Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  ‘Shortly afterwards an officer of General Victor arrived and reported to him a general attack of the enemy. The First Consul, astonished at this news, said that it seemed impossible to him. “General Gardanne told me,” he added, “of his arrival on the Bormida, upon which he had cut the bridge.” “General Gardanne,” I replied, “has made a false report; I was yesterday evening closer than he to the bridgehead, and I proposed to him to attempt to seize it; but he refused it, although I had placed the cannon to support him; and the bridgehead having not been removed or blocked by our posts, the enemy might have debouched at his ease during that night, without being perceived. So you can boldly believe in the battle.”’

  Despite Deblou’s message and Marmont’s verbal advice, the First Consul was hesitant to commit reserves. Deblou had left the field before the actual attack had begun. This attack might have been a feint – a cover under which Melas would escape Bonaparte. There was certainly no logic in Melas attacking him, having ceded the plain almost without a struggle the day before. In fact, although Bonaparte could hear the sound of battle to the west, it is unlikely he received definite news about the scale of the Austrian attack until 11.00 am at the earliest. If we suppose that Victor made a report at the end of Hadik’s attack, this would have taken at least an hour to reach Torre Garofoli. Therefore, the First Consul continued making his contingencies for blocking Melas’ escape. Around the time the battle commenced, Bonaparte ordered Lapoype to turn his division around and recross the Po to operate in support of Chabran. Lapoype received this message at 10.00am, and had long since departed by the time any recall was sent to him. At some point between 10.00‑11.00 am, the First Consul also sent Desaix a message, instructing him to march from Rivalta in a southward direction to Pozzolo-Formigaro, where he could intercept the road from Genoa to Alessandria.

  At the bridgehead, GM Nobili’s cavalry brigade had come back from the battlefield and headed southwards towards Acqui. FML Ott’s column was now finally able to cross over the Bormida and begin its march on Sale via Castelceriolo. Crossard was attached to this column as a staff officer, and as he crossed over he saw the seriously wounded Hadik being carried back to Alessandria. Hadik indicated to them that his men were still going forward. Ott’s column took the left fork in the road and began marching to the north-east as planned. It was clear to them that the French were concentrated at Marengo, and this meant there was no one to dispute their passage. In comparison to the hell experienced by the main column, their march was fairly leisurely.

  Back on the main road, FML Kaim led forward his line to repeat Hadik’s attack. Kaim was not the sort of general who resorted to stratagems and ruses. The enemy was before him – he advanced. As before, the flags were unfurled and the musicians struck up their martial airs. Eager to set an example to his men, Oberst Veimatti of IR 47 placed himself and all the staff officers of his regiment at the head of his men and advanced towards the French position. At the same time, on the left of the line, Oberst Soudain of IR 63 and Major Prince Aremberg did the same. However, the result was the same, partly because of the difficulty crossing the Fontanone, but mostly because of the intense enfilading fire from Gardanne’s troops lined up along the brook, many of whom had dispersed as skirmishers, using the natural cover along the ditch – some even fighting from inside the ditch. IR 63 had almost 100 killed outright as they advanced through a hail of lead. As the regiment pushed nearer the Fontanone, the soldiers found themselves funnelled into Victor’s killing ground. A huge French volley smashed into IR 63 from across the ditch, killing Oberst Soudain’s horse and badly wounded him in the head and hand, while Prince Aremberg took a crippling hit in the leg. IR 47 suffered equally badly, with Oberst Veimatti and Oberst Leutenant Kovesdy included in the scores of men who fell. As Hadik had found, Kaim’s men could not cross the ditch in sufficient numbers to break the French line. Captain Rauch in IR23 Toscana was also in this attack, and recalled:

  ‘When the regiment had only advanced a little further, it was already running onto cultivated terrain – arable land, cut up by ditches, meadows and bushes; the field of view around it was limited in all directions, which gave cover to the enemy facing us and at the same time, acted as a barrier, so that our cavalry could not co-operate to support us at all. Ignoring the obstacles, we mounted a lively attack and the musketry was so ferocious, that I had never heard its like before … I came through unwounded, but my coat and my clothes were shot through with bullet holes.’17

  The Austrian pioneer troops were normally equipped with Laufbrücken (lightweight, portable bridges) which could be thrown over obstacles like the Fontanone, but for some inexplicable reason, when the Laufbrücken were called for, the equipment wagons were right at the tail of the army and had to wait for Ott’s column to cross the Bormida before they could be brought forward.

  As Kaim’s men tried to bludgeon their way into Marengo, Hadik’s troops reformed under the command of Bellegarde. Although quite badly mauled in the first attack, the men were still eager to resume the fight. Keeping away from Gardanne’s enfilading fire, Bellegarde directed the troops to move to Kaim’s left and advance up to the Fontanone opposite the farm of Barbotta. Some of the Austrian light troops managed to get across the marshy ground and onto the opposite bank. Frimont’s cavalry also moved up into this sector of the battlefield. From Barbotta, a road led southward into the rear of the Marengo position. If this could be exploited, the French line could be taken in reverse.

  It was now approaching 11.00 am. Just at the right moment for the French, Lannes arrived from San Giuliano. This corps had spent an ugly night at the small village, sleeping in the open. There was no shelter, no food, no wine and no brandy, and so breakfast had passed as quickly as the evening meal before.18 Arriving in support of Victor, Lannes left the 28th and 40th Half-Brigades in reserve behind Marengo. He ordered Watrin to drive away the Austrians taking up position at Barbotta. Marching directly at the Austrians with the 6th Light, the 22nd Half-Brigade and all of Lannes’ artillery, Watrin engaged the Austrians. General Champeaux led his cavalry brigade to support the attack, but fell mortally wounded at the head of the 1st Dragoons. As Bellegarde’s men were pushed back across the Fontanone, the French infantry, ignorant of the depth of the muddy ditch, hesitated momentarily. Five NCOs of the 22nd threw caution to the wind and jumped in. They made the far bank with a little difficulty, although under heavy fire; inspired by that success, the rest of the line followed. Other French soldiers attacked and captured an Austrian gun, then turned it round on its former owners, serving it with skill.19 Watrin’s advance continued until a terrific barrage from the Austrian reserve batteries under the direction of Major Perczel blunted his ambitions. In this attack, General Watrin’s brother, Lucien, was killed.20

  Back in the Austrian centre, there was a discussion about getting some of the cavalry to work their way behind the French position. If they could get onto the French left flank, a brisk charge could roll up Gardanne’s troops and put an end to the enfilade fire. GM Pelatti’s cavalry brigade was chosen for this task and Zach was sent to give the necessary orders. According to Neipperg:

  ‘General Zach, however, ordered the regiments of the 1st Kaiser and 4th Karaczay Light Dragoons to pass the ditch at all costs. The chiefs represented the impossibility; they had to obey; half of them remained mired, the rest could only pass one by one with infinite difficulty.’21

  GM Pelatti was a local man, an Italian from Castellazo Bormida.22 Approaching midday, he found a crossing point which was sheltered from view by trees and started to cross, as Neipperg describes. With the difficulties in crossing the ditch, only two squadrons of the 1st Kaiser Light Dragoons were able to assemble and form into two lines on the French flank. It was at this point that they were seen by Brigadier General Kellermann, who was located to the left of Gardanne. The French general sent an order for the 8th Dragoons to attack the Austrian horsemen. While the green-jacketed French dragoons advanced, Kellermann formed his heavy cavalry int
o a single line and followed a short distance behind. The art of cavalry warfare is to always have a reserve. The first clash of horses is likely to disorder both friend and foe alike, and all momentum is lost. The initiative can only be regained by the arrival of successive waves of horsemen. Kellermann knew this, and so was ready to follow. His after-action report describes the outcome:

  ‘I ordered the 8th Dragoons to charge them; I supported them, marching in line; the 8th knocked over the enemy’s cavalry; but the charge having disordered them, they were charged in turn; I ordered them to unmask me and rally behind the brigade, which advanced with sang froid on the enemy’s line, charged it at fifty paces, routed it, and tumbled it into the ditches, even on its infantry. The enemy lost more than 100 horses in these two charges.’23

  Neipperg agreed with the effect of light cavalry being pounced upon by heavy cavalry:

