Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth Century
Page 37
(1472–1529) found it diffi
cult to
alter.5 Although Wang Yangming’s power ful refutation was generally accepted
by his followers without question,6 it nevertheless failed to eradicate completely
this popu lar view. Thus, we fi nd the very same distinction perpetuated in the
Song- Yuan xue- an
(Scholarly Cases of Song and Yuan Classical Schol-
ars), where Huang Zongxi
(1610–1695) explic itly remarks that Lu Xiang-
shan’s teaching was focused on zun dexing and Zhu Xi’s was on dao wenxue.
While neither side completely ignored the emphasis of the other, the diff erence
between the two in terms of priority was nevertheless a real one.7
However, my purpose here is not to discuss the philosophical diff erences
between Zhu and Lu. Instead, I set as my central task in this study to examine
the relationship between morality and knowledge in Zhu Xi’s philosophical
system. Like li
(princi ple) and qi
(material force), Tianli
(Heavenly
Princi ple) and renyu
( human desire), or yin and yang
(passive and ac-
tive cosmic forces), morality and knowledge form a polarity in Zhu Xi’s
thought.8 Because of its central position in his system, Zhu Xi used many dif-
fer ent paired concepts in the Confucian tradition to express this polarity. Apart
from zun dexing and dao wenxue, which are clearly an overarching pair in this
category, there are also other polarized pairs such as “seriousness” ( jing ) and
“learning” ( xue
), “self- cultivation” ( hanyang
) and “extension of knowl-
edge” ( zhizhi
), “exercise of seriousness” ( jujing
) and “exhaustive in-
vestigation of princi ple” ( qiongli
), “essentialism” ( yue
) and “erudition”
( bo ), and “a single thread” ( yiguan
) and “extensive knowledge” ( duoshi
) .
Each and every one of these pairs of polarized concepts describes in its own
way the relationship between morality and knowledge. It is therefore necessary
to treat them below as “unit- ideas,” borrowing the terminology of Arthur O.
Lovejoy.9
To begin with, we must try to understand Zhu Xi’s statement, quoted above,
about his emphasis on “inquiry and study.” Does this mean that he assigned a
greater importance to knowledge than to morality? Needless to say, this could
not possibly have been the case. “Honoring the moral nature” was a central and
fundamental assumption in Neo- Confucianism shared by all individual think-
ers irrespective of their diff er ent views on other matters. Zhu Xi was certainly
no exception. Like Lu Xiangshan, he also took “honoring the moral nature” to
be the primary and ultimate goal toward which all “inquiry and study” must be
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 183
directed. Morality not only takes pre ce dence over, but also gives meaning to
knowledge.10
The question then inevitably arises: If this is the case, why did Zhu Xi, by
his own admission, place a greater emphasis on “inquiry and study”? First of
all, it is impor tant to point out that in the letter to Xiang Anshi quoted above,
Zhu Xi is not talking about the relative importance of knowledge vis- à- vis mo-
rality in Confucian learning as a whole. There, it may be recalled, he is merely
referring to “honoring the moral nature” and “following the paths of inquiry
and study” as two “methods of instruction.” In other words, his emphasis on
“inquiry and study” was made, not on the general theoretical level, but on the
practical, pedagogic leve1.11 I am not suggesting, however, that their overall
diff erences are reducible to a pedagogic one. As we shall see below, Zhu Xi’s
emphasis on “inquiry and study” is very much a refl ection of his philosophi-
cal views on such key concepts as “princi ple” ( li) and “mind” ( xin ) . All I am
saying is that the traditional distinction between Zhu and Lu in terms of zun
dexing versus dao wenxue is more apparent than real; its validity is rather lim-
ited in scope.
