Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  It appears that something of a lull descended on the battlefield; with the early afternoon sun now high above them, the hottest part of the day began. Although the immediate crisis appeared to have passed, in truth the French were in a terrible position. Rivaud’s brigade could have barely formed a battalion in the defence of the village. The butchery around Marengo was extraordinary. The wounded had been piled up inside the walls of the farmhouse, but Austrian shells had landed among them. The Fontanone was choked with bodies and blood. The remainder of Victor’s troops were low on ammunition and could offer not much more than a thick skirmish line in that direction. Much of the French artillery was disabled by Austrian fire. Only one half-brigade (the 40th) had yet to be fully committed into the line, and even it had faced cavalry attacks. Kellermann took this opportunity to have his men dismount to rest the horses. The period of calm was, Kellermann remarked, ‘the precursor of a tempest’.14

  The fighting around Stortigliona continued until about 1.00 pm, when, under heavy artillery fire, Dampierre’s little group broke away and retreated southwards for a kilometre, rallying at Cascina Bianca. While part of O’Reilly’s force pursued Dampierre, a portion of it moved into position to fire on Victor’s left flank. It was the French turn to suffer from an enfilading fire.15 As French troops turned to face this new threat, it reduced the number of muskets which could be brought to bear on the main road. By now, Gardanne’s troops in particular were extremely low on ammunition, and probably formed little more than a thick skirmish line, with the battalions reduced to clumps gathered around the colours. Dupont’s unpublished memoir has the following to say on the crisis concerning the lack of ammunition:

  ‘Our troops were all engaged: there were no more reserves, ammunition ran out; whole regiments asked for cartridges, and General Marmont, commander of the artillery, to whom I mentioned this, denied it saying that they were almost all consumed. We realized, indeed, that the passage of the Alps had only allowed incomplete supplies.’16

  As the above account alludes, this was the gamble the First Consul had taken. His ‘thunderbolt’ strategy relied on speed of movement and capturing enemy supplies. Without conventional lines of communication, there was an evident risk the troops would lack the essential equipment and munitions to succeed. All throughout the campaign, the French had relied on their enthusiasm and ingenuity to improvise solutions; but now they were in a battle of attrition, and the Austrians had the advantage in guns and powder.

  Alongside Gardanne, the troops in Chambarlhac’s division were equally hard-pressed. Grenadier Coignet gives a vivid description of the pressure they faced:

  ‘There we were riddled with canister: everything fell on us. We held the left of the army and touched the highway of Alessandria. That was the most difficult position. The enemy always wanted to turn us and gain the road that was so useful to them. We had to support our left to avoid being caught from behind … The smoke was so thick that you could no longer see. The shells set fire to the large cornfield which we were in the middle of. This made a revolution in the ranks. A few cartridge pouches blew up. We were forced to fall back and reform as soon as possible. This accident did us great harm, and it took all the intrepidity of our chiefs to restore us.’

  MAP 10: Tactical situation - 12.00 pm

  (Austrians) A – Hadik’s corps (Bellegarde) supporting crossing of Fontanone; B – Pioneers lay bridges for Lattermann’s grenadier brigade to cross Fontanone; C – Kaim’s infantry corps; D – Weidenfeld’s grenadier brigade; E - Pilatti’s cavalry brigade regrouping; F – O’Reilly; G – Ott probing south from Castelceriolo; H – Lobkowitz Dragoons probing rear of French position.

  (French) 1 – Dampierre’s detachment; 2 & 3 – Gardanne/Chambarlhac (part); 4 – Kellermann’s brigade and 8th Dragoons; 5 – Rivaud’s brigade in Marengo; 6 – 40th Half-Brigade in reserve; 7 – Champeaux’s cavalry brigade; 8 – 6th Light Infantry; 9 – 22nd Half-Brigade; 10 – 28th Half-Brigade holding French right; 11 – company of 6th Light pursued from Castelceriolo.

  MAP 11: Tactical situation - 1.00 pm

  (Austrians) A – O’Reilly clears Stortigliona; B – Weidenfeld’s grenadier brigade; C – Austrian cavalry massing for attack on main road; D – Kaim’s infantry corps; E – Lattermann’s grenadier brigade pressing Marengo from the north; F – Hadik’s corps attacking Watrin; G – Gottesheim’s brigade pressing French right; H – Lobkowitz Dragoons rallying; I – Schellenberg’s division.

