Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  The situation was now well beyond recrimination, and required swift action. Despite this, 3rd Division still did not march until 16:00. The King and all of his most senior officers were now fully aware that a failure to hold Volta would compromise the integrity of the Mincio line, and also threaten Peschiera. Such a situation would present some extremely unpleasant options which might, in turn, have severe political as well as military implications.

  Radetzky Crosses the Mincio

  After the fighting of the 25th, Radetzky correctly judged that the enemy army would not again be able to give battle on the east bank of the river, and that Carlo Alberto’s only option was to withdraw to the west bank. His assumption was that such a move would be made via Goito.

  The next morning, this hunch was confirmed by signs of an enemy withdrawal from Villafranca. Based upon this assumption, he issued the following orders. Count Wratislaw’s I Corps was to cross the river at Monzambano and push west through Solferino and Castiglione (just over two kilometres west of Solferino), threatening the enemy line of retreat to the west, via Crema to Milan. D’Aspre’s II Corps was to cross at Valeggio, and move on Volta, with a view to pursuing any retreat towards Cremona. Three brigades of FML Wocher’s I Reserve Corps were instructed to cross at Salionze, and move through Ponti, with the opportunity of then following either I or II Corps, as the need arose. Taxis’ cavalry and the Artillery Reserve were tasked to follow II Corps, and Thurn’s small III Corps was to undertake the investment of Peschiera. These movements were immediately put in hand.

  VOLTA – THE LAST THROW OF THE DICE

  July 26th (see map in colour section)

  The First Action of Volta

  Count Broglia’s 3rd Division, although unaware of the fact, was in a race with the enemy for the prize of Volta, a village atop the Hill of San Felice, dominating the area about six and a half kilometres to the north of him. In a literal sense, the entire army was dependent upon the speed of his march.

  Baron D’Apre’s II Corps, with Taxis’ cavalry, and the General Artillery Reserve, were assembled, on the morning of July 26th, in staging areas east of Valeggio. Just after noon, their march began. The narrow bridge at Valeggio caused considerable delay to the crossing of the river, and the head of the column only reached Borghetto, about a two hour march from Volta, at around 16:00. Like his adversary, D’Aspre was also involved in a race, of which he too, knew nothing.

  The first to reach the vital position was Quartermaster-General Staff Captain John, with a troop of hussars, the leading element of Prince Friedrich Liechtenstein’s Brigade. From the heights, Captain John could see General De Sonnaz’ columns approaching from the south. He swiftly informed Prince Liechtenstein, who posted some hussars forward, and hurried his other units to the scene. He, with Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß’ 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion occupied the southern entrance to the village, deploying two guns there, and also the base of the heights. The Prince then hurriedly posted II/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Hauser, on the high ground to the west of the village. Two companies of II/IR Franz Carl were placed at the foot of San Felice Hills, in the the Church of S. Maria Maddalena, with two others just to the west, in Buneletto. The battalion’s remaining two companies were held in reserve, around the southwest part of Volta.

  Liechtenstein placed four guns of his brigade battery west of the village of Luccone, with two companies of I/IR Franz Carl between San Felice Hill and that village, with advanced posts on the plain below. The other four companies of the battalion were held in reserve around the eastern approaches to Volta, in the direction of Molini di Volta. The brigade’s two squadrons of Reuss Hussars were deployed behind these companies. The Prince’s brigade totalled 3,733 men in all.6

  As Liechtenstein began his deployment, De Sonnaz was a little over a kilometre away.7 Lieutenant-General Broglia’s 3rd Division was marching in two columns. These were:

  A.

  On the left; The Savoy Brigade (4,750 men) – 1st Infantry Regiment (three battalions), 2nd Infantry Regiment (three battalions), 1/I Bersaglieri Company, Captain Viariggi (120), 2nd Position Battery (five guns), Parmesan Artillery Section (two guns), and the Modenese Artillery Section (two guns)

  B.

  On the right; The Composite Brigade (2,842) – 16th Infantry Regiment (three battalions), Parmesan Infantry Battalion, Modenese Infantry Battalion, Piacenza Volunteer Company, Captain Raimondi, 7th Field Artillery Battery (eight guns – total artillery, 328), two squadrons, Novara Cavalry Regiment (180).8

  As the 3rd Division approached, these two columns deployed respectively, to the left and right of the Goito Road. A bombardment was immediately started by the guns of the 2nd Position, Parmesan, and Modenese artillery. After about half an hour, under cover of the continuing artillery fire, II/16th Regiment, Major Poncini, and III/16th, Major Danesi, in the first line, along with one division of I/16th, from the second line, advanced against the east of S. Felice Hill, and Luccone. The other division of I/16th, and the Parmesan Battalion attacked further east, towards Sottomonte. The weak Modena Infantry Battalion, Major Meari, assigned as escort for Captain Gazzera’s 7th Field Artillery Battery, did not take part in this action.

  The advance of Major Poncini’s II/16th Regiment against M. Gizzolo stalled almost immediately against the IR Franz Carl companies there, and a brisk exchange of fire took place between the antagonists. To Poncini’s right, though, no opposition was encountered, and this wing was able to advance onto the heights north of Pasini, and to occupy three important groups of buildings there, these being, from north to south, the Marinelli, Petacchi, and Mortelli Houses.

  Back on the Composite Brigade’s left, the attacking ranks were reordered, and the attack resumed. To meet this, Liechtenstein was forced to commit the four reserve companies of IR Franz Carl. Nevertheless, the attack, joined by Captain Viariggi’s Bersaglieri Company, was able to outflank the defenders to the east, through Luccone, and to take Monte Gizzolo. This move threatened the eastern outskirts of Volta itself, and communications via the road to Valeggio.

  On the Piedmontese left, the Savoy Brigade had also been on the offensive. Its attack was not contemporaneous with that of the Composite Brigade, but it prevented Prince Liechtenstein from transferring any troops to his left flank. 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel Dulac was posted on the right, and 2nd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Mollard, on the left, formed in three battalion columns. All six battalions advanced up the slopes, the Austrian skirmishers withdrawing before them. Colonel Mollard’s regiment, along with II/1st Regiment, Major Georges, penetrated directly into the village itself, as did elements of the 16th Regiment to the east. The effort on the left by Colonel Dulac’s other two battalions, I/1st, Major de Saxel, and III/1st, Major Mudry, swung to the right against Captain Hauser’s Kaiser Jäger, in and to the west of the village. A fierce and disjointed combat began for its possession. To add to the confusion, elements of both regiments did not actually ascend the heights, but battled for control of Buneletto and S. Maria Maddalena at their base.

  After about two hours, Liechtenstein’s position was looking precarious. In Volta, some officers, particularly of IR Franz Carl began to consider that a breakout from the village should be considered, as their position was clearly surrounded, and they looked likely to be cut off. At this critical moment, the Interim-Commander of II/ Kaiser Jäger, Captain Hauser, made an impassioned plea for holding on, both in the village, and those buildings outside it, the whole position being of vital importance. His argument was accepted, and work went on barricading and fortifying their positions. Troops of the Franz Carl Regiment also retained control of Buneletto and S. Maria Maddalena, at the foot of the San Felice Hills, and had barricaded themselves in.

  At around 20:00, Hauser’s view was vindicated, as the lead elements of Colonel Kerpan’s brigade (2,749 men, in total) began to arrive.9 Initially, Colonel Bianchi’s IR Kinsky hurried forward, followed by I/Szluiner Grenzer, Major Mollinary. 10 companies of the former were then ordered against Luccone,
and the remaining two companies together with the Szluiners, to M. Rosa, between Sottomonte and the Marinelli, Petacchi, and Mortelli Houses, further north.

  II and III/16th Regiment were unable to withstand this assault, and were swept from the heights back down on to the plain. 4/IR Kinsky, Oberlieutenant Schäfer, stormed a group of buildings near Sottomonte, capturing a number of prisoners, including Major Poncini. About 100 men altogether, were made captive. For the rest of the night, there were only fitful exchanges of fire between the outposts on this flank.10

  In and around Volta itself, fierce fighting had been taking place since the beginning of the Savoy Brigade’s initial assault. III/2nd Regiment’s commander, Major Regard de Villeneuve, was killed, and his place taken by Captain Charbonneau. Not long afterwards, Charbonneau was himself badly wounded. In the confusion of the fighting, elements of the Novara Cavalry both attacked, and were fired upon by units of both friendly brigades. In one of these incidents, General Broglia was wounded in the leg, and unhorsed. Inside Volta, the Savoyards had cleared much of the village, but signally failed to take the Church, and various other buildings from the mixed force of Feld-Jäger, Kaiser Jäger, and Hungarians battling against them. The sun set at about 21:00, and only half an hour later it was pitch-black darkness. For several hours, many unpleasant close-quarter actions took place, which continued into the early hours of the morning. The situation was a stalemate.11