Having clarifi ed this point, the above question must be modifi ed as follows:
Why was it necessary for Zhu Xi to say a great deal about “inquiry and study”
but relatively less about “honoring the moral nature” in his instructions? The
answer is provided by Zhu Xi himself. He says:
The actual work in the realm of inquiry and study involves many items,
but that in the realm of “honoring the moral nature” is rather simple. For
instance, Yichuan
[Cheng Yi
, 1033–1107] only said: “To be seri-
ous is to concentrate on one” and “to concentrate on one means not to go
away from it.” That is all [“honoring the moral nature”] is about and there
is nothing else. However, in the past my discussions on the side of “honor-
ing the moral nature” have been rather light. Now I feel this to be a
mistake. The fi rst part of the phrase [“honoring the moral nature”] pro-
vides a general framework so that the work of “inquiry and study” can be
carried out meaningfully.12
Hence, according to Zhu, while “honoring the moral nature” is a matter of the
fi rst order, there is nevertheless very little that can be directly said about the
former. In his view, the so- called honoring the moral nature involves mainly
establishing as well as maintaining a moral state of mind, which is identifi able
with Cheng Yi’s “seriousness” or “reverence” ( jing). This brings us naturally to
Cheng Yi’s best- known formula, “Self- cultivation requires seriousness; the
pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge.”13
184 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m
S E L F - C U LT I VAT I O N V E R S U S E X T E N S I O N
O F K N O W L E D G E : S T R U G G L E W I T H
C H E N G Y I ’ S F O R M U L A
As we know, throughout his long intellectual life, Zhu Xi placed this formula at
the very center of his teaching. As a matter of fact, he regarded this formula as a
most satisfactory reformulation of the polarity of zun dexing and dao wenxue.14
Although he discussed a great deal more about “seriousness” or “reverence” than
about “honoring the moral nature,” his conception of the relationship between
“seriousness” and “extension of knowledge” bears a remarkable resemblance
to that between zun dexing and dao wenxue. “Seriousness” is not a separate task to
be accomplished before every thing else can be carried out. Rather, it is a state of
mind or mental attitude under which knowledge can be eff ectively extended.15
In other words, “exercise of seriousness” and “extension of knowledge” must
begin si mul ta neously.16 It is in this reformulation that his views of the relation-
ship between morality and knowledge are most fully revealed.
There can be no doubt that the fi rst part of Cheng Yi’s formula, “self-
cultivation requires seriousness,” falls exclusively into the category of morality
and therefore constitutes the key to
Confucian learning.17 However, the second
part, “the pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge,” requires
a word of explanation. Zhu Xi says: “ ‘The investigation of things’ simply means
that in regard to a thing that comes to our attention we make an exhaustive
study of all its princi ples. ‘The extension of knowledge,’ on the other hand, means
that after we have studied exhaustively the princi ples of a thing, our knowledge
of it becomes complete. We obtain this knowledge as if we have extended it
[from our minds].”18 “The investigation of things” ( gewu
) and “the exten-
sion of knowledge” ( zhizhi
) are, in this case, taken as two diff er ent descrip-
tions of the same operation seeking to discover the “princi ples” of things. We
use the term gewu when we speak of this operation from the point of view of the
object of investigation and the term zhizhi when we speak of it from the point of
view of the knowing subject. In light of the above discussion, Cheng Yi’s for-
mula as understood and interpreted by Zhu Xi may be seen as involving alto-
gether three aspects. First, a moral attitude of “seriousness” or “reverence” must
be established and maintained at all times; second, an intellectual activity of gewu
or zhizhi must be pursued in a spiritual state of “seriousness” or “reverence”;
third, as a result, “princi ples” ( li) of things become known. In Zhu Xi’s view, this
operation is an endless, ongoing pro cess in the life of every truly confi rmed Con-
fucian. It is through this spiritual journey that a Confucian seeks to bring his
moral nature to perfection. Thus, taken as a whole, these three aspects consti-
tute a total system of moral practice. Yet even in such a system of primarily
moral character, we fi nd that the role assigned to knowledge by Zhu Xi is essen-
tial even though it is, paradoxically, also secondary at the same time.
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 185
On the surface, it is true that “seriousness” and “reverence” are moral lan-
guage and that “princi ples” are also primarily princi ples of the moral kind. A
closer examination shows, however, that “investigation of things” or “extension
of knowledge”— the central and operative part of the entire system—is clearly a
reference to an intellectual pro cess by which knowledge is gained about “princi-
ples of things.” That this pro cess is necessarily intellectual can be explained by
the fact that in Zhu Xi’s conception, the mind ( xin) is identifi ed with material
force ( qi), the most intelligent and sensitive of all the material forces.19 In inves-
tigating things, internal or external, the mind only seeks to know their consti-
tutive princi ples in an objective way; it does not engage in moral activities of
any kind on this level. Even though the initial decision to investigate a thing is
a moral one and the knowledge thus gained is only to serve moral ends, there
is nevertheless no indication that in Zhu Xi’s system morality is ever allowed to
interfere directly with the intellectual operation of gewu or zhizhi. Moral con-
siderations always take place on a diff er ent (from the Neo- Confucian point of
view, however, higher) level.
