not only with formidable

  technical and material resources but also with an ideological stance favourable

  to world capitalist interests. Yet this military-to-military financial rapport

  between Pakistan and USA, recently described as a ‘relationship from hell’,

  has never been stable. From the Sino-Indian War of 1962, when the US

  refused to provide urgently required, and agreed, weapons spare parts, to

  Kargil, the war on terror, the Raymond Davis affair and the Salala massacre,

  there have been several times that this relationship has become embittered,

  thereby distressing the two countries’ economic relationship.16 The reality is that Pakistan’s military has never really trusted US intentions and has, from early

  on, sought more stable financial resources. Those concerns, then, eventually,

  led the military to directly intertwine itself as a financial-industrial class in its own right. In other words, the higher echelons of the military brass became,

  and continue to be, a significant player in the financial-industrial class who

  reap significant economic and political rewards.17

  Now, with so much at stake, it is hardly surprising that the military often

  chooses to intervene politically, especially when it feels its interests are threa-

  tened. Of course, that intervention adds to political instability, even if by its

  Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 18:26 09 January 2017

  coercive force it is able to establish its predominance. For that hegemony

  comes with a price, which is the inability of a civilian political superstructure to take root. And, often the military exacerbates civilian political instability to

  perpetuate its own dominance. However, it is not only military interventionism

  that has retarded civilian political maturation. Coming back to an earlier point,

  which requires emphasis, the origin of military interventions in Pakistan was in

  the inability of its political elite to formulate a coherent, agreeable and legitimate ideological superstructure. Here, this book emphasizes that specific failure as

  the ‘principale raison’ facilitating military intervention. This is so since the

  disjointed ideological and political superstructures, of the ‘traditionalist’ or

  Civil and military hegemony

  141

  ‘secularist’ kind, are not flexible enough to contain instability. Nehru, the first

  Indian Prime Minister, while commenting on military intervention in Pakistan,

  states that ‘it is not the inordinate ambition or a special taste for the politics

  but the failure of the political classes to govern effectively that the military

  intervention takes place in Pakistan’.18 In other words, that inability to govern actually means the failure of the political classes to present a popularly

  approved ideology, the absence of which invites the military. If genuine poli-

  tical forces were able to construct a corresponding political superstructure,

  then the crises could have been overcome by inherent mechanisms for managing

  discontent within it. However, the coercive imposition and consequent failure

  of the traditionalist and secularist superstructures facilitates military inter-

  vention, in as much as they are not based on the aspired foundational values.

  With the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the assassination of Liaquat

  Ali Khan, both ‘revivalists,’ ideological extremes sunk the country into deeper

  and deeper crises.

  Two political propensities in Pakistan

  Since the creation of the independent nation-state of Pakistan, it has been

  struggling to establish a workable, legitimate, balanced and representative

  political system. That, too, must be imagined while reconciling the forces of

  the foundational, contextual and the individual. This inability to construct a

  political order that balances between ideological polarities invites two contra-

  dictory political dispensations towards governance, the ‘military-hegemonic’

  and the ‘dominant-party’. In the first political propensity, the primary objective

  was to curb participatory politics and to subjugate the political parties and

  other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony. Alternatively, the

  other’s primary concern was to subordinate the military-bureaucratic elites to

  civilian-led party dominance and substitute military rule.19 Both political dispensations have not been able to resolve Pakistan’s chronic political

  instability, and largely ignore entrenching it with local ethics. Even the leading

  potentates of Pakistan after 1947 ‘were unable to charter a course of action

  that institutionalized the historical aspirations of a people who had borne the

  oppression of exploitative class relations under centuries of pre-colonial and

  post-colonial modes of production’. 20 And, until now, Pakistan’s fractious Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 18:26 09 January 2017

  political oscillating between civilian and military rule remains unconnected to

  the political aspirations of the masses.

