Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  There are several interesting parts to this letter. The first is the abandonment of the plan to hold a position at Stradella and to advance to Voghera. The second is that the original of this letter (published by Hüffer) makes no mention of the strengths of the various corps. It is probable the First Consul based these numbers on the information provided by Gioelli. It is also worth stating these numbers underestimated the Austrian strength quite considerably. Having sent this letter to Berthier, Bonaparte then wrote to General Suchet and the Army of Italy. Unaware of Suchet’s strength and position, he gave a very simple instruction to him: to hold in check a corps as strong as his own. When he did reach Ceva, he was to discover the location of the Army of the Reserve and manoeuvre to rejoin it. The key issue with acting on this intelligence is that Ott had of course been redirected from Alessandria, also to Voghera. The French were therefore about to advance into a battle they did not expect to fight, against a force considerably larger than they had been informed of. With O’Reilly’s troops added to those of Ott, the French would face a force near to 18,000 men strong.

  Already that day, Lannes had begun moving on Stradella via Broni. By then O’Reilly had passed this position, having escaped Piacenza the day before, leaving a small rearguard at the latter position. The Chief of Brigade of the 28th Line was Jean-Marie Roger-Valhubert. Rather imprudently, he rode ahead of his half-brigade and entered Broni alone, only to come face-to-face with the Austrian rearguard, about 200 strong. Valhubert found himself separated from the Austrians by a thick hedge. Being mounted, he could see them, but they could not see Valhubert was alone. In a moment of supreme sangfroid, Valhubert menacingly called on the Austrians to surrender. They begrudgingly complied with his wishes and layed down their arms. When no French soldiers materialized, the Austrians realized they had been duped and began to retrieve their weapons. Valhubert bounded the hedge on his horse and fell into the middle of the group, grabbing the commanding officer by the scruff of the neck and placing the point of his sword against his back. He instructed the Austrians to lower their weapons, and they complied. At this point, Valhubert’s own troops arrived on the scene and secured the prisoners. They rested at Broni while the remainder of Lannes’ troops caught up with them. It was there that Berthier’s instructions arrived, directing Lannes on to Voghera the following day, supported by Victor with Chambarlac’s division.

  On 9 June, the French advanced in the direction of Casteggio. At 6.00 am, Brigadier General Gency led the 6th Light Infantry towards Santa Giulietta, following the main road. On their left was a long line of hills, the beginning of the Appenines; on their right was a largely flat plain, extending 10km to the Po. The terrain was extremely broken, cut with ditches and stone walls, and although largely flat, visibility was greatly reduced by rows of trees, from which vines were hung like garlands. When the French light infantry spied the Austrian forward posts at Santa Giulietta, they at first withdrew, but then returned in strength, pushing them back to Rivetta, 2km east of Casteggio. At this point they encountered more of O’Reilly’s force and so they paused again, waiting for the rest of Watrin’s division to arrive. At 11.00 am, the French began to probe O’Reilly’s defences, so the Irishman decided to fall back on Casteggio, where the buildings would offer a better means of defence. So far these encounters with the Austrians were exactly what Lannes had expected – nothing more than a weak rearguard which should be pursued to Voghera. There was therefore some sense of alarm when Vogelsang’s division appeared, with the battalions deploying like clockwork right and left of the main road before scaling the heights above the French position. The French then came under strong artillery fire.

  The French responded by deploying two battalions of the 6th Light and had them march obliquely towards the north of Casteggio, drawing the Austrian fire from the main road. Watrin led the other battalion of the 6th Light and the 40th Line to the south, up onto the line of hills. Lannes remained in the centre, on the main road with the 22nd Line, four pieces of artillery and the 12th Hussars. Somewhat impatiently, Lannes ordered a battalion of the 22nd Line to march straight at Vogelsang’s position on the hills. They went off at the pas de charge through the tall crops, but came under the most severe artillery fire. As they retreated in disorder, Lannes ordered the 12th Hussars to charge the Austrian light infantry in front of Casteggio. This charge scattered the Bach and Am Ende light battalions, and the French hussars penetrated the lower part of the village. They then came under attack themselves by the Bussy Light Horse and Nauendorf Hussars, and were forced to cut their way out from being surrounded.

