those days took John Bull seriously as a critical authority,
but its " revelation " served to draw attention to sinister
forces working below the surface and using the well-worn
method of forgery to discredit Serbia.
A far graver event, also savouring almost of melodrama,
1 The Senor G." referred to in the " document " is obviously intended, by
Insinuation to mean Mr. Grujic, still Chargé d'Affaires in London at the date
even (5 April, 1914). Those who know anything of Mr. Grujic will find this much
grotesque
to
cause
even
a
passing
annoyance.
Yet
Miss
Durham,
in
her
the
·and adresses includes among countless other wild and unproved charges
the insinuation that Mr. Grujic, as also Mr. Jovan M. Jovanovié, was in the plot.
128
imparted further venom to the press feud. Various
allegations had been put abroad from interested quarters
as to the scarcely veiled glee displayed by Mr. Hartwig,
the all-powerful Russian Minister in Belgrade, when the
first news of the murder had reached him. His Austro-
Hungarian colleague, Baron Giesl, returned on 10 July from
an absence of some days, and Hartwig made a point of
calling upon him that evening in order to contradict the
story. But while he sat in the Minister's study explaining
matters, he was suddenly overcome by heart failure and
expired within a few minutes. Following upon the
excitement of Sarajevo, this tragic incident gave rise to
fresh rumours of the grossest kind; and it was even
whispered that the champion of Slavdom had been
poisoned by a cup of coffee by his bitterest rival! While
the Belgrade Cabinet accorded a state funeral and a grave
of honour to the dead Minister, " reckless and provocative
language "l continued to be used; and on the 13th there
was a panic among the Austrians in Belgrade, Giesl going
so far as to assure Pasic that a regular assault was being
planned against the Legation. The one story was as
preposterous as the other; but though nothing whatever
happened, the rumour was taken seriously in Vienna and
added to the general irritation against Serbia. Meanwhile
there were periodical demonstrations before the Serbian
Legation in Vienna, which had to be specially guarded.
1 The Times leader of 16 July, 1914.
CHAPTER VI
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME
TURNING to the question of responsibility for the murder,
we find that there are four possible channels of investiga-
tion. First and foremost stands the charge of complicity
which public opinion in the neighbouring Monarchy
levelled agains
t t he
Serbian Government, and which
underlay the formidable ultimatum of 23 July. On the
other hand, the Serbian historian Professor Stanojevic,
in his sensational pamphlet,1 ascribes the outrage to three
distinct groups
—
the nationalist students in Bosnia, the
military conspirators in Belgrade, and certain unspecified
" Austro-Hungarian politicians." The first and third
of
these groups he dismisses in a few phrases, hinting that
the rôle of the former is well enough known already, and
is in any
case " a question of technical nature," while
that of the latter is never likely to be fully known; and
he then concentrates upon the " Black Hand," whose
importance is thus exalted .out of all proportion to the
true facts.
I have already given my reasons for limiting the charge
against Austria-Hungary to one of culpable negligence.
Let me examine the other three possibilities.
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
oerbian Government was in a position of very great
e
mbarrassment, in
which
foreign
complications
were
specially unwelcome to it. Only four days before the
murder (24 June) King Peter, incapacitated by ill-health,
and appointed as Regent his son, Prince Alexander, till
1 Ubistvo Austriskog Prestolonaslednika Ferdinanda (German ed., Di Ermordung
des Erzherzogs , Frankfurt, 1923), p. 43.
130
then without direct political experience. On the same
day the Pasic administration, which had already in April
committed itself to elections for a " Great Skupstina " and
a revision of the Constitution, had dissolved Parliament
and embarked upon a desperate struggle with the Opposi-
tion parties. That the Government should have chosen
the opening of an electoral campaign for sharing in a
foreign murder plot which was likely to produce war is
grotesquely
improbable;
but
there
are
many
other
reasons for doubting official complicity. The country was
exhausted by two wars; the finances, carefully husbanded
by Mr. Pacu, were not equal to further strain. The
Albanian campaign in the previous autumn had shown
the reluctance of the peasant soldiers to return to the
colours, and it was now the eve of harvest. The concordat
with the Vatican had only just been signed, and delicate
negotiations with Montenegro for Customs and mili-
tary union, and perhaps even a dynastic arrangement,
were still pending. The position in the new Macedonian
territories was far from consolidated, the civil administra-
tion was notoriously bad there, and there was extreme
friction between the civil and military authorities. How
little the army chiefs anticipated war is best shown by the
fact that the Voivode Putnik was taking a cure at
Gleichenberg, in Austria, and was actually caught there
by the outbreak of hostilities.
