Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  ‘2) That the enemy has left no more than 1,000 men under General Gardanne on the main road to San Giuliano, presumably as a decoy, to conceal his movements behind it;

  ‘3) That yesterday (13 June) a column was sent back from Garofoli, in order via Cassano to reach Novi, where in the view of the spy, they could arrive early today.

  ‘Now our manoeuvres are aimed at reaching San Giuliano with the main column, to pursue all the enemy units standing there back towards Garofoli with the advanced-guard and to make him believe, that our attack is directed there, but from San Giuliano, it will turn left, in order to reach the road which runs from Sale to Alessandria; on this we will meet the enemy main force and as our entire force comes onto that road, defeat them.

  ‘An unexpected appearance in the enemy flank must have a huge effect; we can hope to surprise the enemy column, cut it in two or take it completely in the rear, to drive them back to the Tanaro and the Po. Determination and rapidity must secure us a glorious victory.

  ‘The second column under FML Ott is too weak against the enemy, should the overthrow of the enemy main column be expected of them, but he must endeavour to harass them, halt them and if he is himself attacked, to retire slowly, all the more so to decoy the enemy in that event. His line of retreat goes along the Tanaro on to the Bormida bridgehead, which he is then to occupy and so, defend it to the last man together with the left flank of the Bormida.

  ‘The third column is likewise merely designated to advance against the enemy, so far as it is possible, towards Novi, engage them and then to retire as slowly as possible into the Bormida bridgehead, cross the Bormida and cover the left bank of the Bormida upstream of the bridgehead.

  ‘These two flank columns are consequently our decoys, behind which we will execute our main strike with God’s help.

  ‘During the march of these two flank columns, I hope to judge from their fire, how far the enemy may have already advanced, which will serve me, located with the main column as a guideline, as to where to fall into the enemy flank; irrespective of that, frequent reports following on one after the other.

  ‘Today the Casale, Asti and Turin (Piedmontese regiments) also march into the Alessandria garrison; GM Skal has to maintain a garrison force in the bridgehead during this attack.

  ‘Hauptmann Sokolovich and Oberleutenant Bellichy will remain with GM Skal.

  ‘The FMLs and generals are to make even today all conceivable efforts, so that their columns can be formed up quickly, so as not to lose any time when marching off.

  ‘The third column already has its infantry across the Bormida; it is only necessary that the cavalry belonging to this column are shifted over when it gets dark, so that it can march itself, two columns are not going over one bridge.

  ‘The troops will march off at midnight; after an hour of unbroken marching, the heads will halt, so that the columns can close up and the troops form up in a column of divisions.4 When the day just begins to dawn, the columns will continue their marches further to attack.’

  In summary, the key parts of the plan were for O’Reilly to watch the Novi road, and guard for the arrival of the French column sent to Novi. Most crucially, Ott’s column was to advance on Sale and pin the main French force, falling back towards the Bormida if necessary. The main weight of attack would come from the central column falling on the left flank of the enemy. Stutterheim’s account has Zach saying: ‘If luck favours our intentions, so the enemy is thrown in the Po and without retreat.’ If nothing else, it would open the road to Piacenza, or so Zach supposed. The main advantage of this plan was the element of surprise. If the spy was to be believed, Bonaparte was fixated on the idea the Austrians were planning to escape him by crossing the Po at Casale. It would be the French who would be strung out on the march, not the Austrians, and this element of surprise was crucial to their success.

  With the final commitment to give battle made, Melas’ mood also began to lift in the afternoon despite a front of wet weather which moved in. In the time-honoured tradition, he decided to make a tour of his army on the eve of battle. Before this, he had Alessandria’s magazines opened and issued the army with rations of rice, meat and wine. They also emptied the last remaining depots, handing out new shoes and replacing or repairing damaged equipment. There was no point holding anything in reserve before this battle.