  ‘Scarcely had this cavalry and some infantry battalions, encouraged by its example, crossed than all the enemy’s cavalry threw themselves upon them, threw them into the ditch, causing them an infinite loss, and making many prisoners. The brave Lieutenant-Colonel Baron de Kees of the Kaiser Light Dragoons Regiment was caught and wounded beyond this ditch, which greatly contributed to discouraging the cavalry he commanded. These two regiments were ruined for the whole day. The enemy again occupied the ditch, and might have already enjoyed his success if he had not been stopped by the corps of grenadiers commanded by General Weidenfeld, who, at the charge, prevented the enemy from advancing further.’24

  When Weidenfeld’s grenadiers arrived, they opened fire on Kellermann’s cavalry with their battalion guns. After a quarter of an hour under fire, Kellermann could see no fresh attempts to cross the ditch were going to be made, so he withdrew his brigade to its original position on Gardanne’s left.

  There is one last anecdote from this episode in the battle, which is drawn from the bravery citation of Grenadier Corporal Cervelle from the 101st Half-Brigade. Some of the Austrian light dragoons appear to have escaped Kellermann and fled in the direction of Gardanne’s troops. Seeing the horsemen in green jackets, the French ignored them, assuming these were the same French dragoons posted on their flank. It was Cervelle who first noticed they were enemy cavalry: ‘Let’s charge,’ he shouted. ‘They are the enemy’s and their horses are tired!’ The officers ordered their men to open fire and within a few moments the already disordered light dragoons were being shot from their saddles.25

  With the failure of the cavalry attack, and Lannes driving back the attempt to take the French right, Kaim also fell back from the centre to regroup. It was midday and the Austrian main column had not yet reached the start position allocated to it in Zach’s plan. This force, which was supposed to deliver the hammer blow to Bonaparte’s army by falling on its flank at Sale, was now a battered and bruised wreck. There is no disputing the bravery of the Austrians, particularly their officers, who led conspicuously from the front, but they had walked into something of a trap. Rather than breaking out towards Novi, O’Reilly’s column had now become bogged down in a firefight with Dampierre’s small force at Stortigliona. Zach stated that O’Reilly was injured by a fall from his horse in the battle, and perhaps that might explain why the French were able to hold his column up with just a few hundred men. The result of this private battle was that O’Reilly had become cut off from the main column. Much of the cavalry had been sent away at the beginning of the battle – no one thought to recall them or ask if Suchet was actually in range. The only thing which was going to plan was Ott’s advance on Sale; in other words, a false march against an enemy which did not exist. However, despite this, no one on the Austrian side, with perhaps the exception of Radetzky, appears to have been thinking strategically. Zach was obsessed about enacting his plan, and Melas could not think beyond the great fatalistic ‘decisive battle’. Melas was so fixated with beating his way through Marengo that he ordered his grenadiers to prepare for action. A third attempt to storm the village would be made.

  So what news of the First Consul? Despite two or more hours of thundering cannonade, he was apparently still not convinced the Austrians were serious about pressing home an attack, and had remained at Torre Garofoli. Perhaps the spy Gioelli had told him the Austrians were planning to make a feint to cover their withdrawal? It is certainly possible the spy had heard this discussed. In any case, Bonaparte clearly did not want to make a false move until it was absolutely clear what Melas was intending. It appears that Berthier went to look first, and then the First Consul followed. It was not until 11.00 am that Bonaparte decided to take a look for himself.26 We have confirmation of this from the memoirs of Horse Grenadier Joseph Petit:

  ‘At eight o’clock in the morning, the enemy had manifested much vigour of preparation. He touched upon a few weak points, and made certain dispositions in consequence; but his intentions were not fully known at head-quarters till towards the latter part of the morning. Berthier was the first upon the field of battle. Till this time the various aides-de-camp had relieved each other in apprising the consul of the enemy’s steps. Numerous wounded soldiers arriving, acquainted us that the Austrians were in force. Upon these tidings, the consul mounted his favourite charger at eleven o’clock, and made great haste to the field of battle.’

  MAP 8: Tactical situation – 11.00‑12.00 pm

  (Austrians) A – Hadik’s Corps (Bellegarde) advances on Barbotta; B – Kaim’s Corps attacks Marengo; C – Pelatti’s cavalry brigade attempts to cross the Fontanone; D – O’Reilly attacking Dampierre; E – division of grenadiers in reserve; Ott’s column.

