Commander, Static Defences: Major Sirtori
Commander, Outpost Line: Lieutenant-Colonel Rossaroll
Director of Munitions: Major Ponti
Troops:
Engineer officers
6
Two Venetian Line Battalions, and the Cacciatori del Sile
2,094
Marine Infantry
200
Artillery
323
Engineer Company
102
Civic Guard
50
The First Bombardment of Marghera
By the evening of May 3rd, all of the Austrian batteries, with the exception of the unfinished Nr. 5, had been armed and provisioned. A total of some 15,000 projectiles were stockpiled for use in the imminent operation. These batteries were:10
The armament of Fort Marghera, and its supporting works at the beginning of the attack, was as follows:11
Fort Marghera:
18 x 24 Pounder Cannon
22 x 18 Pounder Cannon
Four 12 Pounder Cannon
30 x 6 Pounder Cannon
Two 8 Pound Howitzers
Three 6 Pound Howitzers
Three 24 Pound Howitzers
Nine 12 Pound Mortars
Seven 8 Pound Mortars
Two ‘Petrieri’ (Stone throwing catapults)
Fort Rizzardi
Three 24 Pounder Cannon
One 18 Pounder Cannon
One 6 Pounder Cannon
Speranza and Covered Way Batteries
Four 18 Pounder Cannon
Four 8 Pounder Cannon
Five Arches Battery
Four 24 Pounder Cannon
One 8 Pound Long Howitzer
Fort Manin
Two 24 Pounder Cannon
Two 18 Pounder Cannon
Two 12 Pounder Cannon
Six 6 Pounder Cannon
One 6 Pound Howitzer
Fort San Giuliano
Four 24 Pounder Cannon
Six 12 Pounder Cannon
Six 8 Pounder Cannon
There were, in addition to the above, a number of rocket launchers and heavy rampart rifles scattered amongst the various works.
May 4th
In anticipation of a grand victory to come, Marshal Radetzky himself had come from Milan, accompanied by a veritable galaxy of Archdukes and generals, to view the proceedings. Matters did not, however, follow this course.
At about 12:30, fire was opened from the 26 pieces in the emplaced batteries. A short time later, the defenders replied with a far heavier bombardment than expected, and considerably more than the attackers. Indeed, so heavy was the shelling, that the Austrian batteries were forced to increase their rate of fire. Although the fire and counter-fire continued into the night, by the early evening, the Austrian bombardment was much reduced. By the following morning, it had virtually ceased. At 05:00 on the 5th, came the order to cease fire.
In Battery Nr. 4, two guns had been dismounted, the barrel of a 24 pounder damaged, and four men badly wounded, amazingly, the only casualties suffered by the besiegers that day. The day’s loss to the defenders was nine killed or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded. Two 18 pounder cannon were dismounted, as was one 24 pounder.12
The following morning, an emissary approached the fort, with a request to the Venetian Government to surrender. President Manin rejected this demand, proposing negotiations instead. This brought from the Marshal the reply that it was not possible to negotiate with rebels.
On May 6th, from around 05:30 until 19:00, 1,750 men worked non-stop on the trenches. That night, a further 800 toiled on additional battery positions. Attempts to interfere with the progress of the work were repulsed by pickets of the 7th Feld-Jäger Battalion, which itself lost one dead, and six wounded.
The bombardment was also resumed, though with less intensity, as the depots were running short of ammunition. This attempt to silence the fort had clearly failed. A great deal more hard work was clearly needed before again attempting to pound the fort into submission. From this point, having miscalculated both the determination of the defenders and the scale of the task, the besiegers redoubled their efforts.
May 7th brought yet more heavy rain, which would last several days. As the Venetians had dammed the Olioso Canal, the rainwater washed into fields and the siege-works, slowing progress to a crawl. The following day, General Pepe visited the fort. In consultation with Colonel Ulloa, he ordered a sortie for the next morning, for the purpose of gauging the progress of the enemy works.
