For the Common Defense

by Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski

  For the Common Defense in the Twenty-first Century

  As mandated by Congress, the Department of Defense submitted its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review on the assumption that the war in Iraq would end for U.S. combat units by 2012, as President Obama had promised. With the usual confusion of ends and means, the report stressed that the armed forces would try to deter wars and “prevail” in “today’s wars,” which would require the capabilities to “defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.” The key mission was to defend the United States and “support civil authorities at home.” The armed forces should prepare to operate against the “aggression by state adversaries” and “new trans-national terrorist threats.” They should be prepared for “counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.” The forces must be ready to meet multiple threats in “overlapping timeframes,” meaning at the same time, so the force had to be made flexible and invest in “key enablers.” The term “transform” did not appear in the executive summary. The new mantra was to “rebalance” the force and “reform” how the Department of Defense did business.

  As required by law, the QDR had to provide estimated costs. Defense spending would peak in fiscal year 2011 at $708 billion, drop to $616 billion in 2012, then slowly grow to $666 billion in 2015 at a real growth rate of only 1 percent. The defense budget would be 4.7 percent of gross domestic product—historically a bearable national expense. Continuing the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Overseas Contingency Operations) would require a minimum of $132 billion for 2011.

  As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates knew, the budget, normally cut 2–4 percent by Congress, would be a dead document unless the armed forces reduced their personnel. The Army and Marine Corps would have to manage with 60,000 and 20,000 fewer troops, respectively. A more novel part of the QDR was the promise to stop or delay several aircraft and warship programs, so the Air Force and Navy would have to make sacrifices too. The transition to a high-technology force, however, would not stop since information, target acquisition, and precision-guidance for munitions would increase for all the services. Anything that would counter IEDs and WMDs would receive developmental priority. Drones and robots would become commonplace above and on the battlefield. Headed for the junkyard would be HUMVEES, replaced by Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles. The digitization of warfare would become the province of a new Cyber Command.

  In 2011, as part of a toxic negotiation on reducing the national debt, the Obama administration and Congress agreed to cut the defense budget by $400 billion over the decade ahead. If executed, this plan will reduce personnel costs by cutting the defense military and civilian force by 100,000 or more, but the cuts still cannot be made without 20–30 percent reduction in other categories of defense spending, like weapons modernization. Yet dramatic reductions in military personnel justify drastic investments in robotics and unpiloted vehicles, important but not decisive elements in the future force. The U.S. armed forces may not prevail in whatever conflicts lie ahead unless the American people insist that their political leaders make security decisions on the basis of expert advice from their civilian and military professionals and not make decisions based primarily on their impact on domestic politics. Only then will the United States have a common defense.

  The 1622 Virginia massacre touched off the first large-scale Indian war. Indian-fighting remained a central theme in U.S. military history for the next two and one-half centuries. Théodore de Bry, America, Part XIII. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  The English and their Indian allies attack the Pequot Indians in their Mystic River fort in 1637. To fight Indians successfully, whites invariably needed the cooperation of friendly Indians. John Underhill, News From America, 1638. Courtesy of The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

  The cornerstones of American military policy from the Revolutionary era through the 1880s were citizen-soldiers; a small regular army; a small navy that cruised on distant stations; and coastal fortifications.

  Citizen-soldiers at the Battle of Lexington in April 1775. Engraving by C. Tiebout. Courtesy of The New-York Historical Society.

  The Continental Army, America’s first regular army, at the Battle of Monmouth in June 1778. Painting by H. Charles McBarron. U.S. Army Art Collection. U.S. Army.

  The 44-gun frigate President on station in the Mediterranean in the early nineteenth century. Painting by Antoine Roux. Courtesy of The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

  Fort McHenry, built about 1800, defended the harbor of Baltimore. Courtesy of the National Park Service.

  One important factor in the Union’s victory over the Confederacy was the superior organizational and administrative abilities of these four Northern leaders.

  President Abraham Lincoln, with practically no previous military experience, became a strong and resourceful Commander-in-Chief. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles mobilized the North’s naval forces, which blockaded the South, assisted the Army in capturing coastal enclaves, and cooperated with the Army in operations along inland waterways. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton oversaw the growth of the Union Army to more than 1 million men and ensured that it had ample logistical support. National Archives (111-B-4559).

