Marengo
Page 24
We know the division’s artillery could not have crossed the Scrivia much before 10.00 am. Desaix would then have set off for Pozzolo-Formigaro as soon as possible, but Boudet claims the division had not got ‘more than one mile beyond Rivalta’ (a French ‘mile’ is akin to half a league; approximately 2km – or half an hour’s march) when it stopped. At the earliest then, the ‘redoubled cannonade’ reported by Savary was either Kaim’s second assault on Marengo, or more probably the point at which Lannes joined the battle. This indicates Savary set out for Novi between 10.30 and 11.00 am. He would not have returned then until 12.30 pm at the earliest. Reporting back to Desaix, Savary was then instructed to go and find the First Consul, tell him Novi was empty, that Boudet’s division was halted at Rivalta and to ask for new orders. Contrary to popular legend, Desaix did not ‘march to the sound of the guns’; he simply waited for confirmation before moving any further away from the main body of the army on what appeared to be a false movement.
Elsewhere on the extremities of the battlefield, Brigadier General Jean Rivaud heard the opening cannonade while at Sale with his cavalry brigade. According to the 1801 regimental history of the 21st Chasseurs, their mission was ‘to contain the enemy on the right flank and become if needed the pivot of the line’.4 At the outbreak of fighting, Rivaud sent a squadron of the 12th Hussars to scout out in the direction at the main Alessandria road. The squadron appears to have headed south in the direction of San Giuliano, then turned westwards at 10.00 am, before reaching at midday the farm of Pagella, 3km to the north-east of Castelceriolo.5 By this time, Rivaud had begun to move the whole brigade in the direction of Castelceriolo, approaching the sound of the guns cautiously.
On the French left there were two cavalry detachments watching that wing of the army. The nearest to the battlefield was the 11th Hussars, commanded by Chief of Squadron Ismert. This force had been sent by Victor to monitor the Orba and Lemme rivers and appears to have encountered some Austrian patrols. Ismert said he executed several little charges until 11.30 am, when he was obliged to recross the Lemme. A study of a chart demonstrates Ismert had his rivers confused; he in fact would have meant the confluence of the Orba and Bormida rivers, and the Austrians he encountered were most likely scouts from Nobili’s cavalry brigade which had been sent to Cantalupo. In any case, he headed in the direction of the fighting and came across Dampierre’s detachment at Stortigliona. There, Ismert received an instruction from one of Victor’s ADCs to remain in this position.
The last French outpost on the battlefield was Duvignau’s brigade, which was positioned at Castellazo, 8km south-west of Marengo. The brigade had forded the Orba to reach this position, and on arrival the commander of the 12th Chasseurs had placed two advanced posts on the Bormida, one commanded by Lieutenant Loquette and the other by Lieutenant Besson. Chief of Squadron Müller was ordered to bivouac the regiment. He placed half the regiment in the courtyard of a ‘sort of chateau’, the remainder in the courtyard of a large grange.6 The sound of the ‘violent’ cannonade caused the commander of the 12th Chasseurs, Chief of Brigade de France, a degree of unease, and he twice rode along his line without noticing any enemy movements. In the event of attack, a rallying point (or place d’alarm) was nominated a little way behind the village. Chief of Brigade de France, satisfied with his dispositions, sent a maréchal des logis (sergeant) with a message back to Victor detailing his actions. As it approached midday, the subaltern officers went to a lunch in the village hosted by Capuchin friars. They were blissfully unaware that two messengers sent by Victor had been intercepted and Nobili’s cavalry brigade was just a few kilometres away on the other side of the Bormida at Cantalupo.
