Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  ‘I thought to attack, the enemy has forestalled me; return in the name of God, if you can.’

  Having recalled Desaix and Lapoype to the battlefield, Bonaparte went forward to look at the dispositions made by Victor and Lannes. As discussed above, the First Consul was immediately concerned with the right of the French line at Castelceriolo. As for Victor and Lannes’ troops, it appears Bonaparte was content with what he found (this would have been about 1.00 pm). According to Dupont: ‘Arriving on the ground, the First Consul travelled the lines; he changed nothing of the dispositions already ordered and the action continued with the chances still equal.’5

  At 2.00 pm, we reach one of the most critical parts of the battle. We have noted Victor and Lannes began their retreat around this time, and fell back for fifteen minutes, approximately 1km to a new line level with Spinetta and the vineyards extending northwards from there. Before the retreat began, Bonaparte had already decided to direct Monnier’s division towards Castelceriolo and to engage the troops commanded by Ott. Monnier’s after-action report states:

  ‘The division arrived yesterday on the field of battle, at two o’clock in the afternoon. It was directed on our right, where the enemy was advancing in force. The 19th, led by General Cara-Saint-Cyr, went to the right, advanced in a close column upon the village of Castelceriolo; while the 70th, commanded by General Schilt, who followed his movements to the left, threatened to take the centre of the enemy in the rear. The columns, numerous in infantry and cavalry, could not resist our impetuous shock; they retreated in the greatest disorder in the marshes in front of the Bormida, abandoning to us two pieces of artillery and three caissons.’

  Following the Ventolina and Villanova roads, there is a distance of 7km from San Giuliano to Castelceriolo, a little under two hours’ march. From his position behind Torre Garofoli, Monnier’s 2.00 pm timing fits. To have achieved this, Bonaparte would have made the decision to deploy Monnier on the right well before he arrived on the field, something confirmed by Victor, who spoke of Monnier already being on the right at the time of the French retreat. One thing which should be noted is that Monnier was not with the force which marched on San Giuliano; for reasons known only unto him, Monnier actually remained behind the lines at San Giuliano with two battalions of the 72nd Half-Brigade. The 3rd Battalion of this half-brigade continued on the main road to Marengo, followed by the Consular Guard.

  Before describing the action in more detail, there is one other crucial point to note. We have concluded Desaix received the recall a little after 1.00 pm, and by this same conclusion, Savary would have reached the First Consul by 2.00 pm. Whatever his merits as an aide-de-camp, Savary can be extremely frustrating as a source on the battle. Having described meeting Bruyère, Desaix’s ADC then spends several pages describing the battle he did not witness and blaming another ADC (Lauriston) for providing the First Consul with false intelligence on the status of the Austrian-held bridge on the Bormida. Eventually, Savary returns to his personal account. He appears to have told Bonaparte there were no Austrians at Novi, and the First Consul made it quite clear he was no longer interested in the comings and goings of that place. Of more interest was the news Desaix had made a halt.

  ‘At what hour did you leave him?’ the First Consul asked, looking at his pocket watch.

  Savary told him the time, but in his memoirs Savary does not record this time; he just wrote ‘at such an hour’. He had either forgotten or, more likely, the real time was inconvenient to his general account of the battle. In any case, knowing Bruyère would have reached Desaix, and Bouder’s division would now be on the march, Bonaparte gave his verdict on the news. ‘Well he cannot be far off; go and tell him to form in that direction (pointing with his hand to a particular spot): let him quit the main road, and make way for all those wounded men who would only embarrass him, and perhaps draw his own soldiers after him.’6

  By halting his march at the sound of the Austrian cannonade, Desaix had proven what an able lieutenant he was. He knew the importance that Bonaparte had placed on the arrival of Hohenzollern from Genoa, but was equally aware that facts were changing from the lack of any evidence of Hohenzollern’s arrival, and the growing sound of battle to the north-west. As a result of Desaix halting his march, although the situation at Marengo was difficult for the soldiers fighting in the front line, by 2.00 pm, Bonaparte knew he had 5,000 fresh troops with artillery marching towards him. If he could stabilise the right with Monnier, and prevent Ott from breaking out beyond the new line the army was holding at Spinetta, the situation was far from desperate. He had clearly made an error of judgement in the morning, but now he was determined to regain the initiative.