  Henry Wager Halleck exhibited superb administrative skills as the commanding general from July 1862 until March 1864 and then as Chief of Staff. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  Railroads were indispensable logistical arteries and played a large role in shaping Civil War strategy. Raiders in blue and in gray often made them a prime objective, because overturned locomotives and torn-up tracks could frustrate enemy plans as decisively as a battlefield defeat. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  Approximately 180,000 black troops served in the Union Army, playing a vital role in the North’s victory and, consequently, in the liberation of their race from slavery. This photo shows Company E of the 4th United States Colored Troops. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  These four military intellectuals fostered crucial developments in armed forces professionalization and theorizing during the late nineteenth century.

  William T. Sherman, although best known for his Civil War exploits, made his most enduring contributions to the Army in the postwar era. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  Emory Upton wrote The Military Policy of the United States setting forth the simplistic thesis that the country was always unprepared for war. Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Congress.

  Stephen B. Luce, who hoped to apply scientific methods to the study of naval warfare, helped establish the Naval War College in 1884. U.S. Navy Photograph.

  Alfred Thayer Mahan simply codified the big-navy philosophy of his age in The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. U.S. Navy Photograph.

  Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, who proposed a “command of the sea” strategy based on battleship fleets, was instrumental in the dramatic transition in American maritime strategy in the late nineteenth century U.S. Navy Photograph.

  The three battleships authorized in 1890, including the Oregon shown here, marked the advent of the new maritime strategy advocated by Tracy and Mahan. Once begun, battleship construction dominated the Navy for the next half-century. U.S. Navy Photograph.

  The War with the Philippine Republic was America’s first large war in Asia. Filipino soldiers ultimately submitted to an American pacification program that combined effective colonial government with vigorous campaigning. National Archives (111-RB-1258).

  As in all of America’s wars, hastily mobilized citizen-soldiers played an instrumental role in the War with the Philippine Republic. This picture shows Oregon Volunteer Infantry in the P
hilippines in 1899. National Archives (111-RB-1047).

  Waiting to advance: American infantry in the Meuse-Argonne campaign, 1918. Signal Corps No. 111-SC-24445 in National Archives (hereafter NA).

  Transportation problems: An AEF traffic jam in the Meuse-Argonne reflects the problems of coordinating an offensive. Signal Corps No. 111-SC-24642 in NA.

  Artillery conquers, infantry occupies: A 75-mm. gun of the 6th Artillery Regiment fires for the 1st Division during AEF attacks, 1918. Signal Corps No. 111-SC-27421 in NA.

  Air support for the AEF: Sopwith Camel pursuit planes of the 148th Squadron, American Air Service, AEF, prepare for a mission, 1918. Signal Corps No. 111-SC-18846 in NA.

  The Navy prepared for a naval campaign above, on, and below the Pacific Ocean: The U.S.S. Lexington (CV-2) at anchor at Hawaii, 1933. No. 80-A-416531 in NA.

  Submarines gave the U.S. Navy additional power for a Pacific war: “Fleet boats” like U.S.S. Mackeral (SS-204) provided the 1941 Navy with scouts and skirmishers—and commerce raiders after Pearl Harbor. U.S.N. No. 19-N-23722 in NA.

  Amphibious warfare at inception: A detachment of Marines practices loading a landing craft, Quantico, Virginia, 1920s. Defense Department No. 531602 in NA.

  Amphibious warfare at maturity: Beaching ships carry the heavy equipment of three marine divisions ashore at Iwo Jima, February, 1945. American amphibious assault operations provided the allies with an important offensive advantage in World War II. Defense Department No. 110851 in NA.

  Attack on Fortress Europe: 8th Air Force B-17s bomb German oil refineries, November 1943. The Anglo-American bomber forces created a “Second Front” in the air. Defense Department No. 55429 AC in NA.

  Attack on Fortress Europe: Soldiers of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division clear a street of German defenders in Brest, France, August 1944. Signal Corps No. SC 193705-S in NA.

  The ships that sank an empire: The carriers Langley (CVL-27) and Ticonderoga (CV-14) lead three fast battleships and four light cruisers into Ulithi anchorage after air strikes on Japanese bases in the Philippines, December 1944. No. 80-G-301352 in NA.

  Limited war remains total for the infantry: Soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division prepare to cross a rice paddy, Korea, 1951. Signal Corps No. SC 368495 in NA.