At 04:00, on May 9th, two columns of troops left Fort Marghera. From Lunette 12, Major Sirtori led one company of Neapolitans, one of Cacciatori del Sile, two companies of Lombard Bersaglieri, a hundred sappers, and a few artillerymen with two three pounders, west along the rail line.13 At the same time, Major Rossarol, with the Swiss Company, the Velite Company, and the Friuli Volunteers, leaving Lunette XIII, moved alongside the Mestre Canal.
Both columns were received by a heavy fire from both the Austrian pickets and artillery. The objective was achieved, in that it was discovered that the slow progress of advancing the trenches was indeed due to the heavy rain. The sappers made this worse by cutting into the Mestre Canal, and causing further flooding. It was during the withdrawal that the majority of the attackers’ losses occurred. These were eight men killed, 10 mortally wounded, and 27 wounded. Imperial casualties are listed as one killed and nine wounded.14 The same day, the Lombard Bersaglieri were returned to Venice, along with the Velite Company. On the 10th, the Swiss Company was also sent back to the city for six days’ rest.
Further incursions took place on the following two days, to disrupt the work on the advancing trenches, with the loss of two mortally wounded, and 11 wounded on the 10th, and one man killed and seven wounded on the 12th. The Austrian loss is given as one killed and two wounded. The defending batteries, that day, opened a heavy fire on the engineers constructing Batteries Nr. 15 and 16, and also upon Battery Nr. 3, killing two men.15 Large numbers men were also regularly falling ill in the pestilential muddy quagmire, many of them dying in hospital.
Operations in Mid-May
The Venetians, too, had their problems. The inevitability of the increased enemy efforts against the defences compounded the already delicate matter of powder and shot. Ammunition stocks were gradually diminishing and it was becoming urgent for further supplies. The War Minister had already asked Colonel de Marina Marchesi to administer a gun powder factory on the small island of delle Grazie which had a production capacity of only 1,000 kilos per day, very little considering the huge quantities used daily at Marghera.16 It was not possible to do much more, however, due to the lack of resources and raw materials. The quality of the powder itself was also in decline.
At Marghera, the Committee of Public Safety had established a sub-committee to oversee the internal administration of the fort. Colonel Ulloa’s frustration at this meddling, and also interference by the press in military affairs, led him to complain to Pepe. The latter assured him that he fully understood the difficulties, as he himself had, “…practised more patience in Venice, than under five Neapolitan Kings.”17 The sub-committee was sent packing, and the general himself upbraided the offending Official Gazzete.
On May 13th, General Pepe held a Council of War to discuss the situation at Marghera. 17 persons were present, including the General, General Cavedalis, the War and Navy Ministers, Naval Captain Tizzo, Colonel Ulloa, Engineer Lieutenant-Colonel Ronzelli, and Naval Artillery Lieutenant-Colonel Marchesi. Cavedalis advised that it was opportune to examine whether a defence of the fort, and the other works, was viable, and in what circumstances might the evacuation or surrender of these be considered. After a meandering discussion, the meeting broke up, having achieved virtually nothing. Ulloa, the fort’s commander, pointedly comments that his opinion was not sought.18
The following day, the whole of the First Parallel was visible from the fort. As a result, Ulloa had two additional 18 pou
nders and two 8 pound mortars moved to the left face of Bastion V. Two 12 pounders were added on the right face of Bastion I. The two faces of Counterguard XI each received two six pound howitzers, and two 8 pounder cannon.19
On May 16th, FML Haynau was promoted to Feldzeugmeister, and transferred to the senior command in Hungary. As a result, the direction of operations against Venice fell once again upon FML Thurn. Thurn, more patient than Haynau, knuckled down to the task. The Engineer Director, Lieutenant-Colonel Khautz, himself fell ill, and was replaced, on May 17th, by Colonel Schauroth.20 The construction of new trenches and batteries continued.
That same day, after a store of gabions and fascines was spotted from the fort, behind the main parallel, rockets were fired at it, in an attempt to set it on fire. This led to a general exchange of fire. On the night of the 18th, the besiegers lost one officer, Lieutenant Niesner, and three men killed, with a further eight wounded. The following two days also saw a lively fire from the outposts, the besiegers losing one officer and two men killed, and a further four men wounded on the 19th. Two more dead, and two wounded were lost on the 20th, and a Venetian sortie from Treponti that day netted 100 oxen. The same day, FML Thurn sent emissaries to Marghera, informing of the surrender of Bologna to Imperial troops. Thurn inquired as to whether the Venetians wished to follow suit. This offer was declined.
The following day, as four of their men died in the trenches, and another two were wounded, the Austrians formally invited the foreign Consuls in Venice to evacuate their nationals from the city. Approximately 3,000 people departed.
Sortie from Brondolo
On the 21st, too, a sortie was made from Fort Brondolo, in the far south of the Lagoon. General Rizzardi, commanding there, had been informed of enemy plans to denude the area of livestock. The General despatched three columns to forestall this. The first, commanded by Colonel Morandi, comprised four companies of the 2nd Legion, and one of the 2nd Regiment, 570 men altogether. The second, under Major Materazzo, comprised two companies of the Euganeo legion, and 160 men of the Cacciatori del Alpi, 360 men altogether. The third column led by Lieutenant-Colonel Calvi, comprised 140 men of the Cacciatori del Alpi.
Morandi moved west to Treponti, some 12 kilometres on foot, from Brondolo. On the way, he encountered Austrian pickets, pushing them before him. Reaching Treponti, he gathered all the animals possible, and herded them back to the fort. Materazzo moved south, to Cavanella, and repeated the exercise. Calvi’s column moved south, to Porto Caleri, on the tip of a point, 10 kilometres south of Fort Brondolo. Here, he captured an Austrian post of a corporal and seven men. Altogether, the raiders returned with 300 oxen, four pigs, 12 horses, eight prisoners, and much fresh produce. The Austrians had one officer and several men killed. One soldier of the 2nd Regiment also lost his life, and four stragglers were taken prisoner.21
The Fall of Fort Marghera
In the main area of operations, by the evening of May 23rd, all of the siege batteries were fully armed and provisioned for the bombardment to commence the following day. The details of the relevant batteries were as follows:
Siege Batteries engaged in the “72 hours Bombardment” of Fort Marghera22
The various calibres of ammunition for the bombardment had been brought from the magazines of Verona and Mantua, 73,400 rounds altogether. It was estimated that this was enough for the shelling to continue for 96 hours, were it to be necessary. It was light-heartedly estimated that the cost of each round was a Ducat!23 Facing this array, the fort itself now possessed a total of 74 guns.
May 24th
At daybreak, FML Thurn gave orders to begin the bombardment, and, at 05:15, Battery Nr. 5 opened fire, being rapidly joined by the other works. After about five minutes, the defending batteries began to respond. On average, it was estimated that 40 rounds were being fired by the two sides every minute, for the first 12 hours, about 25 by the besiegers, and 15 from the defence.24
The fort’s defenders concentrated their fire against Batteries Nr. 8, to the left of the Mestre Canal, Nr 3, between the canal and the railway, and Nr. 14, beside the railway embankment. Battery Nr. 14 was silenced by this fire by about 11:00, five men being killed and four wounded. The jubilant Venetians then redoubled their fire against Battery Nr. 8. The cannonade continued until dusk. Indirect fire by the Austrian mortars, however, continued overnight.
In Fort Rizzardi, the commanding officer, Captain Barbaran, was wounded in the opening minutes of the shelling. A French volunteer, Sergeant Jules Dumontet, immediately assumed command, and remained so for the rest of the day, despite being himself injured several times. Rizzardi itself was badly damaged, and the two batteries near it, almost silenced.25
The besieger’s casualties for the day were 17 dead, and 35 wounded. Battery Nr. 3 had one howitzer unserviceable. Battery Nr. 8 had been severely damaged, and one gun was dismounted. In Battery Nr. 14, the entire breastwork had been demolished, and two 32 pounder cannon dismounted. Battery Nr. 17B had also been heavily damaged, with both guns unserviceable.
