Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  18) Finally, at nightfall, he sent an order to all his divisional commanders to be ready early on the 7th to push out a heavy line of skirmishers followed by entire divisions at supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. 44

  Grant accomplished all those activities while he was lame from his horse falling on him the night of Friday, April 4th.

  While Fuller did an excellent job of describing Grant's hectic day, alas, the list is not complete. Fuller failed to mention that Grant made several visits to the various divisions during the day, although he did mention Grant's two visits to Sherman. Fuller also omitted reference to the arrangements Grant may have made concerning the final defense line of Colonel Webster. Surely Fuller only wanted to mention significant events, but trust that the final line of defense constitutes that.

  Remember Fuller's description of the Confederate General Johnston. Fuller said that Johnston acted "more like a gallant regimental commander than a general." This makes the comparison with Grant more poignant. Grant was obviously in charge and displayed masterful insight as an overall commander. He was constantly hurrying forward reinforcements, filling the gaps in the line with fresh troops, supplying ammunition to all parts of the line while and providing stoic leadership and encouragement to his men. He also had the presence of mind to plan the attack for the following day's actions. He planned to take the offensive whether Buell's army arrived or not. One additional fact to remember is that Grant was significantly outnumbered during the first day’s battle and still was not driven from the field.

  As April 6th drew to a close, the first regiments of Nelson's division arrived at Pittsburg. Grant placed the two regiments himself on the extreme left of the line. They were in place during the final rebel assault of the day.

  Shortly after dark, Lew Wallace's division came marching into camp and was placed in line. Grant now had fresh forces in hand and planned to make the enemy pay on the morrow.

  Catton offers some anecdotes which displays Grant's strength of character during the tumultuous day of April 6th. One occurred as Grant prepared his final line of defense. As Webster hurried his cannons into line Rawlins asked Grant: "Do you think they are pressing us, General?" Grant replied casually: "They have been pressing us all day, John, but I think we will stop them here." 45

  "The danger had passed, but not everyone was ready to recognize the fact. A surgeon in the 55th Illinois, which had been drawn up in support of the line of guns, found Grant nearby and ventured to remark: General, things are going decidedly against us today. Grant told him: Not at all, sir. We are whipping them there now. The doctor, with some reason, felt that not another man in the army would have said that just then." 46

  That night Grant's line was perpendicular to the river and ran due west from the landing. The night brought incessant rain and bone chilling cold as the dark spring night soaked the weary soldiers.

  Grant sought shelter and rest at his headquarters but was unable to find peace because his headquarters had been transformed into a hospital full of suffering men. In Grant's words: "The sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire and I returned to my tree in the rain." 47 Grant spent the night in the rain under that tree. He had previously ordered the navy to fire a salvo at the enemy at fifteen minute intervals throughout the night to prevent their sleeping. Under these conditions, it is doubtful if anyone rested that night.

  Early in the evening, Colonel McPherson found Grant to report on his inspection of the lines. "Grant greeted him with a cheerful: Well, Mac, how is it? McPherson was not encouraging; at least a third of the army was out of action, he said, and all the rest were disheartened. Grant said nothing, and McPherson sought to prompt him by asking: General Grant, under this condition of affairs, what do you propose to do, sir? Shall I make preparations for retreat? Grant snapped back: Retreat? No. I propose to attack at daylight and whip them." 48

  Little did McPherson know that Grant had already told Sherman to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning. According to Sherman's memoirs, this conversation occurred during Grant's second visit with him just prior to sunset. At nightfall, Grant informed the other division commanders of his desire to assume the offensive at daybreak.

  Of course, McPherson knew nothing about this. McPherson was a brave and courageous officer, so for him to counsel retreat, the situation must have appeared very grave.

  Another detail to note is Grant ordered the offensive for April 7th prior to Lew Wallace's arrival and without knowing if all of Buell's forces would be ready for action in the morning. All Grant ever wanted was an even fight and in this case, even if the enemy still had a numerical advantage, he intended to attack and win.

  Later that night Sherman dropped by to see Grant. Sherman, who was one tough old bird, came by to counsel retreat. He found him standing next to his tree, drenched, smoking a cigar and holding a lantern. When Sherman saw the look of determination on Grant's face he was moved to forget his original purpose. As he approached he said: "Well, Grant, we've had the devil's own day, haven't we? Grant replied: Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though." 49

  On April 7th, Beauregard’s headquarters was located at Shiloh Church. Many of the Confederates spent the previous night in the original Federal camps. Because the rebels had moved back from the positions they occupied at the close of action on April 6th, the naval bombardment had little effect, except to keep everyone awake on both sides.

