Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  On 5 June, the French garrison marched out. On the same day, Vogelsang’s division marched towards Novi; Schellenberg’s division departed on 6 June, while Gottesheim’s brigade was directed on Piacenza, taking the route through the mountains via Torriglia and Bobbio. Prince Hohenzollern’s division remained in Genoa, approximately 7,000-strong. Melas’ firm intention was for the main part of the army to unite at Alessandria. The divisions of Kaim and Hadik were already marching there with the cavalry, and Elsnitz was on his way from the Var. All the written orders suggested Ott was to do likewise.

  However, at this point, the ‘fog of war’ descends on our account. With the passage of two centuries, it becomes very difficult to properly understand decisions made by the Austrians. According to Radetzky’s memoirs, as the negotiations with Massena continued, Melas became impatient and wanted a decision: either the surrender should take place or the blockade should be lifted. The account adds that Zach was ordered to go to Ott, and to accelerate the outcome one way or the other. Radetzky states Zach arrived in Genoa after the signing of the convention, and also says he had with him the spy ‘who had played Cuneo into our hands’. According to Radetzky, on the report of the spy, Zach redirected Ott’s troops towards Stradella, where he hoped to catch Bonaparte’s troops in the rear if they attempted to march on Alessandria.

  Stutterheim does not mention the arrival of Zach. The former had remained behind in Genoa with the émigré Crossard, concluding business while the divisions of Vogelsang and Schellenberg set off. His account states the two divisions heard at Novi the rumour the enemy had crossed the Po in the area around Piacenza. Stutterheim claims the two divisions then took off towards Tortona without orders. The first Ott knew about this was on the evening of 7 June when arriving in Novi himself. As ever, it is difficult to square the conflicting accounts. If Zach had been to Genoa, this would almost certainly have been recorded. The authors of three of the most important Austrian accounts - Geppert, Stutterheim and Crossard - were staff officers in Genoa at this moment: all remain silent on the fact.

  It appears certain that Ott’s troops left Genoa with every intention of reaching Alessandria. However, when Vogelsang quit Novi, he marched on Tortona. We know this from the memoirs of Crossard, who was detailed to ride ahead of the column and find a crossing point over the Scrivia. This river is a torrent, with a wide stony bed forming something of a shallow scar across the landscape, over 100km long. The river bed is normally quite dry, but is prone to sudden floods of water coming down from the mountains. When Crossard encountered it, there had been a storm so the river was swollen and fast-moving. Crossard was at a complete loss what to do when he saw a long column of country carts pass over the river heading for Alessandria. The four-wheeled carts were quite low and had a long and broad apron, perfect for forming an improvised bridge for infantry. The staff officer stopped the column and had the carts chained together across the river. When Vogelsang’s column arrived, Crossard directed the cavalry and artillery to ford the river, while the infantry marched over the cart bridge. Darkness fell around 9.00 pm and the troops were still in the process of crossing. The last battalion to cross met with an accident. The carts formed something of a dyke and the pressure of the river caused the chains to break. With some difficulty, the men thrown into the river were saved, and Crossard did not believe anyone drowned.

  By now, General O’Reilly and Gottesheim had made contact with Ott’s leading elements. They reported they were being followed by 6,000 enemy troops, which had crossed the Po, but they would attack and repulse the enemy if they were supported. Ott’s chief of staff, Colonel de Best, recommended Ott march his troops towards Voghera as quickly as possible. Alas, the rush to go to O’Reilly’s assistance and the lack of pre-planning took its toll. On 8 June, Ott’s corps awoke at Voghera in a state of utter confusion. The two divisions had become intermingled in the night. Even individual regiments had broken up. Nearly 17,000 men were in disarray. Stutterheim complained this was a recipe for disaster, spending the rest of the day splitting the two divisions and forming a new camp at Broni.

