The World Was Going Our Way
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10 . Pahlavi, An Enduring Love, pp. 68-9. Tafazoli had no part in the subsequent stages of the Shah’s courtship of Farah Diba, which are described in these memoirs.
11 . Ibid., pp. 66-7. The friend refused to seek the Empress’s help to get her out of jail.
12 . vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 18.
13 . Pahlavi, An Enduring Love, p. 67.
14 . Shawcross, The Shah’s Last Ride, pp. 97-8.
15 . Ibid., pp. 85, 160-61. The KGB reported that Bakhtiar had ‘displayed exceptional harshness towards communists’. It later claimed that Service A fabrications, brought to the attention of the Shah’s regime in 1969-70, led to his ‘liquidation’; vol. 2 misc., item 14.
16 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 216-18. Mitrokhin’s brief note on Kuzichkin’s defection confirms that he had ‘a lot of information about illegals’ (vol. 2, ch. 1).
17 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p.362. After 1962 the Soviet leadership abandoned assassination as a normal instrument of policy outside the Soviet bloc, resorting to it only on rare occasions such as the killing of President Hafizullah Amin of Afghanistan in December 1979; see below, pp. 401-2.
18 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp.359-61, 363-5.
19 . vol. 2, ch. 2.
20 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 374.
21 . vol. 2, ch. 2.
22 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 382- 3.
23 . Little, ‘A Fool’s Errand’.
24 . Milani, The Persian Sphinx, pp. 229-30.
25 . Shawcross, The Shah’s Last Ride, p. 206.
26 . t-7, 140.
27 . t-7, 143.
28 . In November 1971, for example, President Bakr’s National Charter, which proposed a ‘national coalition in which . . . all progressive forces will participate’, was enthusiastically received in Moscow, despite serious reservations by the ICP. Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, pp. 114-15.
29 . Ibid., pp. 114-17.
30 . k-24, 54-7.
31 . Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, pp. 22, 70-91; Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, p. 51.
32 . British Embassy, Baghdad, to FCO, 15 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1969, FCO 17/871, The National Archives, Kew (copies on National Security Archive website).
33 . Sebag Montefiore, ‘Stalin and Saddam’; Coughlin, Saddam, pp. 47-8, 75-6, 174.
34 . Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, pp. 28, 128-9; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp. 97-8, 131. On the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan, see below, p. 386.
35 . k-26, 116.
36 . k-13, 221.
37 . k-13, 224.
38 . Dulaymi, ‘Stop the Repressions and Persecution’; Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, pp. 129-30, 137, 139-40.
39 . Mogarebi had been drawn into intelligence work in 1944 by the Soviet agent Lieutenant Colonel Makhmud (codenamed IMAM), leader of a group of Tudeh [Communist] sympathizers within the Iranian army, who acted as his controller. After Makhmud’s death in 1954, Mogarebi was run directly by the Tehran residency; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
40 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 198.
41 . In 1976 the residency communicated with Mogarebi on eighteen occasions by radio from a residency car, five times by personal meetings and twice by dead letter-box. Mogarebi refused to travel further from his home for personal meetings or to conduct car-to-car radio communications; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
42 . Ibid.
43 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 196.
44 . The radio signals used to communicate with Mogarebi from a residency car were known as the ‘Close Information Link’ system; ibid., pp. 196-7. A KGB damage assessment arrived at four possible explanations for SAVAK’s detection of Mogarebi: (1) inadequate attention by Mogarebi to his security; (2) an intelligence leak which led SAVAK to conclude that the KGB had a source in the General Staff; (3) mistakes by the Tehran residency in making contact with Mogarebi; or (4) Mogarebi’s past association with Iranian Communists and, in particular, with the KGB agent Lieutenant Colonel Makhmud (IMAM); according to Mogarebi’s KGB file, he had been arrested in 1954 but released because of lack of evidence; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
45 . vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 23. The KGB remained in contact with ZHAMAN until August 1982; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 24.
46 . vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 24. Hoveyda saw the report while Court Minister for a month after his resignation as Prime Minister in August 1977. SAVAK seems to have forgotten that its report to the Shah would also be seen by Hoveyda as Court Minister.
47 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 238.
48 . vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 38.