  Essentially, in either hegemonic political dispensation, establishing total

  and absolute control over the state and society emerged as the primary

  objective of Pakistan’s political development. 21 Here, again, this conflict intensifies as various contenders in the political arena failed to develop a

  minimal consensus on the nature, direction and ideology of the political

  system
that is in harmony with its enduring foundational values. Still, further

  exacerbating the political situation, both the civilian and military rulers view

  each other with total distrust and animosity.22 And this has been the state of

  142

  Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

  affairs since early on after Pakistan’s inception. Certainly, one walks a slippery

  slope between respecting religious mores and coercively imposing them;

  between honouring diversity and maintaining a broad-based commitment to

  enduring core ideals; between freedom of speech and its limitations when

  infringing on the sensibilities of others. In these subtleties is found the path

  towards ‘ummah wasat’, which is bemusing to many.

  The inability to find that median has resulted in Pakistan’s chronic political

  tumult and explains why, just looking at the times from 1947–54, nine provincial

  governors were dismissed.23 Not just then, though, the failure of the civilian politicians to respect the demarcations of power and foster a consensual ideology

  led to the dismissal of four elected prime ministers from 1988 to 1999 when the

  military dismissed the fifth elected government and General Musharraf seized

  power. 24 Even now, the threat of military interventionism remains, with Tahir-ul-Qadri claiming his long march for democracy was cancelled due to

  this. 25 Thus, with no initiatives for presenting a popularly accepted ideology forthcoming, Pakistan’s politics is doomed to swing between extremes, neither

  of which provides any real chance of resolving the deep imbalances.

  A military-hegemonic political system

  A military-hegemonic political system is regarded as the supremacy of the military

  in the political system. It achieves this by four processes: ‘(1) promotion of the

  “corporate interests” of the military; (2) political exclusion, i.e. exclusion of

  political leaders, political parties and urban middle class; (3) political control,

  i.e. control of the press and labour; (4) political inclusion, i.e. co-optation and

  consolidation of bureaucratic elites, financial-industrial groups and feudal

  classes’.26 Taken together, these processes anchor the military’s monopoly over decision-making that enables it to manipulate and steer the behaviour of

  political leaders and interest groups in a chosen direction. Moreover, often

  they are intertwined and go hand in hand with one another.

  First, the Pakistani military’s corporate interests are sustained by Siddiqa’s

  term ‘Milbus’, which she defines as ‘capital used for the benefit of the military

  fraternity, especially the officer cadre, which is not recorded as part of the

  defence budget or does not follow the normal accountability procedures of the

  state, making it an independent genre of capital’.27 Effectively, the military Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 18:26 09 January 2017

  engages in two broad but distinct sets of activities – ‘profit making through

  the privatization of security’ and ‘military engagement in non-traditional

  roles such as farming, running hotels, airlines, banks or real estate agencies’. 28

  Its most significant component is ‘entrepreneurial activities that do not fall

  under the scope of the normal accountability procedures of the state, and are

  mainly for the gratification of military personnel and their cronies’.29 Suffice to say the economic strength of the military continues unabated and its higher

  echelons use this privilege to maintain hegemony.30

  Second, the military’s hegemony is further strengthened by political exclusion

  of all those who they feel are impediments to Pakistan’s commitment to

  Civil and military hegemony

  143

  peripheral capitalism and its structural imperative. And, to be precise, the

  method that has consistently been employed to remove political leaders and

  parties from the political arena was via ordinances. These included Section

  144 of the Criminal Code, Security of Pakistan Act 1952, Public Offices

  Disqualification Order 1959, Press and Public Ordinance 1963, Political

  Organizations Ordinance 1962, Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1965, to name

  a few. Under military hegemony each of these became tools for repression

  and control. Third, political control, too, occurs ‘on executive decrees or

  ordinances and manipulation of the judiciary, political exclusion and building

  strategic alliances’.31 Recall, in the preceding chapter, the constitutional amendments including the ‘doctrine of necessity’, ‘revolutionary-legality’ and

  ‘implied mandate’ – all have been used to justify military intervention. 32 While the constitution does not, in and of itself, justify military interventionism, it is often manipulated after military intervention takes place.