  While this reorganization took place, Crossard remarks that Ott was ‘without news of Melas’ and did not know the location of Bonaparte or his army. A prudent man might have held off and sent for instructions before walking into the unknown. However, just before nightfall, General Vogelsang prepared a small reconnaissance force under the French émigré, Captain de Bellerose, of the de Bussy Light Horse. His instructions were to probe forwards and find the enemy wherever he found them. It was a dark night; there was no way of accurately estimating the location and strength of the French forces. The captain spurred his men forwards and ultimately rode into the French outposts and was killed. His lieutenant returned to headquarters, stating the republican army was approaching.

  On the morning of 9 June, Ott received reports that O’Reilly had been involved in a small outpost skirmish, after which the French had fallen back. It did not appear serious and the French retreated from this encounter. However, when the head of Ott’s column reached Casteggio at 11.00 am, he ran into the French advanced guard supported by a strong column. This did not appear to be the weak force O’Reilly had described. At this point Zach arrived. It is the first positive confirmation we have of Zach meeting with Ott. Gioelli was probably with him (as Radetzky described), because by now the spy would have returned from his mission to Milan, and was setting off to meet Bonaparte at Pavia as the two had agreed. Gioelli had likely informed Zach the French were in fact moving against the Po and not advancing toward Austria, and Zach would therefore have realized the danger of the imperial army’s communications being cut.

  Making an assessment of the situation, Zach was nervous about giving battle. When asked what to do, he appeared to dither, taking a cautious approach and avoiding an engagement. According to Stutterheim, a voice rose up from the assembled officers (probably de Best) and said: ‘Who is going to run away from these fellows? Come on – we stay!’9

  Acting more like a hussar than a general, Ott concurred: ‘My outposts are attacked; I march to their aid.’

  Against all expectations, a serious battle was about to be fought.

  Having taken Milan, Bonaparte put in motion the next phase of his strategy. The main post road from Turin to Mantua followed the right bank of the Po, passing through Asti, Alessandria, Tortona, Piacenza and Cremona. To intercept this vital line of communication for Melas’s army, the First Consul sought to block the road in three places. Duhesme would take Loison’s division from Lodi to Cremona; Murat would take Boudet’s division and the cavalry reserve to sieze Piacenza, where the post road was intersected by the main road from Milan to Parma and Bologna. Lannes would force a crossing of the Po at Belgiojoso and occupy Stradella. Victor would remain in reserve, ready to exploit whichever crossing could first be captured.

  In the early hours of 5 June, Boudet’s division quit Lodi and marched more than 30km down the Via Emilia until they reached the Po opposite Piacenza. The bridge at Piacenza was guarded by a large earthwork bridgehead fortification mounted with gun platforms and a large cheval-de-frise blocking the road. Brushing aside the Austrian forward posts, Boudet attempted to capture the bridgehead by sending the 9th Light Infantry onto the flanks to draw the defenders’ fire, while mounting a frontal assault on the main gate with the grenadiers of the 59th Line. The commander of the town was GM Mosel. He had some notice of the French advance and had prepared the defences well. In addition to mounting guns in the bridgehead itself, he placed some on the far bank of the Po, creating an enfilading fire along the flanks of the fortress. Boudet’s troops came under heavy artillery fire as they advanced towards the fort for fifteen minutes. The assault on the gate quickly failed; however, the 9th Light took shelter in the ditches surrounding the fort and were able to fire through the embrasures at the crews serving the guns.

  At the start of the action Mosel had about 400 fit troops, a mixture of line infantry, Tyrolean Jäger and fifty horsemen fro
m the de Bussy Light Horse. Although he was able to arm some convalescents, the citadel there required a garrison of 600 men, let alone protecting the entire city. Mosel suffered 120 casualties in the first attack on the bridgehead and was naturally concerned the French might sieze the bridge. Piacenza was filled with stores and equipment, including the army’s treasury and the Imperial Chancellery containing all of the army’s records and correspondance. Mosel had these evacuated to Parma for safekeeping, and while waiting for reinforcements to arrive, decided to evacuate the bridgehead at night and break the boat bridge over the Po. While a covering fire was maintained from the opposite bank, the guns in the bridgehead were evacuated, then a portion of the bridge was removed. Unfortuately for Mosel, his rearguard of eighty men was captured almost single-handedly by Captain Hippolyte Cazeaux of the 9th Light. However, the bridge was cut and Murat was left extremely frustrated.