  Lannes sent an urgent request to Victor to come up in support. In the meantime, Mainoni arrived with Valhubert and the 28th Line. Watrin directed them up on the extreme left flank to support Mahler. Initially, the French began to roll up the Austrian battalions on the heights, but Vogelsang had kept four battalions in reserve and these were now committed. In the village below, FML Schellenberg arrived with part of his division and formed a line along the Coppa stream. The remainder of the division (five battalions) were left at the village of Montebello. Lannes was now outnumbered and hard-pressed. The Austrians attempted to get cavalry over the heights and beyond the French line, but they found the 28th Line holding the extreme left of the French line. Valhubert led his grenadiers in a bayonet charge against the Austrian horsemen and saw them off. Ott did not press his advantage as strongly as he might have, perhaps because French prisoners had erroneously told him Bonaparte was present with the French. Neither commander really knew what he was faced with, but both had imprudently attacked.

  At 2.00 pm, Olivier Rivaud’s infantry brigade arrived. Rivaud directed the 43rd Line onto the left to support Watrin. He deployed one battalion of this half-brigade in a closed column and deployed a battalion either side of this in skirmish formation. These were directed at Vogelsang’s battations, supported by Watrin’s troops and the 28th Line. Rivaud led the central battalion, which he forebade from firing, instead relying on the masses of skirmishers either side of him for fire support. Victor meanwhile directed the 24th Light Infantry over to the extreme right to support the 6th Light Infantry, which had made some good progress working round the Austrian flank.

  In the Austrian centre, Schellenberg could see the French making progress on both wings, so he ordered his reserve battalions up from Montebello, but they ran so quickly they were exhausted by the time they arrived on the battlefield and needed a moment to rest. The French continued to press, so Schellenberg gave the order to retreat to Montebello and hold a new line. O’Reilly’s light troops were ordered to protect this retreat by defending the village. When Lannes saw what was happening, he ordered the 96th Line to make a frontal attack and capture Casteggio. The charge was beaten and the 96th stormed over the bridge, chasing off O’Reilly’s light troops in the direction of Montebello. Rivaud also pushed his troops on, entering a desperate fight with Austrian infantry in a large farmhouse complex up in the hills. With Casteggio now in French hands, the battle moved to Montebello. It was evening now, and Ott had at last begun to think more prudently. He ordered Schellenberg to form a rearguard at Montebello while the rest of the corps headed to Voghera to regroup. Fighting continued until nightfall, when the last of Schellenberg’s troops were at last able to disengage and make good their escape.

  For much of the campaign it had been raining. On 7 June, General Duvignau’s cavalry brigade quit Milan and stopped outside Pavia, in the rain. Among the officers in the brigade was Galy-Montaglas of the 12th Chasseurs. As memoirs go, his is perhaps unique in having been censored by its publisher for its extremely pornographic descriptions of the Milan brothels which Montaglas and his comrades visited the night before. Montaglas did not like Duvignau at all. The general was in his thirtieth year; he had been greviously wounded at the Battle of Valmy in 1792, where he was ADC to General Rochambeau. Although well versed in war, he caused something of an upset by bringing his wife on campaign with him. While the regiment sat outside Pavia in the pou
ring rain, Duvignau apparently disappeared for an hour while he ‘took his pleasures with Madame his wife in the city’.11 From this place of comfort, Duvignau angered everyone by sending orders for the regiment to continue its march until it reached the village of Belgiojoso. There, Duvignau sent further instructions for the regiment to set up outposts. Montaglas was put in charge of this, and he was infuriated to find the army was already massed in this area. Why didn’t Duvignau know the location of the rest of the army, Montaglas asked? He concluded: ‘Very often, generals do not know what they are doing and soldiers are always victims of their ineptitude.’ They continued on their way, ‘wet as ducks’, until they reached Piacenza, where the Austrians still held the citadel and would occasionally fire at the French crossing the river. Somewhere in the muddy quagmire which passed for a road, Montaglas lost his pet dog, Countess. He was inconsolable for the moment. On 9 June, on the road to Stradella, they met Bonaparte, who was on his way from Milan to join the army in the field for the first time in the campaign. That night, while Lannes and Victor’s troops were firing the final shots of the Battle of Montebello, the regiment’s foragers returned with the most wonderful discovery. That night, Montaglas estimated the 340 men of his regiment drank ‘at least three thousand bottles of wine’. While they drank, some fattened hens were cooked and bread was distributed. The light cavalry had a certain reputation to uphold.12

  Bonaparte arrived at Stradella on 9 June and established his headquarters there. The half-brigades which had fought at Montebello needed rest and resupplying, and some time was needed for the divisions of Gardanne, Boudet, Monnier and Lapoype to arrive from Piacenza. Bonaparte therefore decided to concentrate his army between Stradella and Voghera before deciding on the next course of action. It was at Stradella where Bonaparte most likely met with the spy Gioelli. The First Consul posed the spy a series of questions about Melas’ intentions and the status of the imperial army’s concentration at Alessandria. We will return to these questions in detail in due course.

  Bonaparte then went to visit the battlefield at Casteggio. In his bulletin, he admitted 600 casualties, which is higher than the 500 Berthier reported, but still appears light compared to the Austrian admission of 4,275 killed, wounded and taken prisoner.13 Indeed, Lannes famously said of his troops, the ‘bones cracked in my division like glass in a hailstorm’.14 During the tour of the field, he encountered a surprise visitor, General Louis Charles Antoine Desaix. The last time the two men had seen each other was in Egypt. Desaix had led an expedition up the Nile which discovered the ancient city of Thebes and the temple of Karnak. By the time he returned to Cairo, Bonaparte had already quit the country and returned to France. Desaix was one of the great French generals of the revolutionary era. He was a year older than Bonaparte and had risen to prominence under Moreau on the Army of the Rhine. However, he became captivated by Bonaparte’s first Italian campaign, and in 1797 had transferred to serve under him. Of all the men who served him, Desaix had a special place in Bonaparte’s estimation. With Desaix, Bonaparte did not have to fear a political rival; in the military sense, they were kindred spirits, obsessed with the pursuit of glory.

  The two men went to Bonaparte’s quarters at Stradella and spent a great deal of time discussing events since they had last met. The key item for Bonaparte was the Treaty of El Arish which Desaix had put his name to on 24 January 1800. This was an agreement between the local British commander, Sir Sidney Smith, and General Kléber agreeing to the repatriation of the French army from Egypt. This had been an extremely unhappy episode for Desaix. Kléber obliged him to conduct the negotiations, which Sir Sidney Smith had been instructed not to indulge in. Despite repeated warning from Lord Keith, the negotiations had continued and Kléber ordered Desaix to sign the treaty on his behalf. On 3 March, Desaix quit Egypt, eager to return to Bonaparte. Despite having been issued with passports by Sir Sidney Smith and the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Desaix’s ship was intercepted within sight of Toulon by a British warship and taken to Livorno. There, Desaix was treated extremely harshly by Lord Keith until the latter was instructed to honour the agreement and let the Frenchman go free. Desaix was still enraged by the whole experience and desperately wanted some form of revenge on the British. When Desaix returned to France, he immediately asked to join Bonaparte. The First Consul advised Desaix to go to Paris and await him there – the campaign was going to plan and it was not essential he take part. However, Desaix could not be held back. With an entourage which included his aides-de-camp Savary and Rapp, and two boy servants he had been presented by the King of Darfur (western Sudan), Desaix crossed the Little St Bernard Pass into Italy.

  On Desaix’s eventual departure from Bonaparte’s quarters, Bonaparte’s secretary, Bourrienne, was surprised how long the two had been talking. To this Bonaparte replied: ‘Yes, I have been a long time with him, but I had my reasons. As soon as I return to Paris, I will make him minister-at-law. He shall always be my lieutenant: I would make him a prince if I could. I find him quite an antique character.’

  Next morning, Bonaparte and his entourage passed by the battlefield of Montebello again on their way to Voghera, which had been captured the night before by the 21st Chasseurs.15 An interesting event occurred at this town, which is widely reported. One of the Horse Grenadiers of the Consular Guard, Joseph Petit, reports they saw the First Consul on a balcony, standing with Desaix and an ‘emigrant officer’ who had come to parley with them. Seeing the imperial uniform, Petit says the troops cheered ‘vive Bonaparte!’ and the bands struck up with military songs. Savary confirms this, writing: ‘We met Austrian parliamentarians at Voghera, whose special mission seemed to be to ascertain whether our army was truly marching upon them. The First Consul had them detained long enough for them to be seen. He even attempted to show them General Desaix, who was known to one of them, and dismissed them.’

