Our Great Hearted Men

by Peter Brune

  The only reports received here were from our Liaison officer with the 119th American regiment. At 7.5 a.m. he reported that the attack was progressing well; Tanks and Troops were across the HINDENBURG SUPPORT LINE . . . The Support Battalions were reported to be ‘mopping up’ the MAIN HINDENBURG LINE.28

  At around 11.00 am, just as the fog began to clear, the 15th Brigade reached the southern portion of the Bellicourt Tunnel—which was about halfway to the American Green Line objective—and found scattered and leaderless groups of Americans who ‘did not seem to know anything of the situation and could not say where their front line was’.29 As this position was being subjected to intense shell fire and enfiladed machine gun fire from the north, the 58th and 57th battalions—still with a company of the right-flank 3rd Division 11th Brigade’s 44th Battalion—were forced to dig in and consolidate. In addition, parties of Americans were taken into the 15th Brigade’s 58th and 57th Battalions. The whereabouts of their original left-flank 59th Battalion was unknown. It transpired that the 59th Battalion had formed a joint HQ with the 3rd Division’s 44th Battalion (less one company), and were held up by enfilading machine gun fire to their north.

  After receiving orders to resume their advance, the COs of the 57th and 58th Battalion planned an attack for 3.00 pm to advance to, and clear, the village of Estrées. The assault was to be supported by a creeping barrage, four tanks and six Whippet Tanks. Given the 59th Battalion was held up, the 57th (right flank) and 58th (left flank) were to stage the attack, with the 59th ordered to provide flank protection on the left.

  The attack did not go according to plan. As the two Battalions went forward the artillery barrage failed to ‘fall in the place arranged’ and a 77-mm gun deployed on the Le Catelet–Nauroy Line knocked out all four tanks and four of the six Whippet Tanks in about fifteen minutes.30 Two tank reports from the 8th Tank Battalion illustrate their ability to deal with machine gun posts but their difficulties in the face of improved German anti-tank fire. Lieutenant Harding in Tank 9199:

  I moved in front of Infantry in an Easterly direction. Hostile shelling was very severe. The enemies’ defence consisted of many machine gun nests. I was able to pick out three of these and used my 6 pdr gun with effect. The Infantry were unable to move forward in face of fierce MG fire. I accordingly returned to Infantry in order that I might best form an idea what part of enemies’ defence was giving most trouble. The MG fire seemed to be coming from all directions. I moved forward again in the direction of Cabaret Wood . . . and fired on a light field gun position there. Before I could come within near range my tank was hit on the left idle sprocket. I decided to withdraw from action, which I did. I acquainted the Infantry of my intention and reason and then moved back . . . I was able to bring my tank to the rallying point but on arrival my left track broke and fell off. Further movement was thus impossible.31

  During this engagement, Harding’s tank managed to expend some 40 rounds of 6-pounder ammunition and 60 rounds of machine gun fire, and was in action for 45 minutes. Second-Lieutenant Dunlop in Tank 9385 was attached to the 58th Battalion:

  . . . picked up the infantry and went over the bank in front of them. As soon as we appeared over the bank the enemy machine guns opened up. We went along in a direction leading left of the Cabaret Wood Farm. When the enemy infantry saw the tank they left their trench and retreated under the fire of all the possible guns of the tank, my driver firing with his revolver whenever a slight cessation of enemy fire permitted. During the whole of the time from leaving the bank we were under direct fire from enemy field guns in the Farm and on our left. On the way up and before we crossed the enemy front line, a shell came through the left sponson and burst in the right hand side slightly wounding two of the crew. They got into the right side and we carried on doing as much damage as possible to the retreating infantry and the gunners at the Farm. We crossed the trench and on reaching a point level with the Farm I asked for news of the movement of our own infantry and was told they were not following up behind, so I asked my driver to return. On our way back the left track was clipped by a shell but not sufficiently damaged to stop us. Fortunately we managed to get fairly close to our front line before we were finally put out of action altogether by a shell smashing up the right track. Shells were dropping all round the tank so I gave orders to evacuate. I saw all my crew out and they managed to reach our front line in spite of shells and machine gun fire.32

  Lieutenant Dunlop’s tank expended some 800 rounds of machine gun fire, covered two miles, and suffered three casualties.