  On 6 June, Lannes began crossing the Po upriver at Belgiojoso. Led by General of Brigade Mainoni, the 28th Line spearheaded the crossing, using several boats which had been gathered. This half-brigade formed a protective cordon behind which some engineers could build a ‘flying bridge’ – a large raft tethered to the river banks, propelled across the current of the water. At 10.00 am, the Austrians sighted the French and attacked. There was a vigourous contest in which Lannes had to intervene to prevent the Frenchmen being pushed back into the river. The Austrians broke off in the direction of Stradella, and then returned mid-afternoon with some artillery. By then the French had transported five companies of the 40th Line across the Po to reinforce Mainoni. In the coming clash, the French took the initiative and attacked the Austrians, driving them off the field after hand-to-hand fighting. The moment Berthier heard Lannes had troops across the Po, he ordered the army headquarters to Pavia, and directed Victor to march to the newly constructed flying bridge. Berthier also instructed Duhesme to move on Cremona and capture the Austrian magazines in the city, or if this was not possible, to cross the Po elsewhere and march in the direction of Stradella to rejoin the army.

  Murat continued to be frustrated at Piacenza. The strong current of the Po made repairing the bridge impossible. No boats could be found in the vicinity of the bridgehead, and the Austrians maintained a hampering artillery fire against the French, who had too little ammunition to reply effectively. Adjutant-General Dalton took a patrol of the 9th Light about 10 miles downstream and gathered various boats. These were collected at Nocetto in preparation for an operation the following day. In the early hours of 7 June, Boudet took the bulk of his forces to Nocetta and began crossing the Po. They took up position on the main road about 2 miles east of Piacenza. Inside the city, General O’Reilly arrived at the head of two squadrons of the Nauendorf Hussars. He had been instructed to take command of the city and had ridden ahead of his main force to do this. In so doing, he lost contact with his infantry, who had run into Lannes opposite Belgiojoso. The only infantry support he received was 600 men from IR 14 Klebeck, who arrived via the Bobbio Road. The Austrian scouts now reported the arrival of Boudet on the right bank opposite Nocetto. To complicate matters, O’Reilly was informed a large artillery convoy of about 1,500 vehicles was about to arrive in the city on its way to Parma. O’Reilly detailed one of his hussar squadrons to protect this convoy and sent an urgent message for it to make all speed on the Parma road to avoid being captured by Boudet’s troops. O’Reilly decided to evacuate Piacenza and to save as much of the field artillery as possible.

  Things now began to move very swiftly. The French scouts spotted the artillery convoy and also noticed a column of Austrian infantry coming up from the direction of Parma. General of Brigade Musnier took his brigade, composed of the 9th Light Infantry, to sieze Piacenza, sending one battalion of the Ninth to pursue the artillery convoy. Musnier advised Boudet to bring the 59th Line up in support as soon as it was across the Po. As the first two battalions advanced on Piacenza, they were attacked by the remaining squadron of the Nauendorf Hussars. The French infantrymen closed up their columns and advanced towards the approaching hussars. The Ninth had come under heavy artillery fire around the bridgehead and suffered their first significant casualties of the campaign. Boudet’s journal says the men called for vengeance when faced with the Austrians horsemen. Musnier ordered the columns to lower bayonets and they charged the hussars, who broke off their attack and fled back to the city.

  At the bridgehead, Murat’s impatience was at fever pitch. He asked his engineers to re-examine the bridge. Chief of Battalion Pastre of the 59th called for volunteers to swim across to the other side of the bridge. The distance was not so great, but the Po was swollen with mountain water and rainfall. Six of the swimmers drowned and Pastre was plucked out of the water unconscious. Murat need not have been so impatient. Musnier was now inside the city with his light infantrymen and running through the streets. The general took the Ninth’s carabinier companies and made for the far gate on the Stradella road. At the same time, IR 14 Klebeck entered the city by that gate. Hemmed in by Piacenza’s streets, the two adversaries clashed, with the Ninth quickly gaining the upper hand. O’Reilly’s wife was in the city. On balance, the Irishman thought she would be safer remaining than going with him, so the general left his wife behind and made off with a small bodyguard. The remainder of the city garrison locked themselves in the citadel.