  Beauregard and Johnston had hoped to rout Grant before he could receive reinforcements from Buell. If they had been facing any other Union commander, they would have succeeded. Unknown to Beauregard, most of Buell's army had reached Pittsburg and were in place in the National line. On April 7th, the odds would be heavily in the Union's favor. Grant's forces now numbered about 55,000 men, while Beauregard could only muster about 30,000. With the odds so much in the favor of the Federals, it speaks well of Beauregard's generalship that the Confederate forces did as well as they did.

  As April 7th dawned, the two armies were arrayed as follows. In the Union line, left to right was: McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman and Lew Wallace. The two divisions of Prentiss and W.H.L. Wallace, or what remained, were divided between Sherman, Hurlbut and McClernand. In the Confederate line, left to right were: Bragg, Polk, Breckinridge and Hardee.

  At about 6 A.M., Beauregard's men began their offensive. It did not take them long to come to conclude Grant had been reinforced during the night. All day, the Northerners pushed the rebels back across the fields that had seen such desperate fighting the day before. Today, the Yankees had the advantage. The Confederates gave ground grudgingly and even counterattacked at one point, but the Federals were just too strong for them.

  Although the fighting on the 7th resembled the fighting of the day before, on the whole it was not as intense. The fighting was similar with regard to being a series of small actions happening simultaneously.

  About 2 P.M., Beauregard realized the Yankee advantage in numbers would inexorably pulverize his army, so the Confederates began their retreat leaving Breckinridge as the rear guard. By 3 P.M. the Southerners were in full retreat toward Corinth.

  The Battle of Shiloh came to a close as a decided Union victory. To date, it was the costliest battle ever fought on the North American continent. The Federals suffered approximately 13,000 casualties, while the rebel losses were between 10,000 and 11,000.

  As the battle drew to a close, General Grant’s failure to pursue the enemy raised many eyebrows. Before we examine this criticism, and there are many critics (Ropes, Fuller and McFeely), there is one item to consider. All the critics point out that it is a military axiom to pursue a defeated foe and so it is. In their zeal for criticism, however, they forget who it is they are criticizing. Ulysses S. Grant is probably the most aggressive general in the history of the United States Army and possibly in the history of the world. The critics find themselves in the position of criticizing the most aggressive general in history for not being as a
ggressive as they think he should have been. There is something twisted in that logic.

  Adam Badeau addressed this issue in an excerpt in his book and Grant confirmed the incident in his memoirs. This incident took place late on April 7th with the enemy in full retreat. "Grant rode along in the piece of woods, towards the left, where he met Generals McCook and Crittenden. The day was far spent, the rebels effectually repulsed, and still retreating. Grant was anxious to press their broken legions further, and so told the two division commanders of Buell's army. But those officers at once protested. It must be their forces which should pursue, for the men who had been disorganized so greatly, as Sunday's fight would have disorganized the finest soldiers, were in no condition to follow, even in the elation of victory. But McCook and Crittenden declared that their troops, also, were exhausted; they had marched, if they had not fought, the day before, and the two generals assured their commander that the weariness of his reinforcements allowed no pursuit. A heavy rain was falling; it was difficult to follow in the darkness and wet, and the army, fatigued with its exertions, went into camp. Two brigades of Wood's division, of the Army of the Ohio, which had just arrived, and a portion of Sherman's command, were sent out to ascertain the direction of Beauregard's retreat, which did not cease till the rebels got back to Corinth; but the pursuit was short and desultory, and the weary hosts, that had been engaged in battle more than twenty hours rested from their labors." 50

  The corroborating story of the pursuit is given in Sherman's memoirs in his report of the Battle of Shiloh to Rawlins dated April 10, 1862. The report of the pursuit is dated April 8, 1862. In short, the Federal pursuit ran into the rear guard under Nathan Bedford Forrest and failed to press their advantage. This is somewhat of a surprise because Sherman was in charge of the pursuit on the 8th.

  To the critics who charged Grant with the sin of failing to pursue the enemy, it may be worthwhile to revisit a quote from a letter to Julia dated February 24, 1862. "These terrible battles are very good things to read about for persons who loose no friends but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of it as possible." 51 In other words, it is very easy to write about these events one month, one year, ten years or 100 years after the fact and offer criticisms, but for those who have not participated in those types of activities, their criticisms ring hollow.

  Once again, the ever truthful Grant offered the reason for lack of a more aggressive pursuit. In his memoirs, Grant offered this reasoning: "I wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did not feel disposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, to pursue." 52 So much for Grant's lack of compassion and his historical reputation as a butcher.

  Considering the situation, Grant's logic and reasoning for not pursuing is perfectly correct. No one ever had to tell U. S. Grant when to pursue, he knew he should have and made an attempt to do so, but sometimes your heart has to win out over your head. Instead of criticism, Grant should have been commended for keen insight and taking care of his troops' well-being. In the end, he took full responsibility for failing to pursue as aggressively as he should.