  (French) 1 – Dampierre’s detachment; 2 – Kellermann attacks Pelatti; 3 & 4 - Gardanne and Chambarlhac; 5 – Rivaud protecting Marengo; 6 – Champeaux’s brigade counter-attacks; 7 Lannes’ Corps drives Hadik’s Corps back over the Fontanone.

  The Foot Guards and Monnier’s division were instructed to advance towards the battlefield at this time, and had a distance of more than 11km to march before arriving at Marengo. Moving at an ordinary rate of 4km per hour – assuming the Guard and Monnier’s troops were already formed on the road, under arms and awaiting orders – the head of the column would not be due to arrive at Marengo much before 2.00 pm.

  Chapter 11

  The Battle for Marengo

  At the time of the battle, General Soult was inside Alessandria held prisoner by the Austrians. One month before, on 14 May, he had been wounded at the Battle of Monte Creto – his right leg was shattered by a ball while leading a desperate assault against Hohenzollern’s entrenchments. In driving rain and hill fog, the general could not be carried to safety. He lay on the ground protected by his two aides-de-camp (his brother, Chief of Squadron Pierre-Benoît Soult, and Lieutenant Étienne Hulot) and was taken into captivity. Soult and his ADCs were later joined by Dr Cothenet, a surgeon from the 25th Light Infantry sent by Massena to care for him, and these four were transferred to Alessandria. Soult’s memoirs say he was in the Episcopal Palace at Alessandria, and on the day of battle they heard the gunfire of Hadik’s first attack. Soult was bedridden, but still proves to be a valuable ‘witness’ of the battle:

  ‘From my bed I could hear the battle very well, and from the distance and closeness of the fire I could judge which of the two parties was making progress. It was a cruel position. My brother and Lieutenant Hulot, my aides-de-camp, and Dr Cothenet, my surgeon, went alternately to watch at an observatory above the Episcopal palace, where I was staying. There, armed with a spyglass telescope, they could see the movements of the two armies well enough, and then they came to communicate their remarks to me. I was thus informed of the state of the battle, as well as possible, without taking part.’1

  Twenty kilometres away from Soult, General Desaix also heard the opening barrage of Hadik’s attack at Marengo. At 9.00 am, Desaix was still at Rivalta waiting for his command to finish crossing the Scrivia. Boudet recorded his division’s actions in his journal:

  ‘At the break of day, the water did not yet permit us
to ford, but a boat had been secured by the help of some boatmen that a detachment had taken from Tortona during the night. The troops crossed speedily, and went to take position at Rivalta. Towards ten o’clock in the morning, the waters had fallen and the artillery was able to ford the river.

  ‘Meanwhile, Desaix had sent to headquarters to find out what was to happen following the action of the day before. He received an order (fortunately too late) to go to Pozzolo-Formigaro, an intermediate position, from where we could move on Alessandria or to Genoa, in case the enemy tried to make its retreat that way.’2

  As Boudet states, Desaix had informed the First Consul there were no imperial troops at Novi, but there were some at Serravalle. The bearer of this message – Desaix’s ADC, Savary – had returned to Rivalta with the instruction to march on Pozzolo-Formigaro. When the sound of artillery fire was heard in the direction of Alessandria, Desaix was uneasy about it. Savary’s memoirs are wildly inaccurate in their timings, but the general description of what occurred next rings true:

  ‘We at once took up arms, and quitted Rivalta; we marched on Novi; but scarcely had day dawned, when we heard a redoubled cannonade open in the distance behind our right. The country was flat; we could only see a little smoke. General Desaix, astonished, stopped his division and ordered me to go quickly to reconnoitre Novi. I took fifty horses, which I launched at full speed on the road; I quickly reached the place where I was sent. Everything was calm and in the condition in which I had left it the day before; no one had yet appeared. I put off my detachment at a gallop, and rejoined General Desaix. I had only been two hours in my mission. It could influence the combinations of the day; I ran to announce to the first consul all was quiet at Novi, that General Desaix had suspended his movement and awaited new orders.’3