2 D.A., ii., No. 78.
3 ibid, annexe to No. 78, p. 151.
4
Markgraf
Pallavicini,
Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador
in
Constantinople,
told Conrad that Francis Joseph had expressed himself in this sense during an
audience in June 1914· See Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 107. Confirmation of this
is to be found in Secrets of the Bosphorus, p. 56, by the American Ambassador,
Mr. Morgenthau, who reports a conversation with his colleague Pallavicini on
Francis
Joseph's
84th
birthday
(18
August,
1914).
Pallavicini
told
him
that
during an audience in May 1914 Francis Joseph " had said that a European war
was unavoidable," since the Central Powers would not accept the Treaty of
Bucarest as a settlement of the Balkan Question,
274
sentence referring to it was therefore erased from the
document despatched to Kragujevac.l It was only on
the 29th, when war was already an accomplished fact,
that Berchtold calmly reported to his master that " the
news had not been confirmed," and had therefore been
omitted from the document.2 Moreover, on his return
from Ischl he repeated the same lie to de Bunsen as an
additional reason why Grey's proposals for mediation
could not be accepted.3 That he was this time con-
sciously lying is shown by the fact that the declaration
of war, in its curtailed form, had already been despatched
to Serbia. He also used the incident in a telegram to
St. Petersburg to justify his declaration of war.4 There
is as yet no evidence to show whether the bogus incident
of Temeskubin was manufactured at the Ministry of
War, or whether the responsibility should fall upon the
Ballplatz; but it is quite clear that the initiative for
its invention must have come from some official quarter,
and it is worthy of notice that Field-Marshal Conrad,
in his extremely voluminous Memoirs, while quoting
verbatim the document in its final form, passes over the
incident in complete silence.5
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DECLARES WAR
The declaration of war was received with immense
enthusiasm both in Vienna and in Budapest, and despite
the spectre of Russian intervention in the background,
the phrase in commonest use was that of a " punitive
expedition " against the savages of Serbia. Cheering
1 Gooss, op. cit., p. 219; Wendel, Die Habsburger und die Südslawen, p. 72.
2
Gooss, op. cit., p. 219. Berchtold adds that the only other incident known
to have occurred was of too trifling a character to be cited as the basis of an
important state document.
3 Berchtold to Mensdorff, 28 (despatched 29) July, D.A., ii., No. 90. Curiously
enough Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatches contain no reference.
4 28 July, D.A., ii., No. 95·
5 Conrad, op. cit, iv., pp. 141-3. Hermann Wendel (op. cit., p. 73) has aptly
compared the story with that of the French airmen over Nürnberg, used by
Germany as an excuse for war, and afterwards admitted to have been false.
275
crowds on the streets sang the ballad of Prince Eugene,
" Der edle Ritter," and his conquest of Belgrade two
centuries earlier. In wide circles war was greeted as a
positive "deliverance,"1 and the Hungarian
statesman,
Count Apponyi, voiced the feelings of his people when
the first news of war wrung from him the heartfelt
exclamation, " At last!" He at least had the satisfac-
tion of knowing that his own educational policy in
Hungary had contributed as much as any other single
factor to embroil the Dual Monarchy with both Jugoslavs
and Roumanians.
Since the war, Hungarian controversialists have been
active in disclaiming all responsibility for its outbreak,
and seek to prove this by laying stress upon Tisza's
cautious attitude during the first fortnight of July.»
But this argument can only be upheld if Tisza's conver-
sion, from 14 July onwards, into one of the staunchest
advocates of drastic action, and the unreserved approval
accorded to him by the Hungarian Parliament and public
opinion, be passed over in discreet silence.» It is, more-
over, essential to remember that while the Austrian
Parliament could not be summoned during the war
crisis because it rested on a pretty exact representation
of the peoples of Austria and would almost certainly
have revealed a majority hostile to war, the Hungarian
Parliament, on the other hand, being the close preserve
of the Magyar ruling class, and representing neither the
working-classes nor the non-Magyar nationalities, pre-
sented a solid front in favour of the Chauvinistic policy
which was now culminating in war and was destined to
end in the downfall of the old Hungary.
1 Eine Erlösung; cf. Auffenberg, Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang, p. 260.
2 See supra, pp. 165-9, 188-95.
3 Highly characteristic of these disingenuous tactics is an article in Current
History for January 1925, entitled " Martyrdom of Count Stephan Tisza," by
Ernest Ludwig, who was head of the Austro-Hungarian press propaganda in the
United States during the period of American neutrality, and has now returned
to America to conduct on behalf of the Hungarian Legitimists a campaign for
the revision of the Peace Treaties.
276
The rupture of diplomatic relations and even the
declaration of war did not destroy all hope of a peaceful
solution. Berchtold had, it is true, rejected both Grey's
and Sazonov's overtures, but there was still a possibility
of direct discussions between Vienna and St. Petersburg,
and this was favoured by all the Powers, including
Germany.1 But once actual hostilities commenced, it
was generally realised that an entirely different situation
would at once arise, and that at least partial mobilisa-
tion of Russia must automatically follow, * unless she
was prepared to give Austria-Hungary a decisive start
and virtually to abandon Serbia to her fate. Berchtold
fully recognised this (incidentally he had been expressly
warned of it by Grey), yet he deliberately permitted,
if he did not directly instigate, a bombardment of
Belgrade on 29 July. This was, of course, oil upon the
flames, and forced the Russian Government to act, while
rousing
Russian
public
opinion.
Yet
Conrad
treated
Russia's preparation as sheer aggression, and now pressed
the Ballplatz more urgently than ever to obtain the
Emperor's sanction for a general mobilisation.
At the last moment Berchtold and Stürgkh appear to
have had some misgivings as to the financial consequences
for the Dual Monarchy, but Conrad was not slow to
; remind them that it was now far too late to raise that
issue.
On the same day on which war was declared, Bethmann
Hollweg advised Vienna to renew its assurances that it
would under no circumstances annex Serbian territory,
1 cf. Bethmann Hollweg to Pourtalès, 28 July, D.D., ii., No. 315.
2 Russia acted quite loyally in the whole matter. The Ambassador in Vienna,
Shebeko, notified his colleague, Tschirschky, on 28 July, that the military districts
of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan were being mobilised. Conrad, op. cit.,
iv., p. 142. In St. Petersburg itself, on 29 July, Sazonov was quite frank to
Pourtalès, explaining that as Vienna had mobilised eight corps, Russia was
obliged to mobilise in the districts next to the Austrian frontier. See Pourtalès
to Berlin, 29 July D.D., ii., No. 343; Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 29
July, ibid, No. 385. On the same day General Chelius is quite emphatic that
Russia does not want war, but feels keenly the unjust treatment of Serbia (ibid,
No. 344).
277
and would only occupy it temporarily, pending satisfac-
tion of its demands. But this advice, which of course
involved a renewal of direct negotiations between Vienna
and St. Petersburg, was given in so half-hearted a manner
as to rob it of much of its effect. 1
The news of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on
Serbia rendered action on the part of Russia absolutely
inevitable, and there can
be
little doubt that the
bombardment of Belgrade, which soon followed, was
deliberately intended in Vienna to diminish the chances
of peace by rousing Russia still further. The effect was
automatic.
To
Vienna's
mobilisation
of
eight
army
corps on 24 July, St. Petersburg merely replied by
certain preliminary measures of precaution, and though
it was decided in " principle " to mobilise the four
military districts nearest to Austria-Hungary, the actual
order was not given. But when the news of war came,
the army chiefs pressed the Tsar to order a general
mobilisation. As the result of statements made by the
then Minister of War, General Suhomlinov, on his disgrace
and trial, it was for some time believed that the Tsar
yielded to this pressure, but changed his mind the same
day, and that his revocation of the original order was
simply disregarded. But even Suhomlinov himself has
now abandoned this version, of which there is no trace
in his Memoirs, published in Germany in 1924,2 and it
now appears definitely established that on 29 July the
Tsar upheld his opposition to a general mobilisation, but
consented to a partial mobilisation.3 Though there is
no written record of the motives underlying this decision,
the only explanation that will fit all the facts is that it
1 D.D., ii., No. 323, Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 28 July. " In doing
so you will carefully avoid creating the impression that we wish to hold back
Austria." cf. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 423.
2 Erinnerungen, pp. 353-71.
3 The earlier thesis may be found in Hoeniger, Russlands Vorbereitung zum
Weltkriege (1919). but this is out of date since the publication of General Dobro-
rolski's Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee (1922). Much the best summary
of the evidence on this whole question is that contained in chapters viii. and
x. of Renouvin's Les Causes Immédiates de la Guerre (1925).
278
was
prompted
by
Austria-Hungary's
declaration
of
war upon Serbia. This is shown very clearly by the
despatch
of
the
German
Military
Attaché, General
Chelius, to his Government in Berlin.1
A LAST ATTEMPT IN ROME
One final effort was made by Sir Edward Grey to
avert the catastrophe. News had reached London that
Mr. Mihajlovic, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Rome,
had informed San Giuliano2 that Serbia might still be
prepared to accept even Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian
Note if only some definition could be reached as to the
share of Austro-Hungarian agents in the investigations on
Serbian soil, and that he had gone on to suggest the
negotiation of this point through the Great Powers, so
as to save the necessity for direct Austro-Serbian dis-
cussions.
San
Giuliano
was
naturally
encouraged
by
this
proposal, but his hopes were speedily dashed when
he
talked
with
the
Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador
next day. For Mérey, discussing the possibility of a
pledge by Austria-Hungary not to acquire territory at
Serbia's expense, made it quite clear that no such under-
taking could be given, " since Austria-Hungary could not
foresee whether during the war she might not be forced,
against her will, to retain Serbian territories."3
Meanwhile the news of Mihajlovic's step in Rome,
when transmitted to London, encouraged Grey to urge
once more upon Lichnowsky on the morning of the 29th
the need for some moderating influence in Vienna, since
he saw clearly that " unless Austria-Hungary were ready
1 D.D., ii., No. 344 (29 July).
2 Who specially asked Sir R. Rodd to transmit to London. See B.D.C., No. 64.
3This conversation was revealed by Signor Salandra in a speech made on
the Capitol on 2 June, 1915. He was answering the assertion publicly made
by Count Tisza that such a pledge had been given. It is only fair to add that
this represented Tisza's wishes (as revealed at the Joint Council of 19 July> s^e
supra, p. 200), but not those of his colleagues. See Bertrand, L'Autriche a voulu
la Grande Guerre, p. 66.
279
to discuss the Serbian Question, the world-war would be
inevitable."1 In the afternoon he had a further con-
versation with Lichnowsky, in which, in his anxiety for
a compromise, he abandoned his previous opposition to
the occupation of Belgrade, and suggested this as a kind
of hostage which Austria might hold in her hands pending
a diplomatic settlement of her quarrel with Serbia.2
For the first time a pacific proposal carries real weight
in Berlin, and Bethmann Hollweg that same evening3
wires
to
Tschirschky
the
Mihajlovió proposal and
Lichnowsky’s and Grey’s comments on it, and bids him
tell Berchtold that „ we regard such a surrender of Serbia
as a suitable basis for negotiations, subject to the
occupation of Serbian territory as pledge (Faustpfand).“
Even the German military chiefs blew cold, for Captain
Fleischmann,
Conrad’s
Intelligence
&
nbsp; Officer
in
Berlin,
wired to his chief that Moltke did not regard, the Russian
ispatched n as a reason for Austria-Hungary following
suit, and begged him not to declare war on Russia but to
await her attack.« To this Conrad wired back, „ We
shall not declare war on the Russians, and shall not
begin war.”
It was at this moment that the Tsar ispatched his
telegram to William II urging that the Austro-Serbian
problem should be referred to the Hague Tribunal/
and William, despite frivolous comments upon it,« did
actually telegraph to Francis Joseph in a moderating
sense.7
1 Lichnowsky to Berlin, 29 July (2.8 p.m.), D.D., ii.. No. 357.
2
ibid., 29 July, (6.39 p.m.), D.D., ii., No. 368. This is the document in
which Grey's honest plan for Anglo-German co-operation is unfolded, and on
which William II's most famous marginalia are to be found, where for instance
he calls Grey " the common swindler " and " common cur " (gemeiner Hunds-
fott) and comments " ultra-mean and Mephistophelian, but thoroughly English,"
or again, " With such rascals (Haliunkén) I'll never make a naval agreement."
3
The telegram was ispatched from Berlin half an hour after midnight (i.e.
12.30 a.m. on 30 July), D.D., ii., No. 384.
4 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 152.
5 D.D., ii-, No. 366, 29 July.
6 Nanu I " (which can only be translated by " What-hoi I don't think ")
and a series of notes of exclamation.
7 D.D., ii., No. 437, 30 July.
280
It seems probable that the Mihajlovic project and the
Tsar's appeal, combined with the strong protests of Italy
against Vienna's action, the certainty that Italy would
both remain neutral and demand compensation, and the
dislocating effect of all this upon the plans of the German
General Staff, produced in the Emperor William a passing
pacific mood, and this was the impression left upon Berch-
told in Vienna. This impression was doubtless increased
by the very outspoken message delivered to him by
Tschirschky in Bethmann Hollweg's name on 30 July.
The Chancellor had waited two whole days at a time of
supreme crisis, without any response from Vienna to his
appeal for direct Austro-Russian negotiations. He was
now at last roused sufficiently to describe this as "a
grave mistake," which " positively is provoking warlike
action on the part of Russia." " We are ready/' he
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