  Having set out the tactical situation at 2.00 pm, we should return to the thick of the fighting. While Bonaparte had been quietly touring the rear and making his plans for deploying the reserves, Coignet was fighting for his life, but was thankful for the arrival of Bonaparte and his Guardsmen. The support was as much practical as moral. Coignet wrote:

  ‘Suddenly six hundred men of the Consular Guard arrived with cartridges in their canvas smocks and on blankets attached to their shoulders. They passed behind the ranks and made the distribution. Then the fire redoubled. At that moment we had already fallen back a lot. We were in the middle of the plain. More willows, more ravines: a bush from place to place. We saw a great part of the army, and above all we saw the Consular Guard. Bonaparte soon appeared. His presence was a pledge of security, a motive of confidence, an occasion of unheard-of enthusiasm.’

  MAP 13: Tactical situation – 2.30 pm

  (Austrians) A – O’Reilly; B – Weidenfeld’s grenadier brigade; C – Kaim’s infantry corps; D – Austrian cavalry regrouping; E – Lattermann’s grenadier brigade; F – Hadik’s corps; G – Gottesheim’s brigade; H – Lobkowitz Dragoons; I – Schellenberg’s division.

  (French) 1 – Kellermann’s brigade; 2 & 3 – Gardanne/Chambarlhac; 4 – 40th Half-Brigade; 5 – Bonaparte with Guard cavalry; 6 – battalion of 72nd Half-Brigade; 7 – Foot Guard arriving; 8 – Champeaux’s cavalry brigade; 9 – Watrin (part); 10 – 28th Half-Brigade holding French right; 11 – 70th Line (Schilt); 12 – 19th Light (Carra-St-Cyr).

  It was said by a later adversary that Napoleon’s presence at a battle was equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men.7 We can easily picture the First Consul on his charger. On the day of the battle, Bonaparte was in his thirty-first year; he was still thin, not the paunchy man of later years. As befitted his rank (he was still addressed as General Bonaparte in 1800), he wore a general of division’s habit; dark ‘national blue’ and double-breasted, with a red collar and beautiful gold oak leaf embroidery. This jacket was mostly covered by a simple, light grey riding coat – this neutral colour making the First Consul stand out among his suite of lavishly dressed aides and generals. Above all, what made him stand out was his black felt bicorn.8 This was Bonaparte’s trademark look – the grey coat, the bicorn – very simple clothes which associated him with the uniforms worn by ordinary soldiers.

  Bonaparte and Berthier toured the lines, allowing the soldiers to see them, reassuring them that help was on its way. Despite this, the pressure on the French line was too great to prevent it from falling back towards Spinetta. As the Austrians advanced beyond Marengo, they simply deployed their artillery and pounded the retreating French formations. Many accounts mention the soldiers were alarmed at how exposed Bonaparte was to incoming enemy fire as he toured the line. There were shouts of: ‘Let us save the republic! Let us save its first magistrate!’

  Horse Grenadier Petit observed this first movement of retreat from near to the First Consul:

  ‘The left wing under the command of Victor began to give way; and we perceived several corps of infantry retire in disorder, as well as platoons of cavalry pushed back. The firing drew nearer; in the centre a dreadful discharge was heard, and ceased all at once on the Bormida. I was in an inexpressible anxiety, yet still I ventured to flatter myself that our troops advanced; o
n the contrary, however, I saw them in a few minutes after returning but with too much haste, carrying the wounded on their shoulders. On the part of the right wing also, I saw, with concern, the enemy gained insensibly upon us.

