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The Life of Alcibiades

Page 10

by Jacqueline de Romilly


  the possibilities for resistance were also well grounded. Thucydides would

  not have put such emphasis on this episode had he not seen it as a warn-

  ing, one that went unheeded by Athens in 415.

  The result? At Gela, Hermocrates was heard. The cities came to an

  agreement. They informed the Athenian leaders, who could only approve,

  and depart.

  On their return to Athens, however, they were exiled and fi ned “for

  having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. So

  thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the Athenians that noth-

  ing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible

  and what was impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate, it

  mattered not. The reason for this was their general extraordinary success,

  which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.” 10

  This account of the fi rst expedition ended as it began, returning to

  the idea that beyond an interest in Sicily’s rich agriculture, there was one

  driving force always at work: 11 inherent in Athenian imperialism was the need to expand.

  At fi rst Athens’ empire emerged spontaneously and naturally. With its

  fl eet, Athens had played an important role in the war against the barbar-

  ians. And afterward, Athens retained prominence among its allies, many

  8. 4.60.1. The “natural” hostility refers to that between races, Ionian and Dorian.

  Thucydides always insists on the fact that the hostility, though real, served more as a pretext than an actual reason, and counted for less than the interplay of fear and ambition.

  9. 4.61.3.

  10. 4.65.

  11. Thucydides’s words echoed other passages used elsewhere to characterize Athenian

  ambition.

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  of whom preferred to pay tribute money rather than resist Athenian ac-

  tions. The result: Athens grew stronger. In a short time, most of its al-

  lies became subjects. Whenever one of them sought to defect, its inferior

  strength forced it fi nally to submit; then it was reduced further. At the be-

  ginning of the Peloponnesian War Athens thus commanded, with varying

  degrees of obedience, almost all the islanders; and it was constantly alert

  to retain their respect. Pericles knew this: he had said to the Athenians,

  speaking of the empire, that they could never recede: “For what you hold

  is . . . a tyranny; to take it was perhaps wrong, but to let it go is unsafe”

  (2.63.2). That was just the weapon Sparta used against Athens, encourag-

  ing defections everywhere. And that is why Athens, afraid of defections,

  became increasingly repressive.

  But Pericles was not talking about conquest. On the contrary, he had

  warned the Athenians, promising them victory, but on one condition: that

  “you can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the con-

  duct of the war, and will abstain from willfully involving yourselves in

  other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the

  enemy’s devices” (1.144.1). He knew that temptation. He knew, as the

  Athenian delegates explained in book 1, that an envied power always tried

  to strengthen itself. And he knew the Athenian character: “addicted to in-

  novation and their designs are characterized by swiftness,” “adventurous

  beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger

  they are sanguine.” 12 He did not trust them.

  Pericles, however, had been dead for some fi fteen years. During that

  time, Athenian imperialism, though checked somewhat by the war, had

  strengthened and hardened. And at that time, people thought the war was

  over.

  What an opportunity for Alcibiades. He was the great man of the mo-

  ment, with his Olympic victories. He wanted even more glory. He wanted

  to surpass Themistocles. He became excited about the idea of an expedi-

  tion to the west, a great expedition, giving Athens a new far-off fi eld of

  domination with infi nite possibilities. His ideas resonated in an Athens

  captivated by glory and adventure. The young people joined him, but they

  12. These passages parallel those between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, offered

  by the Corinthians in 1.70.2; the preceding idea resumes the Athenians’ line of argument in 1.75–76.

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  were not alone. Plutarch offers a vivid description of the many Athenians

  who, “in the wrestling schools and alcoves . . . could commonly be seen

  sitting and mapping out the shape of Sicily and the position of Libya and

  Carthage.” 13 The mention of Libya and Carthage here is important, and we will come back to it. These fantasies became part of a popular day-dream. For or against, everyone was talking about the possibility of an

  expedition and became fascinated by the distant island. In Euripides’s Tro-

  jan Women , a play written at just this time, the poet sharply condemned

  offensive wars; and even in that play there is a reference to Sicily: “the

  land of Etna” is among the places to which the captive women imagine

  being sent. 14

  This curiosity implies a lot of discussion certainly; but for most people

  it was linked to a strong desire to go to Sicily. Thucydides says as much,

  and states the reasons for it, in the explanations he offers for the vote that

  determined the decision. It refl ected the many animating desires at work:

  “Everyone fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that

  they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at

  all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime

  of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and the soldiery was

  to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a

  never ending fund of pay for the future” (6.24.3). For Alcibiades, beyond

  such material benefi ts was glory! The glory of bringing Athens its greatest

  conquest, of leading and conquering and forever eclipsing all the others.