Throughout his life, Zhu Xi never swerved from the view that knowledge
must precede practice or action ( xing
). While this cannot be taken to mean
that he valued knowledge above every thing else in life, it does reveal nonethe-
less his central concern with the intellectual foundation of morality. He said:
“Knowledge and practice always require each other like the eyes and legs of a
man. Without legs, a man cannot walk although he has eyes, but without eyes,
he cannot see although he has legs. With re spect to order, knowledge comes
fi rst; with re spect to importance, however, a greater weight must be attached to
practice.”20 Here Zhu Xi is clearly talking about the relationship between knowl-
edge and morality. By “knowledge” he is referring to “extension of knowledge,”
which, as explained above, is basically an intellectual operation; by “practice” or
“action” he is referring to moral practice— practice based on the “princi ples”
obtained from the “extension of knowledge.” Since, according to him, the pur-
suit of knowledge can be justifi ed not on its own ground but only on the ground
of its relevance to moral life, it is therefore natu ral that between knowledge and
morality, his emphasis lay ultimately on the latter. However, his insistence that
“knowledge must precede practice” reveals unmistakably the crucial role
that knowledge plays in his total system.
In response to a questioner, Zhu Xi said:
With regard to the question you raised yesterday about the order of self-
cultivation, extension of knowledge and practice, I think self- cultivation
should come fi rst, extension of knowledge next, and practice still next.
Without self-
cultivation, you cannot become your own master. . . .
Having cultivated yourself, you must extend your knowledge, and hav-
ing extended your knowledge, you must put it into practice. Knowledge
without practice is no diff er ent from having no knowledge, but all the
186 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m
three things must be done si mul ta neously. The order should not be taken
to mean that you cultivate yourself today, extend your knowledge tomor-
row and then practice it day after tomorrow.21
We can sense that he was at pains trying to establish the order of this triad.
Clearly, the order here is conceived more as a logical one than a temporal one.
In the actual temporal order, he always took the “extension of knowledge” to
be the starting point of Confucian learning. Thus, when really hard pressed, he
would not even hesitate to reverse the original order in Cheng Yi’s formula by
placing the “extension of knowledge” before “self- cultivation.”22 From his point
of view, this is necessary because self- cultivation, like practice, must also be
predicated on princi ples of the right kind. Without a correct knowledge of the
princi ples involved, cultivation or practice would be blind.23
T H E R O L E O F B O O K L E A R N I N G
The above analy sis shows that although Zhu Xi used Cheng Yi’s formula as a
heuristic princi ple throughout his long teaching career and always spoke of it
with worshipful reverence, in practice he reinterpreted it in such a way that the
role played by knowledge was clearly more active and central than in the origi-
nal formulation. To clarify Zhu Xi’s conception of knowledge, it is desirable
that we now turn to his views on book learning and its relation to morality. Of
all the Song dynasty (960–1279) Neo- Confucian phi los o phers, Zhu Xi alone
emphasized the importance of book learning to the attainment of the Way and,
moreover, developed a systematic methodology about it. It was this aspect of his
thought that led to the criticism of a seventeenth- century thinker that “Master
Zhu’s learning consists wholly of book learning and nothing else.”24 While this
is undoubtedly an overstatement, it neverthel
ess serves well as an illustration
of the infl uence that his emphasis on book learning exerted on the subsequent
development of Neo- Confucianism. Even his admirers characterized a central
part of his teaching as “Study the princi ples thoroughly through book learning
so that one’s knowledge may be extended.”25
To be fair to Zhu Xi, we must begin by pointing out that he never advocated
the primacy of scholarship in Confucian learning. On the contrary, he made it
very clear in his instructions that “Book learning is only a matter of the second
order.”26 It is nevertheless true that on the whole, he was convinced that to be a
good Confucian does commit one to a basic understanding of the original Con-
fucian teaching and its tradition. In a memorial presented to the throne in 1194,
he said:
With regard to the way of learning, nothing is more urgent than a thor-
ough study of princi ples; and a thorough study of princi ples must of
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 187
necessity consist in book learning. . . . All princi ples in the world are
wondrous and subtle, each perfect in its own way, and eternally valid.
However, only the ancient sages had been able to grasp them in their en-
tirety. As a result, the words and the deeds [of the ancient sages] have all
become permanent and fundamental exemplars for the later generations
to emulate. Those who followed them were gentlemen and blessed; those
who contradicted them were small men and accursed. The most blessed
can preserve the empire and therefore serve as a positive example; the most
accursed cannot even preserve his own person and would therefore serve
as a negative example. These vis i ble traces and necessary results are all
contained in the classics and histories. A person who wishes to have a
thorough knowledge of the princi ples in the world without fi rst seeking
them [in the classics and histories] is one who wishes to go forward but
ends up standing right in front of a wall. This is why we say, “a thorough
study of princi ples must of necessity consist in book learning.”27
In this connection, two related observations may be made about Zhu Xi’s the-
ory of book learning. First, it appears that he honestly believed that the ancient
sages had not only discovered most, if not all, of the princi ples but also embod-