  Faced by heavy casualties, particularly to officers, both battalion commanders ordered their men to hold and consolidate their positions in depth on the Le Catelet–Nauroy support trench line, which lay about halfway between the Hindenburg Main Line and the American Green Line objective. By around 7.00 pm that night the 58th Battalion reported that it had made contact with the 57th on its right, and had, in unison with a number of Americans and a company of the left-flank 44th Battalion, formed a defensive flank. The 58th Battalion Report on Operations also made a startling revelation:

  An incident occurred during the evening which goes to prove that the Americans in their advance did not mop up completely as the Bearer Sub-Division of the 15th Field Ambulance, on entering a dug-out, found 2 enemy Officers and 40 other ranks occupying same. This dug-out was situated behind my Battalion Headquarters.33

  With the 5th AIF Division thus engaged, on its left or northern flank, it will be remembered that the 27th Division had failed in its attempt to capture the Knoll, Gillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm two days earlier, which was Monash’s planned start line for its 29 September assault. Thus, on the 29th it faced two enormous challenges. First, it had to cross over 1000 yards of ground without artillery support, as unknown numbers of stranded Americans were perceived to be scattered across that ground. Second, it was to then seize a further 4500 yards to gain its Green Line objective.

  At 5.50 am the Americans crossed their start line. If the absence of artillery support was to be a crippling factor in their progress even before they had crossed that line, then the fate of their tank support only added to their impending disaster. As the infantry began the advance, 34 of the allotted 40 tanks, mainly from the 301st Tank Battalion, accompanied them, as six had failed to reach their start line. Then, of the remaining 34, two were almost immediately lost in an old British minefield containing 600 mines; heavy anti-tank fire from Gillemont Farm accounted for a further fourteen; and poor navigation skills caused yet others to lose direction in the smoke and mist. In the event only one reached the Tunnel Line.

  What then transpired for the 27th American Division is a classic example of a breakdown in the 1918 interlocking-arms doctrine for infantry support, where the emphasis was on firepower not manpower. The absence of artillery support told heavily on the tanks, which in turn dramatically affected their infantry support role. While the Americans and their supporting tanks made much of their difficulty in navigation, it is left to the reader to contemplate the additional infantry casualties that would have resulted had that fog and mist screen not been present. The conditions were not the problem; it was rather the Americans’ total inexperience in navigation. Major-General Montgomery, in his The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the hundred Days, made the point that the conditions on this day were ‘almost a replica of the morning of August 8th’.34

  If the Americans suffered from a lack of a tactical doctrine, then other worrying issues soon became apparent: supply and administration. Charles Bean: ‘In this fighting their water, rations, and ammunition arrived irregularly, sometimes not at all. Some troops who had been without food for a day returned to obtain it. In action, the men without leaders were lost, helpless and listless.’35

  On 29 September the AIF 3rd Division (Major-General Gellibrand) had the task of following up the 27th American Division and then ‘leapfrogging’ through it on the Green Line at 11.00 am. It was then to assault and capture its segment of the d
istant Red Line. Gellibrand allotted his 10th Brigade (Brigadier-General McNicoll) the left or northern flank, his 11th Brigade (Brigadier-General Cannan) the right flank, and the 9th Brigade (Brigadier-General Goddard) was to act as reserve.

