The World Was Going Our Way
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38 . Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 192.
39 . Ismael and Ismael, The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon, ch. 7; Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 74-7. Bakdash’s KGB codename is given in k-26, 172.
40 . k-6, 168.
41 . Ibid. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record whether or not Shaya’s confidences to OSIPOV on 12 September 1973 took place during a hunting expedition. On another occasion Shaya told OSIPOV that the former Syrian Foreign Minister, Dr Ibrahim Makhus, had remarked during a shooting party that Arab leaders would do well to try to imitate the efficiency and devotion to duty shown by the gundog.
42 . The old Russian calendar was thirteen days behind the Western calendar which was adopted after the October Revolution. Its anniversary thus fell on 7 November rather than 25 October.
43 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 99-102.
44 . Ibid., p. 84 n. 35.
45 . k-26, 94; k-26, 148.
46 . k-26, 94. On 26 March 1975 the General Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, Aziz Muhammad, agreed to a similar request.
47 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, p. 108.
48 . k-22, 442.
49 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 108-12; Roberts, ‘The USSR in Syrian Perspective’, p. 221.
50 . k-26, 221.
51 . k-26, 219. Though the files on the July and September 1976 KGB transfers of money via Damascus to the Lebanese Communist Party were the only ones noted by Mitrokhin, there were undoubtedly others.
52 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 112-13, 130-34; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 286-9. Human Rights Watch includes Jumblatt in a list of foreign assassinations carried out by Syrian intelligence agencies; Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 153.
53 . See above, p. 165.
54 . Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 305.
55 . k-24, 45; see above, p. 167. Though Mitrokhin’s notes do not mention Asad, it is scarcely conceivable that discussion of the assassination plan could have gone ahead without his authorization.
56 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 134-5.
57 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 314; k-24, 44.
58 . Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 335.
59 . Pipes, The Hidden Hand, pp. 59, 71 n.38.
60 . Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 137, 140-45. On Muhammad, see above, pp. 188-90.
61 . See above, ch. 9.
62 . k-26, 143. On Carrillo’s and Marchais’s involvement in Eurocommunism, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 300- 6.
63 . Ismael and Ismael, The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon, p. 202. The Syrian Communist Party split into three groups: the main party led by Bakdash, a group led by his younger rival, Yusuf Faisal, and a breakaway Communist Party-Political Bureau, led by Riyadh al-Turk. Bakdash’s and Faisal’s groups were members of the ruling National Progressive Front. The Communist Party-Political Bureau was outlawed and viciously persecuted (see below).
64 . Al-Turk is known to have been taken to hospital in critical condition in February 1981, January 1982, December 1983, December 1984, December 1987 and November 1988. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 57, 67; Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship, pp. 77-8; Ismael and Ismael, The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon, pp. 196-7. Amazingly, al-Turk survived to be released from jail in 1998.
65 . k-26, 143.
66 . The KGB paid the Syrian Communist Party $50,000 in January 1979, $50,000 in April, $45,000 in November, $70,000 and $60,000 in December; k-26, 166. It is possible that further payments are recorded in files not noted by Mitrokhin.
67 . k-26, 168.
68 . Mitrokhin noted a payment of $30,000 to the Syrian Communist Party in February 1980 and two much larger payments in December: $100,000 to Bakdash and $199,000 to FARID; k-26, 170, 172.
69 . k-26, 164, 197.
70 . k-26, 169.
71 . k-26, 171.
72 . k-26, 151.
73 . k-26, 197.
74 . Ismael and Ismael, The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon, pp. 206-25.
75 . Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 395-410.
76 . Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 397-9.
77 . ‘These conversations’, writes Kirpichenko, ‘have stuck in my memory by virtue of their seriousness and richness.’ However, Asad’s questions ‘were often difficult to answer because of the incompatibility of our state structures and the specifics of local problems in the security sphere’ - a tactful reference to the contrast between the centralized Soviet intelligence system and the chaotic structure of Syria’s fifteen overlapping intelligence and security agencies.
78 . Kirpichenko, Razvedka, pp. 186-8. On Asad and deception, see Pipes, ‘Asad’s Art of the Double Game’.
79 . The most reliable assessment of human rights abuses under the Asad regime is in Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked.
80 . See above, pp. 199-200. Rif’at lost most of his influence after an unsuccessful coup attempt during Asad’s illness in 1984.