  Fourth, political inclusion occurs by co-opting segments of civil society,

  including politicians and media, into an uneasy and unequal relationship,

  giving an appearance of democracy and respect for the rule of law. 33 Of particular note is the co-opting of feudals, not only into the military itself but also

  in the financial-industrial class. However, the primary thrust of the military is

  to deactivate those who were previously active – the political leaders – and

  restrict the participation of aspiring classes. The military-bureaucratic elites

  pursue policies to promote the financial-industrial groups and ensure the

  continued preponderance of the feudal classes in the rural structure.34

  Overall, a military hegemonic system may have a semblance of political

  stability, but, as Shafqat notes, stability hinges on the hegemony of the military

  in the political system.35 In Pakistan, ‘political order’ and ‘political stability’ are achieved by establishing the hegemony of relatively strong institutions like the

  bureaucracy and the military. 36 Consequently, the weak political structures in Pakistan, like political parties, interest groups and parliaments, become

  weaker and further fragmented – which, in turn, serves the interest of the

  military. Therefore, it is not the absence of effective political institutions or a

  constitution, for that matter, but the military-bureaucratic elites’ perceptions

  and beliefs that the political parties and the entire political process are chaotic

  and non-legitimate.37 Shafqat adds, under military-hegemonic conditions, political parties and interest groups do not develop; they stagnate. 38 As a Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 18:26 09 January 2017

  consequence, the military aims to be solely in control of political society and

  believes that it alone should be the real political base. This, in turn, produces

  anti-military hegemonic movements, which leads to the erosion of the military’s

  power and creates a crisis of political instability.

  Weakening of military hegemony

  Since the military-bureaucratic elites monopolize power, authority and sources

  of economic patronage, the civilian political leaders have limited choices.

  Falk’s theory outlines three options from which civilian political leaders must

  144

  Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

  choose: ‘1. Corroborate with the regime at the elite level and seek access to

  governmental patronage; 2. Build a coalition of like-minded political leaders and

  political parties and seek concessions from the regime within the framework of

  the military-hegemonic syste
m; 3. Pursue a strategy of regime confrontation,

  mobilize the masses and build a broad coalition of groups and classes that are

  adversely affected by the regime’s policies, thereby creating conditions which

  weaken the military hegemony’.39 The political history of Pakistan reveals that the tactics employed by civilian political leaders against the military are

  confrontational. This illustrates a coercive rather than consultative manner of

  political negotiation. 40 A politics of protest and demonstration reflects the weakening of hegemonic control. The increase in political participation and,

  in particular, the agitation variety of it, results in an authoritarian response

  from the military-bureaucratic regime. More specifically, this occurs ‘since

  processes and institutions that could promote negotiations leading to bargain,

  compromise and accommodation within the system are weak’.41 Eventually, the continuous pressure from the masses, organized by the civilian political

  leaders, places serious constraints on the military elites, which facilitates the

  erosion of military power and the decaying of the military-hegemonic system.

  Clearly, with mounting resentment against military rule, an incrementally

  aggressive phenomenon begins to take place by those disgruntled segments of

  society that are not allowed to express their political discontent through

  institutional mechanisms. Urban professionals, industrial labour and, to a

  certain degree, disgruntled feudals – all those who are unable to operate in the

  political system – become politicised and anti-regime.42 Thereafter, politics under the military-hegemonic political system would show that protests and

  demonstrations emerge as an expression of political discontent. While military-

  bureaucratic institutions decay, confrontational politics intensifies in the

  already segmented society. Class and ethnic cleavages sharpen and antagonism

  against the military-bureaucratic hegemony increases.43 This increases the volatility and unpredictability of outcomes.

  What is important to emphasize is that all those excluded from power

  begin to rely on mass urban protests. These protests tend to encourage and