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Marengo

Page 30

by T E Crowdy


  The officers were just dozing off when the trumpeters blared ‘to horse’. The slumbering officers raced to get on to their horses and reach the rally point outside the village. A column of Austrian hussars rode into the village behind them. At the same time, the column that Besson had watched fording the Bormida came round trying to cut them off. Led by Lieutenant Démont, the chasseurs made two small charges and opened a pathway back towards the Orba and the presumed safety of the French army at Marengo. They galloped for their lives.

  The 12th Chasseurs had decided to make a stand once they had crossed the Orba. They found a position from where their flanks were protected by hedges and ditches, hoping the Austrians would not be able to make their numerical superiority count. Across the Orba, Nimpsche’s various detachments began to regroup and form up into a column, the size of which would overwhelm the 12th Chasseurs, who had already lost half their number killed or captured. As this column formed, a corporal from the 8th Dragoons arrived. He had been sent by Victor once the retreat from Marengo had begun. At outset of his journey, he had been given an escort of four dragoons, all of whom had been taken prisoner or killed on the way. As a footnote to the corporal’s message, he told de France that the army had been utterly destroyed. It was grim news indeed. Chief of Brigade de France watched as Nimpsche took up his place at the head of the column ready for the charge. Realizing resistance there was futile, he ordered his remaining 100 or so chasseurs to head eastwards at the gallop.15

  To the north of Cantalupo, we now rejoin Dampierre’s little detachment, which by 2.00 pm was taking refuge in Cascina Bianca, pursued by O’Reilly’s troopers. With Dampierre was Chief of Squadron Pierre Ismert of the 11th Hussars. His after-action report gives a clear description of his activities, and how he took an opportunity to escape O’Reilly’s clutches:

  ‘About two o’clock the enemy forced us, by his superiority, to retire. His artillery and infantry made great ravages. We were without guns and ammunition. So we retreated 400 fathoms. The enemy assailed us on all sides without engaging us. Their cavalry, who had cut off the retreat, executed a charge upon us. The obstacles which it had to traverse brought a little disorder into its ranks. I took advantage of it, and executed a vigorous charge; I succeeded in piercing their line, and I rallied my troop four or five hundred fathoms from this last action.

  ‘While the enemy was occupied with our infantry, which I could no longer assist, I gave orders to have all the fugitives picked up. This search procured for me some fifty infantrymen, a captain of the 2nd Cavalry, and twelve men who had been sent out for supplies, which served me very usefully. I divided my hussars into three parts: the right commanded by Captain Sainte-Marie, the left by Captain Briche and the centre, where I had placed the cavalry of the 2nd and the infantry under my direction.

  ‘The enemy cavalry, who had become more audacious by the little capture it had just made, came to charge me. My infantry ambushed them and fired a discharge, and on my side I made a light charge and withdrew my infantry. The enemy, who had become more circumspect, followed me, but without fury.

  ‘The brave Captain Briche recognized a column of cavalry which came out on my left, coming from San Carlo. This intelligent officer immediately pulled away from me, in order to attract the enemy towards the Lemme, so as not to allow him time to know where I was. This little manoeuvre was perfectly successful. For my part, I took advantage of all the advantages of these positions, and retired to San Giuliano.’

  The location ‘San Carlo’ does not now appear in maps, but finding the patrol from the 2nd Cavalry indicates Ismert had headed southwards from Cascina Bianca, in the direction of Frugarolo. The Austrian cavalry reported by Ismert was most likely the detachment of the 3rd Johann Dragoons which had been despatched south-eastwards looking for Desaix’s approach from Novi. What is most interesting about Ismert’s account is the small remark that the 2nd Cavalry had been sent out to procure supplies. This detail was quite probably the same one sent out by General Kellermann before the action to procure supplies from the convent of the Holy Cross and All Saints at Bosco Marengo. Bourrienne tells the story of how convents were always well supplied, and so always sought out by French soldiers. Bonaparte’s secretary states that Kellermann’s men procured an abundant quantity of supplies and wine from this convent, in return for a guard to ‘protect’ them from pillage. These supplies instead ended up in headquarters and formed the ingredients of the meal given to the First Consul and his ravenous staff after the battle. This meal became known to history as Chicken Marengo (Poulet Marengo).

