Our Great Hearted Men

by Peter Brune

  During the late afternoon, light rain began to fall, which intensified during the night. With typical administrative efficiency, and despite casualties to its Transport and Quartermaster personnel in transit, the AIF Battalions were furnished with a hot meal, a warm drink—and in some cases rum—late on that rain-soaked night and in the early hours of the morning. Those Americans who had managed to join the AIF 3rd Division during that day’s confused fighting were also supplied.

  General Rawlinson’s orders for 30 September were that the IX Corps in the south was to capture the high ground to its north-east and then move on Joncourt, so as to assist the Australian Corps right flank. In the centre, the Australian Corps was to take over the advance, with the Americans ordered to withdraw to the rear to reorganise and rest. The 3rd and 5th AIF Divisions were ordered to advance in a north-easterly direction. On the northern flank, the 3rd Division’s objectives were the tunnel entrance, the Knob and the village of Bony, which would secure that northern end of the Hindenburg Main Line. The 5th Division had three tasks: the newly deployed 14th Brigade was to attack northwards along Railway Ridge to capture a portion of the Le Catelet Line; the 15th Brigade was to occupy that gained ground and later thrust eastwards; and the right-flank 8th Brigade was to move on Joncourt in unison with its right-flank British IX Corps advance.

  ***

  On 30 September 1918, on the far right or southern 5th AIF Division flank, its 8th Brigade’s attempt to advance was met with heavy machine gun fire from the north. The only ground gained that day was by the Brigade’s 32nd Battalion, which, having a secure and advancing British 32nd Division right flank, was able to make some 500 yards before digging in. During that morning Lance-Corporal Len Clarkson became a casualty. His letter to his parents, 4 October 1918:

  I am afraid you will have to excuse this terrible scrawl but I don’t feel much like writing as I am very weak and a bit ‘done-in’, but thankful to be alive and out of the war (I hope). I was wounded on the morning of September 30th. We started to advance across open country . . . but the machine gun fire was so heavy that we had to stop and dig ourselves in. Then Fritz opened up on us with whizbangs and one of them landed amongst three of us lying down. I was hit in the right thigh above the knee and cried out for stretcher bearers.

  After some time these chaps arrived (they’re wonderful). They cut off my breeches and plugged up the hole in my leg with bandages, quite a gory job. They looked at the other two but they were dead so they left me to attend to others and there were plenty of them. Then the rain began to pelt down and I felt pretty miserable and scared as the shells were still bursting all around us and I was afraid that I would be hit again (actually I was but only slightly—in the other leg). After a couple of hours the shelling stopped and I waited to be carried out. After what seemed an awful long time along came four Tommie stretcher bearers and they started back with me. We were all scared stiff as we were right out in the open with plenty of shells about but they kept on going and every now and then would put me down for a spell.

  I had the Platoon’s cigarette rations in my pockets and told the Tommies to help themselves which seemed to urge them on a bit as we all wanted to get as far away from Fritz as we could. There seemed to be an awful lot of dead lying about. After they had carried me for what seemed miles they dumped me at an underground C.C.S. (Casualty Clearing Station). This seemed to be full of wounded Germans but the Doctors, seeing that I was an ‘Aussie’ put me on the table before the Jerries and made them wait (I suppose that was fair enough). The place was a shambles and looked like a butcher shop. They plugged my wound again and I was loaded into a Red Cross motor van with 3 others and remember a mighty lot of bumps and that the road seemed pretty rough; every bump hurt a bit. Two of the other fellows were in a bad way and will probably die. Late that night we were loaded into a Red Cross train and it was strange to see Army Nurses and they looked after us like children. They had plenty to do as the train was full of wounded . . . I expect I will be sent to England soon,

  Much love to all,

  Len45

  While the 5th Division’s 8th Brigade was thus employed, on its left the 14th Brigade (Brigadier-General Stewart) was tasked with an attack along that portion of the Le Catelet Line held by the 15th Brigade. It was then to advance along Railway Ridge. The Brigade was to be supported by a creeping artillery barrage from two field artillery brigades, which was timed for zero hour 300 yards ahead of the infantry, and a subsequent advance at a rate of 100 yards every five minutes. The heavy artillery was to concentrate its fire upon the Le Catelet Trench Line.46