  The tour of the camp went very well. Melas may have had his faults as an army commander, and clearly there were many other places he would have preferred to be that fateful Friday, but once he was in the saddle, before his men, he was energized. The smell of open fires, tobacco smoke and the comradeship of soldiers, this was Melas in his element, not the politicking, strategizing, pen-pushing existence he was so often condemned to endure in his headquarters. As he arrived at each regiment, the men would surround him to hear his words translated into the various languages and dialects by the officers standing alongside his horse. When he reached IR 23 Toscana, Melas was observed by a captain named Wenzel Rauch. This regiment was living under something of a cloud, as it was the subject of an investigation after an action near Novi the previous November. The regiment had been operating in open order and had got into difficulties – regimental honour had been called into question. Standing before the regiment, Melas told the men the investigation would now be dropped, and he would personally vouch for their courage and bravery. Having wiped the slate clean, Melas now told the Toscana Regiment he would place particular trust in their bravery, and expected every man to do his duty in the coming battle. As one can imagine, Melas’ words were greeted with wild enthusiasm by the men. Indeed, Melas had boosted the men’s morale to fever pitch.5

  Crossard confirms the high morale of the Austrian troops on 13 June. Of the troops committed to battle, only Ott’s corps had suffered serious reverses at the hands of the French, and even these troops had fought with a certain glory:

  MAP 4: Zach’s battle plan – 14 June

  A – supposed main line of French advance; B – small French covering force at San Giuliano (Gardanne); C – French column due to arrive at Novi on morning of 14 June to intercept Hohenzollern.

  1 – Austrian right column (O’Reilly); 2 – Austrian main column (Melas); 3 – Austrian left column (Ott).

  ‘The good spirit with which the Austrian troops were animated could only inspire them with audacity, the presage of victory. They had been abundantly supplied; the fatigues had not weighed upon them; their number equalled that which the enemy might have; all probabilities were therefore in favour of Melas. It was also these probabilities that General Vogelsang took for a certainty.’

  Radetzky also played a key part in the army’s preparation for combat. While Zach had been left to develop the battle plan, Radetzky had written a rousing Armeebefehl (order of the day) in Melas’ name to be read to the troops before moving into the new camp. The order read in full:

  ‘As we approach with every hour the decisive moment, in which only courage, bravery and steadiness can underpin the laboriously won glory of such an exceptional army, punish a recklessly advancing enemy and repel the coming danger to the threatened fatherland, then I do not believe it superfluous to repeat several comments which have already been made and to expect with all the more certainty compliance with them, when the army not only has given continued agreeable proof of the confidence placed in me, but has also increased with each day my present trust and regard towards them. I am satisfied beforehand, that the generals will most conscientiously keep the regimental commanders to good order, observance of their sacred duties, bravery and determination, at this time, commend to them the proper following of orders as their honour and duty and at the same time task them with the impressing vigorously on their subordinate staff-rank and line officers, then these on through the lower ranks to the common soldier, who listens so willingly to the speech of his superior, what each man has to do, to work together for the maintenance of the honour of the army and to assure it of victory in advance already, which the enemy has
already sought so often in vain to make us doubtful of and has sought to tear from us.

  ‘It will primarily be a matter of moving against the enemy with concentrated forces; consequently the troops are in no way to dissolve into skirmishers, but must remain closed up even in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, who even in flight can rally and renew their attack. I expressly order that under no circumstances are flags to be sent out of the battle line, but the troops must advance with flags flying and bands playing, whatever the weather might be; we have sworn loyalty to the flags, we will defend them to the last man.

  ‘The playing of music invigorates the courage of the advancing force, informs the enemy of a determinedly advancing force; besides which, it is useful for the troops units, especially in restricted ground, as a reliable indicator of their position in the line and even at the moment of breaking up and scattering the unit, as the only means to rally again. It is therefore only too strikingly obvious that the sending back of musicians can bring with it disadvantageous consequences.

  ‘Any kind of stopping short in the face of an advancing enemy or their bold skirmishers grants the enemy a few calm moments to be able all the more certainly to damage us. Only determined advances will disconcert even the boldest enemy.

  ‘I suppress the thought that possibly there could still be those in the army who would forget their duty, who take no interest in the army’s honour and who may turn their backs on the enemy; necessity requires however that such is made impossible, which weakness of spirit and heart can effect against better expectations; therefore on the advance it is ordered that proportionately small reserve detachments, who must use their weapons against this kind of forgetfulness of duty without hesitation and to fire into, but on the other hand deal with individual deserters in accordance with martial law on the spot.