  With the covering batteries removed, Murat’s engineers were at last able to start building a flying bridge. As the French cavalry reserve began to cross, Boudet took the 59th Line and his hussars to meet the Austrian column coming up from Parma. Murat went to watch the action and was overjoyed at how Boudet’s soliders fought like ‘madmen’, launching a bayonet charge against the Austrians despite being under artillery fire. As they were assaulted from the front, Boudet had his howitzers lob shells at the rear of the Austrian column. He then personally led a charge of the 11th hussars to complete the Austrian rout. Murat reflected in a letter to Bonaparte that his troops had taken around 2,000 prisoners, killed fifty and taken thirteen pieces of artillery along with two flags. Considerable stores were taken from the magazines, and thirty large boats filled with provisions of all kinds had been seized. He also had O’Reilly’s wife in his custody, and informed Bonaparte she was ‘tolerably ugly’. More imporantly, the River Po was now passable because the flying bridges had been established and all the cavalry was across ready to support the next action. They had also captured some despatches carried by a courier, but because none of them could read German he had sent the letters onto headquarters with his report.

  Elsewhere that day, Duhesme had fought Vukassovich’s rearguard and occupied Cremona. Inside the city, they seized a grain store and a large supply of equipment. Bonaparte had achieved his aim of cutting the Austrian line of retreat to Mantua, and the capture of Piacenza was particularly important because it controlled much of the road network in northern Italy. The army was now in a position to occupy Stradella and wait for Melas to attempt to recover his line of communications. This is exactly as he had foreseen the campaign developing. However, this achievement was to be soured by the contents of the captured letters Murat had sent. Bonaparte had spent the evening of 7 June inspecting some of the troops who had come down from the Army of the Rhine. He went to bed afterwards, but was awoken shortly before dawn by Bourrienne. Bonaparte had a rule that he never wanted to be woken unless it was bad news which required his immediate consideration – good news could wait. This was bad news - the letter revealed Genoa had fallen.

  Bonaparte initially disbelieved Bourrienne’s translation, but he eventually accepted the news and made his plans accordingly. He sent the following information to Berthier:

  ‘General Murat has forwarded to me at Milan the dispatches captured from the enemy. I am occupied in getting them examined; they contain some very interesting details.

  ‘A letter from Melas to the Aulic council, dated the 5th June, from Turin, informs me Massena capitulated on the 4th. His troops are not prisoners of war; they ar
e on the march to join General Suchet. It appears, however, that Massena has embarked on a frigate so as to arrive more promptly at Nice.

  ‘General Melas also confesses in his letters that Baron Elsnitz has been unable to effect his retreat by the Col di Tenda, because one of his brigadier generals has been overthrown at the Col di Braus, and that line of march has been cut off. He has conducted his retreat to Oneglia. General Melas states he hopes Elsnitz will arrive in Ormea on 7th June.

  ‘Elsnitz has only 6,000 men of his division with him, and 3,400 men of Morzin’s division; total 9,400 men; of whom he will have to leave 1,000 men at Cuneo, 1,000 men at Savona and 300 at Ceva.

  ‘General Hohenzollern will remain at Genoa. ‘General Ott, with 9,000 men, will return by the Bochetta and Ovada to Alessandria.

  ‘Thus, it appears it will not be before the 12th or 13th of June that the enemy will be able to assemble his forces at Alessandria and then it will have only the following forces:

  - Elsnitz’s division, 7,000 men

  - Ott’s division, 9,000 men

  - Hadik’s division, which is currently on the Orco, 6,000 men

  - Total: 22,000 men

  ‘Move forward some parties boldly and crush all the troops you encounter. The advanced-guard can push on to Voghera.

  ‘Cross the cavalry and artillery so all the divisions may be complete, having their cartridges and everything in proper order.

  ‘Even though my carriage is ready and half of my guides have left, I will wait for your return of post.’10