Our focus now turns to the Austrian column under the command of FML Ott. In Zach’s original scheme, Ott’s command was to march on Sale and distract the French while the main Austrian column marched out of Marengo and executed a left turn at San Giuliano to fall on the flank of the French army. No one had thought to change this plan, so Ott marched away from the battle raging around Marengo and took the quiet road to Castelceriolo. Although there was a main road through the town, the surrounding area was described by Crossard as marshy and covered with vines. Stutterheim mentions there were a lot of bushes in the area, and older maps show the land to the south of Castelceriolo was cultivated with small holdings. Just outside the village was the castle, or rather a fortified manor house belonging to the Ghilini family – the lords of Castelceriolo. Before Ott’s troops arrived, a small detachment of the 6th Light was sent to scout the town by Lannes. Although probably less than 100 men, it appears Ott took some time scouting the strength of the French troops before mounting an attack on the place. The French gave token resistance according to Stutterheim, and were driven off in the direction of Sale, pursued by several squadrons of the Lobkowitz Dragoons (the 6th’s regimental history says the Frenchmen held out for four hours!).
MAP 9: French positions at midday
A – Lannes and Champeaux’s brigade on the right of Marengo; B – Victor and Kellermann’s brigade on the left of Marengo; C – 11th Hussars moving to Stortigliona; D – Duvignau’s brigade at Castellazo; E – J. Rivaud’s cavalry brigade probing from Sale; F – Monnier and Consular Guard on march from Torre Garofoli; G – Desaix outside Rivalta; H – Lapoype’s division marching to the Po.
When Ott’s troops occupied the town and explored the land beyond it, they found two things of note. Contrary to Zach’s instructions, there was no sign of the French army in the direction of Sale. Looking down towards the south, where the battle was raging, they could see an open field which extended south-eastward, behind the French position at Marengo, continuing as far as the vineyards of San Giuliano. Although it was against Zach’s instructions, Ott decided he would execute a right turn and join the battle at Marengo.7 It was not long before General Watrin saw Ott was planning to turn his flank:
‘Perceiving the enemy appeared in force at Castelceriolo and seeing him deploying a strong column on my right, I made a battalion of the 22nd carry towards Castelceriolo to support the 6th Light which was going to be turned by the enemy corps which extended fully beyond our right. General Lannes seconded this movement with the 28th, which he carried at once to this point, whereas the 40th supported vigorously several cavalry charges which the enemy made at them on the main road of Marengo.’
The movement of the 28th Half-Brigade to support the right flanks is confirmed by a letter written in 1805 by the former commander of the unit, Roger-Valhubert. This key document was discovered in the papers of Dupont and is therefore not one of the documents collected by de Cugnac in the French War Archives. This letter helpfully provides a time for this phase of the battle:8
‘At noon the 28th held the extreme right of the army, and never left it. This corps made a change of front, the left in front, which, from being parallel to the Bormida, placed it somewhat perpendicular to this river: then it faced opposite the Po and had, at around a hundred fathoms behind it, the road from Tortona to Alessandria.’
The 28th were an indomitable unit; having guarded the Alpine passes through the winter, they fought with distinction at the crossing of the Po and at Montebello. With just 998 combatants at the start of the action, the chief of brigade issued a stern instruction forbidding the carrying off of wounded men. With no formal stretcher-bearers in that era, soldiers would often excuse themselves by carrying wounded comrades to the rear – from where they did not return: such losses could not be afforded. No sooner had the unit come under fire from Ott’s troops, than Roger-Valhubert was wounded by a gunshot. True to his word, he refused all treatment and grimly clung on.9
Watrin’s report (cited above) also states the 40th Line came under cavalry attack. This unit was placed to the rear of the French position, probably level with Spinetta, directly behind Marengo. There are several indications of these attacks in the bravery citations attributed to the regiment. Grenadier François Boudier killed an Austrian horseman who was about to strike down a French
officer. Fusilier Jean Pinau was notable for the way he encouraged his comrades to resist the Austrian cavalry, which charged ‘seven times’. Meanwhile, Sergeant Jean-Pierre Senat led a detachment which fought off a group of horsemen trying to charge the left flank of the 40th Line’s third battalion.
