The Life of Alcibiades
Page 9
both the optimism in the Argive alliance and its precariousness. No-
where does Thucydides say that lasting peace would have been possible
if Nicias had been given a chance and there had been more support for
a true alliance with Sparta; nor does he say that peace would have been
better assured if Athens had let Alcibiades act and had taken bases in the
Peloponnese capable of checking Sparta. Thucydides is not one to adopt
unverifi able hypotheses or a priori reconstructions. But divisions and
indecisiveness were harmful. Thucydides makes that clear. And Athe-
nians of the time did not deceive themselves. Which led to the business
of ostracism.
Ostracism was a uniquely Athenian practice. It meant the exile of a
politician for ten years. But this form of exile was not dishonorable, nor
was it a punishment. Cleisthenes, the founder of the democracy, was said
to have initiated this practice to remove the friends of tyrants. The prac-
tice actually began even earlier, but the purpose was always to remove
anyone who disturbed and opposed Athenian politics, either because he
had become too important or because there was a confl ict between two
leaders and two policies. In this respect, in our own time, we acknowledge
the wisdom of an institution that seems harsh or risky but would not en-
dure otherwise. Every year the people voted, by a show of hands, whether
or not to proceed with an ostracism vote. If the response was positive,
another vote, requiring a full quorum, was held to decide whom to ostra-
cize. Some of the leading men of Athens had been struck with ostracism,
including Themistocles and Aristides, as had two illustrious ancestors of
Alcibiades.
We must admit that the circumstances just described, including the vac-
illations and plotting between Nicias and Alcibiades, represented a typical
occasion for ostracism. It would remove one of them and leave the other
50 Chapter
3
with a free hand. In the spring of 417, apparently, 12 a certain Hyperbolus succeeded in setting in motion the idea of an ostracism. The popular vote
was to take place in March.
Hyperbolus was a democrat. Thucydides speaks of him scornfully, treat-
ing him as dishonest and contemptible (8.73.3); the comedians were no
kinder. In the Knights , Aristophanes calls him “a bad citizen, Hyperbolus—
a scoundrel.” 13 The harsh judgment is both moral and social—a bit like that of Cleon. Hyperbolus was a simple lamp peddler.
The question then arises: Who would be banished? Nicias? Or Alcibi-
ades? The episode had a surprise ending, with supreme irony.
Alcibiades had few arguments for persuading Athens against Nicias.
It seems that in the beginning another individual was the target of his ef-
forts: this was someone named Phaeax, an aristocrat who had held some
political offi ce and was involved in various political cases. And several
witnesses say that he was caught up in this ostracism effort. 14 However, we know nothing about it. Was he at fi rst supported by Alcibiades? Or
was he the straw man for Nicias? It is a mystery. Actually, we have one
speech, transmitted in the works of the orator Andocides, entitled Against
Alcibiades, that deals with an ostracism. However, based on all the evi-
dence, this speech is a fi ction and could not have been written at that time
or by Andocides. It appears to have been a school exercise in which Pha-
eax was supposed to have spoken. It is a violent attack and relates to both
the public and private life of Alcibiades. Maybe this was someone Alcibi-
ades had at one time wanted to go after. But he was neither well known
nor dangerous enough; so Alcibiades had another idea.
There is no doubt about Alcibiades’s diplomatic talents. He and Nicias
came to an agreement. If we can believe Plutarch, in the Life of Alcibi-
ades , 13, the idea was his: “Once it became clear that . . . one . . . would
suffer the effects of the ostracism vote, Alcibiades combined the disparate
factions and, after holding talks with Nicias, arranged things so that the
12. One inscription suggests a later date (A. G. Woodhead, Hesperia, 1949); but the text is not decisive.
13 . 1304. See also Clouds 1065; Wasps 1007; Peace 681–82.
14 . In Plutarch, see Aristides 7.3–4; Nicias 11; and Alcibiades 13. For other theories, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, ad 8.73.3.
Political
Debut 51
ostracism backfi red.” 15 What does he do? He convinces Nicias. Both men worked with their supporters and, on the day of the vote, the designated
victim was none other than . . . Hyperbolus, the very one who set in mo-
tion the ostracism. He was banished by more than six thousand votes.
He would never return to Athens. He reappears in Thucydides’s history
when he was assassinated in Samos by the enemies of the democracy. 16
The ostracism of Hyperbolus is one of the great surprises of the popu-
lar vote. It is also an illustration of Alcibiades’s extraordinary ability. The
two principal fi gures remained face to face; they would soon be seen con-
fronting each other over what was the most important episode in Athe-
nian history of the time: the Sicilian expedition.