  On 11 June, the French army was reorganized, and Desaix was provided with a corps of his own.

  All the troops coming from the Rhine which are not part of Lapoype’s Division.

  The staff of General Desaix will be that of Boudet’s Division.

  The staff of General Victor will be that of Chambarlhac’s Division; meanwhile one can draw on the adjudant-generals and their lieutenants.

  General Murat commands all the cavalry, including the 12th Hussars and 21st Chasseurs. I have charged this general with attaching a squadron to the corps under the orders of General Lannes, one for the corps of General Desaix, one for the corps of General Victor, a company to the Division Loison, a squadron to the corps of General Duhesme.

  The following day, on 12 June, Murat confirmed the organization of the cavalry brigades:

  Brigade of General Rivaud.

  The 11th, 12th Hussars, 12th, 21st Chasseurs.

  Brigade of General Champeaux.

  2nd Chasseurs, 1st, 8th Dragons.

  Brigade of General Duvignau.

  15th Chasseurs, 7th, 9th Dragoons.

  Brigade Kellermann.

  The heavy cavalry.

  I have attached to the division of General Desaix the squadron of the 1st Regiment of Hussars.

  To General Victor, the 3rd Cavalry.

  To the Division of General Duhesme, the squadron of the 7th Chasseurs.

  To General Lannes, a squadron of the 5th Regiment of Dragoons.

  To General Loison, a company of the 5th Regiment of Dragoons.

  A company of the 5th Regiment of Dragoons to General Headquarters.

  Everything was now set for Bonaparte to advance the army out beyond Voghera towards Alessandria. Victor would assume the role of advanced-guard, with Lannes following in support. Desaix would act as the reserve. However, as the march began, Melas’ intentions were still a complete mystery to the First Consul. The questions posed to the spy needed answers as soon as possible.

  Chapter 8

  The Armies Concentrate

  On the afternoon of 11 June, Hadik and Kaim’s troops arrived at Alessandria from Turin. Before
departing the Piedmontese capital, these forces had consisted of twenty infantry battalions and thirty-three squadrons of cavalry. En route to Alessandria, they left some forces to strengthen the Turin garrison and placed a rearguard at Asti, which would follow later. They actually arrived with just nine and two-thirds battalions and eleven squadrons. That same afternoon, Elsnitz also arrived in Alessandria: there was widespread shock at the state of this force. Melas had left Elsnitz in Nice with 19,000 excellent soldiers, but fruitless engagements and a difficult retreat through the mountains had reduced his corps considerably. Provisions had run out on the way. Desperate for food, men had been seen gnawing on roots and the bark off the trees; many sat down and simply starved to death on the spot. Some even deserted and fled to the British fleet, either ending up transported to Spain or enrolled as mercenaries in the British Army. There were hardly 4,000 men in a condition to fight – the majority of them being Morzin’s grenadier division. Another 3,000 had completed the march, but were barefoot and completely exhausted. Coupled with Ott’s heavy losses at Casteggio, the great imperial army was a mere shadow of the one which had commenced operations on 6 April. All Melas had wanted was to concentrate the army as swiftly as possible before delivering battle against the Dijon Reserve Army. Now he was sat at Alessandria, with Frenchmen all round him, encumbered with baggage, sick and wounded soldiers, cut off from his lines of communication and his home. He had never wanted this command, and must have cursed the day he was invited to accept it. Melas wrote a gloomy letter to the Hofkriegsrat outlining his current situation:

  ‘This afternoon the divisions under Kaim and Hadik, together with the remains of FML Elsnitz’s force, which now mostly comprises of the eleven Grenadier battalions, have arrived at the camp of Alessandria; only GM Nimbsch still remains with the rearguard at Asti. FML Ott’s force is positioned on the left bank of the Scrivia, between Torre Garofoli and San Giuliano and likewise a very weak division under FML O’Reilly comprising mostly of light troops is positioned at Sale.’