Marengo
Page 20
Instead of crossing the Po, perhaps Melas was considering a return to Genoa. From there Melas could strike out towards Piacenza via Bobbio, or perhaps he was intending to turn round and defeat Massena and Suchet? Perhaps the spy’s intelligence was a ruse to make him look in the other direction? The only thing for it was to send the light cavalry out to scour the plain and look for the Austrians. If the Austrians resisted and contested possession of the plain, it would indicate Melas was considering a battle. If the Austrians withdrew beyond the Bormida, perhaps the spy was correct after all. As a piece of insurance, Bonaparte despatched Desaix to Serravalle with Boudet’s division and a cavalry detachment. If the spy’s information was accurate, then Desaix would meet Hohenzollern that night on the road to Novi. If Hohenzollern was not there, then Desaix could face the other way and block Melas’ escape route from Alessandria to Genoa. Meanwhile, Bonaparte began directing all his infantry away from Sale towards the centre of the plain at San Giuliano.
At midday, Bonaparte had reached Sale with the cavalry of his guard. They found nothing there. General Duvignau arrived there soon afterwards with his light cavalry brigade. News then came from San Giuliano, where Gardanne’s division had been directed. The Austrians had evacuated the hamlet and were not to be seen on the plain. Bonaparte headed southwards to take a look for himself.
At 1.00 pm, Gardanne was joined by the remainder of the infantry commanded by Victor and Lannes. It was raining, and the men were permitted a short rest while the First Consul, his guard, the general staff and an ‘enormous suite’ (as Horse Grenadier Petit described it) swarmed around the three farms which comprised San Giuliano. Victor interviewed some peasants still at San Giuliano who, being braver than most of their fellows, had decided to await the approach of the two armies rather than flee. They told him that the Austrians had departed the night before, but were still present with 4,000 men not two leagues away, at the hamlet of Marengo on the western edge of the plain. At 3.00 pm, Bonaparte ordered Victor to take his corps and attack the Austrians. Gardanne would lead, with Chambarlhac’s division following behind. Lannes would remain at San Giuliano, while Monnier’s division would move forward to Torre Garofoli on the eastern edge of the plain. The division of Lapoype would arrive at Ponte-Curone later on in the day to replace Monnier as a reserve. With Chabran opposite Casale, and Desaix at Novi, Bonaparte had every angle covered, except for an attack against Suchet.
Duvignau had initially remained at Sale, but was subsequently ordered to join the advance on Marengo:
‘I was ordered to go to San Giuliano with the cavalry, and to hasten its march. The enemy was at Marengo, he occupied the village, that of Spinetta, the banks of the Bormida, and had his army at Alessandria. I therefore forced the march. General Murat joined me and marched at our head as far as San Giuliano. I had on the right and on the left, scouts of the regiments under my command. Those of the 12th Chasseurs ventured too far and part of them were taken by the enemy.
‘At three o’clock in the afternoon we found ourselves in the beautiful plains of San Giuliano, the only plains we have encountered in all Italy, where cavalry may be usefully employed. We saw before us the village of Marengo, and we burned with the desire of soon being there.’13
MAP 5: French movements, morning and afternoon, 13 June
A – Route taken by Lannes to San Giuliano; B – Victor’s advance on Marengo; C – Monnier directed to Torre Garofoli on eastern edge of plain; D – Desaix’s march towards Novi, avoiding Tortona citadel; E – Division of Lapoype arriving at Pontecurone; F – Chabran watching Casale and Valenza.
1 – Location of new Austrian camp; 2 – Austrian rearguard (O’Reilly).
Advancing westwards, Victor’s infantry reached the intersection of the old and new Alessandria‑Tortona road, level with Cascina Grossa on their left. Chambarlhac’s division remained in reserve, taking position on a plateau. Grenadier Coignet remembered the division formed a line and the men piled arms. He could not see the rest of the army, he said, only ADCs flying in all directions in the lower ground around them.
Gardanne’s division was directed forward towards Marengo. At this point one should clarify the division was quite small, brigade-sized really, officially mustering 3,691 men according to the French order of battle. It comprised two infantry half-brigades, the 44th and 101st, with a small detachment of fifty-three men from the 102nd. In Gardanne’s after-action report, he downplays the size of the division further, stating they were about 2,000 men strong. Gardanne’s adjutant general, Achille Dampierre, also emphasizes the weakness of the force, later describing it as ‘cette prétendue division’ (this so-called division).14 Although weak, Gardanne split his force, providing Dampierre with 500 men to follow the new road in the direction of Spinetta (Dampierre complained he actually only had two to three hundred by the time he detached skirmishers and guards for the artillery). Gardanne would advance with the rest of the division, led by the combined grenadiers on the right, following on the new road; behind them, the 24th Light from Chambarlhac’s division would follow in support.
General Duvignau’s cavalry brigade supported the advance, advancing in an open column of platoons. Having earlier described the plain around San Giuliano as being the best in Italy for cavalry, it is interesting to read the difficulties his brigade had in keeping up with the infantry as it advanced up the old road:
‘I kept the head of my column level with that of the infantry as long as the ground permitted me. The infantry and the artillery followed a great track, and my cavalry was obliged to march through broken ground. Several times I marched in line and at the trot, always scouting my left, and searching the houses, the clumps of wood, and somewhat the enemy cavalry which was on my left retreating as I advanced. The ground became more and more cut up with broad, deep ditches, with difficult access, with defiles where two regiments had to pass man by man. Scarcely reformed, which was very lengthy, the vineyards, on which it was necessary to use the sabre because they were entwined, presented new obstacles. All these accidents of terrain delayed the march of the brigade; add to this the fatigue of the horses which had been without oats for many days. It was necessary to take the trot to keep up. I succeeded, however, and I was there when the fire began at Spinetta.’
The Austrian advanced guard at Marengo was commanded by FML O’Reilly. The Irishman clearly had his pickets out beyond Spinetta, but his main position was at Marengo, along the line of the Fontanone brook either side of the hamlet. Knowing the Austrian army planned to advance through Marengo in the early hours of the following morning, one would suppose O’Reilly would have taken greater caution to inform himself of the French advance; but it is unclear if O’Reilly knew what Zach’s great master plan was at this very moment. He may well have believed he was in fact still the army’s rearguard and that he would continue to fall back on Alessandria following FML Ott and Vogelsang. The Austrian accounts are split on this. Stutterheim was incredulous that O’Reilly was apparently taken by surprise in broad daylight, while Crossard suggests O’Reilly’s orders were to fall back on the bridgehead if attacked. In either case, his key fault was in failing to inform Melas that the French were advancing from San Giuliano in significant numbers and preparing to attack.
French reports are somewhat confusing on what occurred next. Duvignau says there was an obstinate struggle at Spinetta, after which the Austrians fell back on Marengo. No one else appears to talk about an action at Spinetta. Dampierre claims he was first to arrive at Marengo, and with his ‘picket’ of about 400 men he captured the position, taking two guns and some caissons. It is almost as if Dampierre played no part in the action at Spinetta, or he got Marengo and Spinetta confused. Gardanne elaborates, claiming the Austrians had 4,000 men and seven guns defending Marengo. Victor’s ADC, Joachim Jérôme Quiot, put the Austrian numbers more accurately at 3,000 with four guns. The latter claimed the action commenced at approximately 4.00 pm and was over within half an hour. Gardanne suggests the action took nearer an ho
ur. It is difficult to square the accounts with one another, but it appears that at some point O’Reilly’s troops opened a fusillade on Gardanne’s column. The Austrians perhaps saw the 24th Light manoeuvring menacingly behind Gardanne, and then rapidly withdrew towards the bridgehead when Dampierre appeared on their right flank. An account attributed by de Cugnac to Bonaparte’s ADC, Lauriston, summarizes the action thus:
‘We marched on the village of Marengo in very good order. The enemy was as strong as us. He had moreover a numerous artillery. He made a very lively fire; but at length he was compelled to yield, and pushed very vigorously up to the Bormida. The general had ordered me to go forward to see what was going on and report to him. I advanced to the right of Victor’s division; I entered the village of Marengo with the skirmishers at the moment it was taken.’
One peculiar account of the battle given by Coignet, while perhaps little more than camp-fire gossip, is interesting nonetheless. He claims the 24th were sent forwards and were seriously mauled by the Austrians. Coignet claims the half-brigade had shot some of its officers at Montebello when ordered to advance. In retribution for this, when the 24th came into difficulty during the attack on Marengo and had to form square, the First Consul deliberately left the half-brigade unsupported and exposed. Coignet says his unit, the 96th half-brigade, was sent forward at 5.00 or 6.00 pm to disengage the 24th. When they arrived, the light infantrymen greeted the 96th with insults for not coming to their assistance sooner. They had, Coignet reckoned, lost nearly half their men in the action. Rumour or not, this account is difficult to square with the other versions of the action; however, it perhaps indicates that the action against O’Reilly was not as one-sided as Dampierre portrays.
The First Consul certainly witnessed the taking of Marengo. Duvignau confirms Bonaparte was with the forces which advanced on the place. Horse Grenadier Petit was also there:
‘The consul, with his horse guards, and pieces of light artillery, skirted Marengo. We saw him almost the whole time, at a distance from us, traversing the plain, examining the terrain with attention, by turns profoundly meditating, and giving orders. The day began to close in, and we had been on horseback from the moment it broke. We had also been soaked to the skin, for none of us, the consul not excepted, had put on a cloak. We were often obliged to set foot to the ground to stretch and revive our limbs, which had been benumbed by the wet and the uncommon cold. We were joined by several deserters, and some scattered prisoners who had been taken; among others, an officer of Bussy’s legion wearing the cross of St Louis. The general questioned them with considerable earnestness. All the prisoners were astonished, when informed that the person they had just been speaking with was Bonaparte.’
Before continuing with the pursuit of O’Reilly’s men towards the bridgehead, it is important to consider the impact of the Austrian retreat on the First Consul’s thinking. By retreating from Marengo, the Austrians had ceded to the French the entire plain. Since crawling over his maps in Paris, Bonaparte’s strategy had been based on avoiding combat with the Austrians on open ground. As we have stated many times, their greater strength in artillery and cavalry meant the plain favoured the imperial army in an open battle. It was now inconceivable that the Austrians were intending to give battle. With the time now approaching 6.00 pm and in heavy rainfall, Bonaparte withdrew from the battlefield, leaving matters to Berthier and Victor to resolve. His ‘profound meditation’ had led him to believe Melas was intending flight.
As O’Reilly’s troops fell back on the bridgehead, the French went in pursuit. Dampierre admitted they advanced with too much ardour right up to the foot of the entrenchments on the Bormida. He described the bridgehead as looking more like a town than a field fortification. The Austrians had mounted fourteen guns in this bridgehead, and these spat a hail of ball and canister at the French. Nonetheless, Dampierre’s skirmishers were soon on the banks of the Bormida. General Duvignau was ordered to support the attack, and to advance at the trot. The brigade soon got into trouble from the many ditches which cut up the ground. A staff officer arrived from General Victor, telling Duvignau to hurry up, but the frustrated cavalry officer complained he could not move more than 20m without encountering a large ditch filled with water. Somewhat exasperated, Duvignau finally reached General Victor and Berthier, who were directing the attack.
Across the Bormida, the Austrian commanders at last received a message from O’Reilly that he was unable to hold Marengo. As they rode forward to observe the situation, the Austrian staff saw cannonballs raining down on the infantry arriving at the campsite. No one knew what to do. Should they attempt to camp as instructed or prepare for action? Radetzky had a clear head. He advised Melas to launch a counter-attack with Ott’s troops, and offered to lead Schellenberg’s division in person. Melas agreed with the plan and gave Radetzky four battalions and the Lobkowitz Dragoons. As they marched off, Zach appeared. When he saw Radetzky marching off to round up the troops, the quartermaster general asked Melas what the general adjutant was doing and had him stopped. He was aghast. Despite the cannonballs flying over from the other side of the Bormida, it was almost as if Zach simply could not believe what was happening. His plan had clearly stated the French were at Sale. The orders had been issued and could not be changed. Zach declared that the French tirailleurs were nothing but a small force, and reiterated: ‘The main enemy force is positioned at Sale.’
Fortunately for the Austrians, common sense eventually prevailed. The regiment closest to the bridgehead was IR 51 Splényi, the infamous légion infernale. The regiment was now just 700 strong, and had taken many casualties while acting as the rearguard at Casteggio. However, it was still extremely motivated, and fearsomely tough. At the moment the bullets began to fly, the regiment formed itself across the road, facing towards the French. When Zach finally realized the bridgehead was actually in some danger, he consented to Radetzky leading IR 51 Splényi out to launch a counter-attack. The 1st Kaiser Light Dragoons were sent in support and three batteries of guns were moved up to the river bank to fire in support of the artillery inside the bridgehead.15 The Splényi regimental history describes how the regiment fell upon the French advanced guard:
‘With a contempt for death provoked by the courage of despair, the brave sons of Siebenbürgen [Transylvania] pressed forward against the French, and with our brave artillery, the regiment succeeded, even before nightfall, in repelling the attack, and driving Gardanne away from the Bormida.’16
The counter-attack succeeded, but at some cost. Radetzky had his horse shot from under him, and staff officer Hauptmann Troyer was wounded too. IR 51 took about fifty casualties, including the commander of the regiment, Oberst Von Eros, who was mortally wounded when a cannonball struck his lower torso. By 10.00 pm, in the darkness, on the broken and unfamiliar ground, the two adversaries stopped fighting. The rain continued to come down, and the Frenchmen sat down on the wet earth and tried to find some means of sleeping.
On the French side, Dampierre described how, ‘after we had gone within range of a pistol shot, in the midst of a shower of bullets and grape-shot, we had to retire at nine o’clock in the evening, and go and bivouac within range of the cannon of the entrenchments.’ The memoirs of Marmont, commander of the French artillery, claim he tried to support the attack of Gardanne’s division, but his artillery was driven off by the Austrian guns on the far bank. Having lost a few men, Marmont went looking for Gardanne to find out what he intended to do: ‘I found him in a ditch, having taken no measures either to attack the bridgehead or to prevent the enemy from leaving and debouching. Thereupon I left him, having no orders to give him, and the night being near.’
General Duvignau left the 12th Chasseurs planted in the middle of a vineyard while he went off to find new orders from Victor. After a long search, Duvignau found him at the presbytery of Spinetta, where he had set up his headquarters. When Duvignau arrived, Victor was meditating on his concern that he was in such close proximity to the enemy and yet unaware of th
eir designs. Therefore, Victor ordered Duvignau to scout the Tanaro on the right of the position. He was also to place the 6th Dragoons behind Marengo near to the 43rd Line and to keep the 12th Chasseurs in the plain on the left, with forward posts detached in front. He was then to contribute to a grand-guard on the main road, supporting the grenadiers of the 43rd Line with the 6th Dragoons, in order to guard two pieces of artillery placed in front of Marengo.
Duvignau left Victor and rejoined the 12th Chasseurs at 10.00 pm. After taking a number of them for the Tanaro patrol, he went to set up the guard provided by the 6th Dragoons. Duvignau then had an accident approaching midnight. He had been mounted since 6.00 am, and his horse had not rested or eaten. When attempting to jump a ditch, the horse fell and overturned on the general. Heavily bruised and spitting blood, Duvignau was taken to Marengo. When his condition did not appear to be any better, he went to Spinetta, where Victor authorized him to go to the rear for treatment. In his absence, the men of the 12th Chasseurs suspected Duvignau had in fact deserted them to be with his wife, whom he had left at San Giuliano. The angry troopers stayed in the fields until midnight, when the commander, having had enough of Duvignau’s presumed antics, marched them off towards Marengo to bivouac for the night. They were still ‘enraged by hunger’ and again had nothing to eat, so they spent hours wandering around in search of sustenance. A patrol was sent out under the command of Captain Détré to make a search along the banks of the Bormida; he took fifty troops with him and formed a picket.