Far too little stress is usually laid upon the military
unpreparedness of Serbia, yet this notorious fact must
have weighed decisively with both the Government and
the
military
chiefs
at
Belgrade.
The
two
Balkan
campaigns had strained the military machine to the
uttermost. Only 120,000 rifles were available, and these
were of six different types. The shortage of field guns1
had to be made up for by old slow-firing guns, with black
powder, or at best by the Krupp guns captured from the
Turks in 1912. Of heavy artillery there was none at all.
1 The best were Schneider-Canet 75mm. guns.
131
There was a serious shortage of every kind of ammuni-
tion, which at once became acute after the outbreak of
àr,
W
and brought Serbia to the very verge of ruin ,by
November 1914. Before its dissolution in June the
Isjkupstina had voted a new war-credit of 100,000,000
>
dinars, but, of course, nothing had as yet been supplied
t>y the time that war actually broke out. The problem of
the transport of war material from France to land-locked
Serbia had always presented considerable difficulties, and
was, of course, to be accentuated tenfold as soon as
France herself became involved in war.
But hardly less serious than shortage of ammunition
was the complete lack of equipment and war material of
every kind. The Serbian Army was lacking in uniforms,
in tents, in bandages, and the most elementary medical
stores, and its stock of oxen and farm carts, which formed
the backbone of its commissariat and transport depart-
ments, had been dangerously deplenished.1 In a word,
the authorities had every possible motive for alarm and
none whatever for a policy of adventure and assassina-
tion Í Nor is it too much to assert that a knowledge of
the exhausted and unprepared state of the Serbian Army
was one of the determining factors which weighed with
the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and Foreign Office
when the crisis came. The temptation to strike before
'the Serbs had time to rearm and recuperate was naturally
Very great.
Special reference should also be made to the Monte-
negrin question, which figured far more in the calcula-
tions of Vienna than is generally realised. One result of
the Balkan Wars had been greatly to strengthen the
movement for union between Serbia and Montenegro,
now no longer separated from each other by Austrian or
1 For a very matter-of-fact account of technical conditions see Bitka na Jadru
(The Struggle round Jadar, August 1914), by General 2ivko Pavlovié, then Chief
of Staff under the Voivode Putnik. This is vol. i. (623 pages) of the official
Serbian military history of the war. See pp. 53-5 and cursim.
132
Turkish garrisons in the Sandjak. Save for a small
Court clique, King Nicholas was universally distrusted,
and his sons had forfeited all claim to be considered.
Early in 1914 the Montenegrin statesman Mr. Miuèkovié
began serious discussions with Mr. Pasic on the following
basis:
The
two
countries
would
remain
nominally
independent, each under its own dynasty, but there
would be a union of finance, customs, and posts, uniformity
in justice and administration, a fusion of the two armies, a
joint General Staff, and a common orientation of foreign
policy
and
diplomatic
representation.1
These
nego-
tiations became known both to Vienna and to Berlin, and
caused the former such acute alarm that Count Szápáry,
the Austro-Hungarian Minister in St. Petersburg, was
instructed to inform Sazonov that in the event of union
" Austria-Hungary would not remain a silent observer,"
since her Adriatic interests did not permit any change in
the balance of power.8 Hartwig, on learning this, urged
on Pasic the need for extreme caution in the matter, and
early in July, at Sazonov's orders, advised the postpone-
ment of the negotiations, with a view to calming Vienna.·
This pacific advice deserves to be placed on record, as
disproving Sazonov's
warlike
aims.
Meanwhile
it
is
abundantly
clear
that
Vienna
was
highly
nervous,
looked upon the union as inevitable unless Serbia were
speedily crushed,4 and thus gained an additional argument
in favour of war.
Another quite material fact to be borne in mind in any
apportionment of war-guilt is Berchtold's steady refusal
1 See despatch of Hartwig to Sazonov, 7 April (N.S.), 1914, in Siebert, Diplo-
matische Aktenstücke, p. 629.
