The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict_A Very Short Introduction

by Martin Bunton

  6. Urges all States, the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system to continue to support and assist the Palestinian people in the early realization of their right to self-determination, independence and freedom;

  7. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to implement the present resolution and to report to the Assembly within three months on progress made in this regard.

  44th plenary meeting

  29 November 2012

  The basic outlines for the resolution of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict are clear. First, the emergence of two states with clear boundaries based on the 1949 armistice lines (sometimes referred to as the Green Line or the pre-June 1967 border): minor and reciprocal territorial exchanges would leave some heavily populated Jewish settlements located close to the Green Line in situ without compromising the contiguity and viability of the Palestinian state. Second, the sharing of Jerusalem as the capital of both Israel and Palestine: Israel would retain sovereignty over many Jewish settlements close to the Green Line, Palestinians would gain sovereignty over Arab neighbourhoods, and a shared regime would provide both sides with unimpeded access to the respective holy places. Third, a mutually acceptable negotiation of the Palestinian refugee problem: morally a resolution would require acknowledgement of the unjust displacement brought about by Israel’s founding, while practically it would be based on meaningful financial compensation and a ‘return’ to the new state of Palestine, without ruling out a return to homes in Israel so long as the Jewish character of the state was not threatened. Fourth, limitations placed on the Palestinian military forces established to provide security in the new Palestinian state.

  All this means that the parameters of a two-state solution are well known and well rehearsed. And yet the prospects for a two-states solution are in fact fading, undermined by hardliners on both sides who refuse to accept the establishment of two states within the borders of mandate Palestine and by rapidly changing facts on the ground.

  On the Palestinian side, efforts towards a two-states solution have been paralysed by the absence of a unified leadership and coherent strategy. To be sure, long-term centrifugal forces have fragmented Palestinian society into pieces (West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the refugees’ host countries). Most recently, the intra-Palestinian violence in 2007 culminated in the political separation of Fatah in the West Bank and its bitter rival Hamas in the Gaza Strip. An effective Palestinian national strategy for self-determination requires, above all, reconciliation between the nationalist Fatah party, which signed on to bilateral negotiations under international sponsorship, and the Islamist Hamas party, which believes in achieving this goal through confrontation and resistance. Though the United States and Israel have pushed to exclude Hamas, which they consider a terrorist organization, Palestinian unity is essential to the peace process: were a weakened Fatah to reach an agreement with Israel on a two-states solution, it is not clear that it alone has the legitimacy or credibility to sign off on it. Any agreement that a large majority of Palestinians did not accept would play into the hands of Hamas and make such a state tougher to govern effectively. It would not bring about a lasting peace.

  But a unified platform will require subjecting the armed irredentism of Hamas to greater scrutiny, and concluding a genuine ceasefire agreement with Israel. In order for Israelis to conceive of a neighbouring Palestinian state being in their interests, the question of security is paramount. Although Hamas has never offered permanent recognition of Israel, various leaders have pledged acceptance of a long-term truce or hudna in exchange for a two-states solution. Hamas leaders have also said that the party would accept, if not endorse the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders provided that the compromise was approved by a majority of Palestinians in a referendum.

  Many Palestinians are evidently frustrated with both Fatah and Hamas for perpetuating what is viewed as a self-serving division. But reconciling the schism between the two parties, which are themselves internally divided, has been a real challenge given the ongoing diplomatic stalemate. The deepening occupation tends to bolster the legitimacy of Hamas: its military clashes with Israel allow it to be portrayed as heroic in its resistance. Meanwhile Fatah faces increased marginalization, as it struggles to avoid the charge that the Palestinian Authority it heads is little more than a fig leaf for an expanding Israeli occupation.

  On the Israeli side, negotiations towards a two-states solution are paralysed chiefly by the challenge of containing, let alone reversing, settlement construction. The settler population has reached over 500,000, and it is growing at a faster rate than the rest of the Israeli population. To be sure, those settlers who see Jewish sovereignty over all of the territory of mandate Palestine— ‘Greater Israel’—as a Biblical right, as well as a national obligation, are a minority. Nonetheless they are a powerful constituency and, considering how Israel’s system of proportional government allows small parties to make strident demands, they present dangerous political risks to any government that seeks to remove them. One need only consider, for example, the challenge presented by the old city of Hebron where holy sites such as the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob)—a building shared with the Ibrahimi mosque—have been tightly integrated into the settlement infrastructure.