  To the north of the battlefield, we last encountered Jean Rivaud’s cavalry brigade in the vicinity of Sale, probing in the direction of Castelceriolo, albeit via a circuitous route across the plain. At 3.00 pm, Rivaud’s advanced guard (a squadron of the 12th Hussars) encountered Ott’s cavalry scouts beyond the village of Lobbi. The rival horsemen fired on each other from a distance with their carbines, then the French withdrew, believing the Austrians were in large numbers. In fact, Ott’s cavalry was about to head off to engage the Consular Guard, so the French were not rigorously pursued. Two kilometres away, the advanced guard rejoined Rivaud, who was now on the main road at Pagella. Surprised the pursuit did not materialize, Rivaud formed his brigade into a column of platoons (i.e. quarter-squadrons), 12th Hussars at the head, followed by the 21st Chasseurs. He then began to advance cautiously towards Castelceriolo.16

  Far behind the French lines, there was further trouble. The Austrian garrison in Fort San Victor at Tortona was commanded by Generalmajor Wenzel Karl Brigado. As the sounds of battle had raged to the west, Brigado ordered an attack to be made out of Fort San Victor in the direction of Rivalta. Oberleutnant Wratzfeld led a detachment of the 3rd Battalion IR 24 out towards the town. Corporals Georg Rase and Heinrich Müller captured ninety-one prisoners and a large quantity of stores, including a French pay chest. The two corporals found themselves having to defend the chest from their own men, who naturally wanted to plunder it. Calm was restored by the arrival of Oberleutnant Wratzfeld. While this anecdote serves as something of an historical footnote (both corporals were awarded the gold bravery medal), if the French did find themselves pushed back over the Scrivia, the loss of Tortona would likely prove a formidable obstacle to a retreating army.17

  MAP 15: French positions – Approx. 5.00 pm

  A – IR 23 Franz Kinsky heading to Cascina Grossa; B – IR 11 Wallis (St-Julien); C – Lattermann’s Grenadiers; D – 9th Lichtenstein Dragoons; E – Kaim’s Corps; F – line of skirmishers and artillery following French; G – Ott’s corps.

  1 – Boudet with 9th Light Infantry; 2 – Guénand’s brigade with Marmont’s battery; 3 – 72nd Line (Monnier); 4 – Lannes’ corps; 5 – Champeaux’s dragoons; 6 – Horse Guard; 7 – Kellermann’s brigade; 8 – Victor’s corps; ; 9 – Foot Guard (approx); 10 – Monnier’s division sheltering in vines (approx); 11 – Rivaud’s cavalry brigade.

  Chapter 14

  Vengeance!

  Aide-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, Louis Lejeune, had been sent by Bonaparte to hurry the arrival of Desaix. The ADC encountered Boudet’s division half a league (2km) from the battlefield. Watching the approaching column of infantry, Lejeune remarked that Desaix’s troops ‘were marching as gaily as if they were bound for a ball’.1 Having rested the whole morning waiting for the Scrivia to subside, and then for fresh orders to arrive from headquarters, the division was as fresh as could be that hot afternoon. It had at least 4,500 men present, and eight guns, including two 12-pdrs, four 8-pdrs and two 6in howitzers.2 The division was preceded by a strong squadron of the 1st Hussars. Boudet’s journal records his first impressions arriving at San Giuliano, which had become the rallying point for the army’s wounded:

  ‘My division, accelerating its march, was soon arrived at San Giuliano. It witnessed there the disorder that was starting to reign within the army; the disorder was caused, in part by the movement of a great number of wounded and their comrades who assisted t
hem, blocking the road and, on the other, the encumbrance of wagons and a crowd of domestics, sutlers, and of bad soldiers who had joined in with them.’

  Commanding Boudet’s second brigade was 44-year-old Louis Charles Guénand, a professional career officer and graduate of the Paris École Militaire. In 1793, he had been denounced as a nobleman and suspended for the remainder of the wars of the French Revolution. This did little for his promotional prospects.3 Command of this brigade was his first employment since suspension, and it appears he was anxious to make an impression. Somewhat unfortunately, his report and several letters he penned describing the battle have never been used in the accounts of the battle. This has been a terrible omission, as his brigade was to play a pivotal part in the battle:

  ‘The advanced-guard and corps of the line were all in such a rout it was impossible for General Guénand to enter by the road that went to San Giuliano which found itself so encumbered by the fugitives he had to abandon it to go forwards rapidly, crossing through the fields at this point.’

  Guénand was clearly unimpressed by the debris of the army he encountered, which in contrast to his well-ordered brigade was clearly something of a mob. In a letter to the First Consul dated 25 June 1800, Guénand indicates that Bonaparte was present to witness the arrival of Boudet’s division:

  ‘I am writing this to see if you recall what might be my name, my face and above all my bearing at the moment when I arrived on the field passing through our fugitives to offer you my brigade in the fine order in which you saw it arrive.’

  Bonaparte’s presence at the arrival of the division is confirmed in his own memoirs, writing about the confidence the arrival of Boudet’s troops inspired. Speaking of Boudet’s first brigade, the 9th Light, he wrote:

  ‘I truly never had with me better troops than the 9th Legion [sic] … One saw them pass, with their determined air; the calm of brave men, their resolution. I judged they looked certain of victory and presumed the enemy would be stopped and thrown back.’4

  Dupont concurred with the high state of morale among Desaix’s troops. He wrote of the division in his memoir:

  ‘It formed its ranks in front of the First Consul; he showed himself with a serene front, and we heard the soldiers say in seeing him: “It’s not going too badly; he laughs, the little Corporal.” This omen was precious in such a moment, and it is a noble testimony of the French character. Nothing is indeed more remarkable than the fine countenance of that division in the middle of the movement of retreat which took place, and we cannot too much praise the enthusiasm with which these three half-brigades, the only hope of success, went forward under the command of Desaix.’

  Once the division was past San Giuliano, there was a break in the vineyards, and the ground formed something of an open plain. Here Boudet deployed his division:

  ‘On the left of the main road, I placed my first brigade, a portion of which was deployed, the other in closed column. I also ordered my second brigade to assume the same dispositions on the right of the road.’

  The sight of Boudet’s division was an enormous boost to the morale of French troops retreating towards San Giuliano. Coignet was part of the French rearguard. Coignet’s captain gave him a swig of rum and congratulated him on surviving, but they were hard-pressed keeping the Austrians at bay, periodically firing volleys in the direction of their assailants. The guns fouled and the Frenchmen were again required to urinate into the musket barrels to unclog them. Then this most welcome of news arrived:

  ‘The battle was lost, when an aide-de-camp came rushing past, asking where the consul was, and announcing the reserve. The consul himself passed a little later, crying out to us that we should be supported. Our poor little platoons, harassed with fatigue, were revived at these words. Each one turned his eyes towards Montebello, towards the place where our saviours were to appear. At last cries resound everywhere: “Here they are!” “Here they are!”

  ‘General Desaix’s division advanced at l’arme au bras [support arms]. The artillery was placed in the intervals between the half-brigades, and a regiment of heavy cavalry closed the march. They arrived on the same road to Alessandria on which we had been fighting since the morning. We saw it perfectly, because we were then at the extremity of the plateau of Marengo, at the place where the ground is inclined and descended. We saw Desaix’s division below us. It was like a forest of bayonets. As for the Austrians, less advanced than our platoons, they were deceived by the folds of the ground, and did not suspect the arrival of our reinforcement. For the sake of happiness, Desaix, on approaching us, found a position, in order to put himself in line, which seemed to have been chosen beforehand. To his left was a gigantic hedge, perpendicular to the main road, protected by a kind of slope, and behind which all the troops were hidden. We did not even see the cavalry.’

  This account is very useful because it helps us understand where Coignet was at the time the reserve arrived. Pittaluga’s plan of the battlefield (dated 31 December 1896) shows the extent of the higher ground which Coignet describes as the ‘plateau’. The ground has changed considerably in our own time, and is today occupied by an industrial estate. The reverse incline of this plateau extends between the farmhouses of Li Poggi and Pistona. The giant hedge which Coignet reports appears to be a tree-lined road approximately 1km to the east of Pistona. This tree-lined road runs perpendicular from the main road, southwards to Cascina Grossa. It is shown in Lejeune’s painting of the Battle of Marengo, and survives to this day as the Via della Libertá (Liberty Way). Like many roads in the area, it is embanked to guard against flooding. Just behind this road is the point where the old and new Alessandria–Tortona roads converge before continuing to San Giuliano; if the position had been picked in advance as Coignet suggests, it was a perfect one.

  Although Boudet deployed his division outside San Giuliano as previously described, it did not all remain there. While the army was retreating and Guénand’s division was deploying (it would have taken at least half an hour for the tail of the division to reach the point of deployment), Desaix and Boudet went ahead and came up with something of a plan. Boudet writes:

  ‘Lieutenant General Desaix and I, considering the position of the army, decided to send forward my first brigade, composed of the 9th Light. The order was thus given for this movement, the execution of which would at least remind the retreating troops of their courage, and by result, make them return.’

  This would take the half-brigade far in advance of Guénand’s brigade, beyond the vine belt in front of them, out beyond the French rearguard. The mission was equally clear – to buy time for Guénand to deploy, and to perform a feat of arms which would inspire the army and restore to the ranks all the soldiers around San Giuliano who had quit on the pretext of assisting the wounded, or through lack of ammunition. Before the Ninth advanced, there was a small action which is never mentioned. With Boudet’s division were 100 or so troopers from 1st Hussars. The regiment’s colourful regimental history records how the hussars (formerly known as the Berchény Hussars) swept the area clear of the Austrian skirmishers which had been following the French rearguard:

  ‘It was therefore Captain de Juniac with the blue dolmans of Berchény, preceding Desaix’s corps, which arrived first before the cannons of Marengo to save the day. It executed the boldest charges, killed twenty-six Austrians and made a number prisoner. This squadron obtained considerable success; its intrepidity was of great help on all the points where it found itself. It put a number of the enemy out of action. Desaix, admiring its valour, testified his satisfaction and took the name of Captain de Juniac who was in command to give to the first consul. He had successively removed seventeen Austrian posts; Hussar Bricogne-Visconti and Hussar Michel in removing one took the commanding officer prisoner.’5

  The only other mention of such an action is found in Kellermann’s Truth on the battle of Marengo pamphlet, in which he writes: ‘The enemy skirmishers were repulsed until the village of Cascina Grossa.’ It is unclear if these
skirmishers were found on the main road and were preceding Saint-Julien’s infantry, or if they were the same Austrian volunteers who had followed the centre. The result of the action was that the Austrians were unaware of the advancing French half-brigade.

  The 9th Light Infantry was 2,000 men strong in three battalions. The first and second battalions formed line, with the third battalion remaining in column 200 paces to the rear.6 The three elite carabinier companies were formed as a single unit, placed towards the right of the first battalion. Coignet describes how the advancing Austrians were walking in a leisurely fashion, muskets at the shoulder as if going home. Coignet passed the 9th Light by about 300 paces when it was launched forward, leaping through the tall hedge ‘like rabbits’ and propelling itself to within musket range of Saint-Julian’s column. The original version of Coignet describes hearing the command: ‘Battalion fire – oblique to the right!’ This indicates the Ninth greeted the Austrians with a volley, the soldiers in the ranks aiming their muskets to the right at the road. Boudet does not mention this, only that he halted within musket range and threw out skirmishers to attack the Austrians.7 These were not inexperienced volunteers like the Austrians were employing in their skirmish line, but trained light infantrymen. Racing out of their ranks, they swarmed towards the head of the Austrian regiment in column on the road, making a rapid, well-aimed fire.

 

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