  When the right or southern flank 3rd Division’s 11th Brigade advanced it soon became apparent that the American 27th Division attack had foundered. As the 11th Brigade’s left-flank 41st Battalion reached the Benjamin Post trench system—which was near the 27th American Division start line for that day—‘it became evident that things were not going well.’36 It was met with intense machine gun, artillery and sniper fire, which drove them into that trench system. The 41st Battalion would later report that:

  . . . a number of Americans appeared through the mist and got into the Benjamin Post trench system. This number rapidly increased and it was learned that they had been definitely checked on the line GILLEMONT–QUENNEMONT, had suffered very heavily, and it was apparent their morale and organisation no longer existed as a fighting Unit.37

  A striking feature of the subsequent attempt by the 41st Battalion to then move forward by outflanking and mopping up machine gun posts was the high incidence of officer casualties through machine gun and sniper fire. The Battalion would later state that their nine officers were lost as a result of their desire to move forward to gather intelligence and run their battle. In the face of such fire they suffered accordingly.

  The 44th Battalion on the 11th Brigade’s right flank was able to advance and make contact with the 15th Brigade’s 58th Battalion. By 11.00 am that morning the 11th Brigade found that its tank support had come under heavy fire and that no ‘live’ tanks were then operating on its front.

  On the 3rd Division’s left or northern flank the 10th Brigade advanced to its start line with its 40th Battalion on the left or northern flank, its 39th in the centre, its 38th Battalion on the right and its 37th Battalion in reserve. As the Battalions approached their start line they also came under heavy, direct fire from machine guns and 77-mm guns; their eight supporting tanks were soon either knocked out by shell fire or mines; and, with some American troops who had passed beyond the Gillemont Trench Line and others in unknown locations ahead of them, they were unable to employ their field artillery. Under direct observation from well-sited German machine gun posts and concrete dugouts, their movement was restricted to trenches and patrolling in an effort to advance.

  Major-General Gellibrand was informed at 9.50 am that his 10th and 11th Brigades had been held up. It is at this point that questionable intelligence and poor communication came into play. When, at around 10.30 am the 10th and 11th Brigades again reported their positions to 3rd Division HQ, Gellibrand had already left to visit the front and confer with his two brigadiers. In his absence, the Division’s GSO 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Jess, advised Brigadiers Cannan and McNicoll to attempt to employ strong patrolling rather than attacks in strength on the German posts and dugouts. Cannan and McNicoll had anticipated this order and had already begun that process. Jess, also aware that the much more successful advance on the 5th Division’s front offered an opportunity for an outflanking movement against the Germans opposing 3rd Division, ordered the 9th Brigade to prepare for this possibility.

  Meanwhile, at the Australian Corps HQ Monash and Blamey were forming a very different interpretation of events. Charles Bean:

  About 11 a.m. there reached Monash an airman’s report that Americans had been seen all along their objective. Ground flares had been observed (it said) in Gouy. Messages from General Brand and from other senior Australians with the American staff, said that the 27th Division had undoubtedly reached the Tunnel mound, but that how much further they had gone was unknown.38

  At 1.10 pm on 29 September, after General Gellibrand had returned to 3rd Division HQ from his visit to the front and his two brigade commanders, he spoke to Blamey at Corps HQ. The two had a spirited discussion. In essence, Blamey argued that the Germans facing 3rd Division were ‘isolated’ posts that merely required ‘mopping up’, and that elements of the American 27th Division had gained the Green Line.

  Gellibrand knew better. He told Blamey that far from facing a task of ‘mopping up’, his Division faced considerable German strength on the American start line. His evidence was compelling. He informed Blamey that very significant numbers of Americans had returned to that line; that the Germans had excellent observation over his northern front from the high ground west of Quennemont Farm; that American troops and tank officers had informed him that the Americans were a long way from the Green Line; and that planes had flown over his troops on the start line requesting signals. Despite the fact that Gellibrand informed Blamey that he had just returned from the front—and might have added that he had conferred with his two brigadiers—Blamey remained unconvinced.39 Peter Sadler, in his biography of Gellibrand, has given a pithy summation of the divergence of opinion between Gellibrand and Blamey: ‘Here was a classic example of one person knowing what the situation was, because he had studied it first hand, and another believing unconfirmed reports that justified his preconceptions.’40

  In the end, the 3rd Division was ordered to stage a further frontal assault against the German defences with tank support at 3.00 pm. Given the still-unclear position of forward American troops, yet again the Division was forced to advance without artillery and machine gun support. When the attack went in its soldiers ‘were met with such machine gun and shell fire that the continuation of the advance was not possible during daylight’.41 Although the advance only gained a few hundred yards, the long-sought-after prize of Gillemont Farm was taken.

