Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  On the way up the river, Grant ran close to the shore at Crump's Landing to communicate with General Wallace. Grant directed Wallace to prepare his troops to move and Wallace responded that his troops were ready to move at once. Until he reached the field at Pittsburg, Grant was uncertain whether Crump's Landing was the enemy's ultimate objective.

  Grant arrived at Pittsburg Landing about 8 A.M. that morning. Almost two hours had elapsed since breakfast had been interrupted by the sounds of battle.

  The approximate size of the two forces was discussed previously, but is worth reviewing. Grant had approximately 37,000 men on site at Pittsburg Landing when attacked by the rebels. Johnston had between 40,000 and 45,000 men in his attacking force. This is contrary to most historical accounts about Grant. After all, he defeated his opponents because he had more men and supplies. This is what has been taught over the years. Regretfully, much of what many historians have handed down to the public concerning Grant is myth and legend. In fact, when Grant was attacked on April 6th, he was outnumbered by a ratio of about 1.15 to 1 men. For comparison purposes, at Gettysburg, Meade outnumbered Lee, 85,000 to 65,000 men, or a ratio of about 1.3 to 1.

  To reiterate, this was not the first time Grant had been outnumbered. At Fort Donelson, he invested the fort with 15,000 men, while inside the fort was a rebel force of approximately 18,000 men. Historians point to Grant's force on the day of the surrender when they talk of how many men he had at Fort Donelson. By that time he had approximately 27,000 men. Grant was initially the underdog at Fort Donelson by a ratio of 1.2 to 1. A further example of how statistics have been used to distort the facts about Grant and are still being used that way today is an incident the author experienced while in a book store in Austin, Texas. While perusing books on the Civil War I discovered a book entitled, The Civil War Quiz Book. This book was published between 1990 and 1992 which meant that it was a recent publication. The book contained many questions about the Civil War and multiple choice answers to those questions. One question concerned the number of Confederate soldiers at Fort Donelson when Grant surrounded the fort with his army of 40,000 men. This is entirely incorrect. As stated previously, he had 15,000 when the fort was surrounded on February 12th and 22,000 by the evening of February 14th. When the fort surrendered on February 16th, 1862, his force numbered 27,000. There were never 40,000 Union men at Fort Donelson. Grant may have had 40,000 men in his district, but they were not at Fort Donelson.

  Incidents such as this are all too frequent, not only in historical analysis, but also in the media. When publications are printed with inaccuracies, it tends to perpetuate myths and legends which are false. It is for reasons such as these that this book was written.

  Suffice it to say that Grant was initially outnumbered at Shiloh as he had been at Fort Donelson and later would be again during the Vicksburg campaign. The fact he overcame these obstacles to record incredible triumphs serve as a tribute to his military genius.

  The Battle of Shiloh began about 5:15 A.M. the morning of April 6th. The Southern forces moved upon the Yankee positions from the southwest which was their only avenue of approach, so the battle started along Sherman's and Prentiss's fronts. For being taken by surprise, the Federals were remarkably prepared. In fact, Colonel Peabody of the 25th Missouri regiment had his skirmishers up and out before daybreak. His patrols first encountered the lead elements of the enemy in Fraley's field at 5:15 A.M. The Union skirmishers were quickly driven in and before long the rebels were hotly pressing the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss. It was not long before the Confederates emerged from the woods that Sherman's eyes were finally opened.

  As soon as Grant determined this was an attack on Pittsburg Landing and not a feint, he ordered Captain Baxter of his staff to go back to Crump's Landing and order General Wallace to make all haste to Pittsburg Landing by the road closest to the river.