  (French) 1 – Dampierre’s detachment retreating southwards; 2 & 3 – Gardanne/Chambarlhac falling back; 4 – Kellermann covering the retreat; 5 – Rivaud’s brigade in Marengo; 6 – 40th Half-Brigade moving forward to support Marengo; 7 – Champeaux’s cavalry brigade; 8 – Watrin (part) retreating; 9 – 28th Half-Brigade holding French right.

  Approaching 2.00 pm, General Kellermann noticed the Austrian cavalry reserve forming up.17 The horsemen came out from the woods along the Bormida behind them and headed up the road to Marengo. This body of cavalry was preceded by a large quantity of cavalry artillery. Kellermann made a quick estimation of their strength and considered there to be 2,000‑3,000 enemy horse riding confidently on, resolute in their numerical superiority. Kellermann ordered ‘to horse’ and took his brigade forward to meet this new threat. Straddling the road on the right of Gardanne’s infantry, Kellermann placed his brigade in the same manner as he had met Pilatti’s cavalry earlier. The 8th Dragoons took the first line, with the heavy cavalry in the rear supporting. Kellermann then rode over to seek General Gardanne’s opinion on the situation.

  With urgency in his voice, Kellermann called over to Gardanne: ‘General, arrange your troops, the enemy is coming with all his forces.’

  Gardanne replied grimly: ‘I am without a single cartridge, without a shell.’18

  Without ammunition, Gardanne had to get his troops onto better ground to protect them from the approaching Austrian cavalry. A little way behind Gardanne’s position was a vineyard in front of Spinetta. Kellermann agreed and offered to cover this withdrawal with his brigade. Dupont noticed Gardanne’s division falling back and raced towards it. ‘I am going to take a better position,’ Gardanne told Dupont. ‘I shall hold there.’19

  As Gardanne’s skirmishers fell back, a huge shout of ‘hurrah!’ came up from the Austrian lines.20 The Austrian cavalry charged up the main road, followed by a mass of infantry. The 8th Dragoons counter-charged, but were unable to stem the tide of Austrian cavalry. As the dragoons were forced to retire, Kellermann charged in and drove the lighter Austrian horse back on the infantry massing behind.21 This charge gave long enough for Gardanne’s men to reach the safety of the vines. Kellermann then broke off contact and followed the movement of retreat, protecting the main road.

  It is difficult to describe the moments following Gardanne’s retreat with any great clarity. As the French left fell back, the movement was followed by Lannes’ troops, with the troops forming closed columns. Victor’s memoir states his troops fell back for fifteen minutes only, which would have brought them into line with the village of Spinetta and the vineyards to the north of the village which extended either side of the old and new Tortona roads. In this fifteen-minute period, there was desperate fighting as the Austrians at last crossed the Fontanone at Marengo and began to deploy. Again, Coignet is extremely useful, particularly for describing the fate of Rivaud’s men in Marengo:

  ‘Opposite the centre of the division was a farm surrounded by large walls. A regiment of Austrian dragoons took advantage of it to hide and fell on a battalion of the 43rd Half-Brigade. It surrounded them, put them in disorder, and made them prisoner. This made a hole in our line, and since we had nothing behind us, we had to press on our right to fill the deficit. General Kellermann was informed of this, and hastened himself with his dragoons, charged the Austrians and stopped them for some time. Our position did not become much better. The artillery overwhelmed us. Our ranks were thinned in a glance. Only the wounded were seen, and the soldiers who carried the
m to the ambulance did not return again. Also, while the Austrian columns ceaselessly received further reinforcements, we weakened incessantly and no one came to support us. We could see behind us only the plain encumbered with the dying and the bearers. By dint of firing, we could no longer ram the cartridges to the bottom of our muskets. The officers, despairing, pointed out a singular remedy for this new misfortune. It consisted of pissing in the barrel and then drying it by burning loose powder. The ammunition began to fail, and we retreated, but in good order.’