  In this 14th Brigade advance the 53rd Battalion was to lead, with the 55th in support 500 yards behind it. The 53rd Battalion’s entry into battle was handicapped by two events. First, ‘the guiding arrangements went amiss, and the Battalion had to find its own way across very difficult country, not previously reconnoitred, and was 15 minutes late in reaching its start line’.47 As the barrage began at 6.00 am, and as the approaching 53rd came under heavy machine gun fire, its well-drilled CO and his soldiers came onto their start line in artillery formation and then reverted to an attack formation. The second problem occurred when it was found that the artillery barrage ‘was not very strong’, and the advance was met with further heavy machine gun fire from Cabaret Farm, the Le Catelet Line and Bony.

  The story of the 14th Brigade’s fighting on 30 September was one of ferocious, close-quarter fighting, where the skill and endeavour of the Section Commander and his troops were pitted against a desperate, skilled and determined enemy who mostly fought to the end. And a feature of that resistance was the high number of German machine guns employed and the preparedness of those manning them to fight to the last. After the 53rd Battalion and its supporting 55th Battalion had gained some ground along the Le Catelet Line, they were met by a fierce counter-attack, that drove them back. At noon efforts were made to bomb the enemy trench line and regain ground, but that and subsequent attempts failed. The Germans counter-attacked again along the Le Catelet Trench Line at 3.00 pm, and in fierce fighting drove the 53rd and 55th Battalions back a further 200 yards. Then the Australians attacked again and retook that lost ground. By late afternoon, with evidence of yet another impending German counter-attack, the 53rd and 55th Battalions were concentrated under the former’s CO and ordered to consolidate a strong flank line extending from their northernmost Le Catelet Line to link up with the 3rd Division’s 44th Battalion on their left. This line was completed around midnight.

  Some measure of the intensity of the hand-to-hand fighting of that day was the fact that while some 70 machine guns, seven 77-mm guns and one 4.2 inch gun were taken, only two German officers and 30 other ranks were captured. A later count of the German dead in the area revealed 200 corpses.48

  In support of its 14th Brigade, the 15th (Brigadier-General Elliott) had occupied and consolidated the limited trench line gained by the 14th Brigade, and had made an unsuccessful attempt to clear the troublesome Cabaret Wood Farm.

  If the 5th Division had endured a tough day’s fighting on the Australian Corps’s right flank, the 30 September operation facing General Gellibrand’s left or northern flank 3rd Division was also formidable. The 3rd Division Report on Operations, 29 September to 2 October 1918:

  The situation regarding the operation of the American Division [the 27th] was still obscure. The enemy was holding strongly those trenches of the portion of the HINDENBURG Line system still in his possession, though during the night his advanced patrols had been pushed back from their forward positions in MACQUINCOURT VALLEY–QUENNEMONT FARM–GILLEMONT FARM, nearer to his front line in the HINDENBURG Line system.

  Command of the Forward Area passed from 27th American Division to Third Division at 3.35 a.m.49

  For his 3rd Division attack on 30 September, Major-General Gellibrand had planned to deploy his fresh 9th Brigade (Brigadier-General Goddard). But when he was ordered at 7.10 pm on 29 September to stage another frontal assault, it became apparen
t that Goddard’s fresh brigade could not cover the necessary distance to its start line on time, especially given the heavy rain and mud of that night. It is a measure of the competence and trust in the AIF command and its junior formations that Gellibrand was able to stage his attack with a mixture of battalions from his three brigades—no mean feat in terms of command, control and cooperation. His plan for 30 September now envisaged a thrust by Brigadier Cannan’s 11th Brigade’s 42nd, 43rd and 35th Battalions upon Bony Ridge, which was to be reinforced by the 9th Brigade’s 33rd and 35th Battalions upon their arrival. Next, the 9th Brigade with its remaining 34th Battalion and the 11th Brigade’s 41st were to finally clear the Hindenburg Outpost Line. The 3rd Division’s left or northern thrust for that day was to be an eastward movement undertaken by Brigadier-General McNicoll’s 10th Brigade. But yet again, there would be no artillery support for the operation, given the still-unknown fate of any stranded Americans. The only concession was permission to shell Bony.

  In its Report on Operations, the 3rd Division would later record that:

  The progress of the attack of the 11th Brigade at 6.0 a.m. was very slow, the enemy fighting stubbornly for each machine gun position or portion of trench; and throughout the whole of this day the 11th Brigade and the patrols of the 10th Brigade were engaged in severe fighting (bayonet, rifle grenades and bombs). The enemy shelling on the portion of the HINDENBURG Line in our possession was very heavy and concentrated and movement, except along the trenches, was practically impossible.50

  As the morning’s fighting progressed, the 9th Brigade signalled that its troops were held up under excellent German observation of their positions and that they required artillery support. Just after midday 3rd Division informed Corps HQ that its 10th and 11th Brigades—and their adjoining 5th Division 14th Brigade—were all stalled at their start lines by heavy machine gun and artillery fire. But late that afternoon there were signs that the enemy’s resolve was weakening. Although Cannan’s 11th Brigade was still held up on Bony Ridge and Stewart’s 14th Brigade on Railway Ridge, patrols of the 9th and 10th Brigades found the last vestiges of German positions on the Hindenburg Outpost Line vacated and promptly occupied them. Despite the fact that heavy machine gun fire from Bony prohibited any further advance, both Brigades now reported that German infantry were evacuating Bony. Apparently the machine gun barrage was screening a German withdrawal.

  That afternoon a further discordant conversation occurred between Monash and Gellibrand. In essence, Monash questioned the frontage of the latter’s attack; he stated that Gellibrand could not be facing significant numbers of enemy troops; questioned his use of his available tank resources; and even disputed the strength of his units. The 3rd Division was warned to prepare for another frontal attack the next day.

  ***

  On the 5th Division’s right or southern Australian Corps flank, the fighting on 30 September had restored some order to the battlefield: the likelihood of still-stranded and surviving Americans was no longer a factor, and the line had been clearly defined and consolidated, which now facilitated a set-piece attack with time to employ concentrated artillery support. Major-General Hobbs now ordered a limited advance, with provision made for exploitation, should the opportunity present itself. The attack was timed for 6.00 am.

  On his southern or left flank his 8th Brigade achieved immediate success. Moving closely behind its creeping barrage, within three hours it had passed through Joncourt, was in contact with the British 32nd Division on its right, and had established a line just in front of the Beaurevoir Line. On the Brigade’s left, the 14th Brigade’s 56th Battalion, with a company of the 53rd in support, managed to move through and to the east of Estrées. The Brigade’s Report on Operations would later identify the ‘excellent barrage provided by the artillery’, the successful ‘co-operation between tanks and infantry’ and the ‘unqualified success’ in establishing contact with its supporting planes.51 Even more rapid success materialised on Brigadier Elliott’s 15th Brigade’s left 5th Division front. He would later report that after employing a 100-round trench mortar barrage upon Cabaret Wood Farm, and then following his 6.00 am artillery barrage, his troops had taken that locality. Elliott concluded his report by mentioning that: ‘The [German] 2nd Guards Division fought well throughout and when CABARET WOOD FARM and a portion of the LE CATELET–NAUROY Line was taken there was at least one dead man to every 2 yards of trench, as well as scattered bodies out in the open.’52

  Early on the morning of 1 October, Major-General Gellibrand, having received earlier reports that numbers of Germans were withdrawing from Bony behind covering machine gun fire, was told that his 10th and 11th Brigades were making progress towards that village. By 10.00 am Bony and its nearby trenches were in their possession. By midday the 3rd Division had reached Bony Point and the Knob, had secured the northern tunnel entrance, and were pushing out patrols in a north-easterly direction towards Le Catelet—‘the whole of the Hindenburg System was in our possession’.53

  Clearly, this German withdrawal was instigated because troops on this front faced the distinct possibility of being outflanked. And there was no possibility of committing reserves—there weren’t any. With the four offensives planned by Foch and Haig all beginning between 26 and 29 September, and raging roughly across a 100mile front, the Germans were stretched to the very limits of not only their resources, but also of their dwindling reserves of energy.

  Gunner James Armitage and his 30th Battery, 8th AFA Brigade moved forward in support of the 3rd Division late that day and witnessed evidence of the fighting around Bony:

  . . . we went into action on the right of Bony; a totally destroyed village which had been the centre of terrific fighting . . . The adjacent wood was thick with American dead, derelict tanks and large numbers of German dead.

  Our position was right among the trenches of the first defences of the German Hindenburg Line. We had to clear large numbers of German dead before we could make a camp.54

  The end came quickly. By 2 October the exhausted 3rd and 5th AIF Divisions had accomplished their tasks. The 5th was now relieved by the 2nd AIF Division and the 3rd by a division of the British XIII Corps. All that remained of the Hindenburg Line was its third and final Beaurevoir Line. The following day, Major-General Rosenthal’s 2nd AIF Division broke through a portion of that obstacle, and on 5 October its 6th Brigade captured Montbrehain—the last Australian operation of the Great War.

  CHAPTER 13

  The equal of any

  On 21 November 1918, Prime Minister Hughes appointed Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash to the London post of Director-General of Repatriation and Demobilisation. It was no small assignment. Ahead lay the task of repatriating 185 000 men and 7000 dependants: roughly ‘95,000 in France and Belgium; 60,000 in Great Britain (staffs, reinforcements, sick, wounded and convalescents); and 30,000 in Egypt and Mesopotamia’.1 Despite a shortage of shipping, Monash accomplished this herculean task in a little over eight months. The 5th Division’s General Hobbs succeeded him in command of the Australian Corps.

  Monash returned to Melbourne on Boxing Day 1919, but his triumphant return was soon marred by the death of his wife on 27 February. In late June 1920 Monash was appointed general manager of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria. By 1930 the commission had established an electricity grid across Victoria and had become a highly successful government utility. He was also instrumental in the construction of the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne. On Armistice Day 1929, Prime Minister James Scullin promoted Monash and Chauvel to the rank of General. Monash died on 8 October 1931 aged 66. Some measure of the respect, and indeed the esteem, in which he was held was demonstrated by the fact that his state funeral drew a crowd of at least 250 000.2

  After the war Monash received no shortage of accolades. Writing in 1938, Liddell Hart claimed that had the Great War continued for another year, Monash would ‘have almost certainly’ risen to command of an Army and ‘he might have even risen to be Commander-in-
Chief’.3 Thirty years later, Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein was even more forthright, asserting that Monash was ‘the best general on the Western Front’ and that the war would have concluded earlier and with fewer casualties had Monash been appointed C-in-C of the BEF.4 In his memoirs, David Lloyd George added still further praise: ‘Monash was, according to the testimony of those who knew well his genius for war and what he accomplished by it, the most resourceful General in the whole of the British Army.’5

  At the time of writing there is a proposal by former Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer and the Saluting Monash Council to have General Sir John Monash promoted to the rank of Field Marshal. In view of the tributes mentioned above, and this most recent attempt for the further promotion of Sir John Monash, it is incumbent upon this work to attempt a balanced summary of both his achievements and his standing as a Great War general.

  Monash had many command strengths. First, as is applicable to any vocation, was his considerable intelligence. But raw intellect is never enough. We have noted the quality, breadth and relative speed of Monash’s education. That intellect, that lateral thinking and speed of thought were all initially harnessed to the rigours of civil engineering, which entailed man management and coordination of resources. Monash’s was thus an acutely disciplined mind. In 1938 Liddell Hart was of the opinion that Monash ‘more than any one [sic] fulfilled the idea which gradually developed in the war—that the scale and nature of operations required a “big business” type of commander, a great constructive and organising brain. His views were as large as his capacity.’6

  A capacity for flexibility of thought and innovation is the next. Monash’s time in England training his 3rd AIF Division was central to his education as a corps commander. It was here that he absorbed the key elements of an evolving BEF doctrine, which involved an all-arms approach to modern warfare. Three examples of his flexibility of thought were his ready adoption of Courage’s tank plan for Hamel, despite the fiasco that had been Bullecourt; his positive response to Blamey and Sinclair-Maclagan’s desire to keep the tanks at Hamel under infantry control and protected by a creeping artillery barrage; and his rapid change of thrust at the Somme in order to assault Mont St Quentin.