in
Belgrade
survives
unpunished."
These
phrases
were
toned down at the very last moment (indeed after the document had been sent
off to Berlin), as the result of an insistent telegram from Count Tisza. Nothing
illustrates better the original divergence of view between Berchtold and Tisza.
It is also important to note the motive given by Tisza for the change:
"in
order not to frighten off Berlin " (urn Berlin nicht kopfscheu zu machen), in other
words, on purely tactical grounds. See Gooss, op. cit., p. 29.
Professor Fay appears to have overlooked this, fo r he writes (Papers of Count
Tisza, in American Historical Review for January, 1924, p. 314) that Tisza
was " not informed of the royal [sic] letter till after it was despatched to Potsdam
;
when he finally saw them [sic] he disapproved of their wording and tone." This is
misleading, as suggesting that he had no concern with the document as presented,
whereas
he
secured
important
modifications.
Professor
Fay
has
evidently
relied upon Bishop Fraknói (Die Ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des
Weltkrieges, p. 16)
who, referring to Tisza's protest against Berchtold's phrasing
of the memorandu m, writes:
" But Berchtold did not wait for the arrival of
the
Hungarian
answer.
Wh en
Tisza
sent
off
his
despatch,
the
memorandum
was already in the hands of William II." Fraknói's first sentence is accurate,
but his
second is gravely inaccurate, and
he
overlooks the
fact that
what
William II received was Berchtold's document as amended by Tisza.
2
D.A., i., No. 4; Gooss, op. cit., p. 30.
175
to secure German help against Russia. For with little
Serbia, so long as she stood alone, Austria-Hungary
could obviously cope unaided.
WILLIAM II AND VIENNA
According to Szögyény's report the Emperor read
the letter attentively, at first merely remarking that he
had foreseen serious action against Serbia, but that as
European complications must be expected, he would
like to consult the Chancellor before giving any definite
answer. After lunch, however, he was more expansive,
and authorised the Ambassador to inform Francis Joseph
that " in this case also " (auch in diesem Falle) — a phrase
to which the German critics have tried hard to give an
ambiguous turn, but which, though not a model for
diplomatic stylists, is perfectly clear from the context-
Vienna could reckon on Germany's full support. He
had no doubt that the Chancellor would " fully agree "
with him, especially as regards action against Serbia.
There must, however, be no delay, since Russia was
certain to be hostile, but was " as yet by no means ready
for war." If, then, Austria-Hungary " really thought
warlike action necessary, he [William] would regret it
if we [Austria-Hungary] left unused a moment so favour-
able for us as the present." In conclusion he promised
to influence King Charles of Roumania, and to comply
with
Austria-Hungary's
wishes
regarding
Bulgaria,
though an alliance with that country was " not at all
sympathetic to him," and though he had " not the
slightest confidence in King Ferdinand or any of his
advisers."1
Later in the day the Emperor received Bethmann
Hollweg and Zimmermann2 at Potsdam, and according
to the Chancellor's own account, expressed his sense of
1 Szögyény to Berchtold, 5 July, D.A., i., No. 6.
2 As deputy for Jagow, who only returned from his honeymoon the following
morning. (Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, p. 97.)
176
the gravity of the situation in Austria-Hungary as a
result of Panserb propaganda. He also reaffirmed the
view that it was not Germany's business to give advice
to Vienna, but that she must assure Francis Joseph of
German support in such a crisis, while endeavouring to
prevent
the
dispute
from
assuming
an
international
character. With these views Bethmann Hollweg found
himself in full agreement.1
In a second telegram2 Szögyény reports his conversa-
tion with Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann on the
following morning. The Chancellor, already acting on
the Emperor's instructions, defined Germany's attitude
to the Serbian problem. Recognising the dangers arising
from Russia's Balkan plans, Germany was ready to
promote " the formal adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple
Alliance," so long as a form was found compatible with
German obligations to Roumania. The German Minister
in Sofia was therefore being instructed forthwith to
associate himself with any overtures of his Austro-
Hungarian
colleague
to
the
Bulgarian
Government;
while the German Minister in Bucarest was to " speak
quite openly " with King Charles regarding the intended
negotiations in Sofia and to insist that the advice so often
tendered by him in favour of an Austro-Serb rapproche-
ment had been rendered invalid by the tragedy of Sara-
jevo. Szögyény adds that in further conversation he
had elicited the fact (festgestellt) that both Chancellor
and Emperor regard immediate action " as the most
radical and best solution " of the Balkan troubles;
that in their view the present juncture was more
favourable than any later; and that neither Italy nor
Roumania should be informed beforehand.3 German
1 Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, i., p. 135.
2Szögyény to Berchtold, 6 July, D.A., i., No. 7.
3 cf. pp. -í3.i — 5. It will be seen that Jagow, who was absent at this time, took
quite a different view, and insisted that Italy must be " squared." This was
because
he
understood
the
Italian
situation.
The
military
cannot
have
been
consulted on this point, for when later on it became clear that Italy would not
support her two allies, they showed great concern on strategic lines.
177
controversialists have attempted to discredit Szögyény's
testimony as that of an old man whose powers were
failing, but on this occasion at any rate its complete
accuracy
can
be
tested
by
reference
to
Bethmann
>
Hollweg's own summary of the conversation in a telegram
to Tschirschky.1 In this document too we find for the
first time precisely stated the official German view — so
often to be reaffirmed during the critical fortnight that
followed, and avowed by German statesmen in their
post-war memoirs1 — that " his Majesty [which here of
course means Germany] could naturally take up no
attitude towards the questions at issue between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia, since they lay outside his compet-
ence/' but that Francis Joseph might rely upon His
Majesty standing " loyally at Austria-Hungary's side "*
in accordance with his duty as an ally and his old
friendship.
In any attempt to estimate William II's own respons-
ibility for war, his marginalia upon official documents
must inevitably play a foremost part. First published
in selection by Karl Kautsky, they may be studied with-
out any partisan comment, throughout the diplomatic
publications
of
the
German
Government,4
and
their
perusal soon recalls the fact that the marginalia, how-
ever hurriedly they may have been scribbled down, were
treated in the Wilhelmstrasse with all the attention and
respect due to state documents of the first order. Two
examples of this will suffice. On 19 June, 1914, the
German Minister in Athens telegraphed certain details
concerning Roumania's
mediation
in the Turco-Greek
dispute, and the Emperor made comments in the margin.
1
6 July, D.D., i., No. 15. Moreover, it so happens that Tschirschky, wiring
in Berlin on 7 July, makes a point of stating that the above despatches of
SzöSyény (presumably shown to him by Berchtold) " correspond entirely " to
bethmann Hollweg's wire to himself, D.D., i., No. 18.
2 Bethmann Hollweg, op. cit., p. 135; and Jagow, op. cit., p. 103.
3 It should be added that at this point the words, " under all circumstances "
had been inserted in the original draft, but were struck out by Bethmann
Hollweg. D. D., i. p. 33, note.
4 Der Grosse Politik, 21 vols., and Die Deutschen Dokumente, 4 vols.
178
These were at once sent to Prince Waldburg in Bucarest,
with instructions to communicate them to King Charles.l
Again, on 23 July, the day of the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum, Lichnowsky sent an important telegram to
Berlin, on which the Emperor commented with copious
violence.1 These comments were at once wired back
by Jagow to Lichnowsky as information and warning.
The light which they throw upon the arrogant, im-
patient and essentially underbred character of William II
is very welcome, but what they show above all else
is the extent to which he dominated and, it may almost
be
said,
terrorised
his
Ministers
and
subordinates.
" Donkey," he writes when Berchtold tries to convince
Russia of his unaggressive tendencies.3 " A fool your-
self,
Mr.
Sazonov,"
he
solemnly
writes
when
his
Ambassador in St. Petersburg records an unguarded
remark of Sazonov about Tisza.« " The little thief
must always gobble up his share," he says of King Victor
Emmanuel.* " The proud Slavs!" is his comment on
Belgrade's dismay at the Note's severity. " Just tread
firmly on the ruffians' feet! "' But his severest com-
ments are reserved for his Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg,
when he dares to suggest certain measures relating to
the fleet and is reminded that " a civilian Chancellor "
does not understand such things.7 His notes on this
occasion in particular make it quite clear that he realised
that the ultimatum must inevitably lead to universal
war, but that he would not for a moment brook an
independent policy on the part of Bethmann Hollweg
or the Wilhelmstrasse.
BERLIN'S ENCOURAGEMENT OF VIENNA
It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the decisive
influence
of
Berlin's
attitude
upon
Austria-Hungary's
1 D.D., i., No. 41.
2 ibid., No. 121.
3 ibid., No. 155.
4 ibid., No. 120.
5 ibid., No. 168.
6 ibid., No. 159.
7 25 July, Bethmann Hollweg to William. D.D., i., No. 182.
179
" will to war," for, when reiterated as it was with every
shade of emphasis, it was interpreted, and must have
been intended, as carte blanche for drastic action against
Serbia.1 It is of course simply incredible that German
official circles should not have foreseen from the very
first that such action might easily lead to a Russo-German,
and so to a general European war, and indeed we find
Count Hoyos reporting from Berlin that the German
Government
favoured
"
immediate
action
"
against
Serbia, " although it clearly recognised that a world war
might arise from this."1
Even more conclusive in this direction is the report
sent by the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires to Munich on
18 July.» In this he communicates (quite accurately,
as the event was to prove) the salient features of the
projected Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia, as revealed
to him by Zimmermann, and then makes the following
comment: " That Serbia cannot accept demands so
incompatible with her dignity as an independent state,
is obvious (liegt auf der Hand). The consequences would
therefore be war." " Berlin," he adds, had at once
" declared itself satisfied with whatever action Vienna
might decide upon, even at the risk of war with Russia."
It is quite true that when Hoyos talked big at Berlin
1 On this point see Jagow, op. cit., p. 103. He argues that there could be
no question of carte blanche to Vienna " because I repeatedly told the Austrian
Ambassador that we wanted to be informed of the steps which might be decided
upon in Vienna." But though Tschirschky (as is shown on p. 192) carried out
this order to the letter, yet Berlin deliberately refrained from any attempt to
hold Vienna back, and hence we are fully entitled to speak of Germany giving
carte blanche.
Again Jagow argues that " it is a very different thing if, recognising certain
steps as necessary in principle, I also suggest the modus procedendi and so take
over the responsibility for this, or if I wish to be made acquainted beforehand
with the character of these steps and to retain in some degree the control for
myself. We
wanted
the latter, not
the
former." Surely
this strengthens,
not
diminishes,
&
nbsp; Germany's
blame.
Altogether
Jagow's
book
betrays
a
curious
mentality; it is fairly frank, but several of his premises seem to me to lead to
conclusions diametrically opposite to those which he draws. He does not admit
— and it looks as though he really did not see — that Berlin's negative attitude
was
a
direct
encouragement
to
Vienna,
and
led
Berchtold
to
put
forward
extravagant demands.
2 Gooss, op. cit., p. 83.
3 D.D., iv., Anhang iv., No. 2, pp. 126-7,
180
about the need for "a complete partition of Serbia "1
Tschirschky was still sufficiently restive to extract from
both Berchtold and Tisza a disclaimer of such drastic
intentions, and to transmit this to Berlin, But despite
such a revelation of mentality in Berchtold's immediate
entourage, Berlin does not until a much later date2 — and
then only owing to anxiety as to Italy's action — make
any attempt to extract from Vienna a clear definition
of intentions which were bound to affect the peace of
Europe, and indeed so far from urging Vienna to greater
moderation, is on the contrary found repeatedly criticising
Vienna for its slowness and inaction.
It has sometimes been claimed that the statesmen of
Berlin could not be expected to foresee the consequences
of giving a free hand to their ally. Such a claim could
at best absolve them from direct criminal connivance,
at the expense of their political sanity. But fortunately
we have much weightier evidence than that of Hoyos
for the assertion that they did foresee those consequences.
For the White Book issued by the German Government
shortly after the outbreak of war contains a reasoned
statement of its motives which is quite conclusive.
" Austria," we read, " was bound to say to herself
that it would be compatible, neither with the dignity
nor the self-preservation of the Monarchy, to look on
any longer inactive at what was going on across the
frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government informed
us of this view and asked our opinion. With all our
heart we were able to give our ally our agreement with
her estimate of the situation and to assure her that an
action which she held necessary, in order to end the
movement in Serbia against the existence of the Monarchy,
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