2 Sazonov to Hartwig, 5 March, 1914, ibid, p. 627. cf. Kaiserliche Katastrophen-
politik, p. 150, where Dr. Kanner describes a conversation between him (as
editor of Die Zeit) in October 1913 with Montlong, head of the Ballplatz Press
bureau. The latter, referring to the proposed union of Serbia and Montenegro,
excitedly exclaimed: " That would be war I "
»Sazonov to Hartwig, 7 July (Siebert, op. cit., p. 631).
3 Conrad von Hötzendorf admits that union was only opposed by the dynasty
and its subordinates, and was correspondingly disquieted. Das Meiner Dienstzeit,
iii., p. 663.
133
to
consider
various
attempts
at
mediation
between
Vienna and Belgrade during the two years previous to the
Great War. The most notable of these was Pasic's
offer, conveyed through Professor Masaryk during a
visit to Belgrade in December 1912, to visit Vienna for the
purpose of concluding a working arrangement, both
political and commercial, between the two countries.1
Berchtold, to whom Masaryk's motives in championing
the Southern Slavs were a sealed book, assumed that he
was seeking some personal advantage, and did not even
deign to reply to the Serbian Premier.
On the other hand, it must always be remembered that
the Serbian Government on three separate occasions in
five years — during the Bosnian Annexation crisis, at the
Friedjung Trial, and in its reply to the Ultimatum —
offered to submit its dispute with Austria-Hungary to
impartial investigation by the Hague Tribunal — a step
which does not suggest a guilty conscience on its own
part or even a desire to shield any of its own guilty
subjects. It is sometimes argued that a reference to the
Hague would simply have meant shelving the matter, but
it is obvious that, even if the Entente had shown itself
lukewarm, two such Powers as Austria-Hungary and
Germany could have effectually enforced a thorough
enquiry, and would have had the backing of public
opinion throughout the world. The plain fact is, of
course, that Austria-Hungary herself had a very guilty
conscience in Southern Slav matters, and did not relish
the prospect of the Fried jung forgeries or the internal
conditions of Bosnia and Croatia being raised before
M* international forum.
Meanwhile, though a whole series of considerations go
to prove that the Serbian Government was far from
wishing to provoke a fresh conflict, it was certainly
1 See letter of Professor Masaryk to Prince Windischgrätz of 6 December,
1913 published by Magyarország of 25 July, 1924, and reproduced in Prager
Presse of 26 July.
134
guilty of a grave blunder in not immediately forestalling
Vienna's demands by instituting a searching enquiry ol
its own. This omission is only very partially explained
by absorption in the electoral campaign. The complicity
of Major Tan
kosic and Ciganovic" became known at a very
early stage, and it would at least have been good tactics,
if nothing else, to take some action against two notor-
iously suspect characters. Inaction was all the more
inexcusable, in view of the frank warning administered by
Herr von Zimmermann, the German Foreign Under-
Secretary, to the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin as
early as 30 June.1 He emphasised the grave consequences
of any failure of Serbia " to do her duty " by proceeding
against suspect persons; in that case " one could not tell
what would happen."* It is indeed impossible to deny
Herr von Jagow's pleas that the Belgrade Government,
though giving official expression to its horror at the crime,4
took no serious steps either to search for its authors or to
1 This was repeated by Zimmermann to Sir H. Rumbold, who reported it to
London.
2 Lerchenfeld to Munich, 2 July, D.D., iv., Anhang iv., No. 1.
3 Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, p. 96.
4 On 1 July Mr. Pasió sent a circular to all Serbian Legations {Serbian Blue
Book, No. 8) reminding them (in view of the attempt of the Austrian and
Hungarian Press to destroy Serbia's " high moral reputation in Europe " and
exploit against her " the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic ") that " the
outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society " as prejudicial
to good relations with Austria-Hungary " at a moment when Serbia is doing
all in her power to improve them." " It is absurd to think that Serbia could have
directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the
greatest interest to
Serbia to prevent the perpetration
of this
outrage." The
value of this announcement would, of course, be materially affected by the
revelations of Mr. Jovanovic (see p. 153), if they were to be accepted at then-
face value.
Two further circulars were sent by Mr. Paâié to the Legations on 14 July
(Serbian Blue Book, Nos. 20 and 21), the one drawing a distinction between the
Austro-Hungarian and the Serbian Press, and emphasising the lack of censorship
and Press control in Serbia, and the other denying the wild rumours circulating
in Vienna as to imaginary attacks on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade.
All these circulars were, of course, for diplomatic use only. The only public
announcement was a statement of the Serbian Press Bureau, issued on 30 June
Sarajevo Page 18