11 . Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. 2, p. 383.
12 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 323.
13 . Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, pp. 331-4. Semichastny ‘categorically denies’ allegations that any US PoW was either sent to the Soviet gulag or interrogated in Moscow during his five years as KGB Chairman.
14 . Gaiduk, ‘The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations’, p. 252.
15 . k-19, 192.
16 . k-19, 195.
17 . k-12, 323. The fact that Mitrokhin’s notes identify no other agent or confidential contact with access to classified information which compared to that of ISAYEYEV suggests, but does not prove, that KGB sources in Vietnam were generally low-grade. Even ISAYEYEV was categorized as a confidential contact rather than an agent, probably because of the limits which he imposed on his collaboration.
18 . See below, pp. 313, 321-2.
19 . Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. 2, p. 400.
20 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, p. 73.
21 . Rubinstein and Smith (eds.), Anti-Americanism in the Third World, p. 138; Hollander, Anti-Americanism, p. 346.
22 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, p. 79.
23 . vol. 3 misc., item 501.
24 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 562-3.
25 . UNI report, 4 Aug. 2004.
26 . On KGB policy to the Orthodox Church, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch. 28.
27 . See below, ch. 20.
28 . See below, pp. 398-402.
29 . Cherkashin, Spy Handler, p. 275.
30 . Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’.
31 . See, for example, Leonov, Likholet’e.
15. The People’s Republic of China
1 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 126-7.
2 . McKnight, Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War, pp. 118-21; ‘Communist Activities in China, Federated Malay States, etc. (The “Noulens Case”)’, box 4, Record Group 262 (records of the British-dominated Shanghai Municipal Police), National Archives, Washington, D.C.
3 . Byron and Pack, The Claws of the Dragon, parts I and II.
4 . Salisbury, The New Emperors, pp. 217ff.
5 . Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
6 . Goncharov, Lewis and Litai, Uncertain Partners, p. 74.
7 . Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 61, 297 n. 64.
8 . Goncharov, Lewis and Litai, Uncertain Partners, p. 74.
9 . USSR-China in a Changing World, p. 74.
10 . Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, p. 335.
11 . k-19, 5.
12 . Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 164-7.
13 . ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963’, p. 181; Pleshakov, ‘Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations’, p. 236.
14 . Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, pp. 397-8.
15 . Wu, Laogai, p. 26.
16 . Byron and Pack, The Claws of the Dragon, pp. 250-53. On Kang Sheng’s return to favour, see ibid., ch. 11, and Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 221.
17 . Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 167.
18 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 494.
19 . ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963’, pp. 181-2.
20 . Byron and Pack, The Claws of the Dragon, p. 253.
21 . Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 259-61.
22 . Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 256.
23 . Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
24 . Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 61.
25 . During the 1950s Hartvig was used by both Line PR and Line X at the Helsinki residency. Line K later used him for active-measures operations as well as intelligence collection. Though he retired in 1968, he remained in contact with the residency until his death in 1979 (k-14, 756).
26 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 494-5.
27 . Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, p. 335.
28 . Directive of the head of the FCD, No. 00156, 2 September 1967; k-19, 4.
29 . As Beijing’s oldest university, Peking University still keeps its traditional English transliteration.
30 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 495-7.
31 . k-19, 1, 8.
32 . ‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest’; Burles, Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics.
33 . Short, The Dragon and the Bear, p. 186; ‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest’.
34 . k-19, 9. On the persecution of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution see Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia, ch. 4.
35 . k-27, 420.
36 . Politburo resolution No. P122/97, 15 April 1968; k-27, 420.
37 . ‘Uighhur’ [pseud.], ‘Sherki Türkestan Evasi’; Tillett, ‘The National Minorities Factor in the Sino-Soviet Dispute’.
38 . Politburo resolution No. P122/97, 15 April 1968; k-27, 420.
39 . Paine, Imperial Rivals, p. 354.
40 . On the making of the Sino-Soviet frontier, see ibid.
41 . Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 35-6.
42 . Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 171-2.
43 . Ibid., pp. 174-7.
44 . k-27, 421.
45 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 497; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 183-5.
46 . Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 218-20.
47 . Jian and Wilson, “‘All under the Heavens is Great Chaos”’; Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, pp. 245-9; Burr (ed.), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 145, document 3.
48 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 497; Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization , pp. 192-4.
49 . Burr (ed.), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 145, document 10.
50 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 497-8.
51 . Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, chs. 74-5. Mitrokhin did not have the opportunity to note the file on the death of Lin Biao, in which Andropov appears to have taken a personal interest; Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 338.
52 . Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization, p. 192.
53 . Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, p. 546.
54 . vol. 5 isl., app. 2.
55 . k-19, 2.
56 . k-19, 12.
57 . k-5, 371.
58 . k-2, 414. Mitrokhin’s notes do not specify the reasons for the failure. Other failed deployments included SENIM, another Chinese agent of the KGB, who crossed the border in August 1972 and was never heard of again; k-18, 72.
59 . vol. 6, app. 3, p. 791.
60 . k-19, 13.
61 . Chang, Wild Swans, p. 441.
62 . k-19, 20. These difficulties were probably recounted by the agent after his return from a failed mission.
63 . k-18, 250.
64 . k-19, 78.
65 . On 8 April 1978 FENIKS went back to North Korea, but agreed to renew contact if he returned to the PRC or had another foreign posting; k-27, 469. He evidently considered it too dangerous to try to establish contact with the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang.
66 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 184.
67 . ‘On certain national-psychological characteristics of the Chinese and their evaluation in the context of intelligence work’, FCD directive no. 822/ PR/62, 12 September 1976; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 185-94.