Casualties amongst the defenders were considerably higher than their opponents, reflecting the latter’s much superior firepower. Losses were about 150, Ulloa stating them as 49 dead and 100 wounded, the latter including Major Francesconi, of the Marine Artillery.26 Damage was considerable. 17 guns had been put out of action in under two hours, the battery in Nr. 4 Casemate being completely destroyed. Several powder stores had been blown up, and the walls of two magazines demolished. In addition, two munitions barges moored beneath the fort had been sunk, and the cargo of a third was necessarily thrown overboard.27
There was a pressing need for more artillerymen, and Admiral Graziani ordered 36 naval gunners to the fort, with 12 more to remain in reserve at the railway bridge. These latter, however, created such a furore at not being allowed to accompany the other men to the fort, that the Admiral relented, and the reserve group was sent with the rest.28
May 25th
The full force of the shelling resumed at 04:00 on the 25th. Whilst the fire from the besiegers was as heavy as on the previous day, that of the defenders had weakened considerably. Some of the artillery crews were operating almost in the open, due to the lack of sand bags. The casemates of Bastions V, VI, and VII, were badly damaged, and had to be pulled down, due to the risk from splintered wood. The battery in Casemate I was re-established. The parapet of Bastion X had to be reconstructed. Bastion I could no longer defend Counterscarp XI, nor could the guns be directed down onto the enemy works. Other casemates and magazines had virtually collapsed. The communications bridges were gone, and deep craters had appeared everywhere. The covered way had no palisades. The supply of fascines had also run out. Outside the main fort, Fort Manin started the day with only three guns operable, and Fort Rizzardi had two. “It looked as if 1,000 ploughs had been used on the terrain around Marghera; no stretch of ground was flat any longer, but everywhere there were holes in the ground, stones, and piles of earth.”29
The Defence of Fort Marghera, Siege of Venice 1849 (late 19th Century lithograph)
Once again, the main pounding continued until nightfall, with the indirect fire continuing thereafter. A shell landed in the powder store of Counterguard XI, killing or wounding 10 men. Another exploded on the salient of Bastion VI, also causing many casualties. A third fell on Bastion V, effectively destroying it. By the evening there were less than 30 guns still serviceable. Overnight, attempts were made to replace the pieces in the most important positions. 8 and 12 pounders were deployed, as they were all that was available.30 There was also a shortage of ammunition. In addition, increasing numbers of enemy troops were being seen in the forward trenches.
In terms of personnel, there were now only 1,742 effectives remaining – 700 to man the guns, 400 for the defence of the fortress, the forward positions, and the Covered Way. This left 160 in Fort Manin, and 482 in reserve. Morale was still high, but all were exhausted, and communications with the city in danger. The loss of Fort Rizzardi would mean not
only the loss of Marghera, inevitable in any case, but the loss of the entire garrison. This last was the key issue, especially in regard to the precious trained artillerymen. Surprisingly, losses to the Imperial forces on the 25th were only two killed, and three wounded.31
May 26th
Next morning, the shelling resumed. The defenders replied as much as they could, but it was clear to all that resistance could not be maintained much longer. A Council of War, held in Venice, somewhat belatedly decided that the works on the mainland could no longer be held, and should, therefore, be evacuated. As a result, President Manin issued a decree, addressed to Colonel Ulloa. It was brief and unambiguous. It read,
1. Fort Marghera is to be evacuated.
2. Colonel Girolamo Ulloa, Commandant of the fort, is to undertake its execution. Venice, 26th May 1849
1. President Manin
Ulloa decided to make his withdrawal that night. Starting at around 21:00, the movement began, from Fort Manin All serviceable guns were spiked or disabled. Other damaged weapons were loaded, and left with various different lengths of lit fuse. This ensured that a certain amount of fire still appeared to be coming from the defenders. The troops then made their way to waiting boats, which conveyed them to the city. By around 22:00, fire from the defending positions had largely ceased. The besiegers followed suit.
While these events occurred, three brigades of Thurn’s men were preparing to assault the defences that very night; the reason that more troops than usual had been seen in the trenches. The following dispositions were made for the assault to come:32
Brigade Coronini, to advance along the railway
Objectives – Lunette XII, Bastion V, and Fort Rizzardi
Troops
7th Feld-Jäger Battalion
I and II/ IR Haynau
One Pioneer company
One miner detachment
Three rocket tubes
20 artillerymen
Two engineer officers
Brigade Wolter: to advance along the right bank of the channel
Radetzky's Marches Page 50