49 . The FCD ‘work plan’ for 1974 had included an operation designed ‘to establish contact with Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian émigré in Iraq with a large number of supporters amongst the clergy in Iran and the opposition to the Shah, and to assess his possibilities’. Mitrokhin noted that the operation ‘was not very successful’; vol. 2, ch. 5.
50 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 438-41.
51 . Mogarebi was shot in December 1978. The residency’s proposal to help his family was turned down by the Centre as too risky; Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 196-200.
52 . vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 24.
53 . vol. 2, ch. 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record what retaliation against the Iranian embassy in Moscow actually occurred.
54 . vol. 2, ch. 2.
55 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 365, 370 - 2. Though Mitrokhin noted the precise location of the Swiss and some other European caches, he did not record details of the DLB in the Tehran suburbs.
56 . Shawcross, The Shah’s Last Ride, p. 275. Mitrokhin’s notes identify Kazakov as a KGB officer operating under diplomatic cover in the consular section of the Tehran residency; vol. 2, app. 2, item 57.
57 . Taheri, The Unknown Life of the Shah, pp. 242, 262.
58 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 230.
59 . vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 49-50; Fadeykin’s career is summarized in vol. 2, app. 2, item 43.
60 . Rafizadeh, Witness, p. 264.
61 . vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 49.
62 . Pipes, Hidden Hand, pp. 80 - 81.
63 . vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 38.
64 . Taheri, The Unknown Life of the Shah, p. 244.
65 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 440-41.
66 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 256-7.
67 . Milani, The Persian Sphinx, pp. 338-40.
68 . vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 24.
69 . vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 54.
70 . Pipes, Hidden Hand, pp. 81-2; Moin, Khomeini, p. 204.
71 . vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 52-3.
72 . Shebarshin had become resident following the death in office of Fadeykin; vol. 2, app. 2, items 43, 53. Less than a decade later, Shebarshin, who had already served as resident in New Delhi, was to become head of the FCD.
73 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 127-8.
74 . Wright, In the Name of God, p. 96.
75 . vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 53.
76 . Unusually, Mitrokhin did not record KOLCHIN’s real name.
77 . vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 54.
78 . The Tehran residency believed that Qotbzadeh’s hostility to the Soviet Union went back to his years as a student in the United States when he had been briefly recruited as a GRU agent but had quarrelled with his controller. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 302-3; Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, p. 233.
79 . vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 56.
80 . Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 304.
81 . vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 53.
82 . Moin, Khomeini, pp. 252-3.
83 . Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, pp. 129-31.
84 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 102-3, 134-5, 166. Shebarshin identifies the head of Line PR only as ‘Vladimir G’; his name does not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes from the files.
85 . Ustinov, the Defence Minister, and Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, also served on th
e Iran Commission; Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, p. 133.
86 . Ibid., pp. 133-6. On the failure of the attempt to rescue the US hostages, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 451-3.
87 . Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp. 112-16.
88 . Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988, p. 149.
89 . vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 39. In March 1980 STOGOV was arrested in Tehran and accused of secret links with the KGB. He was released in September and allowed to leave Iran after requests from the PLO prompted by the KGB; vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 40.
90 . vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 39. The PUK had been founded in 1975 as a breakaway movement from the KDP, then headed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani (see above, pp. 175-6), which it claimed was a ‘rightist tribalist command’. The PUK’s declared aim was ‘to join all the progressive, Leftist nationalist forces in Iraq’ in order to liberate the country from ‘the economic and political chains of neo-imperialism’. Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, pp. 91-2. In 2005 Talabani became President of Iraq.
91 . k-26, 142.
92 . k-26, 144.
93 . k-26, 139.
94 . k-26, 117.
95 . k-26, 138.
96 . Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp. 2, 136, 151.
97 . Though he had no previous military record, in 1976 Saddam had persuaded Bakr to make him a four-star general; he subsequently promoted himself field marshal. Baram, ‘Saddam Husayn, the Ba‘th Regime and the Iraqi Officer Corps’, pp. 211-23.
98 . k-26, 147. Mitrokhin’s notes do not make clear exactly how much money was sent to the ICP during 1981. A first instalment of $200,000, however, was given to Aziz Muhammad on 13 March 1981 by the Damascus resident; k-26, 120. During the same month the KGB residency in Lebanon handed over another $100,000 of Soviet funds and a further $68,185 collected from Iraqis in the USSR to Kerim Ahmad of the ICP Politburo; k-26, 122.