  A key factor in the French ability to rally at Spinetta was a rearguard action by the 40th Half-Brigade. Dupont’s memoir describes how the 40th Line under Chief of Brigade Legendre ‘remained in its position and this rare fearlessness still slowed down the progress of the enemy’. Accompanied by his staff, Dupont rode over to General Watrin and asked if he would attempt a charge with his troops to take back the village. Filled with ‘noble ardour’, Watrin replied to Dupont:

  ‘“I don’t expect anything from it,” he told me with an accent deep in sorrow. “My soldiers, still brave, are overwhelmed; if you want it, we will march.” His dispositions were immediately made, the charge was beaten and everything moved off. What a beautiful feat of arms had crowned the audacity of this division, if fate had been less contrary! But after so long an effort, this attempt was to be powerless.’22

  MAP 12: Tactical situation – 2.00 pm

  (Austrians) A – O’Reilly in pursuit of Dampierre; B – Weidenfeld’s grenadier brigade; C – Kaim’s infantry corps; D – Austrian cavalry surrounds Marengo; E – Lattermann’s grenadier brigade entering Marengo from the north; F – Hadik’s corps advancing on Lannes; G – Gottesheim’s brigade pressing French right; H – Lobkowitz Dragoons; I – Schellenberg’s division.

  (French) 1 – Kellermann covering the retreat; 2 & 3 – Gardanne/Chambarlhac falling back; 4 – 40th Half-Brigade attempting to attack Marengo; 5 – Battalion of 43rd cut off in Marengo; 6 – Champeaux’s cavalry brigade; 7 – Watrin (part) retreating; 8 – 28th Half-Brigade holding French right; 9 – Monnier’s division arriving; 10 – Foot Guard arriving.

  Thus by 2.00 pm, the French were finally driven away out of Marengo. Regrouping in line with Spinetta, the lines of Lannes and Victor were reduced by as much as three-quarters their original number, with just five guns remaining in service. Against them, the Austrians deployed a line of eighty guns, with Hadik’s and Kaim’s troops reforming their battered corps into two lines. However, the French were about to receive a new reinforcement. The final word on this passage of the battle must go to Victor, the architect of the brilliant six-hour defence of Marengo:

  ‘For about a quarter of an hour these brave men had retired, and with what regret! Before an enemy whom they had so often put to flight, when, suddenly, a murmur of joy and hope rose from their ranks: the man of battles and victories appeared, Bonaparte! He was preceded by Monnier’s division, who was already level with our right, and was followed by the Consular Guard which advanced rapidly on [Cascina] Li Poggi.’

  Chapter 12

  The March of the Consular Guard

  The First Consul departed Torre Garofoli at 11.00 am, instructing Monnier’s division and his guard to follow him and march on Marengo. There was a distance of 11km to march to reach the French position at Marengo, as it then stood. On arrival at San Giuliano, the advancing troops encountered the army’s field hospitals (ambulances) gathered there. From this point the column encountered wounded soldiers retreating from the field, along with a crowd of sutlers and their mules and wagons. The number of wounded made it abundantly clear a hot action was taking place. Whatever was said by later writers, the reports and oral history of the battle make it quite apparent that these reserves did not come into play until after the French evacuated Marengo, which is to say, around 2.00 pm.

  Of course, Bonaparte probably rode ahead, impatient to witness the scene for himself, and we know from Horse Grenadier Petit this is the case. With so many questions unresolved about Melas’ intentions, and being the experienced general he was, Bonaparte would not have ridden headlong into the fray, but would have chosen a vantage point from where he could observe the full extent of the battle, and it is likely this was on the area of high ground which later became known as ‘Regione Trono’, the site of the 1805 re-enactment of the battle.1 Having quit his headquarters at 11.00 am, it is unlikely the First Consul would have arrived before noon, and we are able to confirm this because he did not arrive until after Ott’s troops had taken Castelceriolo and then fallen on the flank of Lannes. We know this from the memoirs of Petit, who described the battlefield as the newcomers first witnessed it:

  ‘The enemy’s line was extended to the space of two leagues ... The enemy was particularly tenacious of its position near the bridge; but the principal point of action was at San Stefano [sic]. From this point the enemy could gain Voghera before we could, and thereby cut off our retreat. They, therefore, incessantly directed their attention to this weak point. By twelve o’clock we were well convinced we had the whole Austrian force against us, and that they now, in good earnest, accepted the challenge which they had declined the day before.’

  If one reads Castelceriolo for ‘San Stefano’ (there is no record of such a place), then the description of the Austrian army extending two leagues (8km) perfectly fits the situation shortly after noon. Also, and this is crucial for understanding what he did next, Bonaparte correctly identified the critical point of the battlefield was not Marengo, where Victor and Lannes still held, but Castelceriolo, because there was nothing there to prevent the Austrians advancing eastwards and cutting off the French army’s line of retreat. From his vantage point overlooking the battlefield, the First Consul would have seen the great gap in the vines running from Castelceriolo diagonally towards Cascina Grossa. This was perfect ground for the Austrian cavalry and afforded no cover for the French infantry if it was forced to retreat. The Austrians had to be driven from Castelceriolo if there was any chance to hold Marengo, or to withdraw from the battle. Petit’s account reveals the First Consul’s next step:

  ‘Our general was now satisfied of the measures he had to pursue. Orders were given to the disposable troops in the rear to come forward; but the corps under the command of Desaix was still at a considerable distance.’

  This statement raises an intriguing possibility. It is generally supposed that Bonaparte issued the recall to Desaix from Torre Garofoli when he left for the battlefield himself at 11.00 am. Dupont says as much in his memoirs; but Petit’s statement indicates Bonaparte only issued the recall after he saw the situation for himself.

  We have previously established Desaix halted half an hour’s march from Rivalta in the direction of Pozzolo Formigaro. We know he could not have left Rivalta before 10.00 am because the waters of the Scrivia had not allowed the passage of artillery until then. Once the division had halted (between 10.30‑11.00 am), Savary was then sent on a mission to reconnoitre Novi, which he said took him two hours to complete. This takes us until at least 12.30 pm. On his way to find Bonaparte, Savary encountered the bearer of the recall message, an ADC of the commander-in-chief, Captain Jean-Pierre Bruyère, who was travelling cross-country in the opposite direction looking for Desaix.2 The two aides told each other where to find their respective commanders and galloped off, Savary using the rising plume of battlefield smoke ‘as a compass’. As the crow flies, it is just 4km from the First Consul’s headquarters to Rivalta. If the recall had been sent from Torre Garofoli, it means it took Bruyère over two hours to cover this short distance. This is surely inconceivable. Based on other movements, it would have taken a little under forty minutes to convey this message.

  If we instead follow Petit’s timing, this means Bruyère would have left the Spinetta area shortly after noon. If Savary left Rivalta at 12.30 pm, and both men travelled cross-country, they would have encountered one another at approximately 12.50 pm. The probable arrival time at Rivalta would have been twenty minutes later. We ma
y conclude, therefore, that Desaix did not receive the recall before 1.00 pm. The later time of the recall also perhaps explains why Lapoype’s division did not receive the same recall until 6.00 pm. By the time the messenger arrived at Lapoype’s last known location, the division would have been hours on the march already.

  Most commentators from the period indicate a division marching under a hot sun with artillery would have done well to maintain a pace of 4km per hour. Using the probable route later described by Pittaluga, from their position outside Rivalta to San Giuliano is approximately 10km; it was then a further 8km to Marengo. Supposing it took time for the division to turn around and reform its order of march, Desaix would not have been able to reach San Giuliano until 4.00 pm - and Boudet confirms they did not march on the battlefield until after the arrival of the ADC:

  ‘My division had not got more than one mile beyond Rivalta when one of the commander-in-chief ’s ADCs, sent by the Premier Consul, came in haste to bring me the order to march on San Giuliano and then Marengo, where the two hostile armies had been fighting since day break.’3

  Once his division was on the march, Boudet did allow the detachment from the 3rd Cavalry to ride off ahead, but Desaix retained the 1st Hussars to serve as an advanced-guard.4

  On the subject of the recall, there is one last item to note, and that is the content of the message. One can take the following story as one likes; it has been dismissed and quoted in equal measure. In his memoirs, the Marquis de Faverges says he conversed with a young Hungarian who had served in the Bregenz Hussars, but was serving in the French Army as an aide in 1800. This Hungarian told Faverges he saw Bonaparte’s note with his own eyes after Desaix had read it. One might argue this was not the language used by one of the greatest military commanders in history; or one might see an authentic urgency in the choice of words. In any case, the phrase has entered the mythology of the battle, so it is perhaps fitting to repeat it at this point: