Radetzky's Marches
Page 37
My Dear Count Radetzky,
The shining victory of Sommacampagna and Custoza has filled me with astonishment and pleasure. I believe that I could give the gallant army in Italy no greater proof of my admiration, than by decorating the glorious commander with the Grand Cross of my Maria Theresa Order, which I send to you via Lieutenant-Colonel Count Crenneville. May this highest decoration of a warrior adorn your breast for a long while, so that your deeds may serve the Austrian army as an example.18
Austrian casualties in the two actions of Volta were reported as:
Killed
Two officers and 75 men
Wounded
19 officers and 156 men
Prisoners
One officer and 41 men
Missing
160 men
Total
22 officers and 432 men19
Hardest hit was the brigade of Prince Liechtenstein, with Haradauer’s II/Kaiser Jäger losing one officer and 29 men killed, four officers (one mortally) and 29 men wounded, for men captured, and 36 missing. The two battalions of IR Franz Carl, between them had one officer and 23 men killed, three officers and 69 men wounded, one officer and 23 men captured, and 50 men missing.20
The Piedmontese loss is given as:
Killed
Six officers and 61 men
Wounded
10 officers and 253 men
Prisoners
Two officers and 150 men
Missing
200 men
Total
18 officers and 664 men21
The losses of Colonel Mollard’s 2nd Infantry Regiment, in a report from Memorie Inedite, are given as one officer mortally wounded, and 34 NCOs and men killed, five officers and 92 NCOs and men wounded, and an amazing 1,276 prisoners and missing. The latter is an extraordinary figure, and these numbers combined would represent about half of the regiment’s strength. Of course, in the circumstances, depending upon when the roll was called, it is perfectly possible that large numbers of men were, indeed, ‘missing’. In any case, this regiment’s loss in killed represents more than half of the total number given, leaving all other units, which includes 13 infantry battalions, with a total of 35 fatal losses amongst them. This is clearly inaccurate. Le Masson gives the killed and wounded as over 1,000. Lieutenant Ferrero of the Savoy Brigade, present as a company commander, estimated the dead as about 100, and stressed that this did not include the morning attack of the 27th. It seems that a total loss from all causes of around 1,000 is likely.22
Carlo Alberto Requests an Armistice
At a Council of War, convened at 08:00, after initial reports of the failure of the morning’s attack had been received, it was universally agreed that a ceasefire be requested from Marshal Radetzky. Generals Bes and Rossi, with Colonel Alberto La Marmora, were despatched to Volta, where the Marshal himself had arrived at about noon. Carlo Alberto proposed an immediate cessation of hostilities, to be followed by the withdrawal of his forces to the area west of the River Oglio, and subsequently, negotiations. The deputation returned to Headquarters at about 16:00.23 Radetzky’s conditions were that the Piedmontese must withdraw behind the River Adda, recall their troops from Venice and the naval squadron from the Adriatic, give up the fortresses of Peschiera, Pizzighettone, and Rocca D’Anfo, evacuate the central Italian Duchies, and set free all prisoners of war. These terms were too harsh for Carlo Alberto, and, although Colonel La Marmora advised otherwise, they were rejected.24
Retreat
Although there was now no alternative to a retreat, the direction of that movement was disputed. Baron Bava proposed to swing south, crossing the River Po, and then moving towards Piedmont by way of Piacenza and Pavia. The King, however, was adamant that the withdrawal must be towards Milan, to defend that city. Bava was forced to concede the point, in the face of his own serious misgivings, both about the principle and the means at hand with which to achieve it. Plans were then hastily formulated on the basis of this decision.
At 19:00, the Piedmontese retreat began, as the Aosta Brigade and the 8th Field Artillery Battery, misunderstanding their orders, instead of deploying west of Goito, retreated to the southwest, eventually crossing the River Oglio, and reaching the town of Piadena, less than 30 kilometres east of Cremona, at around 01:00, on July 28th. It was to prove to be the first of many mistakes, misunderstandings, and errors which would occur over the next few days. A key issue now was morale. After the past few days, the defeat, and the total breakdown of the Commissariat took it to a new low. As the Army withdrew, large numbers deserted or fell out of the ranks. The advancing Austrians found the roadsides littered with abandoned packs, accoutrements, and equipment. The problem was compounded by the hostility of much of the peasantry, itself fed by the behaviour of some of the deserters. It was a feature of this phase of the campaign that, in the countryside, the advancing Austrians were often now greeted with shouts of, “Evviva Radetzky!”
Carlo Alberto’s retreat towards the River Oglio was conducted, “…with a chain of misunderstandings, mistakes, orders, counter-orders, and delays.”25 It was fortunate, to say the least, that there was no all-out enemy pursuit. This was deliberate. Radetzky’s purpose was to press and harry the enemy, increasing his exhaustion, and sapping his will to fight. It was also in no-one’s interest to destroy the Royal Army, thus leaving a void.
The army was allowed rest at the Oglio. The retreat continued westward overnight, now towards the River Adda. During the 29th, the 1st, 3rd, 2nd Reserve, and Lombard Divisions reached the area around Cremona, with the 4th Division approaching. The 2nd and 1st Reserve Divisions were somewhat further behind, although not being seriously threatened.
On the 30th, the Austrian army finally crossed the River Oglio in two columns, I Corps across a pontoon bridge at Isola Dovarese, with II and I Reserve Corps, across another one, constructed at Canetto. I Corps then moved along the Great Post Road towards Cremona, with Brigade Strassoldo in the lead. At around 09:00, Strassoldo’s Advance Guard, 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, one squadron of Radetzky Hussars, and two guns of Foot Artillery Battery Nr. 2, made contact with an enemy force.
The battalion was advancing with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd companies to the right of the road, and the remaining three companies to the left, in support. At the village of Gadesco, six kilometres from Cremona, the advance came into contact with elements of the Savoy Brigade, and the 2nd Position, and 7th Field Artillery Batteries. A spirited action developed, in which one Piedmontese gun was dismounted, and another captured, along with three caissons, by 4 and 5/10th Feld-Jäger, led by Captain Brandenstein. As this occurred, four companies of I/Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenzer moved up on the 10th’s left, and I/IR Hohenlohe, on the right.26
This small action caused consternation amongst the disorganised defenders. The action of a flying column, commanded by Colonel Wyß, which captured an officer and 27 men in Crema overnight on the 30th, then proceeding to clash with Piedmontese pickets near Lodi, also jangled the nerves. Indeed, Colonel Fabris wrote that, “In these conditions, the Piedmontese were attacked on the 30th; had the enemy effort been more energetic, the campaign would have ended that day, in a disaster for the army.”27 The morale of Carlo Alberto’s army was on a knife-edge.
By the morning of the next day, July 31st, General Bava had the entire army across the Adda. At this point, it was vital that the troops be rested, and there was a also great deal of reorganisation to attend to. Above all else, Bava needed time. Unfortunately, he would not get it.
Radetzky forces the Line of the River Adda
Like his adversary, Radetzky had concentrated his major force to the north. He did not, however, ignore his left flank. A move slightly further south, at Crotta D’Adda, about 14 kilometres west of Cremona, was also planned, using a reorganised and beefed up IV Corps, now commanded by FML Thurn: 15 ½ battalions, eight squadrons, and 30 guns, approximately 14,000 men. It was formed as follows:
IV Corps
Commander FML Count Thurn
Chief of Staff
Major Maroičić
Corps Adjutant
Major Bils
Division, FML Baron Rath
Brigade, Major-General Degenfeld
III/ Kaiser Jäger Battalion
I and II/IR Nugent (Nr.30)
I and II/IR Prince Emil (Nr. 54)
Kaiser Uhlan Regiment (Nr.4) – two squadrons
Six Pounder Foot Artillery Battery Nr. 13
Brigade, Major-General Prince Eduard Liechtenstein
II/Deutsch-Banater Grenz IR (Nr.12)
I and II/IR Reisinger (Nr.18)
Archduke Carl Uhlan regiment (Nr.3) – two squadrons
Six Pounder Foot Battery Nr. 16
Division, FML von Culoz
Brigade, Colonel Benedek
I and II/IR Paumgarten (Nr. 21)
I and II/IR Gyulai (Nr. 33)
Archduke Carl Uhlan regiment (Nr.3) – two squadrons
Six Pounder Foot Battery Nr. 1
Brigade, Major-General Gravert
III/Vienna Volunteer Battalion
I and II/IR Piret (Nr. 27)
Six Pounder Foot Battery Nr. 17
Artillery Reserve
Half of both Horse Artillery Nr. 9 and Rocket Battery Nr. 7
At Crotta, was 1st Division, formed by the Aosta and Regina Brigades; good troops, but, like everyone else, very tired and under-strength, some 6,000 infantry, in all.28 The division was under the temporary command of Major-General Sommariva. The general, concerned that he might be outflanked to the south, had posted the Regina Brigade west of Crotta, to guard against any enemy move from Cremona via Piacenza.29 Of the six battalions of the Aosta Brigade, only two were guarding the bridge at Crotta.
At dawn on August 1st, I/IR Reisinger, a wing of hussars, and a half-battery, along with a bridging-train, commanded by General Quartermaster Staff Major Count Huyn, appeared on the east bank of the Adda, opposite Crotta. Huyn began to bombard the west bank.
Around 05:00, General Sommariva heard the cannon fire from Crotta at his headquarters, five kilometres to the south. This was soon followed by confused partial reports of the situation, and the need to retreat. This information was, in turn, succeeded by orders from General Bava, to move the Regina Brigade north, conforming to the general concentration around Milan, and to pull troops away from the Po. Sommariva was then informed that the enemy was preparing to construct a bridge near Crotta. At this point, he sent the following message to Bava:
To His Excellency, the General Commanding 1st Corps at Codogno
Meletto, August 1st 1848
The position facing Crotta d’Adda is not suitable to be defended by artillery, as it is commanded by a bank higher by eight metres, neither is there any suitable position on this bank in which to position batteries: this is the opinion of the artillery. Meanwhile, the bridge is under construction, and I am hurrying to gather the troops to march on Cornovecchio, Cornogiovine, San Stefano, Mezzana, San Rocco, Piacenza. The fulfilment of the orders included in the order of Your Excellency dated today, becomes impossible in the present conditions, were the spreading over a long line, it would necessarily lead to it being breached in some place.
(This is) the reason why there is no other choice than to retreat to Piacenza.
The Major-General
Commander of the First Division
Signed (in pencil) M. D’Aix
(In pencil) The bridge has been crossed30
Upon receipt of this incomprehensible tract, at about 07:00, Bava, then at General Headquarters in Codogno, some 10 kilometres (as the crow flies) west of Crotta, after informing the King, moved to see the situation at Crotta for himself. After travelling some 12 kilometres, though, Bava encountered Major-General Trotti, at the head of the Regina Brigade. Now considering that it was too late to affect the situation at Crotta, he instructed Trotti to continue to follow Sommariva’s orders, with the caveat that Sommariva withdraw as slowly as was possible in the circumstances.
At Crotta, General Sommariva had already, at about 06:00 ordered a withdrawal across the River Po, and towards Piacenza. Under the direction of Pioneer Lieutenant Wotruba, work on bridging the Adda continued through the day, and the main body of FML Thurn’s IV Corps began crossing to the west bank at around 16:00.
Captain Talleyrand-Périgord, himself at Headquarters, was in no doubt as to who was to blame:
General Sommariva, who was charged with the defence of the crossing at Crotta d’Adda, saw that the Austrians were preparing to bridge the river. Judging the lie of the land to be unfavourable to the defence, he retired almost without a shot being fired, thereby allowing the Austrians to land unopposed on the right bank. As soon as this information reached headquarters, a retreat on Lodi was ordered.
Action outside Milan, August 4 1848
I was charged to take the order to Gen Sommariva to direct his retreat to Piacenza and there to place himself under the command of General de Brichaserio.31
By the end of the day, the Austrian I, II, and IV Corps were all across the Adda, leaving only I Reserve Corps on the east bank. Bava, by then had the 3rd and 4th Divisions near Lodi, with most of the cavalry, and with the Duke of Savoy’s 1st Reserve Division slightly to the west, and the Lombard Division to the north. The 2nd Division, along with the Nizza Cavalry Regiment, was south of Lodi, astride the two roads leading there, on the west bank of the river. As discussed, 1st Division was south of the Po, around Piacenza, as was General De Laugier’s Tuscan force.