15. In Life of Nicias 11, he doesn’t say it, but he doesn’t deny it either.
16. Thucydides 8.73.3. This is where the historian’s harshest judgment is found. He recalls that Hyperbolus was not ostracized “for fear of his infl uence and prestige,” but was despised for his faults. The same idea is found in the comic Plato, frag. 187 (“It was not for people like him that ostracism had been invented”).
4
The Grand Design
In the spring of 417, Alcibiades succeeded in his scheme to avoid the risk
of ostracism. He entered a period of glory and good fortune, and it was
during this period that he drew Athens into his major undertaking.
Everything was going well for him.
The Argive policy, following a number of setbacks, was fi nally bearing
fruit: a new agreement between Argos and Athens 1 would be fi nalized the following spring. 2
Additionally, in 416, Athens seized the little island of Melos, near the
Peloponnese; although Alcibiades’s role in this affair is not well known,
its audacity would have pleased him, as it was aimed indirectly at Sparta,
1. A part of the inscription has been recovered.
2. See above, chapter 3.
The
Grand
Design 53
whose inhabitants had once colonized Melos. It was also the fi rst indica-
tion of the imperialist goals he would advance.
The idea of an expedition against Melos had little justifi cation. As
Thucydides reports, the inhabitants “would not submit to the Athenians
like other islanders and at fi rst remained neutral.” But that did not sat-
isfy the Athenians, who returned with thirty-eight ships to attack the
island. 3
Thucydides chose to emphasize this episode. In his account he in-
cludes a dialogue between the representatives of Athens and of Melos,
the former explaining to the latter the reasons why they should yield
immediately, since no one was coming to help them, neither the Spar-
tans among men nor the gods
who, they said, recognized the law of
the strongest; “by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever
they can” (5.105). And to the Melians who wonder why they cannot
remain neutral, the Athenians respond that such a stance is not possible:
“For your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be
an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our
power” (5.95). The dialogue continues over several pages, the retorts
tight, dense, and abstract: never has the right of the strongest, hence-
forth the foundation of Athenian imperialism, been more forcefully ex-
pressed and denounced.
We cannot help thinking that it is not by mere chance that this analysis
comes as prelude just before the ambitious undertaking of the Sicilian
expedition.
Moreover, the harshness of the repression of the Melians came to
amplify the vanity of the effort. The island was conquered. All the
men old enough to bear arms were executed. The women and children
were reduced to slavery. And the Athenians themselves colonized the
country.
3 . Some believe that Thucydides characterized the attack against Melos as gratuitous because the island was inscribed on the list of tributes prior to the attack. But that inscription on the list may have corresponded to demands that were never met. When would the island have been taken or won over?
54 Chapter
4
The severity of this decision was not without precedent. Earlier there
had been analogous repressive measures in the case of Torone (5.3.4) as
well as in Scione (5.32.1). Before that, equivalent measures had been envi-
sioned for Mytilene, but that decision was revoked. Imperialist measures
had worsened, no doubt owing to anger about the revolts. But Melos had
not been a city in revolt.
Here, the situation involves our friend Alcibiades. Not for the under-
taking in Melos! No, we do not know anything about his role. Thucydides
chose to judge the event as characteristic of Athenian imperialism gener-
ally, and never names him. However, in regard to the measures of repres-
sion, other historians have.
The speech falsely attributed to Andocides declares, in a passage of
great eloquence, that it was Alcibiades who had “proposed enslaving the
population” (Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 21); and Plutarch affi rms that he
“had spoken out in support of the decree” (16.6). Plutarch even says that
he was “primarily responsible” for the massacre of the Melians. As I have
already reported, Alcibiades took a Melian woman as a slave, with whom
he had a child. 4 While it is not at all clear that he had a part in the decision about the expedition, he could still have encouraged a tight hold on the
island. And he must have been proud of such a harsh policy as confi rming
Athenian power and Spartan apathy.
But that is not all! He had more reasons to feel proud of these pri-
vate successes. It is almost certainly in this same year of 416 that he won
the brilliant Olympic victories and caused a sensation in Greece. 5 The memory of that would have been very fresh when, in the summer of 415,
Nicias is seen in Thucydides’s work as fi ercely critical of these successes
and the arrogance they produced: “He wants to dazzle us with the luxury
of his stable.”
In every respect, at the end of 416 Alcibiades has good reason to be
content with his life and confi dent about his future.
Too content, maybe? Too confi dent?
In any case, out of all this grew his great ambition. And to begin, he
threw himself into the Athenian effort to conquer Sicily.
4. See above, chapter 2.
5. See above, chapter 2.
Sicily
Map 2.
56 Chapter
4
To us, the idea seems almost incredible. This little city of Athens, with its
resources at the time, seeking to subjugate a large and distant island? The
thought of such an undertaking reveals Athens’ maritime strength at that
time as well as its authority in the Greek world.
