Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  Earlier that day, Desaix had been ordered to take Boudet’s division south to Serravalle, the point at which the road from Genoa exits the Apennines and enters the great plain. Bonaparte had issued these instructions after meeting with Gioelli and having received the reports of his cavalry patrols. If the spy was correct, then Desaix would meet Hohenzollern’s corps marching up from Genoa in the direction of Alessandria. Bonaparte’s instructions to Desaix arrived at Pontecurone just after midday on 13 June. Desaix was then found at the home of the Marquess of Durazzo. He had spent a very agreeable evening with the marquess, but appears to have departed in a fateful mood. According to the bulletin of 25 Prairial written by the First Consul, several times that day Desaix said to his ADCs: ‘I have not been fighting in Europe for a long time. The balls do not know us anymore; something will happen to us.’ While these exact words might have been a flight of fancy on the part of Bonaparte, Desaix’s sense of foreboding that day was also recorded in the memoirs of the writer and engineer-geographer Victor de Musset, who stayed with the Marquess of Durazzo several days later. As Desaix departed the home of the marquess, the farewells were long. At the moment Desaix went to mount his horse, he bade the marquess goodbye with the words: ‘Until we see each other in this world.’ After a moment of silence while climbing up onto his horse, he added, ‘Or the next.’17

  Having received the order to march, Boudet’s division quickly prepared itself. The division’s adjutant-general, Dalton, managed to scribble a hurried note to the army’s chief of staff, Dupont, begging for more ammunition:

  ‘I inform you, my general, we were unable to obtain at Voghera more than 20,000 cartridges which, joined to the 30,000 we received during the course of yesterday, and to 13,000 that we have in reserve, make 63,000 out of 83,622 which we need to complete the division to 50 shots per man. You see that we lack another 20,000 still, not including that which would be necessary for us to have in reserve. The division leaves at this instant to direct itself on Serravalle. I beg you, my general, to send me as soon as possible, as much as you can.’

  Following the Via Emilia into Tortona, the road to Sarezzano is not much more than 30km. However, Boudet’s division could not take the main road because the citadel of Tortona was still in Austrian hands. In order to avoid the citadel’s guns, it was necessary for the division to take a circuitous route, looping round to the south of Tortona and passing through the village of Sarezzano, before striking westwards to reach the Scrivia opposite Rivalta, there joining the road towards Genoa. This meant the division would have to use smaller roads and tracks, and would have to pass over hilly ground around Sarezzano – this village being more than 200m higher than Pontercurone. It was also extremely wet, and no sooner had the division marched off than the rain began to lash down.

  Desaix’s force was composed of the brigades of Musnier (9th Light) and Guénand (30th and 59th Line). The 30th Line had only recently caught up with the division, having been left as part of the blockading force at Milan. It was composed only of two battalions, and the majority of the soldiers were conscripts. The other two half-brigades had seen a great deal of action since leaving Milan, notably at Melegnano, Lodi and Piacenza. The brigade had eight guns: a battery of light artillery from the 2nd Horse Artillery under the command of Chief of Battalion Duport comprising two 6in howitzers and four 8-pdrs, and two 12-pdr field guns.18 The 1st Hussars were attached to the division, as was a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry, both units approximately 120 strong.

  The cavalry led the march, followed by the 9th Light. Boudet followed with Guénand’s brigade and the artillery. After the passage of the horses and the light infantry, the tracks they followed were churned into mud. By the time Boudet reached the hills around Sarezzano, the guns were only moving with great difficulty. The infantry had to help the mounted gunners push the guns and caissons through the pouring rain. It was to no avail; the guns were stuck fast and Boudet had no option but to call Guénand’s exhausted brigade to halt, remaining for the night between the villages of Sarezzano and Carbonara Scrivia.19 Meanwhile, the head of the division reached the banks of the Scrivia around 5.00 pm. Instead of a ford opposite Rivalta, they found a raging torrent. Rainwater had drained off the rocky hills and quickly turned the Scrivia into a fast-moving and treacherous body of water. A few of the hussars waded across to the left bank, which gave the carabiniers of the 9th Light an idea. The result was recorded by Dalton in his daily report:

  ‘The 9th Light with the 1st Hussars, which marched at the head, arrived on the edges of Scrivia after five o’clock. We attempted the passage of this river which was very swollen at the moment and we were only able to succeed in crossing some infantrymen by making them hold onto the tail of the horses. Twelve men were swept away in an instant; we saved them with difficulty, but they lost their weapons. The general was forced to make camp on the right bank. The 30th and 59th Line had stayed on the mountain of Sarrezano, under the orders of General of Brigade Guénand, to protect the artillery.’

  MAP 6: Night of 13/14 June

  A - Gardanne; B – Victor; C – Lannes; D – Monnier and the Guard (Torre Garofoli); E – Desaix at Rivalta; F – Chabran; G – Lapopye.

  1 – Austrian camp.

  Boudet’s journal reported only a single company of carabiniers made it across the Scrivia to join Desaix at Rivalta. The remainder of the 9th Light did not spend the night idly, but began looking for boats. In local tradition, a priest came to the aid of the Frenchmen. This was first recorded in 1842 by Pietro Oliva:

  ‘[Desaix] already despaired, when a priest of that country showed up to Desaix, telling him he would call all the villagers, the boatmen to help him. In response to his words rushed farmers, fishermen, boats were sought, and wagons from everywhere, and the French gradually came to the opposite side of the Scrivia.’20

  The priest has been identified as Don Guasone from nearby Castellar Ponzano - a Francophile who supported the revolution. Many of the peasants who came to Guasone’s aid were dependants of the local Castellani-Merlani family, who had lost a son fighting for the French at Novi the year before. The result of this activity was a boat, by which the remainder of the 9th Light were able to cross the river early next morning.

  While this work had gone on, Desaix was naturally concerned. If Bonaparte’s intelligence was correct, the Austrians might already be at Novi, just 10km away. With the torrential rain, and the roar of the Scrivia, Desaix appears not to have heard the guns open up at Marengo around the same time he arrived at Rivalta. This would only have added to his agitation. Before the fall of night, Desaix sent his ADC, Savary, with a detachment of hussars to explore as far as Novi and report on enemy activity. Savary arrived back in the night, stating there was no sign of Austrian troops in the town. At 2.00 am, Desaix ordered Boudet to make a strong reconnaissance with his infantry in the direction of Serravalle, urging him to take an entire brigade if he felt it necessary. Boudet reported back that he had already sent a staff officer, Captain L’Héritier, with a detachment of thirty men from the 3rd Cavalry to investigate the town.21 Boudet advised Desaix to await the return of this patrol before committing his infantry. Desaix agreed and changed the order. When L’Hériter returned, he reported imperial troops at Serravalle, but not at Novi – where he had only seen republican troops (Savary’s escort?). This information was important. It meant the forces of Melas and Hohenzollern had yet to unite. A message was sent urgently to headquarters, probably arriving before first light.

  Chapter 10

  That Miserable Ditch

  In the early hours of Saturday 14 June, the Austrians counted their losses from the action the evening before. In total they had lost 448 casualties to the fray. Perhaps more importantly, the attack had disrupted the march to the new campsite, and the heavy rain had not helped matters either. Although the situation had been stabilized, and the French skirmishers had been driven away from the bridgehead, with Marengo now in enemy hands, the plan to march off at midnight would be folly. Z
ach sent a verbal order out to the staff officers with the column to delay the attack until 8.00 am. This would give the imperial troops a few hours of daylight to reorganize themselves and eat breakfast before the battle.1

  Other than the casualties, the evening battle unsettled some in the imperial camp. A Piedmontese officer, the Franchino di Cavour, witnessed it and was disturbed by the apparently high motivation of the soldiers of the French compared to their Austrian foes:

  ‘One thing truly worthy of remark is, that at the first attack which took place on 13 June, all the French outposts affected to shout, while going forward: “We desire peace or death.” Unfortunately few people are able to feel what a fatal effect these magic words ought to have produced on the minds of the Austrian soldiers. Many of their officers were tired of war and convinced the Great Consul sincerely wanted peace. I am certain that the misfortunes experienced under the walls of Alessandria have their source in the propagation of the idea the French want peace.

  ‘At the commencement of the affair of the 13th, I was so affected with the dull and dejected air of the Austrian soldiers, that I ventured to approach a general, to whom I said in a very reserved tone: “Your Excellency, do you hear the cries of the French? They make a terrible fire while crying for peace. Would it not be possible to destroy the bad effect which this may produce upon the soldiers by haranguing them warmly?” The general shrugged his shoulders and laughed. He doubtless did not know the republicans have beaten and plundered Europe only with harangues, tricks, and songs.’2

  During the night, the Austrian command team debated events. The appearance of the French on the Bormida perhaps indicated Bonaparte was attempting to link with Suchet and the Army of Italy. According to a letter written by Radetzky shortly after the battle, the Austrians had learned Massena had joined with Suchet at Nice and had advanced with 16,000 men. The advanced guard of this force was believed to be operating around Acqui with the intention of cutting off Melas’ communications with Genoa. This intelligence must have been deeply unsettling to the Austrians in Alessandria.

  Despite Zach’s continued insistence that the French were at Sale, Radetzky was concerned at the prospect of a head-on attack to clear the French out of Marengo before the main column could even properly begin its march towards San Giuliano. If the combat the evening before was anything to go by, this frontal attack would require a great deal of sacrifice. He proposed turning the French left by building a pontoon bridge over the Bormida further upstream than the bridgehead. Melas and de Best agreed with him, but Zach had gone to bed exhausted. When they found the quartermaster general and woke him, he also agreed to the change in plan; however, by then it was too late. Radetzky had summoned Captain von Hagen from the Pioneers and discussed the project in detail. At the beginning of June, the bridging train at Alessandria had a total of fifty-one pontoons. Of these, sixteen had been used to create a second bridge over the Bormida, and a further twenty-four had been sent to the Po in order to lend credence to Zach’s deception plan. Only eleven pontoons remained – not enough to create another bridge. The only way Captain von Hagen could build Radetzky a new bridge was by dismantling part of the existing pontoon bridge, and dragging it upstream. With dawn beginning to break it was impossible, von Hagen declared, to attempt such an operation without the French noticing what they were doing. Radetzky called off the idea.3

  Outside, the night gave way to a fine Italian sunrise, one which exuded a warmth thus far lacking on the campaign.4 The skies were clear and there was a cooling westerly breeze. Summer had arrived at last. As Stutterheim gazed up at the heavens studying the weather, all around him the Austrian soldiers began preparing their breakfasts – mostly chewing on bread rations. With the commotion of the night before, and the impending prospect of a major battle, few would have slept much beyond a few hours; but these were hardy young men, disciplined and inured to hardship. They had marched and fought their way from every corner of the Habsburg Empire; down through Italy, across mountains and rivers, through cities, they had driven the French back before their bayonets. Now called back to their ranks, they prepared to march out again.

  Despite Radetzky’s protestations, there was no change to the plan. The enemy’s main force was at Sale, and the troops in front of them at Marengo were only a weak band of skirmishers. Few would have known it, but 14 June was Zach’s birthday. He had come into this world fifty-three years before, and he was determined to end this day with a glorious victory over Bonaparte, or to die in the attempt. The quartermaster general apparently spoke with Hadik and told him as much. According to Cavour:5

  ‘What is very true is that General Zach said before the battle to General Hadik, whom I got it from, that if the battle was lost he was determined to be killed.’

  Such sentiments might appear very noble, but such a fatalistic and blinkered frame of mind indicates Zach was determined to implement his plan, no matter what happened.

  Elsewhere, the mood was better. Crossard was watching the troops prepare to cross the Bormida:

  ‘The soldiers looked gay, and I never saw better dispositions in troops marching to the enemy. General Vogelsang said to me: “I doubt whether Bonaparte will come out of this fortunately; you see the gaiety of the soldiers; we have forty thousand men, an excellent and numerous cavalry, a formidable artillery.”’6

  Once the first division passed the bridges, Crossard saw Melas arrive with his staff. The Austrian commander-in-chief was once again in his element riding among his men. He approached Crossard and spoke with him for the first time since the fall of Cuneo. The émigré had angered Melas by writing to Thugut about various projects, but now Melas let bygones rest – he needed everyone to perform at their best.

  Contradicting Crossard’s upbeat reflections on Austrian morale, Neipperg thought the soldiers had a look on their faces which ‘would have made one believe we were driving our soldiers to slaughter rather than to glory’. Despite Melas’ fine words, which he acknowledged, Neipperg blamed this feeling on the distribution of alcohol before the battle: ‘As usual, they were given bad wine, which, far from awakening their ardour, often numbed it even more.’7

  At 8.00 am, the deployment onto the right bank of the Bormida began. A glaring error was immediately realised. While there were two bridges across the river, there was only one exit from the bridgehead. This was all well and good for an army crossing from the right to left banks, but it immediately caused confusion for those marching towards Marengo. A degree of traffic management was required, and this slowed the speed of deployment considerably. Fortunately for the Austrians, Gardanne’s troops did very little to dispute their passage. Their line was drawn up away from the artillery in the bridgehead, about a kilometre along the main road. Ahead of the main column was an advanced guard commanded by Oberst Frimont of the de Bussy Light Horse. His troops advanced first and cleared away the French outposts, then he moved to the left to allow space for Hadik’s troops to deploy.

  The frontal attack on Marengo was led by FML Hadik with Bellegarde’s brigade; his troops formed the first line. Infantry extended across the road, and the cavalry formed up on the wings. FML Kaim came behind Hadik, forming a second line, followed by the two grenadier brigades. In Melas’ report, he states that the reserve remained in column on the road. There was very good reason for this. Today, the scene of the first clash is formed of large, flat fields. Neipperg describes the appearance of the battlefield in 1800 as being ‘scattered with trees and new plantations’, and the ground ‘resembled a rather thick wood’.8 Hadik drew up a line of guns in front of his line – mostly battalion guns attached to the infantry, but also Frimont’s cavalry battery. These guns opened fire on the French line ahead of them while the Austrian deployment was completed. The battle was now well and truly engaged.

  At 9.00 am, the regimental bands in Hadik’s infantry regiments struck up with their popular Turkish music. The flags were unfurled and the advance on Marengo began. The senior officers rode conspicuously at the head o
f their troops, and Hadik placed himself at the head of Bellegarde’s brigade, which was composed of four battalions, two each from IR 52 Erzherzog Anton and IR 53 Jellacic. As had been stated in Zach’s order, the troops advanced quickly, and did not stop to deploy skirmishers or exchange fire. Ahead of them, Gardanne’s line fired a succession of volleys and then began to withdraw in the direction of Marengo, firing as they went.

  Everything was going to plan until Gardanne withdrew behind the Fontanone brook. Hadik’s troops now came under a crippling fire from the direction of Marengo, but also an enfilading fire against their right flank. They bravely continued forward, taking fearful casualties until they reached the edges of the Fontanone. This obstacle was known by the Austrians, but it had been underestimated. The rainfall the previous day had filled it to bursting point, and the ground around it was extremely swampy and thick with hedges and vegetation. On the extreme right of Hadik’s line was the Hungarian regiment, IR 53 Jellacic. Reaching the Fontanone, their regimental history describes them coming under a ‘murderous French fusillade’: