Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth Century

by Ying-shih Yü

  ied them in what they said and what they did. Because the words and the deeds

  of the sages are preserved in books, book learning naturally provides “the study

  of princi ples” with a most logical starting point. Little won der that he identifi ed

  book learning as a matter of “investigation of things.”28 In fact, it forms the

  most substantial part of his teaching of “investigation of things.” In his famous

  “emendation” to the text of the Daxue

  ( Great Learning), he says, “the fi rst

  step in the education of the adult is to instruct the learner, in regard to all

  things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he has of their princi ples,

  and investigate further until he reaches the limit.”29 There can be little doubt

  here he is primarily talking about knowledge derived initially from book learn-

  ing as a basis for further study.

  Second, book learning in his system is always morality oriented. He never

  advocated book learning for its own sake and without a moral focus. He specifi -

  cally singled out, in the above memorial, classics and histories as the two kinds

  of books for study. This is because he believed that moral princi ples discovered

  by the sages are clearly recorded in the Confucian classics and their actualiza-

  tion in the past is amply illustrated in historical works. According to his disciple

  Yang Ji

  , Zhu Xi’s general educational program runs in the following

  order: The Four Books, the Six Classics, and histories. As for the literary art of

  the post- Qin and Han Period (221 b.c.e.– 220 c.e.), he discussed it with students

  only in his spare time.30 This testimony concerning the order of book learning

  not only agrees with the above memorial but is also corroborated by Zhu Xi’s

  conversations. For instance, he once gave the following instruction to a student:

  “You should fi rst read Lunyu [Analects], Mencius, and the ‘Zhongyong’

  188 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m

  [Doctrine of the Mean]. Then you turn to study one of the Confucian Classics.

  Fi nally, you should read histories. You will fi nd [this order of book learning]

  easy to follow.”31 The criterion according to which Zhu Xi established his order

  of priority in book learning was knowledge of moral princi ples. Study of the

  Analects and Mencius should precede that of the Six Classics because, in his

  view, the former takes less time but yields more results while in the case of the

  latter, the contrary is true.32 Historical works, on the other hand, report moral

  princi ples in actual operation.33 However, history can only reveal the changes

  of the past and the pres ent, and teach moral and practical lessons. It is quite

  irrelevant as far as moral cultivation of the self is concerned.34 Hence, while

  Zhu Xi fully recognized the importance of history as a subject of study in Con-

  fucian learning, he nevertheless assigned it a low priority.

  In a letter to his friend Lü Zuqian

  (1137–1181), Zhu Xi attributed the

  establishment of this order of study— the Four Books, Classics, histories—to

  Cheng Yi.35 This may well have been the case. However, a close look at the re-

  corded sayings of the two Cheng brothers does not exactly bear out Zhu Xi’s

  statement.36 It was in the hands of Zhu Xi that the scope of book learning was

  greatly enlarged. Moreover, as we shall see, he also developed a comprehensive

  methodology to cope with the prob lem of how to understand the meaning of a

  Confucian text on all levels. The intellectual foundation of morality thus be-

  came fi rmly established in the Neo- Confucian tradition.

  Zhu Xi further justifi ed book learning on the ground that the moral mind is

  constantly in need of the support of knowledge obtained from the study of

  Confucian texts. In this re spect, he actually followed a line of thinking fi rst de-

  veloped by Zhang Zai

  (1020–1077). Zhang says: “If one does not read

  enough, one will not be able to investigate and examine moral princi ples to the

  minutest details. Book learning can always give support to one’s mind. The mo-

  ment one stops reading is the moment one’s moral nature lapses into laxity. As

  one reads, one’s mind is always on the alert. But one is surely not to see any

  moral princi ples without engaging in book learning.”37 Zhu Xi often quoted this

  passage with approval in preaching his gospel of book learning. On one occa-

  sion, he off ered the following remark: “The expression ‘to give support to’ is ex-

  tremely well said. As is usually the case, when the mind is not occupied with

  book learning, it has no place to apply itself. Nowadays, there are people who are

  unwilling to pursue princi ples of things with thoroughness once they have

  caught a glimpse [of the Way]. As a result, they indulge their minds in empty

  speculation.”38 But what exactly did he mean when he praised Zhang Zai’s ex-

  pression “book learning gives support to the mind?” The answer may be found

  in the following statement: “In learning, one cannot aff ord not to learn from

  books. As for the method of book learning, it ought to include intimate familiar-

  ity with, deep refl ection on, and total immersion in [the text]. As [knowledge]

  accumulates inch by inch, the eff ort will eventually come to fruition. In the end,

  z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 189

  not only do the princi ples become clear but the mind also naturally gets set-

  tled.”39 Clearly, in his view, a profound intellectual understanding of princi ples

  can keep the mind in a moral state, thereby preventing it from being disturbed

  by selfi sh desires. On this prob lem, however, Zhu Xi must not be regarded as a

  slavish follower of Zhang Zai. As a matter of fact, he took a further step by giving

  knowledge a more positive role to play in the cultivation of moral nature. Zhang

  Zai’s view in terms of “support” implies that the function of knowledge is pas-

  sive; it only “supports” moral nature from collapse but does not add anything to

  it. Zhu Xi, on the other hand, relates knowledge to morality in terms of growth.