In fact, Athens’ interest in the large island was not new. We should remem-
ber that Sicily was occupied at the time by numerous Greek colonies from
different cities and belonging to different ethnicities; they quarreled among
themselves frequently. A city like Athens, mistress of the sea, could hardly
disregard these quarrels since the island was at the time the largest producer
of wheat in the Greek world. Even if Athenian imperialism were not primar-
ily based on her economic needs, those feuds could not be ignored.
At the beginning of the fi fth century, Themistocles, who launched the
policy of Athenian maritime expansion, had also turned his eyes to Sicily.
Not to conquer it, certainly, but to get involved there and to develop ties.
There he is, yet another individual who serves as precedent and model
for Alcibiades. Two of Themistocles’s daughters bore the eloquent names
of Sybaris and Italy. He seems to have been in a fi ght with the tyrant
of Syracuse and considered, when he was forced to leave Athens, taking
refuge in Sicily. Later, Pericles showed renewed interest and established
alliances in Sicily, while also presiding over the founding of a vast Panhel-
lenic colony at Thourioi in southern Italy.
This interest did not end with Pericles’s death. Athens had allies in
Sicily, like Segesta (or Egesta, near Palermo) and Leontini (between Cata-
nia and Syracuse). These allies appealed to Athens, furnishing a pretext.
Moreover, Athens was wary of Syracuse, the large city in the eastern part
of Sicily, founded long ago by the Corinthians. At the same time Athens
was defeating the Persians at Salamis, Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, defeated
the Carthaginians at Himera. The tyrants of that city had kept a brilliant
court, visited by Pindar and Aeschylus. The tyrants were gone but the city
was still powerful. And Athens was suspicious of its ambitions.
Even during the war, Athens had not neglected Sicily. The fi rst expedi-
tion to Sicily was a model, one that prefi gured the opportunities and risks
of Athenian ambition in 415.
That was in 427, 6 and Athens sent twenty ships to Sicily. The Leon-
tines, who were Ionians, found themselves in diffi culty in Syracuse and
6. Thucydides 3.86–88.
The
Grand
Design 57
appealed to Athens for help. Thucydides is specifi c: “The Athenians sent
it upon the plea of their common descent, but in reality to prevent the
exportation of Sicilian corn to the Peloponnese and to test the possibility
of bringing Sicily into subjection.”
It is clear what happened; we can understand this opportunism, born
of the combination of local confl icts and ambition, always present in
Athenian hearts.
We also recognize the risks inherent in this type of undertaking.
Initially, everything went quite well in the fi rst expedition. The Athe-
nians established themselves at Rhegium, opposite Sicily, and worked lo-
cally, rallying Messina to their side (3.90) 7 and removing from Syracuse the Sicels, a non-Greek people (3.103). At the end of the next winter, Athens, at the request of its all
ies, even decided to send reinforcements, with
forty ships. These ships were delayed, and the Syracusans took advantage
of that time to resume their offensive (4.24). Several attempts were made
in the straits of Messina, and later to the north, near Naxos. But nothing
decisive occurred, until the summer of 424. This ended the fi rst Athenian
attempt, in a noteworthy way. Thucydides devoted a major account and
even a speech to the event.
Syracuse had not neglected diplomacy. Soon all the Sicilian cities that
had been at war with each other held an important congress at Gela,
at the southern end of the island, at which the delegate from Syracuse,
Hermocrates, spoke to an attentive gathering. Hermocrates was to pre-
side over the future of Syracuse for many years and would become one of
Athens’ most resolute and effective enemies. At the congress of Gela (one
is tempted to write “the Gela summit”), Hermocrates spoke on behalf of
unity. He condemned wars in which Sicilian cities tore each other apart
and showed that their divisions were playing into the hands of Athens: the
presence of Athens should encourage all the cities to unite.
His theme was clear, emphatic, and brief: “There is also the question
whether we have still time to save Sicily, the whole of which in my opin-
ion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought to fi nd in the name
of that people more imperious arguments for peace than any which I can
advance, when we see the fi rst power in Hellas watching our mistakes
7. Messina would revert to Syracuse the next year, following a Syracusan expedition (4.1).
58 Chapter
4
with the few ships that she has at present in our waters, and under the fair
name of alliance speciously seeking to exploit the natural hostility that
exists between us.” 8 And later: “The attack in question is not inspired by
hatred of one or two nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in
Sicily, the common property of us all.” 9
The common good, a united Sicily: that was his goal. He advocated for
good relations based on common interests, speaking of people who are
“neighbors, who live in the same country, are girt by the same sea, and go
by the same name of Sicilians” (4.64.3).
This shows that Athenian ambitions in Sicily were nothing new, and