  The ground gained by the Fourth Army attack upon the Hindenburg Main Line on 29 September markedly decreased in length and area as it moved northwards. In this, the reasons came down to the quality of the troops and the level of their support. The attack by the 46th (Midland) Division and their supporting 32nd Division was magnificently supported by concentrated and accurate artillery fire on the canal, and a heavy and accurate creeping barrage closely followed up by the infantry. Further, the innovative crossing of the canal obstacle allowed concentration of force and a resultant securing of the objective. On the American 30th Division front their inexperience was, to a large measure, compensated for by the artillery support and the competence of the following 5th Division, which allowed for limited success. However, the chances of success for the American 27th Division were based on the false assumptions that they would capture the start line on 27 September and that they would reach their Green Line objective without artillery support on 29 September. And a consequence of that error was felt not only by the 27th Division but by the AIF 3rd Division. Gunner James Armitage, 30th Battery, 8th AFA Brigade, was a stunned onlooker to the events on that day:

  . . . we pulled our guns out and moved northward back along the same gully past Roisel and camped in an open field near Hesbecourt and Templeux-le-Guerard. Before daylight we were moving back up into the line equipped as horse artillery. All blankets and gear were left behind and rations strapped to each gun limber. We passed through Hargicourt and the whole 8th Artillery Brigade was assembled in a big gully nearby. Here we waited for the attack to develop. We were to leap frog and pass through the Americans who were attacking first (our first experience of actually actively supporting the Yank). The line was only over the rise in front of us. We were to dash out and into action before the Hun could recover from the first onslaught.

  At last we got the order to advance . . . We immediately came into a hail of machine gun fire . . . Our horses were getting hit and we had to retire hastily.

  We now discovered that the Americans had advanced right through the German first defences without stopping to clear out the dugouts and machine gun pockets and had gone onto their second line of defence sending their prisoners, unescorted, to the rear. These prisoners, finding their first line defences still occupied by a number of Germans, rallied and reinforced their comrades. The result was the Americans found themselves between two lines of G
erman trenches, cut off from both retreat and reinforcements by a barrage of reformed German machine guns. This was a horrible example of bad fire discipline and cost a lot of lives. We could not give support because we were too close to fire from cover and would have been literally mown down trying to site our guns on top of the ridge. We had to camp the night in some old trenches.42

  Armitage could not have then known that any support he might later have given was denied the Americans and Australians by orders.

  Prior and Wilson have recorded that Rawlinson and Monash were scathing in their criticism of the American effort on 29 September. They have quoted Rawlinson’s diary as recording that he feared that the Americans had taken heavy casualties ‘but it is their own fault’.43 And in summary they have identified the consequences of an infantry assault against strong enemy positions without artillery support: ‘There were any number of precedents in this war for failure under such circumstances. On this occasion the originators of the fiasco were not the hapless American troops or their commanders but Rawlinson and Monash.’44

  By the end of 29 September the Fourth Army’s British 46th Division, supported by the 32nd, had breached the canal from Le Tronquoy to Riqueval and captured their section of the Hindenburg Main Line and its support line to a depth of 6000 yards. To its north, the American 30th Division and the AIF 5th Division’s front had just reached the second Nauroy–Le Catelet Line, but as that line wound its way northwards to the 27th American and 3rd Division front, it dramatically wound westwards, or backwards, to the American start line of that fateful day.