68 . Short, The Dragon and the Bear, p. 215.
69 . k-7, 46.
70 . ‘Plan of requirements on Chinese subjects for 1977’, FCD directive No. 891/PR/52, 14 March 1977; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 196-203.
71 . Short, The Dragon and the Bear, pp. 214-15.
> 72 . ‘Guidance on measures designed to improve the work against China from third countries’, FCD directive No. 16/PR, 12 January 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 204-7.
73 . ‘Basic targets of interest to Line in Hong Kong’, FCD directive No. 1734/PR/62, 20 April 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 68-78.
74 . ‘Guidance on measures designed to improve the work against China from third countries’, FCD directive No. 16/PR, 12 January 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 205.
75 . vol. 4 sri, ch. 4, p. 134. A retired Western intelligence officer recalls that, ‘Service A clearly made hay with the operational intelligence provided by FENIKS in terms of document format, addresses etc, and I remember some of the forgeries surfacing in Japan in the mid-1970s and being struck by the apparent verisimilitude. (No, we did not swallow them hook, line and sinker!)’
76 . vol. 4 sri, ch. 4, p. 134.
77 . vol. 4 sri, app. 3, p. 153.
78 . k-20, 217. Mitrokhin did not note the file on the implementation of this operation.
79 . vol. 4 ind., app. 3, p. 118.
80 . Bao and Chelminski, Prisoner of Mao, pp. 8-11, 38-9, 99. The book was not, however, a straightforward piece of Soviet propaganda and criticized the insensitivity of Soviet advisers in the PRC during the 1950s. The apparent objectivity of Prisoner of Mao subsequently increased Pasqualini’s value as a KGB agent of influence.
81 . k-14, 19; t-1, 71.
82 . vol. 9, ch. 6, p. 53; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 471.
83 . Pasqualini continued to be an active campaigner against the abuse of human rights in the PRC until his death in 1997. Despite his work as a paid agent of the KGB from 1975 to at least 1979, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of that campaign.
84 . k-14, 27.
85 . ‘Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted at the Meeting of Heads of Service’, FCD directive No. 156/54, 1 February 1984; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 4-14.
86 . ‘Comrade Alyoshin’s [Kryuchkov’s] instructions on planning the work of sections of the Service and organization abroad in 1984’, 2 November 1983; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 16-22.
87 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 207-8.
88 . ‘Work on China’, FCD directive no. 11781/X, 7 May 1985; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 208-10.
89 . Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
90 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch. 21.
91 . The budget for the Beijing residency in 1979 of 4,500 hard-currency rubles puts it in approximately the same league as Athens (4,200) and Tehran (5,000), but well below New York (29,400), Washington (26,000), Rome (15,000), Bonn (11,300), Tokyo (10,400), Paris (10,100) and London (7,100); vol. 6, ch. 9. For further comparative statistics, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 634 n. 63.
92 . Mitrokhin noted only the subject of the file; k-20, 124. Though Mitrokhin did not note the date, neighbouring files in the k-20 series refer to the early to mid-1970s.
93 . Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Kahn, ‘Soviet Comint in the Cold War’, p. 10.
16. Japan
1 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 93, 94-5, 281-2; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 189-92, 250-52, 281-2; Whymant, Stalin’s Spy.
2 . See below, pp. 304-5.
3 . Text of 1951 US-Japanese Security Treaty in Buckley, Japan Today, app. 3.
4 . Though frequently referred to as one of the four islands, the Habomais were technically an island group.
5 . Text of 1960 US-Japanese ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ in Buckley, Japan Today, app. 4.
6 . Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 114-15; Packard, Protest in Tokyo.
7 . k-8, 599.
8 . Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, pp. 581-2. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 115 n. 25. There was, however, little personal hostility during the protest movement to US citizens in Japan.
9 . k-8, 599.
10 . Ibid.
11 . Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 115, 314.
12 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 364-5.
13 . k-8, 248.
14 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
15 . k-8, 251.
16 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 374.
17 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, pp. 176-7. Mitrokhin’s notes on plans for operation VULKAN do not indicate whether or not it was ever implemented. NOMOTO was a Japanese citizen who had emigrated to Russia to work in the Kamchatka fisheries before being recruited as a KGB illegal agent. He was deployed to Japan in 1963 after the closing of the JIMMY residency; k-16, 434.
18 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, p. 177. The compromise of KGB sabotage planning after the defection in 1971 of the Line F officer in London, Oleg Lyalin, led to the withdrawal of Line F officers from most Western residencies (Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 383 ). It is likely that the Line F officer was also withdrawn from Tokyo. Though Mitrokhin noted a number of plans for ‘special actions’ in Japan drawn up in 1970, he saw none prepared in later years.
19 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 383.
20 . Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 174-8. In May 1964 two prominent JCP members, the deputy Yosio Shiga and his close associate Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled by the Central Committee on charges of ‘engaging in conspiratorial activities, such as secretly contacting the Soviet Union, deceiving and betraying our party’. Later in the year Shiga founded a new pro-Soviet breakaway Communist Party, the JCP (Voice of Japan), which survived mainly on handouts from Moscow and never became a significant threat to the JCP. Braddick, Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, pp. 206, 210-11.
21 . Braddick, Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, p. 204.
22 . In the wake of the JCP’s decision to side with Beijing after the Sino-Soviet split, many of its intellectual supporters broke with the Party or were expelled, significantly reducing its influence on public opinion; ibid., p. 267. In 1969 the JCP made an uncompromising denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and demanded the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.
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