  One of the first sights greeting Grant upon his arrival at Pittsburg, was the dismaying spectacle of stragglers moving toward the landing en masse. This was not an unusual occurrence during the Civil War, but the assemblage of such a large body of troops at one location made the situation appear worse than normal. The mass of soldiers assembled along the riverbank occurred due to the shape of the battlefield. Remember from the earlier discussion that the Shiloh battlefield was bordered by the Tennessee River and two creeks which were swollen. The only other avenue of escape was to the southwest where the enemy was located and these soldiers wanted nothing to do with them. The sole remaining route of escape out of harm's way was the landing, so the men crouched along the river bank at that location. The stragglers were both disorganized and scared. Perhaps Grant was correct the most important behavior any commander could instill into untrained soldiers was drill and discipline.

  One of the first orders of business for Grant was ordering ammunition for the men at the front, so he put his staff to work immediately making the necessary arrangements. Grant probably recalled Fort Donelson where the men gave a good account of themselves until they ran out of ammunition.

  Next, Grant seized the 15th and 16th Iowa regiments which had just disembarked at the landing, and ordered them to form a line across the landing to halt the flow of stragglers.

  Before long, he was off to the front to get a bird's eye view of the situation. What he found was the Confederates had made a massive frontal attack upon Sherman and Prentiss, both of whose divisions contained raw, untested troops. The rebel onslaught soon caused both divisions to give way. Prentiss was forced back from his original camps about 9 A.M., while Sherman was able to hold his original position until about 10 A.M. Remember initial contact with the enemy was made at 5:15 A.M. Despite the unquestioned surprise of the National forces, it took the Confederates over five hours to drive the Federals from their original camps, a distance of less than one mile.

  McClernand and Hurlbut's divisions, which were to the rear of Sherman and Prentiss, moved up to support the divisions bearing the mighty onslaught. Soon W.H.L. Wallace’s division, which had been held in reserve, was also moved to the front to support the center of the Union line.

  The Confederates attacked in a formation of three lines of approximately equal strength. Each line of attack was separated from the next by about 500 yards. Hardee commanded the first line, Bragg, the second and Polk, the third. Breckinridge's division was held in reserve.

  As the attack progressed, the rebel commanders decided this type of formation was incompatible with the wooded and broken terrain. As the three divisions became entangled , the Confederate generals decided to divide the mass of men by Hardee taking command of the left, Polk, the center and Bragg, the right.

  Hardee, commanding the Confederate left, made several attempts to turn the National right flank under Sherman, but was repulsed. Early in the day, some of the raw regiments, particularly Sherman's left and Prentiss's right, broke and fled en masse toward the rear. These formed many of the stragglers Grant encountered on his arrival at the landing. Many of these soldiers later spread malicious gossip about the disaster that had befallen the National forces at Shiloh.

  During the initial stages of the battle, the Federal defense line ran approximately from northwest to southeast. As the fighting continued, the Union right under Sherman and McClernand gave ground grudgingly, while the Union left under Prentiss, Wallace and Hurlbut were driven back further. By late morning, Grant had stabilized his defense line on an axis which ran primarily from west to east. In other words, from the initial shots of the battle about 5:15 A.M., until late morning, the Union right had fallen back about one-half mile, while the National left had been driven over one mile from their original positions.

  By late morning, the Union line was being anchored in the center by Generals Prentiss and W.H.L. Wallace at the Hornet's Nest. When Grant visited Prentiss he told him to hold that position at all hazards. Prentiss did exactly that and bought Grant six hours to form an impenetrable line of defense to his rear.

  The Hornet's Nest was an incr
edibly strong position situated in the middle of a thick growth of forest. The Federal line of defense through this area of the battlefield ran along an eroded wagon trail which later was known as the Sunken Road. The Yankees took positions directly behind the road in the thick woods. They could fire and hide behind the trees while they reloaded. Conversely, the enemy had to attack across a completely open field overgrown in tall grass. The rebels made eleven separate attacks on the Hornet's Nest during the next six hours. It was not until the Southern General Daniel Ruggles brought up 62 cannon to bombard the Union positions that the Confederates were able to capture this location. At 5:30 P.M., the rebels made their last attempt under cover of artillery. General Prentiss was forced to surrender what remained of his division, some 2100 troops, following the last attack. Prentiss had held for six hours as the forces on both his flanks were slowly driven back. Prentiss's position had become an untenable outpost entirely cut off from all other parts of the Union army.

  Grant wrote in his memoirs: "with the exception of a few minutes after the capture of Prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg." 37

  About midday, Grant placed two regiments of infantry at the bridge crossing Owl Creek to hold the bridge for the arrival of General Lew Wallace. Numerous times he sent messengers to urge Generals Nelson and Lew Wallace to make haste. As it turned out, Wallace had taken the wrong road. It should have taken Wallace a couple hours to march his command the five miles from Crump's to Pittsburg. Considering General Wallace had been notified to begin his march about 8 A.M., he should easily have arrived at Pittsburg no later than noon, but due to his marching off in the wrong direction he did not reach the battlefield until 7 P.M. that evening.

  General Nelson had been ordered to march to the opposite side of the river across from Pittsburgh at around 7 A.M. the morning of the 6th. For some inexplicable reason, Nelson failed to start before 1:30 P.M.

  While being hard pressed by the enemy during the day, Grant rode from place to place conferring with his division commanders. During these movements, he was accompanied by two or three staff officers instead of the veritable parade which usually attended most commanding officers. He rode leisurely about displaying his imperturbable countenance. He was always cool as a cucumber in battle and he felt the sight helped reassure the men.

  Grant wrote Buell another letter about midday and sent it off to Savannah with a staff officer.

  Pittsburg, April 6th 1862

  Comd.g Officer

  Advance Forces Near Pittsburg, Ten.

  Gen.

  The attack on my forces has been very spirited from early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field leaving all your baggage on the East bank of the river it will be a move to our advantage and possibly save the day to us.

  The rebel forces is estimated at over 100,000 men.

  My Hd Qrs. will be in the log building on top of the hill where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to your place on the field.

  Respectfully &c

  U. S. GRANT

  Maj. Gen. 38

  Grant visited all five division commanders throughout the day. His admiration for Sherman and the close relationship of the two commanders stemmed from the visits he made to Sherman on this day. Sherman was cool under fire and his command gave ground grudgingly throughout the day. Sherman was wounded twice in the hand and shoulder, but stayed at the helm. He also had a number of horses shot out from under him that day. Grant later said in his memoirs: "I never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman." 39

  With such an able commander holding his right flank, Grant was able to concentrate his energies elsewhere. He felt that he could only get a feel for how the battle was going by being at the front. Needless to say, he was under fire all day while, his staff concerned for his safety, tried to nudge him toward safer positions.

  Between 1 P.M. and 2 P.M., General Buell arrived at the landing. Grant went there to meet him to discuss the situation. Buell was very distressed by the sight of so many stragglers around the landing. Supposedly Buell asked Grant, "What preparations have you made for retreating, General?" 40 Grant's response, according to bystanders, was typical Grant and showed the difference between him and other lesser generals, "I haven't despaired of whipping them yet." 41

  Whether these quotations are correct could only be known by those present, but the tone of the meeting between the two commanders is abundantly clear. The personalities and dispositions of these two men could not be more dissimilar. Buell, who was typical of many of the Northern commanders, was more concerned with not losing a battle rather than winning one. Grant, on the other hand, thought the best defense was a good offense. While, he openly displayed his confidence and optimism, deep down he felt a firm conviction in the righteousness of his cause and knew he would inevitably triumph. When the meeting concluded, Buell hurried off to accelerate the movement of his army toward Pittsburg.

  At 2:30 in the afternoon, General Johnston, the Confederate commander, was shot and mortally wounded. Some claimed if he had not died the Southerners would have won at Shiloh. It is the opinion of the author that Albert Sidney Johnston's supposed military genius was grossly overrated. J.F.C. Fuller had this to say about Johnston. "Johnston's generalship was of the most meagre order. In fact, from the opening of the battle until his death, he behaved more like a gallant regimental commander than a general." 42 If this display was an isolated instance it would be easier to defend Johnston's actions and generalship, but remember his actions during the attack on Fort Donelson reflected poorly on his judgment as well. The fact that he did not move to Fort Donelson with his entire command, as Beauregard suggested, and confront Grant before he arrived at Donelson is cause to question his generalship. In addition, the people he chose to command at Fort Donelson were beyond comprehension. In the final analysis, Johnston was killed near the Peach Orchard while trying to orchestrate an attack on the Union left flank. At about 2:30 that afternoon, command passed to Beauregard.

  As mentioned earlier, Prentiss was forced to surrender at the Hornet's Nest about 5:30 P.M. This had given Grant time to form his final line of defense. He had his chief of artillery Colonel J. D. Webster form his final defense line to cover two vital points. One was Pittsburg Landing and the other was the bridge over Snake Creek where Lew Wallace's troops would have to cross. Colonel Webster assembled 53 pieces of artillery of all types and calibers along this line. In addition, the navy was able to supply extra firepower from the gunboats Tyler and Lexington.

  The final rebel attacks of the day were made upon the Federal flanks about sunset, but were easily repulsed by the powerful line of guns located on the heights.

  Catton, in his narrative described the Union situation during the final rebel attacks of the day. This incident is vintage Grant and perfectly describes his incredible fortitude. "A newspaper correspondent saw Grant sitting his horse in the midst of all this, apparently unruffled. News of Prentiss's surrender had spread and most of the men around the landing were very gloomy, and someone found the nerve to ask Grant if he did not think the situation extremely dark. Oh no, said Grant. They can't break our lines tonight--it is too late. Tomorrow we shall attack them with fresh troops and drive them, of course.

  The correspondent, describing this incident, said long afterward that from that moment I never doubted Grant would be recognized not only as a great soldier but a great man." 43

  Now that the Confederate offensive had been halted, it is time to recap Grant's actions during the day. Critics have faulted Grant for what they feel was his lack of adding anything to the Union efforts of the 6th. Contrast these actions with those of Johnston who was involved in leading only a portion of his army instead of being concerned with the whole. Fuller describes Grant's conduct during the
entire day of April 6th.

  1) Remembering his lesson at Fort Donelson, he at once organized ammunition trains.

  2) The 23rd Missouri regiment he hurried forward to reinforce Prentiss.

  3) The 15th and 16th Iowa regiments he directed to form line, arrest the stragglers, and reorganize them as a reserve.

  4) He then rode to the front after sending word to Lewis Wallace and Nelson to advance forthwith.

  5) He visited Hurlbut's, W.H.L. Wallace's, and Prentiss's divisions.

  6) At 10 a.m. he visited Sherman and McClernand, and finding them short of ammunition sent an aide back to send more forward.

  7) He next formed up a large number of stragglers, and constantly under fire, visited every part of the field.

  8) Then he sent back to urge on Lewis Wallace and Nelson. The first had taken the wrong road, and the second in place of marching at 7 a.m. did not start until 1:30 p.m.!

  9) To make up for their delay he sent an order to General Wood of Buell's army to march his division with all speed to Savannah, and arranged for transports to meet him there.

  10) He wrote a message to Buell to urge him on.

  11) He ordered two Iowa regiments to reinforce McClernand.

  12) Between 1 and 2 p.m. he returned to the Landing, and met General Buell on the steamer Tigress.

  13) Then he once again rode to the front to Snake Creek, and sent an aide to find General Wallace and guide him to the battlefield.

  14) At 3 p.m. he ordered forward the 81st Ohio regiment, and placed it in position.

  15) Then he once again visited Sherman, who, in his Memoirs, says: "He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win."

  16) After this he rode back to the Landing and was present on the left when the final attack was made.

  17) Then he placed in position the two leading regiments of Nelson's division.