Marengo

by T E Crowdy

  At this moment of retreat, Petit sums up the French predicament:

  ‘In short, at four o’clock in the afternoon, I have no hesitation in saying, that in a line of five miles or more, there did not stand six thousand infantry to their colours, and only six pieces of cannon could be made any use of. Let me not be accused of exaggeration in painting this prodigious falling off: the causes of which are very easily to be made known. A third of the army was actually put hors de combat: the deficiency of carriages for removing the sick and wounded, occasioned the necessity for more than another third to be occupied in this painful service, not to speak of the plausible pretext this circumstance afforded to certain individuals (of which an army always contains more or less) to absent themselves at so unseasonable a conjuncture from their respective corps. Hunger, thirst and fatigue, had imperiously forced a great number of officers to withdraw also; and everyone knows what effect the absence of officers occasions. The skirmishers also had, for the most part, lost the direction of their corps: in short, what remained of the army, occupied in vigorously defending the defile already mentioned, knew nothing of what passed behind them.’

  The Austrian skirmishers came forward under the protection of their artillery and began to enter the vineyards and woods. On the right, with Castelceriolo evacuated and the Guards’ resistance broken, Ott resumed his march, threatening to outpace the French rearguard to the south. Despite this, Bonaparte was outwardly calm. He knew Desaix could not be far off now, and he sent the aide-de-camp Louis Lejeune off to find him, and to instruct him to hurry up. As the remains of Victor and Lannes’ troops began to retreat in their little closed columns, Eugène Beauharnais and the horse chasseurs were ordered to destroy any abandoned munitions. They would wait for the Austrians to approach before setting the caissons on fire and leaping on their horses to escape.8 Moving eastward out of the protection of the vines and into the open fields on the reverse side of the slope, the army was now entering the most dangerous phase of the battle. Everything now rested on the timely arrival of Desaix. Coignet saw the First Consul in a moment of solitary contemplation:

  ‘Looking behind us, we saw the Consul who was seated on the bank of the ditch on the main road to Alessandria. He was alone, the bridle of his horse passed in his arm and flicked up small stones with his riding crop. He did not seem to see the balls rolling down the road. That was his habit. He never thought of his life. I only once saw him shelter from enemy fire; this was at Eylau, behind the church. When we were near him, he mounted his horse and galloped behind our ranks. “Take courage, soldiers,” he cried. “The reserve is coming! Stand firm!” He went to the right of the army, and everywhere on his way the soldiers shouted: Vive Bonaparte!’

  We have seen how the Austrians attacked the French at Spinetta with a formidable line of artillery, while calling for volunteer skirmishers from the infantry regiments. The French accounts also indicate there was a great deal of cavalry swarming around, albeit their attacks appear to have been largely uncoordinated in the Spinetta area. While these attacks were being made, the remains of the divisions of Hadik and Kaim marched out beyond Marengo and began reforming to the east of the village, in two lines, just as they had begun the battle.

  This deployment appears to have been hindered by the creation of a bottleneck at the Fontanone. In addition to troops trying to march out beyond Marengo, there was a great deal of traffic heading westwards in the guise of wounded soldiers being evacuated and French prisoners being marched off towards Alessandria. One of those waiting to cross the Fontanone was Captain Rauch of IR 23 Toscana. Along with his comrades, he had seen the cavalry fall on the rear of the French inside Marengo and the subsequent round-up of prisoners. The great number of these prisoners, which had filed past him, filled him with joy. As they passed over the bridge and passed Marengo, Rauch could clearly see the destruction and slaughter that had taken place there.9 The ditch was choked with bodies. The casualties of Rivaud’s brigade littered the field. There were dead and injured horses, broken artillery carriages and wagons, a scene of complete devastation. As Rauch passed Marengo, his regiment was directed to the left of the line. When they quit the Barbotta road to head eastwards, Rauch soon encountered the vines, and had to cut his way through them with his sword. Near to him, artillery pieces were dragged through the vines, which were crushed beneath the heavy wheels of the gun carriages and limbers.

  MAP 14: The French retreat, 4.00 pm

  (French) A – Kellermann; B – Gardanne; C – 72nd Line; D – Chambarlhac; E – Guard cavalry; F – Watrin; G – Champeaux; H – 28th Line; J – Foot Guard (estimated line of retreat); K – Monnier; L – Rivaud’s cavalry brigade.

  (Austrians) 1 – Archduke Johann Light Dragoons; 2 – IR 11 Wallis; 3 – Lattermann’s grenadiers; 4 – Lichtenstein Light Dragoons; 5 – Weidenfeld’s grenadiers; 6 – Austrian skirmish and artillery line; 7 – Kaim reforming debris of main column; 8 – Frimont’s light cavalry; 9 – Gottesheim; 10 – Ott’s column.

  In the first line, Captain Emerich Marx, commanding 2nd Battalion IR 53, found himself the senior surviving officer in his battalion, which was now at the head of a column marching towards the French. Marx’s main problem was trying to coordinate a long thin column of men moving through a field of high crops and Italian-style vines totally obscuring his view. Marx was very wary he might blunder into the French without any warning, so was cautious in his advance. He soon crossed over a broad, muddy, water-filled ditch and found before him was a small rise, obscuring the enemy’s position. To check this area, he sent a group of about forty men up onto the rise and ordered them to fire a few shots ahead of them into the crops. Ahead of them some republican cavalry were lying in wait, screening a body of infantry. After Marx’s men fired at them, they peeled away and allowed the infantry behind to fire a massive volley at Marx’s forty-man vanguard. Marx now climbed the rise himself and could saw the unmasked body of troops – probably Lannes’ 40th Line. The French firing caused the Austrian column to disperse and fall back towards the second line. Unsure of the strength of the French troops before him, Marx hurried back to inform Zach that he had come under fire.

  We have heard precious little of Zach since the beginning of the battle. In his account of the battle given to Faverges, the Austrian chief of staff described the losses suffered taking Marengo as ‘horrifying’. Zach told Faverges:

  ‘Unfortunately, our cavalry had no commanders, and we could not profit from the disordered enemy. Unfortunately also, our infantry was no less up in the air. Each regiment came and pirouetted, as the head sang to its colonel. The improvised generals who replaced their fallen colleagues, knowing nothing of our plans, answered haphazardly to the demands for direction.’

  By this Zach appears to concur with Neipperg, who had earlier complained about the pursuit being held up because regimental bands were playing the Grenadiermarsch. The French sources also speak of the Austrians shouting their victory cry ‘Vivat!’ at this time. More tellingly, it was the loss of generals and senior officers which really caused the problems. The losses were shocking. So many had been gunned down, or maimed by artillery fire. Radetzky concurred:

  ‘The commander-in-chief had two horses wounded, the colonel-director of the artillery [Reisner] was wounded in the head. Brave Major Perczel, my worthy friend, had his thigh broken by the same bullet which assailed my horse. Captain Krapf of the engineers was killed beside the commander-in-chief, and there is not one of us who has not had some accident.’

  Speaking with his comrades after the battle, Faverges wrote: ‘Our regiment had lost there almost all its superior officers. The colonel had gone crazy, the Prince Arenberg had had his leg taken off.’ Had the battle been so intense that it had caused a colonel to lose his mind? Apparently so; and it was the same everywhere. The Austrian officers had led from the front and had suffered heavily. This is why Captain Marx had found himself at the head of the main column, blundering into a French rearguard hidden in the crops.

&
nbsp; The problem extended all the way to the top. As stated by Radetzky, Melas had lost two horses shot from under him, and he had fallen heavily, suffering bruises. He had been in the thick of the action and personally directed the final attack on Marengo; but now, at the moment the army desperately needed leadership to complete the victory, Melas’ seventy-one years caught up with him. With the French in full retreat, Melas decided to return to Alessandria, placing command of a new advanced guard in the hands of GM Saint-Julien. According to Crossard, on leaving the field Melas told Saint-Julien:

  ‘It is a finished affair, they retire on all points. You will not go farther than San Giuliano, where you will place the right of your infantry. You will have the enemy pursued by your cavalry and the light artillery, which will kill as many people as possible when he passes the Scrivia. As for me, I am old; I have been on horseback since midnight, so I am going to lie down.’10

  A column was formed, at the head of which was IR 11 Wallis, followed by Lattermann’s grenadier brigade. Behind the grenadiers came the 9th Liechtenstein Dragoons and three batteries of cavalry artillery, with Weidenfeld’s grenadier brigade in reserve. These were directed onto the main road to follow the French withdrawal. As Melas quit the field, Zach placed himself at the head of the column on the main road with Saint Julien, as did Radetzky. If Melas had been overjoyed at the eventual success of the day’s engagement, then Zach was completely ecstatic. The chief of staff believed he had both outwitted his enemies in headquarters and General Bonaparte. Ignoring the fact that the assumptions in his battle plan had been completely wrong, and the failure to adapt the plan had seen much of the army gunned down before it had even reached its start positions, Zach had never rated Bonaparte as a commander, putting his past successes down more to luck than any great judgement. He shouted out to those officers riding near him: ‘Now we certainly have the great Bonaparte here, so where is this rare genius?’ Zach then announced he was going to carry San Giuliano with a bayonet attack.11

  Major Anton Volkmann was less confident.12 This talented staff officer felt obliged to point out a few truths to his chief. Referring to Kaim’s men in the centre behind them, he pointed out to Zach there was no longer a line of battle and one needed to be re-established; whole battalions were so fatigued that their commanders had allowed them to lay down and recover for a short while; the artillery had fallen behind and to carry San Giuliano it would be wise to have the guns at the front. But Zach would not listen. He said if he had listened to the advice of others like Volkmann before, he would not now be at the head of a victorious army, but running away to Milan with one eye looking over his shoulder for the pursuing French.

  As for the rest of the army, the other cavalry regiment which had survived the morning battle largely intact was the 3rd Johann Dragoons. Part of this regiment was directed to the south-east, along the road to Novi to look for Desaix’s column (the Austrians did not know Desaix had been delayed crossing the Scrivia and naturally assumed he had fulfilled his mission the day before). To the right of the column on the main road, IR 47 Franz Kinsky was sent towards Cascina Grossa, a hamlet 700 metres south of the main road. Out on the Austrian left, Ott began his march eastwards, taking the road from Castelceriolo towards the manor house of La Ghilina, approximately 2km north of San Giuliano. In the centre, FML Kaim took control of all the remaining infantry previously forming the main column. These troops had borne the brunt of the morning battle and many were exhausted. Whole battalions sat on the floor resting under the hot sun. Soldiers went looking for food in the houses, or for wells to refill their canteens. Others gave assistance to the wounded, or plundered the dead. Some went chasing after the herds of riderless horses now roaming the plain.13 It clearly took some time to organize these men back into the battle lines which had begun the battle.

  The wings of the army advanced first, on a front nearly 3km wide, with Ott to the north, Saint-Julien to the south on the main road and IR 47 on the extreme right. Kaim’s troops advanced in the centre, lagging slightly behind the wings, probably following the line of the old road. There was also an improvised line of artillery, skirmishers and various detachments of cavalry which followed the French more closely.

  Captain Rauch was with Kaim’s troops and thought ‘the sight of the victoriously advancing soldiers was glorious, it looked like they were engaged in drill on the parade ground’. However, he began to have concerns at the way the regiments in Kaim’s command extended themselves sideways, so rather than forming a solid, double battle line, the two lines converged to form just a single line. Rauch began to have concerns about this formation, because there was no reserve in the centre. These concerns were shared by Crossard, who was with Vogelsang and his staff. Crossard noted the detrimental effects victory was having on the troops near him. He felt that the ranks were disordered, many men having quit them to pillage the dead. Those remaining in the ranks were marching without a care in the world, with less discipline than if walking down a road in peacetime. The officers were slapping one another on the backs, giving and receiving congratulations, totally unconcerned about the French. It seemed as though the army had had a great weight lifted off it since breaking out across the Fontanone, that they were all just grateful to have survived.

  In his order before the battle, Radetzky had warned the army not to become complacent, even if the French appeared to be retreating. They would have done well to heed this advice. Crossard kept muttering to himself: ‘What disorder! Why do we not we reform the army?’ He was surprised when FML Vogelsang, normally a man full of gentle kindness, turned around and said in an aggressive tone, ‘What is the meaning of this screeching? Do you not see that there are two regiments there in total?’, pointing to troops to the south of them. This tirade from one whom Crossard considered to be one of the best generals in the army left him in despair.14

  At this point it is necessary to survey the actions on the wings of the battle in order to gain a complete picture of the French predicament. First we must check on the progress of the Austrians sent to Cantalupo, then on the cavalry brigades of Duvignau and Rivaud, and Dampierre at Cascina Bianca - not to mention the Austrian garrison of Tortona, which also played a part in the day.

  To recall, Nimpsche had been sent south from Alessandria to Cantalupo to guard against the approach of Suchet from Acqui. This redeployment across the Bormida had caused a lengthy delay in Ott’s march to Castelceriolo, and one wonders the outcome had the brigade instead been directed to seize that place, and what would have been the impact of Ott perhaps arriving there at 11.00 am, not at noon. This is to speculate. Arriving at Cantalupo, Nimpsche ordered Major Fulda to ride to Acqui with an advanced guard formed of two squadrons of hussars. They entered Acqui and chased away the French dragoons: many of the French were on exhausted horses and were thus made prisoner. From interrogating them, Fulda learned that Suchet was still too far away to have an impact on the battle. Fulda sent his findings back to Nimpsche who, without orders to do anything but monitor Suchet, now felt more confident to intervene in the battle raging away to the north-east.

  He began to send his troopers towards a ford on the Bormida near to the town of Castellazo. This was the place Duvignau’s brigade had taken up position at earlier in the morning. When we last checked on their progress, the officers of the 12th Chasseurs were going to lunch courtesy of some Capuchin friars. Blissfully unaware of the presence of a large Austrian brigade at Cantalupo less than 3km away, and seemingly ambivalent about the battle raging to the north, the officers sat down to dine. This was about the same time that Rivaud was marching his last reserve into Marengo for the desperate firefight with Lattermann’s grenadiers.

  Halfway through their meal though, there was an alert and everyone hurried back to rejoin the regiment. Perhaps made anxious by the heavy gunfire to the north, the French pickets had become jumpy. They thought they had seen enemy skirmishers coming through the fields, but these were reported to be peasants going about their daily business. Everyone b
reathed a sigh of relief. The main force retreated back to the village, the officers disgruntled at having had their lunch disturbed. Instead of returning to their meal, they decided to go and take a nap to catch up on their lack of sleep the night before.

  Lieutenant Besson was in charge of the post overlooking the Bormida. He watched the build-up of Nimpsche’s cavalry across the river, but they did not appear to be interested in him. However, after a long period of inactivity, 200 Austrian troopers began crossing the river by a ford and headed straight for Castellazo. While transfixed by the approach of this column, Besson was unaware that he was being stalked by another set of Austrian troopers who had already infiltrated the area. Before he knew it, Besson and his picket found themselves surrounded and taken prisoner by Nimpsche’s hussars. Behind Besson, Lieutenant Loquette saw what was happening and rushed off to raise the alarm in the village. Captain Estienne was sent with reinforcements to support Loquette, and Chief of Squadron Muller went to examine the situation himself, riding behind the detachment just sent. Pistol shots rang out nearby. Muller paused and saw six enemy hussars just ahead of him. He galloped back to the village and noticed for the first time that the whole area was swarming with Austrians.