  ‘Bonaparte advanced in front, and exhorted to courage and firmness all the corps he met with: it was visible that his presence re-animated them. Several soldiers were observed to prefer absolute death in sustaining the retreat, to the displeasure they might give him in being a witness of their flight. From this moment his horse guards no longer continued as before, near his person; but, without being at any great distance from him, took an active part in the battle.’9

  Another member of the Consular Guard present at the battle was Trumpet-Major Elie Krettly. Still aged 24, Krettly had joined the army as a musician in the French Guards in 1789. As a trumpeter in the cavalry, he had fought the Mamelukes at Mont Tabor in 1799, an action in which he was twice shot, and stabbed by a lance while saving an officer. Returning to France with Bonaparte, and now as a member of the horse chasseurs, he found himself part of the First Consul’s escort during the battle. His memoirs talk about an action involving the de Bussy Light Horse, the imperial regiment containing French émigrés and part of the Austrian main column’s advanced guard under Frimont. Krettly appears to be referring to the cavalry charge which cut off Marengo and caused the remainder of Rivaud’s troops there to be captured:

  ‘On this great day, I found myself on picket duty beside General Bonaparte; he sent me with one of his aides-de-camp to reconnoitre the rout caused on the left by the de Bussy Dragoons; I went forward near enough this corps; an officer presented himself to me and disputed my passage; I accepted the combat, which was not very long; within a second I had killed him and seized his horse, then I continued on my way.

  ‘I had almost reached the 8th Dragoons, when a shell burst ten paces from us; the first consul’s aide-de-camp and I were covered with a muddy earth which blinded us. After we were put back a bit by this accident, we finally reached the 8th Dragoons and we gave the commander-in-chief ’s orders to the colonel of this corps, and right away, the colonel put the troops into motion and stopped the rout; my mission being fortunately enough finished, I returned to the headquarters to give an account to the first consul of what had occurred.’10

  Precious little is written on this part of the battle from the Austrian perspective. It appears the hour leading up to 3.00 pm was again something of a lull. Neipperg’s account contains the most information on the fall of Marengo and the period which follows. He indicates Melas was instrumental in the final collapse of French resistance:

  ‘As the taking of the village decided the gain of the battle, the commander-in-chief took forward two brigades of grenadiers which supported the infantry so well that by means of the artillery we succeeded in cleaning out the village, and we became masters of the outlet: we had already taken prisoner from the enemy approximately 2,000 men and ten cannons.’

  French accounts of a cavalry charge capturing Rivaud’s men is confirmed by the account of Dannican. He writes:

  ‘During this time a squadron of the Kaiser Dragoons did prodigies of valour at Marengo. Captain Toussaint, who commanded it, took a whole battalion prisoner, and this action produced so great a terror to the French that a part of their centre fled to the Scrivia.’

  Elsewhere, he qualifies this statement with the following:

  ‘The French retreated methodically at first disputing the ground step by step. They stubbornly defended the village of Spinetta, which they abandoned only at the last extremity.’

  With the fall of Marengo, a Piedmontese soldier, Count Vincenzo-Amedeo Ferrero-Ponziglione, decided to write to his friend in Turin, the Marquis de San Marezano. Although perhaps a little premature, he could not contain his excitement:

  ‘Everything is turning out for the best. The centre of the enemy is in full flight. The centre and the right have also been broken. Please pass this good news to LL. EE. MM. Baron de la Tour and Chevalier de la Flechère. Tell your mother to say her prayers. Adieu. Long live our king and the emperor – Spinetta, 14 June 1800 at two thirty.’

  Once resistance ceased in Marengo, it was as if Melas’ army was completely exhausted. Neipperg confirmed victory at Marengo came at 2.00 pm, and he watched the French falling back on Spinetta, following the Tortona road. The French, it appeared, had little more than a line of skirmishers and some cavalry to protect the retreating columns. The retreat was, he admitted, slow, and this was because of the lack of any meaningful pursuit. The Austrian bands struck up a ‘grave and pathetic’ rendition of the Grenadiermarsch as a sign of victory. The troops began to reform their battle lines on the ground outside Marengo, which Neipperg described as a heath. It was as if all sense of urgency had been lost. The critical thing for Neipperg was the lack of a coordinated cavalry attack on the retreating French. In Napoleonic warfare, this was the moment one launched squadron after squadron of light cavalry after the retreating enemy, turning withdrawal into rout; but the cavalry had already been consumed, ‘scattered, and detached on both sides, by squadrons, half squadrons, platoons, etc’. Pilatti’s brigade of dragoons was ‘already lost’ because of the fighting over the Marengo ditch. Other than artillery fire, the only pursuit Neipperg could pinpoint was from ‘a swarm of skirmishers and infantry volunteers’ sent after the French rearguard. While there were specialist light troops in Austrian service, the line infantry volunteers would have been less skilled in this style of fighting. They had routinely been discouraged from skirmishing throughout the campaign, and now was perhaps a hazardous moment to adopt the tactic.

  As for the arrival of Monnier’s troops in Castelceriolo, Stutterheim admits they took possession of a few buildings and some of the gardens. In Captain Karl von Mras’ account of Marengo, he states that Ott had troops in reserve behind the town and sent the Stuart Regiment and some artillery to clear the Frenchmen out. It is unclear exactly when this occurred (according to Soult, whose aides were watching the battle from Alessandria, the fighting at Castelceriolo did not begin until 4.00 pm). Zach was completely dismissive of the operation, telling Faverges that ‘victory belonged to us; the enemy did not hold more than to Castelceriolo, and even this was by the matter of luck. A chief of battalion cut off from his regiment, forgotten, lost, defended there in desperation, and so gave those around him the time to find themselves.’ The regimental history of the 70th Line states that they remained in Castelceriolo for one hour, during which time they were surrounded and escaped to the safety of a belt of vines to avoid being captured by the Austrian cavalry.11 Later claims that the French barricaded themselves into the town and held on throughout are entirely groundless. For confirmation of this, we need only read an excerpt from a letter from Carra-Saint-Cyr to the Minister of War on 21 October 1800:

  ‘I took the village of Ceriolo, in the face of the enemy’s army, at the very moment when the army was in retreat; I operated mine, supported only by the 70th line; it has not been mentioned in the various reports, but my conduct has nevertheless been known to the whole army. On the left of Castelceriolo, General Schilt, head of the 70th, from the same Monnier division, had cleared our right by a brilliant combat, but he also had to follow the retreating movement of the whole army. The Monnier division then retired to San Giuliano, where the army rallied.’12

  Quite what happened to these troops, where they went and where they ended up is a subject we will return to.

  At Spinetta, Bonaparte would have had very little idea what was taking place at Castelceriolo. He asked Dupont to find out what was going on there, and the army chief-of-staff investigated and concluded Monnier was holding out with ‘skilful vigour’ at this place. From what he could see, the capture of the place had put a halt to the Austrian advance in that area and compensated somewhat for the loss of Marengo. With Victor and Lannes having restored order to their battalions and taken position level with Spinetta, there was just one real weak point in the French line. There is a distance
of 3km between Castelceriolo and the main French position at Spinetta. There was a substantial gap between Lannes and the troops in Castelceriolo, and this could be exploited by the Austrians, particularly their cavalry. In order to plug this gap in his line, in terms of uncommitted infantry to hand, Bonaparte had a battalion of the 72nd Line (probably about 400 strong) and his Foot Guard, nominally 800 strong. With the time approaching 3.00 pm, and Desaix still an hour or more away, Bonaparte decided to throw his guardsmen into the hole and buy the army some more time.13

  The march of the Guard at Marengo is one of the most iconic moments of the Napoleonic Wars – immortalized in a musical march still in the repertoire of French military bands. It is also one of the least understood and controversial actions of the battle, certainly since the Austrian claims have become wider-known among French and English-speaking audiences. To understand what happened, we should begin with a review of the Foot Guards. Under the French empire, the Imperial Guard would become an enormous force – a veritable army of praetorians. It is so much a part of the Napoleonic legend that a painting of its bearskins marching behind l’Empereur is still enough to make grown men weep in admiration. However, at the time of Marengo, this force was modest in size, not even the equivalent in size of a regular infantry battalion.

  At the time of Marengo, the Foot Guard was organized into two battalions of grenadiers and a company of light infantry chasseurs (‘huntsmen’ – like the German jäger). It also appears to have had a number of pioneer troops, or sapeurs.14