Melas had watched the first two attacks against Marengo fail. He now decided to commit his two grenadier brigades to breaking the French resistance at Marengo. While Melas prepared for the third attack, and Kaim’s troops reformed, Victor moved some of Chambarlhac’s division forward to bolster Gardanne’s men. Two battalions of the 96th Half-Brigade were placed to the left of Marengo, with their right flank near the main road and the bridge; the 24th Light Infantry positioned themselves to the left of the 96th Half-Brigade. Until then, most of Chambarlhac’s men had been relegated to the role of observers. Now they were up at the ditch for the first time, positioned in a wheat field which gave them a degree of shelter from view. Grenadier Coignet’s account of the fighting there gives a good indication of the intensity of the battle at this stage:
‘Suddenly the enemy’s skirmishers emerged from the marshes and willows in front of us. The artillery begins to fire. A shell explodes in the first company and kills seven men. A bullet wounded the gendarme, who was a staff officer near to General Chambarlhac. The latter escaped at full speed, and we did not see him again during the day.
‘A general, whose name I do not know, took his place; small, well-made, with fine blond moustaches, showing a great deal of bravery and activity … Scarcely was he at our head, when he advanced towards the first company of grenadiers to which I belonged, made us form in a single rank, and threw us into the attack. “March,” he said. “Do not stop to load your weapons. When it is necessary, I will call you back with a drum roll.” That said, he ran off to join his division.
‘A column of Austrians, however, appeared from the groves of willows where it was hidden, deployed before us, and riddled us with its battalion volleys. Our little general responds by other battalion volleys, and here we are, between the two, sacrificed. I run behind a large willow, I lean on the trunk, and I keep shooting at the enemy column. I could not keep it up for long. The balls came in all directions. I was obliged to lie down on the ground, to protect myself from the canister bullets, which had hammered the branches and made them fall upon me. I was covered with it; I thought I was lost. Fortunately all the division advanced on my side. I got up, and found myself in one of the companies of my battalion.’
All along the banks of the Fontanone, French skirmishers found themselves in desperate battles of survival. Surrounded by enemy grenadiers, Fusilier Jean Lambert made a dash for the ditch and leapt into the water, dragging with him a grenadier whom he made prisoner. Another soldier conspicuous for his bravery was Fusilier Jacques Maitre, who stood up to his waist in water, firing on the Austrians through the thick of the action.10 Another notable action of bravery was performed by Sergeant Louis-Jacques Châtelain of the 24th Light Infantry. The Austrians placed a gun opposite his company and began firing on the French line. Châtelain attacked the crew and chased them off. He then had the gun turned on the Austrians and opened fire himself, and remained with the gun ‘until the last extremity’. A similar action was also performed by Grenadier Sergeant Pierre Monnet of the 44th Half-Brigade. Under fire from an enemy battery (probably two regimental guns), Monnet made a single-handed attack, killing or wounding the gunners and driving the rest off, even though he had been shot in the arm.11 Along with Coignet’s description of the battle, these heroic feats illustrate the intensity of the fighting over the Fontanone.
In the centre of the French position, Brigadier General Rivaud had reinforced the village with the second battalion of the 43rd Half-Brigade at midday. By 1.00 pm, these fresh troops were already running low on ammunition, and the sustained artillery bombardment had broken up their formation. Rivaud decided to throw his hand in, and advanced in person with his final reserves, the 3rd Battalion of the 43rd and the 3rd Battalion of the 96th. These were placed with their right against the village and the left extending towards the Austrians, their line occupying a space of about 200 metres. With the remainder of the 96th and the 24th Light already engaged, these two battalions were the last of Victor’s fresh troops. Rivaud’s account of the fighting confirms the severity of the Austrian grenadiers’ assault:
‘I stopped the enemy by a well-fed platoon fire, and made him fall back; he at once returned at the charge, reinforced with fresh troops; I stopped this effort, and wished to advance upon the enemy; a ravine stopped me ten paces away; then he engaged an extremely sharp fusillade at point-blank range; it lasted a quarter of an hour; the men fell like hail on both sides; at this moment I lost half my line; it was no more than a field of carnage; everyone in my brigade on horseback was killed or wounded; the chiefs of battalion and the captains were dangerously hit; my staff officers were killed; my aide-de-camp had his right thigh shot through by a bullet; I myself was wounded in the thigh by a canister bullet; the wound was horrible; but I felt if I yielded, the enemy would take possession of the village, and enter the plain with his cavalry and artillery, and take all the troops who had already taken part in the fight, and who were in disorder on the plain.’