99 . Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988, p. 222.
100 . Ibid., pp. 223-5; Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, pp. 236-7; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp. 158-9.
101 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 166-8.
102 . Information from Sir Nicholas Barrington.
103 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, p. 168.
104 . Wright, In the Name of God, pp. 124, 235-6; Moin, Khomeini, p. 255. Shebarshin was succeeded as resident by Anatoli Nikolayevich Kocheskov (codenamed CHIZHOV), previously resident in Belgium; vol. 2 misc., item 2.
105 . Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, ch. 4.
106 . Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, chs. 12, 13; Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 396-8.
107 . Gates, From the Shadows, p. 502.
108 . Primakov, Russian Crossroads, p. 51.
109 . Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 398.
110 . Though Kryuchkov and Yazov were among the leading coup plotters, Primakov was opposed to it.
111 . Primakov, Russian Crossroads, pp. 63-4.
112 . Pipes, Hidden Hand, p. 16.
10. The Making of the Syrian Alliance
1 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 33-6.
2 . k-12, 201; t-1, 174.
3 . k-5, 254; k-2, 14.
4 . Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 583-5.
5 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, pp. 314-15.
6 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 315.
7 . vol. 6, ch. 12, part 10, p. 497.
8 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, p. 38.
9 . k-26, 148, 165, 173.
10 . See above, pp. 151-2.
11 . Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 142-3. Jundi committed suicide in March 1969, probably to avoid arrest and execution for his various crimes and atrocities; ibid., pp. 151-2.
12 . Ibid., pp. 117, 145-8; Roberts, ‘The USSR in Syrian Perspective’, p. 214.
13 . k-24, 58. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to KERIM after April 1968.
14 . Asad’s friend ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam (thought to have operated previously as his spy in the entourage of Salah Jadid) served successively as Foreign Minister and Vice-President (still with major foreign policy responsibilities until 1978) from 1971 to Asad’s death in 2001; Mustafa Talas, another old friend of Asad who had become Chief of the General Staff in 1968, was Defence Minister from 1972 to Asad’s death; Hikmat Shihabi, head of military intelligence from 1971 to 1974, was Chief of the General Staff from 1974 to 1998.
15 . Khuly became head of the BNS only in 1978. In 1987 he was transferred to the post of deputy commander (later commander) of the air force after the scandal caused by the attempt by Syrian intelligence to plant a bomb on an El Al plane at Heathrow Airport. He was finally pensioned off in 1999. Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 181-2, 475-82; Zisser, Asad’s Legacy, pp. 42, 166, 171.
16 . Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, ch. 4.
17 . Ibid., pp. 29-30, 43; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 177-82, 399-44.
18 . Information from Sir Roger Tomkys, British ambassador in Syria 1984-86.
19 . t-1, 177.
20 . Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 319-20; Zisser, Asad’s Legacy, pp. 32, 157, 170.
21 . t-1, 177. The KGB also claimed that its active measures successfully influenced Rif’at Asad in 1976; k-24, 426.
22 . k-12, 185.
23 . k-12, 182.
24 . See above, p. 195; t-1, 174; k-4, 56; k-12, 201; k-201. Al-Din was killed in an accident in 1980.
25 . t-1, 161, 162.
26 . t-1, 164.
27 . t-1, 160, 169.
28 . t-1, 163.
29 . t-1, 172.
30 . k-24, 61.
31 . t-1, 167.
32 . t-1, 173, 168.
33 . t-1, 176.
34 . t-1, 165.
35 . Only al-Din (IZZAT) and VATAR are clearly identified as agents.
36 . Gromyko, Memories, p. 274.
37 . Report from Grigori Grigorenko to Andropov, seeking approval for bugging Asad’s apartments in the Kremlin, 30 June 1972; approved by Andropov, 3 July 1972; k-6, 168. Though this was the only document relating to the bugging of Asad’s apartments during his visits to Moscow transcribed by Mitrokhin, there can be little doubt that this was normal procedure. Mitrokhin was unable to note any of the transcripts of the bugged conversations which were filed in the archives of the Second Chief Directorate.