81 . ‘Europe on alert for Syrian “Hit” Squads’, Sunday Telegraph, 21 March 1982; ‘L’attentat de la rue Marbeuf relance la polémique sur la sécurité’, Le Monde, 24 April 1982. Others believed to have been the victims of Asad’s hitmen abroad in the early 1980s included the former Syrian Prime Minister Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the leading Lebanese journalists Riyad Taha and Salim al-Lawzi, the wife of ‘Issam al-‘Attar, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the French ambassador in Beirut, Louis de la Mar. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 153-4.
82 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 359-60.
83 . Information from Sir Roger Tomkys, British ambassador in Syria 1984-86.
84 . Zisser, Asad’s Legacy, ch. 3.
11. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
1 . Halliday, ‘Soviet Relations with South Yemen’.
2 . Vassiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East, pp. 192-3.
3 . Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, p. 233.
4 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 142-3.
5 . Kirpichenko, Razvedka, p. 193.
6 . k-12, 373; k-18, 138. Mitrokhin’s notes imply, but do not explicitly state, that Muhammad Said Abdalla (codenamed KERIL), the PDRY Minister of State Security, was also present at the meeting with Andropov on 12 May 1972. Mitrokhin had no access to Sixteenth Directorate files and thus provides no information on the KGB’s ability to decrypt PDRY communications.
7 . k-12, 373; k-18, 138. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the full cost of KGB assistance to the PDRY intelligence agency, but provide some examples: an original allocation of 200,000 convertible rubles in 1972 for the training of PDRY intelligence officers and cipher personnel; ‘financial assistance’ of 200,000 rubles to PDRY intelligence, approved by the Politburo in February 1975; the supply in May 1975 of ‘operational equipment’ valued at over 100,000 rubles; and a payment in June 1975 of $100,000 to the PDRY Minister of State Security. It is unclear whether the equipment and money handed over in May and June 1975 were part of, or additional to, the ‘assistance’ approved by the Politburo in February.
8 . Not to be confused with Yasir Arafat, who had the same codename, AREF; see below, p. 250.
9 . k-12, 374. The total cost of AREF’s treatment at the sanatorium amounted to 2,842 rubles.
10 . Kirpichenko, Razvedka, p. 193.
11 . After the end of Turkish rule in 1918, North Yemen was ruled by an autocratic Imamate from the Zeidi branch of Shia Islam. In 1962 the Imamate was overthrown in a nationalist coup which set up the Yemen Arab Republic. Civil war, however, continued for the remainder of the decade.
12 . Almadaghi, Yemen and the United States, pp. 90-97.
13 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, pp. 316-17.
14 . Mitrokhin noted no file on the assassination of al-Hamdi, save for a file on the KGB active measures which it prompted. Al-Hamdi was killed on the eve of a visit to Aden aimed at forging closer links with the PDRY. A variety of theories h
ave been put forward to account for his assassination; Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemenis, p. 179.
15 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 317.
16 . Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemenis, pp. 77, 181; Almadaghi, Yemen and the United States, pp. 98-9; Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, p. 233. The files noted by Mitrokhin contain no information on either assassination.
17 . Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemenis, pp. 77-8.
18 . Almadaghi, Yemen and the United States, p. 99.
19 . Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemenis, p. 183.
20 . Vassiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East, p. 194.
21 . Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemenis, pp. 185-6.
22 . vol. 6, ch. 10.
23 . Almadaghi, Yemen and the United States, p. 113.
24 . Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, pp. 195-6, 200. Kirpichenko believed that ‘the South Yemeni were . . . beginning to tire of constant confrontation with their neighbours, and Ali Nasir Muhammad was feeling out paths of normalization of relations with the rest of the Arab world’. Kirpichenko, Razvedka, p. 194.
25 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 317.
26 . Almadaghi, Yemen and the United States, pp. 119-27.
27 . Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, pp. 41-4.
28 . Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 519-20.
29 . Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, p. 45.
12. Israel and Zionism
1 . Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, vol. 1, p. 324.
2 . Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant, pp. 246-8; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 418-19. Vertiporokh’s alias ‘Rozhkov’ is given in vol. 2, Iran, app. 2, item 71.
3 . In 1983, Klingberg was secretly arrested, tried and convicted as a Soviet spy. A news blackout was imposed on his arrest and trial and he was kept in jail under an assumed identity. Not until 1993 was the blackout lifted. Cohen, ‘Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons’; Tsur Batsheva, ‘Court Orders Klingberg Freed’, Jerusalem Post, 4 Sept. 1998. Mitrokhin did not note Klingberg’s file.
4 . Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence supplied by KHAIMOV; k-14, 534.
5 . Though Mitrokhin recorded PERETS’s real name and date of birth in Sofia, he noted no details of his position in Israel or the intelligence he provided. k-14, 532. Apart from KHAIMOV and PERETS, the only Bulgarian agent in Israel identified by Mitrokhin is ALIALEKH, who joined the Israeli Communist Party and was employed as a manual worker in a dry-cleaning business. Despite his humble employment, ALIALEKH was considered of some significance; he was allowed to visit his relatives in Bulgaria and had meetings with Bulgarian intelligence during his visits; k-14, 533.
6 . Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, vol. 2, p. 643. During his meetings with Rabinovich, Vertiporokh operated under diplomatic cover as first secretary at the Tel Aviv legation, using his alias Rozhkov; Rabinovich, who reported the meetings to the Foreign Ministry, was unaware that he was dealing with the Soviet resident. The editors of the mostly admirably edited Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations also fail to realize Rozhkov’s real identity.
7 . Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, vol. 2, pp. 868-70. Following a bomb attack on the Tel Aviv legation in February 1953, Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations were broken off; they were reinstated in July.
8 . Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 150-51.
9 . Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, vol. 2, pp. 579n., 589, 610, 698, 821, 913. In 1953 Sneh and the left-wing faction which he headed were expelled from Mapam; late in 1954 they joined the Israeli Communist Party.
10 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 33- 5.
11 . BOKER’s successive controllers were Ya. P. Medyanik, V. A. Avdeyenko and I. P. Dedyulya; k-14, 537.
12 . Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 157-8.
13 . Avni, False Flag, chs. 4-10 and ‘Postscript’ by his interrogator, Yehuda Prag. Avni refutes, among other colourful myths published about his career, the claim that Lenin had stayed with his parents in Switzerland during the First World War.
14 . Avni, False Flag, chs. 10-11.
15 . Mitrokhin’s brief notes on Avni refer to him only by the codename CHEKH. Since CHEKH is identified as the Israeli commercial attaché in Belgrade, there is no doubt about his identity. There is, however, a possible ambiguity about the date of Avni’s transfer to KGB control. Mitrokhin noted, ‘He [CHEKH] was recruited by the KGB’, then added a date whose last digit is indistinct but appears to be 1954 (k-4, 89). It is possible but not probable that 1954 refers only to the date at which Avni became commercial attaché in Belgrade, and that his transfer to the KGB occurred earlier. Even when publishing his memoirs in 1999, Avni continued to believe mistakenly that his career in Soviet intelligence had been exclusively with the GRU.
16 . As a condition of publishing his memoirs, Avni was not allowed by the Israeli authorities to give details of any Mossad operation - or, apparently, of any of the intelligence about Mossad which he passed on to the GRU and KGB. However, an introduction by Nigel West to the English-language edition (doubtless approved by Avni) gives a few examples of Mossad operations in which he took part; Avni, False Flag, pp. xii-xiv.
17 . k-4, 90.
18 . Avni, False Flag, preface and chs. 12-19.
19 . Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 158-64; ‘Yisrael Beer’s Career’, Jerusalem Post, 16 April 1961. Though published after Beer’s arrest, the Jerusalem Post simply repeated his fraudulent account of his career before reaching Palestine in 1938.
20 . British Military Attaché, Tel Aviv, to Director of Military Intelligence, 14 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew (I am grateful for this reference to Ronen Bergman).
21 . Tel Aviv Embassy to Foreign Office, 17 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew.
22 . ‘Yisrael Beer’s Career’, Jerusalem Post, 16 April 1961.
23 . British Military Attaché, Tel Aviv, to Director of Military Intelligence, 14 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew. Peres was, of course, unaware of Beer’s KGB connection.
24 . Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 162-5; Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 14.
25 . Tel Aviv Embassy to Foreign Office, 17 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew.
26 . Among the new KGB agents were DITA, a female journalist in Tel Aviv, and GRANT, a Mapam politician, recruited in, respectively, 1966 and 1967; k-14, 538-9.
27 . Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, p. 214.
28 . vol. 6, ch. 7, part 1, p. 288.
29 . Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 15.
30 . k-8, 583.
31 . Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 15.
32 . Mitrokhin noted the figures for the budget of the Jerusalem residency only for the period 1975 to 1980 (k-13, 243-4, 250-51). The figures (in thousands of convertible rubles) were as follows: 13.0 (1975); 14.1 (1976); 16.0 (1977); 16.4 (1978); 20.3 (1979); 25.4 (1980).