Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

by Farhan Mujahid Chak

incorporate demands that would have mass appeal or would cut across more

  than one group. Mass mobilization, then, becomes Pakistan’s protest method of

  choice. However, such a strategy of ‘regime confrontation and mass mobilization

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  may produce a crisis of regime legitimacy and may cause breakdown of the

  military’s hegemony or even the dominant party system but offers no stable,

  coherent and consensual alternative. Alternative institutions to replace the system

  do not develop in that they require more time and consensus, amongst the

  political leader’, which is not forthcoming, particularly in view of the ideological divergence between them.44 Because more energy is spent in mobilizing and demobilizing the masses, institution building that includes party building,

  resolution of conflict within the parliament through negotiations and bargaining,

  and tolerance of dissent does not occur, and they remain a low priority.45

  Consequently, even after the regime breakdown, the coercive instrument of

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  control, which evolved under the military-hegemonic system, is perceived to

  be the only viable mechanism to ensure political stability and political order.

  Nevertheless, once the military’s grip on power is broken, it withdraws to the

  barracks, negotiates with civilian political leaders. This inaugurates the

  ‘dominant-party’ hegemonic system.

  The ‘dominant-party’ political system

  The origins of the civilian ‘dominant-party’ hegemonic dispensation in Pakistan

  have their roots in the formation of the Muslim League political party. As

  previously mentioned, those with a ‘revivalist’ perspective spearheaded the

  cause for Pakistan. Successfully, they created a political party, galvanized the

  masses and achieved a level of popular support, hitherto unknown. However,

  this civilian-based political organization, while in place prior to and during

  the independence movement for Pakistan, needed to change. Why? Since once

  Pakistan was created, it was no longer a freedom movement. What was

  required was it to become a national, inclusive and ideologically sound party.

  This did not occur and Ahmed characterizes this as due to ‘the failure of the

  Muslim League to develop as a national, Democratic Party’.46 Here, it is important to reiterate the reasons for that failure to transform and develop a

  stable, democratic political order. It was the ideological clash between the

  traditionalists and secularists that paralysed political action, which worked in

  the aspiration and interest of the military and bureaucratic elite.

  The failure of the Muslim League political leadership to transform into a

  national, democratic and ideologically coherent party, following the indepen-

  dence of Pakistan, led to serious consequences. As the founding and ruling

  party, one of their first challenges was to establish a national political structure based on democratic ideals while remaining cognizant of the logistical quagmire

  of maintaining control over a territory which was splintered into two geo-

  graphical units and that contained powerful ethnic divisions.47 On the contrary, while ‘West Pakistan’ is represented by its striking heterogeneity, ‘East Pakistan’, present-day Bangladesh, is represented by its rich homogeneity. As Noman

  states, at that time, ‘East Pakistan’ contained 54 per cent of the total Pakistani

  population and was exclusively Bengali.48 Even though this ethnic demo-graphical reality may have posed some problems for the Muslim League,

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  considering that they had overcome greater obstacles in the past, it was

  assumed that they were capable of providing such an enlightened leadership.

  Yet that did not take place, largely as a consequence of the imbalances and

  hierarchies of power within the Muslim elites in the British Empire in South

  Asia. The core leadership of the Muslim League came from the Muslim

  minority provinces in North India and during the movement for Pakistan

  they had controlled key positions in the political party.49 That core leadership was comprised of ethnic ‘Muhajirs’, whose authority was not challenged from

  Muslim majority provinces, such as Bengal. 50 The support base of regional leaders was confined to their provinces. Following independence, the Muslim

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  Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

  League should have endeavoured to include those regional leaders into their

  political fold, but this hardly occurred and, as a result, minority groups began

  to feel alienated. This increased centrifugal forces. The only other ethnic

  group well represented was the ‘Punjabis’, primarily on account of their

  dominant representation in the military as part of the politicians and military

  establishment’s rapprochement.51 Together, this ‘Muhajir-Punjabi’ nexus acquired key control over the decision-making posts at the apex of centralised

  state power. This ethnic composition has now gradually evolved to include

  others, but at that critical time following independence, the exclusion of other

  ethnicities was striking. 52

  What began to take shape in Pakistan was a form of hereditary politics in

  which political parties were nothing more than family-based Mafias. In other

  words, the ‘dominant-party’ system is a ‘family-mafia’ style of political dis-

  pensation that is more oligarchic than democratic.53 It is an equally hegemonic civilian-based political system that mirrored the coercive mannerisms of the

  military but lacked their organization, discipline and coherence.54 Added to this, the dominance by an unrepresentative centre, the Muhajir-Punjabi elite,

  provoked dissension from the other regions, especially in the majority province

  of Bengal. As a consequence, regional elites, antagonised by the denial of

  heterogeneity in a multi-ethnic state such as Pakistan, mobilised popular

  support for greater provincial autonomy.55

  There are two primary hypotheses that shed light on the failure of the

  civilian political leaders to consolidate democratic propensities in Pakistan.

  First, that the success or failure of a democratic transition from military

  hegemony is dependent on the culture and structure of society. 56 For that reason, the failure of securing a democratic propensity was a reflection of

  culture in both the society and the state. Second, that the success or failure of

  a transition to a democratic polity was dependent on leadership. 57 In other words, the manner in which the civilian political leaders and elites managed

  the shift towards a democratic and participatory political system determined

  the outcome. The first hypothesis has largely been discredited, as democracies

  are not all similar and manifest themselves differently in different societies. As

  Malik adds, the failure of civilian governance is abetted by the feudal nature

  of the national economy, where bureaucrats and politicians operate as latter

  day mai-bap (parents) dispensing largesse and ad hoc doses of administrative

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  and land reform’.58 Thus, the failure of the civilian political leadership to firmly root participatory politics rests in their tendency to behave in an

  equally hegemonic manner. Shafqat notes that the ‘initial
transition to

  democracy was anti-authoritarian, but not necessarily pro-democratic. Such

  a transition created an environment of political liberalism, encouraged

  associational activity, challenged the declining authoritarian institutions,

  but also relied on the same authoritarian institutions’. 59 Seen in this context, the political leaders espouse totalitarian methods for transitioning

  towards a democratic polity. Thus, civilian political leaders failed by the

  choices they made – which included radical usage of ideology, incapacity to

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  build a coalition of interest groups, degenerative economic policies and poor

  performance.60

  In addition, the failure of the civilian political leaders, whether through the

  ‘dominant party’ or the opposition parties, is their strong tendency to attempt

  to cripple the other powerful stakeholders in society. These hegemonic intentions

  of political leaders have become pronounced and crucial whenever the issue

  of appointments of top positions in the armed forces, higher judiciary, ambas-

  sadorial postings and civil bureaucracy have arisen. 61 Thus the ‘dominant-party’ hegemonic system demands not only the dominance of the ruling party

  over the opposition political parties, but also attempts to impose their supremacy

  over elected officials, representative institutions and over non-elected offices

  and non-institutions. In total, the ruling party attempts to secure its total

  hegemony without any inclination to power sharing. As a result, the excluded

  stakeholders of power resent this clear infringement on their sacred space and

  react viciously to guard its political territory.62 These tensions between the adherents of two systems have prompted combative relations between the

  proponents of the military-hegemonic and dominant-party systems.

  Persistence of hegemonic forces

  With hindsight, whenever the military-hegemonic system shows signs of decay or

  weakness, the dominant party system resurfaces. And then, when the civilian

  ‘dominant-party’ superstructure pushes too far, it collapses, only to re-invite

  the military. Shafqat elaborates, citing the period 1971–77, in which the pre-

  occupation of the political leadership and aspiring urban middle classes was

  how to contain the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial

  groups in order to establish the dominance of the elected political leadership

  and civilian political institutions. 63 Here the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the creation of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is important since he was the

  first political leader to attempt to secure the supremacy of civilian institutions

  and become partially successful. However, he too exhibited strong hegemonic

  characteristics. Owing to his social status, his leadership style was uncom-

  promising, dictatorial and the main supporters for his political party also

  came from the large feudal classes in Sind. 64 Here, we notice that Bhutto’s leadership style was secularist, authoritarian and confrontational with regard

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  to other opposition parties and the military rulers.65 Such a leadership style, rooted in confrontation and tyranny, could hardly bode well for Pakistan’s

  political future.

  Interestingly, that moment in Pakistan’s history revealed that the collapse

  of the military-hegemonic political system and the emergence of civilian

  political leadership does not necessarily entail the emergence of effective

  political leadership, broadening of political participation and consolidation of

  democratic processes and institutions. 66 As a matter of fact, the ‘dominant-party’ system functioned as an extension of the ‘military-hegemony’ political

  system in that it discouraged the formation of associational groups and

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  Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture

  opposition parties could not build consensus on ideology, vision or the

  workings of parliamentary democracy.

  Certainly, the political participation of aspiring urban middle classes

  expanded, and was meant to establish the supremacy of elected political leader-

  ship in the political system. This, though, initiated a process of resistance by the military-bureaucratic elites, the financial-industrial groups and a segment of

  the feudal classes, who dominated the economy and were, therefore, reluctant

  to support the process of building civilian democratic institutions. 67 Creating civilian institutions meant changing the nature of the economic structure and

  dismantling the hegemonic position of the military in the political system.

  Evidently, the hegemonic position of the military elites persisted and con-

  strained the process of civilian-based political development. The continuity and

  deeply entrenched nature of military-bureaucratic elites promoted suspicions

  about the very nature of participatory politics, political parties and interest

  groups. 68 As a result, the ambiguity about civilian institutions as viable alternatives to military hegemonic systems continued and led to the process of

  returning to redemocratization in the latter years of General Zia’s rule.69

  In the post-1985 phase of redemocratization, Pakistan continued to suffer

  from similar disabilities and predicaments of the successor civilian regimes.

  Despite greater political liberalization, most political parties, specifically in

  power, show a propensity for the acquisition of unbridled power, in the form of

  the ‘dominant-party’ system as a possible alternative to the military-hegemonic

  system. 70 During this second period of redemocratization, especially after the mysterious sabotage of General Zia’s plane, which resulted in his death,

  Pakistan’s civil society was making a gradual comeback with ‘a free and critical

  press, freer judiciary, a comparatively assertive intermediate class, the emergence

  of human rights groups, various non-governmental organizations and a growing

  vigilance on socio-economic and regional issues were making it look difficult for

  the military to contemplate a comeback’.71 However, the failure of the politicians in consolidating democratic institutions, respecting the demarcations

  of political power and fostering a consensual and coherent ideology led to the

  dismissal of four elected prime ministers. 72

  It must be reiterated that regime change in Pakistan occurs as a con-

  sequence of a decline in the military’s hegemonic capacity, which is a result of

  the tactic of regime confrontation and mass mobilization utilised by political

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  parties and other excluded segments of society. Constrained and conditioned by

  the military-hegemonic political system, the political parties have continued to

  reveal a preference for the dominant-party system, which exhibits partisanship

  and confrontation as its political norms. ‘These conditions have put an enormous

  responsibility on elites and political leaders, to expand areas of negotiation,

  identify issues of agreements and disagreements, then negotiate and bargain,

  minimize potential conflict and build consensus in a manner that the interests of

  a large number of political contestants and economic competitors are pro-

  tected’.73 However, so far the political leaders have failed t
o develop a consensus to restrict the military’s political role, while their actions and conduct has

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  149

  continued to solidify the trend towards a dominant-party system. In this

  book, it is argued that the reason the political leaders are unable to achieve

  consensus and restrict the role of the military is an inadequate balance

  between the foundational, contextual and individual.

  Regime change from military-hegemonic to possible democratic entails

  changes at all levels – local, regional and national. Even decision-makers and

  decision-making procedures at various levels also change, and yet authoritarian

  structures remain intact, as the case of Pakistan reveals, although in a number

  of countries regime change has resulted in readjustment of existing institu-

  tions.74 It is equally important to recognize that, anticipating or conceding its hegemonic position, the military certainly attempts to disengage from the

  political scene, but the degree of its disengagement is closely linked with the

  ability of the political parties and their leadership to develop consensus on

  developing civilian participatory institutions, effective management of political

  conflict and credible economic policies.75 Therefore, the continuous fluctuation between a civilian-based ‘dominant-party’ and ‘military-hegemonic’ political

  system has hampered consensus building between the ruling party and opposi-

  tion political parties as well as with the military. It has promoted tendencies of

  confrontation, violence and polarization in the political process and society. The

  longer the civilian political leadership takes to build a consensus on the type of

  political system, the easier it becomes for the military to retain its military

  hegemony. Under such conditions, the Pakistani case amply demonstrates that

  the military elites began to indulge in political manipulation and undercut the

  political process and development of civilian institutions to return the political

  structure towards the military-oriented power. Thus, it is a vicious cycle; for

  the military establishment, democratisation implies ‘deviation’ from their vision

  of society, which therefore leads to the return of the ‘reluctant’ generals.76