During the day, The British Minister to Turin, Ralph Abercrombie, appeared at the King’s headquarters, offering his services to mediate with Marshal Radetzky, on Carlo Alberto’s behalf. The King accepted this offer. Abercrombie met the Marshal on August 2nd, spending two hours at his headquarters, and finding him now unwilling to consider any conditions other than a return to the situation in existence prior to March. Such terms were still impossible for Carlo Alberto to accept.32 During the day, a clash occurred as 2nd Division withdrew from Lodi. Brigade Strassoldo’s advance guard came into contact with 3/18th Infantry Regiment. Lieutenant Poschacher, of the 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, and an NCO of the Radetzky Hussars were killed, and four jäger wounded. The Piedmontese suffered, “… some loss”.33
On the 3rd, the Army began to withdraw towards Milan itself, with General Broglia’s 3rd Division approaching the city around noon. Last to move, at 22:00 that night, was the Duke of Savoy’s 1st Reserve Division. Three of the four divisions present were deployed in an arc protecting the east and south of the city, with the 1st Reserve Division posted inside the walls, as was the Cavalry Division. The Lombard Division was placed west of the city, protecting the crossing of the River Adda, near Treviglio. The Provisional battalions moved on to Brescia. Orders were issued to Major-General Sommariva, to march along the south bank of the Po as far as Stradella, cross the river there, and make his way to Pavia. From there, he was to join the main army in Milan, on August 6th.
That same day, a flying column, from IV Corps encountered an unidentified enemy force, east of Pavia, suffering 18 wounded. The loss to the other force, which withdrew in the direction of Pavia, was not known.
The Action of Milan, August 4th
Carlo Alberto had, as he had ordered, assembled the bulk of his army to defend Milan. That army, however, was not in a good state. The 2nd and 4th Divisions numbered some 7,000 men each, and the 3rd, about 6,000. The Duke of Savoy’s 1st Reserve Division was about 10,000 strong. With the other various formations around the city, the total number of men available was some 42,000, with 83 guns. Many in the ranks were both tired and discouraged, and, as related, the supply chain had utterly collapsed.
The Marshal’s orders for the 4th were, from right to left, for I Corps to move against the village of Trivulzo, I Reserve Corps, that of San Donato (slightly behind the other corps’), and II Corps, on Chiaravalle. Only provisions animals and wagons were allowed to accompany the march. All other vehicles were required to remain in Melegna
no. Army Headquarters was established at San Donato. Both I and II Corps’ outposts were already within 7.5 kilometres of Milan.
The Austrian advance that morning was made by Count Wratislaw’s I Corps on the right flank, and Baron D’Aspre’s II Corps, on the left. Between two and two and a half kilometres from the city’s walls, 2nd Division faced Wratislaw. 3rd Division confronted D’Aspre. The area where the conflict was to take place had many trees, and also much dense vegetation. There were many scattered stone buildings and deep canals criss-crossed the battlefield. It was not an area at all suited to the movement of large masses of men, nor for the employment of artillery. Regardless of this, the regiments were deployed here, in two lines, with one battalion forward, and two behind. On the previous day, Prince Ferdinando had reconnoitred the area, and deemed it to be unsuitable for defence.34
The advance of Brigade Strassoldo, at about 08:00, first encountered Piedmontese troops near Ca Gambaloita. These were III/11th Infantry Regiment, Major Molinati, supported by the eight 16 pounders of the 3rd Position Battery, Captain Cugia. Advancing against these, came 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Captain Lütgendorf, with three companies on either side of the road, and supported by two guns of Foot Battery Nr. 2. This move was stopped cold by Captain Cugia’s battery. To support the Jäger, at around 10:00, Strassoldo pushed II/Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenzer forward on the left towards Nosedo, and shortly afterwards, I/IR Hohenlohe, Major Hartung was also moved up on the right, but neither could make much headway against the Piedmontese artillery.
The Action before Milan, August 4th 1848 (Adam Brothers)
While this was taking place, on Strassoldo’s right, I and II/Oguliner Grenzer, from Brigade Wohlgemuth, were shifted to cover the left and push towards Nosedo. As they did so, however, at around 14:00, the first elements of II Corps, Brigade E. Schwarzenberg, arrived, to also attack towards Nosedo. Strassoldo also now received the support of three guns of the 1st 12 Pounder Battery, and a howitzer, which began to pound the Piedmontese battery, as a further attack was being prepared.