  General De Sonnaz had been completely repulsed on his right, but on the left, the issue was still in doubt. Mindful of the importance attached to Volta by the King, and the fact that the enemy had received reinforcements, he ordered preparations for a renewed attack the following morning. The first step was to be the withdrawal of the gallant Savoyards, in preparation for a second assault.

  July 27th (see map in colour section)

  Preparations for the Renewal of the Action

  Aware that another attack required the presence of fresh troops, Count De Sonnaz sent a report of the day’s events to General Bava, together with a request for reinforcements. At about 02:00, on July 27th, he withdrew the Savoyards from Volta, to the foot of the San Felice Hills, although some men, who were cut off or did not get the word, remained in the village all night. At about the same time as this withdrawal began, General Bava despatched the Regina Brigade (5,380), the 6th Field Artillery Battery, and a Bersaglieri company to Volta. Subsequently, the 17th Infantry Regiment and the Gazzelli Cavalry Brigade (1,300) were also sent to De Sonnaz.12

  Just before Midnight, Brigade Schwarzenberg arrived near Volta. II Corps’ commander, FML D’Aspre instructed that it remain in reserve, as the situation in Volta was unclear. Reports from prisoners had given the impression of great numbers of enemy troops being present, and he wished to clarify the situation. In the meanwhile, he ordered Brigade Gyulai to continue its march, Brigade Perin to remain in Valeggio, and for the Taxis Cavalry Division and the Corps Reserve Artillery, to halt to the northeast of Volta, and await further instructions. D’Aspre also sent a report to Marshal Radetzky, but this was badly delayed, not reaching the Marshal until 03:00, on the 27th. Once apprised of the situation, he ordered both I and I Reserve Corps to march on Volta, in support.

  The Second Action of Volta

  After its two hour march, the Regina Brigade arrived near Volta at around 04:00. General De Sonnaz now made his preparations for a second attack. His deployment was:

  Volta, July 27th 1848 (Adam Brothers)

  A.

  First Line – To the Left of the Volta-Goito Road: 10th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Abbrate. 6th Field Artillery Battery, Captain Serventi, 7th Field Artillery Battery, Captain Gazzera, and the Parmesan and Modenese Artillery Sections.

  B.

  First Line – To the right of the Volta-Goito Road: 9th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Di Negro, I/16th Infantry Regiment, and the Parmesan Battalion.

  C.

  Second Line – The Savoy Brigade, II and III/16th Infantry Regiment, the five guns of 2nd Position Battery, and the weak Modenese Battalion.

  Facing these forces, the defenders were deployed in the following manner:

  A.

  Left Wing – Luccone Hills: I/IR Franz Carl, four companies of 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, and four guns.

  B.

  Centre – Around Volta Church: Two companies, 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, and two guns.

  C.

  Right Wing – In the southwest of Volta: eight companies, IR Kinsky. Two more companies in Buneletto, and two others in S. Maria Maddalena. Colonel Kerpan’s brigade battery, 6th 6 Pounder Battery was interspersed in gaps in the infantry line.

  D.

  In Reserve – Behind the left wing, stood I and II/Szluiner Grenzer, I/IR Haugwitz, and two squadrons of Reuss Hussars. Behind the centre was II/IR Franz Carl, and behind the right, on Monte Calvario, stood II/Kaiser Jäger. In general reserve, north of Volta, was posted Brigade Edmund Schwarzenberg.13

  The Piedmontese batteries commenced firing at 04:30. After half an hour, the infantry attack began. The three battalions Colonel Di Negro’s 9th Infantry Regiment moved against Monte Gizzolo and Luccone. The first attack was firmly repulsed by the eight companies there. A second attempt, however, took both positions, and elements of III/9th Regiment reached the outskirts of Volta. Further to the right, I/16th Regiment, and the Parmesan Battalion occupied Sottomonte, detaching one company to Monte Rosa, on their right.

  On the Piedmontese left, Colonel Abbrate’s 10th Infantry Regiment attacked against Buneletto and S. Maria Maddalena, held by IR Kinsky. Despite a smartly executed flanking movement, these attacks were a complete failure, and Abbrate was forced to pull back. While these attacks by De Sonnaz’ were taking place, Brigade Gyulai arrived from Valeggio, and was posted north of Volta. FML D’Aspre now considered that the moment had arrived for a counterstroke.

  On the Austrian left, an assault was mounted against M. Gizzolo, by Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß, with his 9th Feld-Jäger, and I/IR Franz Carl, supported by Major Mollinary’s I/Szluiner. At the same time, I/IR Haugwitz, in three divisional columns, supported by four guns, stormed Luccone, while II/Szluiner, with two hussar squadrons, moved across Monte Rosa and on to Sottomonte14. All of these advances were successful, and were supported by the advance of Brigades Schwarzenberg and Gyulai. These blows routed the Piedmontese right wing, forcing General De Sonnaz to call off any further attempts on Volta, and indeed, to order a retreat.15

  De Sonnaz Retreats to Goito

  As the general gave these orders, he had the great good fortune to receive precious reinforcements in the form of 17th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Montale, and General Gazzelli’s cavalry brigade. With the Austrian cavalry advancing, this latter was especially welcome, while Colonel Montale’s regiment provided a steady, fresh unit, on which to anchor the withdrawal of his badly discouraged force.

  As these battered formations pulled back, the main body of the Reserve Cavalry Brigade of Major-General R. Schaaffgotsche moved forward, to take up pursuit of the enemy. The brigade comprised three squadrons of Kaiser Uhlans, and three of Balem Dragoons, commanded by Colonels Ruß and Grawert, respectively. Ruß advanced his men against 6th Field Battery, Captain Serventi, but was received by grapeshot, and repulsed. Regrouping, the uhlans attempted to flank the battery, but were held at bay long enough for a counter-charge to be made by Colonel Avogadro’s Genoa Cavalry Regiment, and the uhlans routed.

  Colonel Grawert now also pressed forward with his three dragoon squadrons. He, in turn, was assailed by the six squadrons of Savoy Cavalry, Colonel Sambuy, and put to flight. This vital poor showing by the Imperial Cavalry was in stark contrast to the actions of two squadrons of the Reuss Hussars, which made a thorough nuisance of themselves at least as far as Cerlungo, some six kilometres south of Volta, forcing the 16th and 17th Regiments to constantly halt, to form square. The pursuit ended around 10:00, and the Piedmontese then halted in the area between Cerlungo and Goito, a further four kilometres to the southeast.

  T
he close-quarter fighting at Volta had been intense, and the Piedmontese troops were completely demoralised at the outcome. Pinelli writes that, “It can be said that this was the only day that discipline was lost, for which the main reasons were the mutual accusations between the senior commanders.” As Garnier-Pagès commented, “The combat was glorious, but the defeat was crushing.”16 Bava, as usual, was much harsher, writing that:

  Cavalry Action at Volta, July 27th 1848 (Adam Brothers)

  There had been many stragglers belonging to the Savoy and Regina Brigades in Goito during the morning. We tried to rally them again into the ranks, but to no avail, since they wanted food and we had no provisions for them, because the Lombard deputies had left the city, and the provisions had probably been sacked by the numerous host of cowards who were at our backs, sparking terror and fear in the countryside, and causing the flight of the civilians, who took with them all their provisions, which could have been very useful to us during our retreat.

  General Headquarters rapidly sent some officers to the Marcaria and Canneto sull’Oglio bridges. These officers had the task of keeping the stragglers under control; this undisciplined mob was actually formed by the dregs of the army. The officers failed to stop them, because they swept away any resistance opposing their rabid march. The stragglers also terrified the civilians with false news of defeats and oncoming ruin.

  The irredeemable loss of Volta spelt the end of any chance of maintaining the line of the Mincio. There were no options other than retreat or the concluding of a ceasefire.17

  For Radetzky, success at Volta was the icing on the cake of Custoza. The Piedmontese, perhaps defeated by strategy and numbers in the great battle, could not claim the same here. Recognition of the importance of the great victory which had already been won was not long in coming. On July 28th, the Marshal received a personal, hand-written letter from Kaiser Ferdinand, delivered by his Personal Adjutant. It read,