  Conquest? Oh, yes, that is the right word. It marks a departure from

  everything that went before. However, there are two qualifi cations. First,

  for the Greeks of that time, conquest did not have its modern meaning.

  Greeks never imagined making such distant territory part of their country:

  the idea of the city and the size of the city made that impossible. Thus, it

  was a matter of imposing authority, of ruling and protecting the interests

  of Athens, commanding respect and material assistance. But even in that

  form, the idea of conquest was never offi cially sanctioned. The goal of

  the expedition was, more modestly, to aid the people of Segesta who were

  13. Plutarch, Alcibiades 17; see also Nicias 12. The source appears to have been the historian Timaeus (fourth century BCE).

  14. Euripides, Trojan Women 220. This locale does not fi gure among the usual lists of possible places of exile.

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  being threatened by Selinunte, and, if possible, to reestablish the Leontines

  who had been forced out by Syracuse. Another goal was, according to

  charmingly vague wording, “to order all other matters in Sicily as they

  should deem best for the interests of Athens” (
6.8.2).

  This nice euphemism fooled no one, and Thucydides was careful to

  make the facts clear: his account of the expedition began by recalling the

  importance of the island and the history of its cities. Then he went on:

  “Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily,

  and such is the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now

  bent upon invading, being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole,

  although they had also the specious design of aiding their kindred and other

  allies on the island” (6.6.1). “Conquering the whole” (τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι): the

  words are clear. Later, speaking of Nicias (who opposed the expedition): he

  “thought that the state was not well-advised, but upon a slight and specious

  pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter

  to achieve” (6.8.4; the word he used was ephiesthai, “to covet a good”).

  That was indeed an ambitious plan. And yet beyond this one, Alcibi-

  ades was secretly planning another, even more grandiose, that he would

  not reveal to Athens and that became known only much later. Behind his

  ostensible goal was his desire to conquer the island; but behind this plan,

  in his cheerful ambition, fl oated the “greater plan.” Unlike those Rus-

  sian dolls that contain smaller and smaller dolls, Alcibiades’s ambition

  revealed ever more immense intentions.

  First, though, he had to obtain approval by the Assembly of the people

  for his expedition, the Sicilian expedition.

  This was monumental: Athens was betting its future. Thucydides’s work

  devotes two whole books to the expedition, omitting nothing in order to

  bring that decision to life and to make us understand the stakes.

  At fi rst, everything was simple; the project was quickly approved. The

  situation had been similar in 427: an ally, Segesta, had requested Athens’

  aid; it had offered money (managing, with a little sleight of hand, to ap-

  pear richer than it was), and the Assembly had approved sending sixty

  ships under the command of three men given full authority: Alcibiades,

  Nicias, and Lamachus.

  It was settled. But Nicias, seeing clearly the dangers that lay behind the

  overly broad and vague objectives, was appalled by the risks Athens was

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  taking. He used a subsequent session of the Assembly, supposedly to deal

  with armaments, to raise the question of the whole affair once more.

  This was irregular, and he knew it. 15 In a fi tting fi nal effort, he appealed to the president of the gathering in moving terms: “If you are afraid to

  move the question again, consider that a violation of the law cannot with

  so many abettors, incur any charge, that you will be the physician of your

  misguided city, and that the virtue of men in offi ce is briefl y this, to do

  their country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they

  can avoid” (6.14).

  In these fi nal words, we hear an echo of the Hippocratic oath. One can

  only be touched by the nobility of this appeal and by the pathos that it

  gives the situation. The pathos is all the more touching for the reader who

  knows the disastrous failure that results from the expedition, and how

  hard Nicias tried to prevent it. However, apart from the pathos, Nicias’s

  appeal helps us understand two things. It shows fi rst how skillfully Alcibi-

  ades had proceeded, taking Nicias and his friends by surprise and obtain-

  ing a vote the scope of which he never revealed. Moreover, it shows that

  this time Alcibiades would have the strength of his conviction; he would

  have to go to the heart of the matter.

  Thucydides provided the two main speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades,

  followed by Nicias’s fi nal pitch (6.8–24). These are of course not the exact

  words of the actual speeches, but even so, one feels that the speakers are pres-

  ent, not only from the arguments that each would advance, but also from the

  two personalities, from their tones, their temperaments, and their aspirations.

  Moreover, he included personal attacks. Nicias attacked Alcibiades for

  his youth and his ambition. He did not mince words: “And if there be

  any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges you to

  make the expedition, merely for ends of his own—especially if he is still

  too young to command—who seeks to be admired for the stud of horses,

  but on account of heavy expenses hopes for some profi t from his appoint-

  ment, do not allow such a one to maintain his private splendor at his

  country’s risk, but remember that such persons injure the public fortune

  15. There was one recent precedent: in 428, Athenians voted for the brutal suppres-

  sion of Mytilene; the next day, with the verdict weighing on them, the Assembly recon-

  vened and reversed the decision. The reversal was immediate, called for by the majority

  of citizens (3.36.5).

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  while they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance,

  and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand” (6.12.2).

  These young people are described as having come at the summons of

  that very individual. And as we have previously shown, Alcibiades was

  proud to claim to represent the young. 16 Then turning, like Nicias, to an example borrowed from medicine (in this case, a balanced diet), he

  spoke for a harmonious combination of young and old. He had noth-

  ing but scorn for Nicias’s criticisms and his “battle between young and

  old”; but he allowed his scorn to come across without slipping into actual

  insolence.

  Similarly, he acknowledged the stable of racehorses and his Olympic

  victories. What is more, he started with that. As shown in chapter 2,

  he boasted that the prestige he brought to the city had strengthened it

  abroad. He even provided a glimpse into that confi dent pride when he

  stated: “Nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position should

  refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his

  misfortunes all to himself” (6.16.4). That astonishing Alcibiades! Daring

  to speak in that way before the people! Yes, he admitted to being fi rst,

  superior to all. And he admitted that this renown aroused jealousy one

  minute and admiration the next.

  This is all about Alcibiades—his life, athletic victories, and awareness

  of his superiority. But we cannot help remarking that there is some cor-

  respondence between Alcibiades’s pride and that of Athens, between the

  ambition of the man and the imperialism of the city.

  It was Pericles who said, according to Thucydides, “Hatred and un-

  popularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired

  to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it

  for the highest objects. Hatred also is short lived; but that which makes

  the splendor of the present and the glory of the future remains for ever

  unforgotten” (2.64.5). That was the air Alcibiades breathed, and he ap-

  plied that spirit to his own life. He was, as an individual, the image of

  Athens.

  This is clearly why, during t
he rest of his speech, he is the bold defender

  of Athenian imperialism.

  16 . See above, chapter 1.

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  Nicias of course stood for consideration of the chances of success and

  risks of failure. Alcibiades knew his case and argued with precision. Thus,

  the reader is presented with the same clear picture of the whole argument

  that the Assembly once had.

  First the risks: Nicias emphasized them strongly. The peace was not

  secure; the treaty included several areas of arbitration, and all the allies of

  Sparta had not ratifi ed it; Sparta herself had been humiliated and would

  seize the opportunity to reverse the situation. It was thus absurd to leave

  in Greece itself so many enemies and to go looking for others whom Ath-

  ens could never truly master even if it were victorious. Syracuse’s rule

  in Sicily was not a danger for Athens. 17 Athens should consolidate her empire in those places where it was still fragile and rebuild her strength,

  weakened by war and the plague. And he appealed for prudence, recalling

  the famous maxim about “how rarely success is gained by wishing and

  how often by forecast” (6.13.1).

  Nicias lays out the problems and speaks as a man of experience. Alcibi-

  ades is going to answer with vigor, and he speaks with confi dence.

  In his analysis of the facts, he has some reasons. He recalls that, thanks

  to the Argive alliance and despite the Spartan victory at Mantinea, Athens

  has nothing to fear from the Lacedaemonians: “They have never since

  fully recovered confi dence” (6.16.6). As for the cities in Sicily, they con-

  sist of heterogeneous and weak people who would be unable to form a

  real union; moreover, we can rely on the barbarians there. Then, with

  regard to Sparta, he returns to the theory so dear to Pericles, saying that

  at the very worst the Lacedaemonians could invade Attica, “but they can

  never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that

  is a match for them” (6.17.8). He addresses every detail. Most of all he

  explains—and this is the point of the speech—that this expedition, if we

  can do it, is inscribed in the great tradition of Athens. There we have him,

  Alcibiades arguing loud and clear for imperialism. For him, imperialism

  means progress, action, moving ahead.

 

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