  In one place, he speaks of book learning as being capable of cultivating the root

  of moral nature.40 In another context, he is even more explicit, saying, “A thor-

  ough study of the princi ples enunciated by the sages and the worthies can

  nourish the root so that the branches and the leaves may grow luxuriantly by

  themselves.” 41 Here his organismic language contrasts vividly with Zhang Zai’s

  mechanistic language. In Zhu Xi’s deep consciousness, knowledge does more

  than just “give support to” morality; it provides morality with nourishment for

  its continuous growth.42

  In his discussion of the polarity of “erudition” ( bo) and “essentialism” ( yue),

  Zhu says:

  In learning, we must fi rst establish a base. Its beginning is rather simple,

  starting with what is essential [to moral practice]. The middle part is very

  broad. In the end, however, it returns to what is essential. Scholars nowa-

  days are fond of the essentialist approach and do not pursue broad knowl-

  edge. The prob lem is: without extensive knowledge, how can we test [the

  authenticity or falsity] of what
we hold to be essential? . . . There are other

  scholars who are only after erudition but never return to what is essential.

  They study one institution today and another institution tomorrow, exert-

  ing themselves only in the investigation of the functional aspects [of the

  Way]. They are even worse than the essentialists.43

  Obviously, Zhu Xi was fi ghting on two diff er ent fronts at the same time. Moral

  essentialism without intellectual base and erudition without moral focus were

  both detestable to him. His own position may be described as a centrist one,

  always seeking to combine “essentialism” and “erudition” in a most creative

  way. In the realm of knowledge, as he once remarked, “essentials come entirely

  from erudition.” 44 This conception of the relationship between bo and yue, it

  must be emphatically pointed out, presupposes the autonomy of book learning.

  In the above- quoted passage, Zhu Xi spoke of a moral beginning as well as a

  moral end in learning, but his emphasis was clearly placed on the broad “ middle

  part,” which is an autonomous intellectual realm. It is very revealing that with

  all his admiration for Cheng Yi, he was nevertheless profoundly dissatisfi ed

  190 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m

  with the latter’s Chengshi Yizhuan

  or Yichuan Yizhuan

  (Com-

  mentary on the Classic of Changes) precisely for its disregard for the autonomy

  of the original text. He sharply criticized this work as follows: “Yichuan in-

  tended to give moral instructions [in the Commentary]. But he should have pro-

  vided them elsewhere, not in connection with the Classic of Changes.” 45 This is

  clear evidence that he was very much conscious of the autonomy of the world of

  knowledge with which morality must not be allowed to interfere directly.

  Zhu Xi also extended his re spect for autonomy to the world of arts. The Ana-

  lects contains the following statement by Confucius (551–479 b.c.e.): “I set my

  heart on the Way, base myself on virtue, lean upon benevolence for support and

  take my recreation in the arts.” 46 Zhang Shi

  (1133–1180) explained the

  meaning of the last phrase, “take my recreation in the arts,” as follows: “The

  arts are only to nourish our moral nature.” Zhu Xi raised a strong objection to

  this explanation, pointing out:

  This statement is especially fallacious. Although the arts occupy the low-

  est place [in the Confucian scheme of things], they nevertheless have a

  raison d’être all their own and each follows its own natu ral pattern. The

  expression “take recreation in the arts” shows that [Confucius] only in-

  tended, in each and every case, to respond to things without going con-

  trary to their princi ples. By not going contrary to princi ples, our moral

  nature is naturally nourished. But we do not, in the beginning, count on

  the arts for the cultivation of our moral nature. Your explanation also has

  its origin in a contemptuous attitude toward the arts because of their low

  place. It is prob ably because you regard it as shameful to “take recreation

  in the arts” that you off er this interpretation to justify your point of

  view. . . . But the arts are entitled to their own right of existence. We take

  recreation in them not necessarily because they can nourish our moral

  nature.47

  The importance of this passage can hardly be overstated. Here Zhu Xi comes

  very close to the view of “art for art’s sake.” Each of the Six Arts (ceremonies,

  music, archery, carriage- driving, writing, and mathe matics), in this view, fol-

  lows its own “natu ral pattern” or “princi ple” and each is to be played according

  to its own rules. All together they constitute an autonomous realm that toler-

  ates no external interference, not even moral interference. They may very well

  produce moral eff ects and serve moral ends, but their existence needs no moral

  justifi cation. Clearly, Zhu Xi’s conception of human culture is pluralistic and

  hierarchical at the same time. It is pluralistic because morality, knowledge, and

  arts all have their separate realms; it is hierarchical because the Way

  ( Dao)

  holds all these realms together with the highest one reserved for morality.