  Air power helps save Korea: UN Command tactical air power, such as this F-80 taking off from Japan, provided an important advantage over the Communist armies in Korea, 1950. U.S. Air Force No. 77201 in NA.

  Vertical assault in Vietnam: UH-1B “Huey” helicopters carry American soldiers into action in central Vietnam, 1966. Air mobility gave the U.S. Army and Marine Corps added effectiveness in the war with the North Vietnamese Army. Signal Corps No. SC 634829 in NA.

  Ambush! Marines cross a creek under fire during a jungle patrol near Phu Bai, South Vietnam, 1967. Despite added helicopter mobility and close air support, American infantry still had to fight the NVA in Vietnam’s wooded mountains. Defense Department No. A188945 in NA.

  Air power in the Nuclear Age: A B-52 bomber, designed to carry nuclear weapons to deter attack by the Soviet Union, instead carries conventional bombs to targets in South Vietnam. U.S. Air Force No. 94836 in NA.

  Appendix A

  Participation and Losses, Major Wars, 1775–2011

  * * *

  SERVED

  BATTLE DEATHS

  OTHER DEATHS

  WOUNDED

  Revolutionary

  War1,

  1775–1783

  200,000+ est.

  6,900 est.

  18,500 est.

  8,500 est.

  War of 18122,

  1812–1815

  286,730

  2,261

  17,500 est.

  4,500 est.

  Mexican War

  1846–1848

  115,906

  1,733

  13,000 est.

  4,152

  Civil War3,

  1861–1865:

  Union

  2,000,000+ est.

  112,000 est.

  250,500 est.

  277,500 est.

  Confederacy

  750,000 est.

  94,000 est.

  167,000 est.

  194,000 est.

  War with Spain,

  1898

  306,760

  385

  3,000 est.

  1,662

  Philippine-

  American War,

  1899–1902

  126,468

  1,004

  3,161

  2,911

  World War I,

  1917–1918

  4,734,991

  53,402

  63,114

  204,002

  World War II,

  1941–1945

  16,112,566

  291,557

  113,842

  671,846

  Korean War4,

  1950–1953

  5,720,000

  33,741

  2,835

  103,284

  Vietnam War5,

  1964–1975

  8,744,000

  47,434

  10,786

  153,303

  Gulf War,

  1990–1991

  2,225,000

  147

  235

  467

  War in

  Afghanistan6,

  2001–

  320,000 est.

  1,488

  386

  15,282

  War in Iraq7,

  2003–2011

  930,000 est.

  3,526

  962

  32,229

  * * *

  1 For the Revolutionary War we have used the statistics collected and analyzed by the Howard H. Peckham group, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, 1974.

  2 The statistics for the War of 1812 are those provided by Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812 (University of Chicago Press, 1989).

  3 Statistics for the Civil War (especially for the Confederacy) are elusive, but we have used those provided by E. B. Long, The Civil War Day by Day (Doubleday, 1971). However, the author of an in-depth study using pre- and postwar census records has argued for raising the war’s final death toll from 620,000 to 750,000. See J. David Hacker, “A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead” Civil War History 57 (December 2011): 307–348.

  4 At one time the Department of Defense listed 20,617 “other deaths” for the Korean War, an implausible figure when compared to the 33,741 battle deaths for Korea and the nearly 11,000 “other deaths” for the Vietnam War. The Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy are certain that they had 813 “other deaths,” but the Army, which listed 9,429 deaths of this sort at one time, has simply now announced that its “other deaths” are not available. Further research has led us to the number 2,835 for “Other Deaths.” The number for “Served” includes personnel deployed worldwide during the conflict.

  5 Defense Manpower Data Center, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALITY/vietnam.pdf. Of the total wounded, only about half required hospitalization.

  6 Statistics for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as of January 25, 2012, from Defense Manpower Data Center, http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf. The figures for Afghanistan include casualties in fourteen regional countries and Cuba (Guantanamo Bay).

  7 Casualties for the Iraq War include deaths in other regional countries, the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea. “Served” means fulltime, global, not just war zone. Because of multiple tours, short deployments, and assignments to Central Command that did not include physically serving in Iraq or Afghanistan, the number of service personnel who “served” in the two wars may run as high as 1.3 million to 1.9 million.

  Appendix B

  The Armed Forces and National Expansion

  * * *

  POPULATION CONTINENTAL U.S. (MILLIONS)

  War Department

  Navy Department