  ‘I am convinced, that the honestly wounded soldier will not except in the most extreme circumstances withdraw any of his comrades out of the battle to assist him, but will move back alone as well as possible; should however it be necessary to obtain help, then at most one man will accompany the wounded man, who must pass him on to the rearward reserve detachment and be sent back to his position in the line, so that faintheartedness finds no opportunity to conceal itself under the guise of brotherly love.

  ‘I continue in the pleasant belief, that as its fighting units concentrate, the army will find a new trust in its strength and in our fellow countrymen, who can look forward in all confident expectation to the approaching battle, to provide new proof that nothing can shatter our courage and that nothing can diminish the trust we have in ourselves.

  ‘Only victory can lead us to a restful time, which I will then use with all my ability, to grant to them all those things, which can only ever be permitted to a brave soldier and to the granting of which the Monarch so willingly gives his permission.’6

  After reading this order, there could be no doubting the seriousness of what lay ahead. Again there was a reminder not to attempt to fight the French in skirmish formation. They were to drive at the French lines in closed formations. The longer they attempted to trade skirmish fire with the French, the heavier the casualties would be. The regimental bands would have to brave the cannonballs along with the soldiers, no matter how much the colonels wanted to preserve their expensive musicians from enemy fire. The wounded would also have to make do, and most grimly of all, there would be squads of soldiers – detachments from the grenadier brigades – instructed to shoot on the spot anyone they suspected of cowardice. Above all was the caution not to underestimate the French who ‘even in flight can rally and renew their attack’.

  Radetzky’s words filled the men with encouragement and determination. While the men began to prepare to move out to the south of the city, all the army’s baggage was directed to a wagon park located north of Alessandria. Everything was ready. However, just as the head of the column began to reach the Bormida camp around 6.00 pm, the unmistakable sound of artillery fire came from the direction of the fortified bridgehead. No one in the column had any idea what the guns were firing at. Something had clearly gone wrong.

  On the morning of 13 June, or rather 24 Prairial, as the republican French styled it, the French prepared to venture forth onto the plain before them. At five in the morning, Berthier wrote a note to Lannes, who was taking his five half-brigades towards Castelnuovo Scrivia:

  ‘We have had no report from you tonight, Citizen General, which makes me think there is no news beyond what you wrote yesterday to the first consul. His intention is that you should attack and overthrow whatever is in front of you. General Victor is moving towards San Giuliano. General Desaix’s reserve is in front of Pontecurone.’

  Arriving at Castelnuovo-Scrivia, Lannes’ troops found 1,500 enemy sick and wounded abandoned there. Victor crossed the Scrivia slightly further upstream, opposite Ova. The bridges over the Scrivia had all been destroyed, but the river was shallow enough to be forded, waist deep, albeit there was quite a strong current.7 Ahead of the infantry, the cavalry also moved forwards to probe and scout ahead. Brigadier General Champeaux reported:8

  ‘The reconnaissances of the night have produced nothing new. Those on the side of Castelnuovo Scrivia went without encountering the enemy, and those on the side of the mountain on our left could not be pushed as far as we wanted, the roads approaching the mountain being all cut with ditches. A deserter was found on this side without being able to give us any information. A dragoon of the 9th Regiment has broken his arm while going to Tortona for the distributions that could not take place.’

  The 12th Chasseurs had spent an uncomfortable night in the middle of a field next to the Tortona road. The ground there was so hard they had trouble knocking in the pegs for tethering their horses. As well as having to sleep in the rain, they had not received supplies or forage for their horses. About an hour before daybreak, General of Brigade Duvignau took the usual precaution of mounting his brigade up, ready for the orders of the day or signs of enemy action. Nothing happened. After two hours of bored inactivity, the brigade was ordered to dismount and prepare soup. At 5.30 am, General Berthier appeared and so Duvignau ordered the ‘à cheval’ (to horse) to be sounded. Later, an officer from the 1st Hussars attached to Murat’s staff arrived and asked for a report on the night’s activities. Duvignau provided this. Then a second aide to General Murat arrived with the order to move forward to Castelnuovo Scrivia. The brigade formed a column and marched off up the track to this place, where they found Adjutant-General César Berthier waiting for them. He directed the brigade over the Scrivia to where Murat was waiting for them on the other side. Once they had crossed the river, the brigade formed line and received an impromptu inspection by the commander of the cavalry. Afterwards, Murat told Duvignau to follow the road westwards in the direction of Sale.9 At the same time that Duvignau’s brigade set off, the 11th Hussars were sent off to join General Gardanne, commander of the new advanced-guard, who was heading towards the suspected Austrian position at San Giuliano.

  As the army was put in motion, the French chief of staff, General Dupont, penned a brief note to Carnot, the Minister of War. It confirmed the puzzlement the French experienced trying to guess the Austrian intentions:

  ‘The enemy is assembled before Alessandria. It is uncertain whether he will give battle; but we will force him to take a stand. The battle of Montebello is more important than it first appeared. It has the happiest consequences for us … p.s. Almost always on horseback, I am compelled sometimes to postpone the account which I owe you of our operations.’10

  The First Consul was very much ill at ease with the situation. At 8.00 am, Bonaparte learned at Castelnuovo Scrivia that the enemy has assembled all his forces at Alessandria, and there were no posts at San Giuliano or in the plain. This news increased his uncertainty. Had Melas crossed the Po already? Was he heading for Genoa, or Acqui? The apparent refusal to fight in the plain of San Giuliano, where the Austrian superiority in artillery and cavalry would be best served,
indicated Melas was intending to escape the First Consul.11 Bonaparte’s state of mind is perhaps best described in Victor’s memoirs. The First Consul knew Melas had concentrated his army at Alessandria. He knew Elsnitz had arrived, and the intelligence reports, including captured letters, indicated Melas was planning to give battle; but there was no sign of the Austrian army holding the plain. According to Victor, Bonaparte simply did not believe Melas would be audacious enough to attack. More than anything else, Bonaparte feared Melas would escape. If the Austrians evaded battle, instead of the war being ended in one great stroke, it would drag on and bring about what Victor called ‘new military and political chances’. Doubts might arise over the infallibility of the First Consul, and his power base in Paris would be shaken. The whole point of the march over the Alps was to dazzle – to show his superiority in military matters, especially over Moreau; but if the Austrians eluded him, what then of his reputation?

  Victor believed Bonaparte doubted Melas would attack him because of ‘the word of a spy, to whom he gave too much confidence ... This spy, one day returning from the enemy’s headquarters, where he had an access which should have made him suspicious, had assured him that Melas’ intention was to pass onto the left bank of the Po.’ Victor noted that this reliance on the spy almost proved fatal. The exact timing of Carlo Gioelli’s meeting with the First Consul is unknown, but the circumstantial evidence points to mid-morning on 13 June. Gioelli told Bonaparte everything Zach had instructed him to say the day before, and also handed over Hohenzollern’s false itinerary for the march from Genoa. The spy was dismissed and his information digested.

  Bonaparte did not swallow Gioelli’s false intelligence entirely. He was too skilful a user of spies to entrust his entire career to the word of a double agent. Even if he was overly generous with his trust in Gioelli, the First Consul had to consider the possibility the Austrians were feeding the spy false intelligence. This was all part of the game. According to Victor, the key doubt in the spy’s intelligence was the lack of corroboration by the reports from General Chabran, who was placed in Chivasso and Crescentino. Zach’s ruse at Casale had been noted, but Chabran was seemingly unimpressed by what he saw. On the night of 11 June, Chabran had written to Lieutenant General Moncey saying the strength of the enemy at Casale had increased. He also reported the boats between the Chivasso and Valenza had been collected ‘under the cannon’ of Casale. Everything indicated the Austrians were threatening to build a bridge there, but Chabran was not sure of it, and said he would inform Moncey if he discovered what the enemy’s projects actually were. Even an Austrian cannonade on his troops opposite Casale did not cause Chabran to be overly concerned.12 As late as 3.00 am on 13 June, Bonaparte was notified by Chabran that the Austrians had not deployed the bridge and had made no dispositions which indicated an imminent crossing. It was all extremely puzzling.