As the grenadiers regrouped from their first attack, the two squadrons of the 1st Kaiser Dragoons launched a headlong charge at Marengo. It was desperate stuff, as described by Rivaud:
‘The enemy, despairing at not being able to shake us with his infantry, formed a charge of cavalry; but this troop stopped before the fire of my battalions; not having been able to cross the ravine; they fell into disorder upon themselves, and lost about sixty men.’
Having been thwarted in three major attempts to batter their way through Marengo, over four hours into the battle, at last a breakthrough was about to occur. The Austrian pioneers had been separated from the wagons carrying their portable foot bridges as already described. Despite this, they worked their way towards the Fontanone under the cover of some trees, to the north of Marengo, and south of Barbotta, probably at a break in the line between the troops under Victor’s command and those of Lannes. By now there would have been so much smoke blowing around the French position that a small group of men might well have gone unseen (there was a westerly breeze, so the smoke would have drifted towards the French). Directed by Radetzky, Major Hardegg led his pioneers up to the muddy banks of the Fontanone. The pioneer commander ordered some of his men into the water. Although almost up to their necks, the pioneers formed a single file, seventeen men deep, and, placing their hands on the shoulders of the man in front and lowering their heads, they created a human bridge. Seeing what was possible, Hardegg ordered the whole company into the ditch and by this means formed several chains over which troops from IR 63 Erzherzog Joseph got across to the far bank. These men fanned out, forming a sort of bridgehead around the human bridge. Seeing this success unfolding, General Lamarseilles drove up all the available artillery reserve to this position to support the foothold on the other side, and began battering the French at Marengo and Lannes’ troops on their left. Now the pioneers’ wagons arrived, and at last they were able to construct a proper footbridge at this point, despite being under fire from French troops who at last saw what was occurring.
Now came the crucial moment. Lattermann’s grenadier brigade was directed across Hardegg’s bridge. As they raced across, they turned southwards and charged at the farmhouse of Marengo where Rivaud was struggling to hold on.12 Behind the grenadiers, the remainder of IR 63 also crossed, this time facing northwards, driving a wedge through the French line, which began to break and take flight. For Rivaud, the situation was now critical:
‘I judged all was lost if we did not rally; although my wound already made me suffer greatly, I went to the centre of my two battalions, stopped the drummers who were fleeing, and put them to the front, and made them beat the charge. My troops stopped; I made them face front, and, under a very sharp enemy fire, I carried them fo
rward; I overthrew the grenadiers, who were already passing the ravine, and I caused the enemy to retreat in his turn, as far as 300 yards from the village; then the troops of General Lannes also advanced on the front of the village, the battle was restored. It was then two o’clock in the afternoon ... Having a very swollen thigh, and unable to keep my horse, I took advantage of this fortunate situation to withdraw from the combat and go to the ambulance [field hospital] to be dressed.’
As Rivaud suggests, Lannes’ troops did rally in the face of the unexpected breakthrough. The regimental history of the 6th Light records that Sergeant Gautheir, Corporals Legay and Thory and Chasseur Barillet rallied several companies which had abandoned their position for want of cartridges. Corporal Legay called out to the light infantrymen: ‘Remember that Frenchmen have no need of powder. Don’t you have your bayonets? Forwards, always forwards. This must be the tactic of the brave!’ Watrin’s light infantrymen regained their composure and charged forwards. On their right, the 22nd Half-Brigade also rallied and counter-charged, pushing back IR 63 towards the foot bridges. However, they did not press home the attack. Protected by the artillery, the Austrians retained their foothold across the Fontanone and began to regroup. However, in this push over the Fontanone, General Bellegarde suffered the fate of Hadik and fell wounded, along with General Lattermann, the grenadier brigade commander. Melas had also been injured in a fall from his horse, one of two incidents he would suffer that day, and was heavily bruised. These casualties among senior commanders would begin to tell.13