  In 2009 Israeli voters elected Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister for the second time. Later that year, he endorsed the two-states solution in a speech delivered at Bar Ilan University in which he envisaged a future where ‘two peoples live freely, side by side, in amity and mutual respect’. But no plan to bring a state into being was produced, and his vision has in fact been repudiated by the actions taken since then, in particular the significant expansion of settlement construction in East Jerusalem.

  Although the Likud-led government under Netanyahu appeared confident that the stalemated status quo could continue indefinitely, some observers felt that such complacency is dangerous. The years 2011 and 2012 witnessed transformational events that suggest the unravelling of an old order across the Arab world, and carry the potential to regionalize and internationalize the conflict. On the one hand, the Arab uprisings that brought down authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya have drawn closer attention to the Palestinians’ desire for democracy and dignity. The cost to Israel of its occupation of Palestinian land would rise significantly if challenged by an outbreak of another Palestinian uprising. A non-violent mass mobilization, modelled on the popular mobilization of the 1987 intifada, may convince the Israeli government that the vision of a sustainable or comfortable status quo is an illusion. It might also force the United States to make a serious push to bring about a two-states solution. Meanwhile, the November 2012 United Nations resolution that raised the status of Palestine to that of a non-member observer state also carries the potential to shake up the status quo. The resolution reaffirms Israel’s right to peace and security within its pre-1967 borders, but also clearly undermines the legitimacy of Israeli settlements that lie beyond those borders. Furthermore, Palestine’s upgraded status may allow it recourse to the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

  Although it appears to be steadily eroding, there does remain broad public support amongst both Israelis and Palestinians for the prescription of a two-states solution to this century-long conflict. What are lacking are the political will and capacity of Israeli and Palestinian leaders to implement the solution. As long as the leaders are left to fix it themselves, the chances of a diplomatic breakthrough appear low. But in the absence of an urgent shift out of the current diplomatic impasse, the prevailing one-state framework will be further consolidated. Indeed, some observers suspect that Israel’s settlement programme in the West Bank will soon render impossible a two-states solution.

  The expansion of settlements in the decade since the Taba accords has raised grave doubts about whether the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River can in fact be partitioned into two viable sta
tes. Of particular concern is the extent to which the deepening of settlement infrastructure (housing as well as fenced-off access roads) has eaten into the West Bank, blocking the establishment of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state. The core of the West Bank highway infrastructure, for example, now belongs to the Israeli settlements. Moreover, the continued encirclement of East Jerusalem by a ring of Jewish settlements not only isolates it from the rest of the West Bank but also effectively bisects the region into northern and southern parts.

  In the absence of a two-states solution, Israel will face two options. One scenario posits a shared homeland: a binational state with equal rights for the two national communities that evolved from it. Israelis in their homes on the coastal plain would be free to walk the hills of ancient Judea and Samaria while Palestinians who can see the Mediterranean Sea from their hill villages would be able to swim in it. This scenario would cost Israel its dream of a Jewish state. The alternative costs Israel its democracy. The second scenario concludes that Jewish history has been too traumatic for Israelis to accept being a minority but recognizes that the Palestinian Arab population is growing more rapidly than the Jewish Israeli population. Such a situation can only end up consigning Palestinians to autonomous and fragmented Bantustans. In 2007, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert indeed warned that the coming demographic parity of Arabs and Jews in the land of historic Palestine would necessarily carry the danger of forcing Israel to become an apartheid-like state. In 2010, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak echoed the diagnosis: ‘If, and as long as between the Jordan and the sea, there is only one political entity, named Israel, it will end up being either non-Jewish or nondemocratic … If the Palestinians vote in elections, it is a binational state, and if they don’t, it is an apartheid state.’

  Chronology

  1858, 1867:

  Ottoman government passes new land laws during era of Tanzimat reforms.

  1869:

  Suez Canal opens.

  1896:

  Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat published.

  1897:

  Founding of World Zionist Organization at Basel, Switzerland.

  1901:

  Establishment of Jewish National Fund for purchasing land in Palestine.

  1904–14:

  Second aliyah, or wave of Jewish immigration, to Palestine.

  1914:

  Ottoman Empire joins war as ally to Germany.

  1915–16:

  Husayn–McMahon correspondence promises an Arab kingdom to Sharif Husyan of the Hijaz.

  1916:

  Sykes–Picot Agreement divides up the Arab Middle East between Britain and France.

  1917:

  Balfour Declaration supports ‘the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’, though without prejudicing its non-Jewish communities. British troops enter Jerusalem.

  1918:

  Woodrow Wilson proclaims Fourteen Points.

  1920:

  At the San Remo Conference, following their victory over the Ottoman Empire, Allied powers approve British administration of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. First large-scale clashes between Zionists and Arabs in Palestine.

  1923:

  Britain’s mandate over Palestine officially ratified by the League of Nations. British fail to set up an elected legislative council.

  1929:

  Western (Wailing) Wall riots.

  1930:

  Britain issues Passfield White Paper, calling for restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchase and drawing attention to the continued absence of legislative council.

  1931:

  MacDonald letter, in which British Prime Minister revokes key elements of 1930 White Paper.

  1936:

  Palestinian Arab demonstrations spontaneously erupt amid frustration at continued colonial rule and rising Jewish immigration. Britain dispatches Peel Commission to investigate underlying causes.

  1937:

  Peel Commission recommends partition. Second stage of Arab revolt begins.

  1939:

  Britain issues White Paper, imposing restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchase and calling for an independent Palestine state.

  1942:

  Biltmore conference held in New York City, calling for a Jewish state over all of Palestine.

  1945:

  At end of the Second World War, United States pressures Britain to relax its restrictions on Jewish refugees settling in Palestine.

  1946:

  Jewish militant group, Irgun, blows up King David Hotel, Britain’s headquarters in Jerusalem.

  1947:

  Britain asks United Nations (UN) to take over Palestine mandate. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommends partition. The Arabs reject it, but UN General Assembly approves (Resolution 181). Civil war breaks out in Palestine.

  1948:

  State of Israel proclaimed. Units of Arab armies invade. Over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs are expelled or flee the fighting. Israel declares independence on more land (including West Jerusalem) than originally proposed by UN. Egypt occupies Gaza Strip and Transjordan annexes East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

  1956:

  Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Company. Israel, France, and Britain work to topple Nasser and invade Egypt. United States pressures them to withdraw.

  1964:

  The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) created under auspices of Arab League.

  1967:

  Israel decisively defeats Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in span of six days. Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip are taken from Egypt; West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan; and Golan Heights from Syria. The UN Security Council approves Resolution 242, calling for an exchange of land for peace. Arab countries meeting at Khartoum issue their ‘three noes’: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel.

  1969:

  Yasir Arafat elected head of PLO. Egypt launches ‘war of attrition’ against Israel.

  1970:

  Jordan’s King Husayn expels the PLO, which re-establishes itself in Lebanon.

  1973:

  Surprise attack in October by Egypt and Syria on Israel. ‘Shuttle diplomacy’ by US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger aims at a political settlement.

  1974:

  Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) formed to create Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

  1975:

  Civil war breaks out in Lebanon.

  1977:

  Menachem Begin elected Prime Minister of Israel. Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat visits Israel.

  1978:

  Talks at Camp David end in peace accord between Israel and Egypt.

  1979:

  Israel and Egypt sign peace treaty in which Israel returns the occupied Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.

  1982:

  Israel invades Lebanon. The PLO is exiled to Tunisia. Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps are massacred by Lebanese Christian militia allied to Israel.

  1987:

  Palestinians launch the first intifada (‘shaking-off’) against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas founded as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

  1988:

  Jordan drops its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank. PLO affirms UN Resolution 242, renounces terrorism, and recognizes Israel.

  1991:

  After Gulf War ends, the United States convenes an international peace conference in Madrid, in which all states of the region participated (though not the PLO).

  1993:

  Secret talks in Oslo between Israeli academics and PLO officials lead to the Oslo accords.

  1994:

  PLO chairman Arafat returns to the occupied territories to head the Palestinian Authority. Israel signs a peace treaty with Jordan.

  1995:

  Israel and PLO sign Oslo II agreement, dividing the West Bank into three zones and c
alling for further Israeli withdrawals. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated during peace rally in Tel Aviv.

  1998:

  At the Wye Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Arafat set a timetable for implementation of Oslo II agreement.

  1999:

  After more slippage in Oslo process, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat set another timetable for implementation of Oslo agreements.

  2000:

  Camp David summit, hosted by US president Bill Clinton, ends in failure. Israel’s opposition leader, Ariel Sharon, visits Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians launch second intifada.

  2001:

  Israeli and Palestinian delegations hold talks at Taba in Egypt. Al-Qaeda terrorists attack World Trade Center and Pentagon.

  2002:

  Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield, controlling areas of the Palestinian Authority, and begins construction of separation barrier. Saudi Arabia’s peace initiative receives unanimous approval at the Arab League meeting in Beirut.

  2003:

  The Quartet group (America, the European Union, Russia, and the UN) issues the ‘Road Map’, a three-stage plan for creating an independent Palestine. Prominent Israeli and Palestinian politicians, many of whom had participated in the Camp David summit, launch the Geneva Initiative, aimed at a comprehensive agreement.