  z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 191

  I N T E R P R E TAT I O N A N D O B J E C T I V I T Y:

  Z H U X I ’ S N E O - C O N F U C I A N H E R M E N E U T I C S

  In Zhu Xi’s cultural order, knowledge is next only to morality. Since, as we have

  seen above, knowledge for him is primarily knowledge gained through book

  learning, especially the Confucian classics, it requires a comprehensive and

  systematic methodology for the interpretation and understanding of texts. This

  is precisely the area wherein lies one of his monumental contributions to Neo-

  Confucian learning. The autonomy of knowledge, in his case, depends almost

  entirely on his methodology of book learning; this methodology led to a full-

  blown development of what may be called Neo- Confucian hermeneutics.

  Zhu Xi’s hermeneutics covers practically all levels of interpretation ranging

  from the philological, the historical, the literal, the reconstructive, to the exis-

  tential. To interpret a classical text, according to him, it is necessary to begin

  with the philological and historical explications of early exegetes. In addition to

  the text, he says, a student must also be able to familiarize himself with the com-

  mentaries to such an extent that he can grasp all the details in the commentar-

  ies that bear directly on the meaning of the text.48 What is even more impor tant

  on this level is to compare closely all the diff er ent interpretations of a text off ered

  by vari ous exegetes through the ages. Truth will emerge only through cross-

  examination and comparison of all these diff erences.49 Philological interpreta-

  tion in his hermeneutical system is only the fi rst step, however. Although it

  cannot be bypassed, it must be transcended. At the end of this stage, one sees

  no commentaries at all, only the text.50

  According to Zhu Xi, reading a text usually requires a person to undergo

  three stages. In the beginning, he learns how to set his mind attentively on the

  text. In the second stage, he penetrates into the text by following correct rules

  of textual analy sis. Being bound by these rules, he can describe the text in its

  general outlines, but the description is lifeless. Only when he reaches the fi nal

  stage can he bring the text to life.51 We can ignore the beginning stage and pro-

  ceed directly to say a word about the second and fi nal stages.

  The second stage involves at least two levels of understanding, namely, the

  literal signifi cance of the text and the original intention of the author. The

  literal level of understanding is relatively simple; it consists mainly of a grasp of

  the language of the text.52 However, the line between the literal and the inten-

  tional levels of understanding is by no means clear- cut. As is often the case, our

  determination of the literal signifi cance of a text very much depends on our

  understanding of the intentional meaning of its author and vice versa. Through-

  out his numerous discus
sions on the prob lem of textual interpretation, Zhu

  Xi’s central concern is always with how to understand the “original intention”

  ( benyi

  ) of the author of a classical text, in his case, the author being either

  a sage or a worthy. In a letter to a friend, he says: “To study a text requires the

  192 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m

  interpreter to be open- minded and cool- headed. His understanding follows closely

  the literal meaning of the text. He must not come to the text with his preconceived

  ideas . . . which prevent him from seeing the original intentions of the sages

  and the worthies.”53 Here what he is actually saying is that the reader cannot

  reach the intentional level without fi rst going through the literal level. On the

  other hand, he was also quite aware that the latter is no absolute guarantee of the

  former. Other wise, he would not have criticized his disciples for engaging only in

  literal interpretation but neglecting the intention of the sages.54

  Special attention must be paid to both his plea for “open- mindedness” and

  his warning against “preconceived ideas” in the understanding of a classical

  text. A basic princi ple in his theory of interpretation is formulated as follows:

  “To read a text, one must not forcibly impose one’s own view on it. Instead, one

  must remove one’s ideas and fi nd out the meaning in it exactly as the ancients

  intended.”55 In this regard, Zhu Xi is indeed very close to some of the modern

  theorists of interpretation, especially Emilio Betti, for Zhu Xi, like Betti, was

  also centrally concerned with the autonomy of the object of interpretation (text)

  as well as the possibility of objective knowledge derived from textual interpreta-

  tion.56 Because of the unique nature of his object of interpretation— the Confu-

  cian text— Zhu Xi always took the prob lem of the author’s original intention

  very seriously. This does not mean, however, that he was totally unaware of what

  Paul Ricouer calls the prob lem of “distanciation.” On the contrary, his great em-

  phasis on the necessity to compare and contrast all the diff er ent interpretations

  of a classical text and, indeed, his lifetime work in the realm of exegesis fully

  testify to the fact that he had all along been grappling with the diffi