  Grant has been charged with many failings concerning his generalship at Shiloh. His lack of entrenchment, lack of pursuit and his failure to be at the site when the fighting began have already been examined. The last charge leveled against Grant was the question of surprise.

  The question of Grant being surprised at Shiloh echoed throughout the land almost before the battle had concluded. The story of great surprise, men being shot in their beds, others at breakfast and general unpreparedness was brought off the battlefield by a reporter for the Cincinnati Gazette. He portrayed a shocking story of gross incompetence and bungling on the part of the Union forces. The public bought the story hook, line and sinker and many of the tales live as folklore today.

  Grant never admitted to being surprised at Shiloh. In fact, he maintained that he failed to see how his forces could have been any more prepared. Remember the earlier correspondence concerning fortifications versus drill and discipline. Remember Grant's admonishments to the various commanders regarding making every effort to be prepared in case of attack. Recall Grant's letter to Buell the morning of April 6th, where he stated he had been expecting an attack but not before Monday or Tuesday. Remember Grant's strong inclination to tell the truth. If the question was, General Grant were you surprised by the Confederate attack on April 6th? Then General Grant would be telling the truth by disavowing surprise.

  Most historians examining the issue have come to the conclusion that Grant was surprised and was just too proud or embarrassed to admit it.

  The actual question to General Grant should have been, were you surprised by the magnitude of the Confederate attack on April 6th? To this, Grant most assuredly would have answered, yes!

  Remember, Grant maintained that his mission was an offensive one and the Federal forces would have to go to Corinth to meet the enemy. As when the rebels attacked him at Fort Donelson, he never believed that they would have the audacity to come out from behind their fortifications to launch an offensive against him. Especially when they knew he would attack them if they waited.

  Recall Grant's correspondence with Halleck dated April 5th. He said he could scarcely believe an attack (general one) would be made against him. Grant was also quoted as saying, "I did not believe, however, that they intended to make a determined attack but were simply making reconnaissances in force." 53

  So the question of surprise is easily answered. Grant was truthful when he said he was not surprised, but it is equally true that they asked the wrong question. Was Grant surprised by the magnitude of the attack? Unquestionably!

  Arthur L. Conger summed up this question in fine fashion. "It may seem difficult to reconcile the statement, I have been looking for this, etc., with his previously expressed views, if we assume Grant to mean by it that he has been looking for a combined attack by every man Johnston could rake and scrape between the Cumberland and the Mississippi. If, however, we recall his orders of April 4 to both Sherman and W.H.L. Wallace (2nd Division) to be prepared in case of an attack to go to assist Lew Wallace's 3rd Division, more or less isolated at Crump's Landing, and take it in the sense that Grant has been expecting a minor surprise attack on his one detached division and suppose that is what has come, it accords with both what he has written and the measures he has taken. It should be remembered that he has had no word from Pittsburg, has no telegraph line there, and that the sound of firing would come from the same direction from either Pittsburg or Crump's." 54

  On April 7th, Grant notified Halleck about what had happened.

  BY TELEGRAPH FROM Pittsburg Tennessee 7th April 1862

  To Maj Gen Halleck

  Yesterday the rebels attacked us here with an overwhelming force driving our troops in from their advanced position nearer to the landing--General Wallace was immy. ordered up from Crump's landing and in the evening one division of Buell's Army and D. C. Buell in person arrived, during the night one other division arrived, and still another today. This morning at the break of day I ordered an attack which resulted in a fight that continued until late this afternoon with a very heavy loss on both sides but a complete repulse of the enemy. I shall follow tomorrow far enough to see that no immediate renewal of attack is contemplated

  U S GRANT 55

  On April 8th, Grant kept Halleck informed of what was transpiring.

  BY TELEGRAPH FROM Pittsburg Tenn 186

  To Maj. Genl. Halleck

  Comdg. Dept.

  Enemy badly routed & fleeing towards Corinth Our Cavalry supported by Infy. are now pursuing him with instructions to pursue to the swampy grounds near Pea Ridge. I want transports sent here for our wounded.

  U. S. GRANT

  April 8, 1862 56

  Also on April 8th Grant issued the following congratulatory order to his troops.

  HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST T
ENNESSEE}

  PITTSBURG, April 8, 1862. }

  General Orders, No. 34.

  The general commanding congratulates the troops who so gallantly maintained their position, repulsed and routed a numerically superior force of the enemy, composed of the flower of the Southern army, commanded by their ablest generals, and fought by them with all the desperation of despair.

  In numbers engaged no such contest ever took place on this continent. In importance of result but few such have taken place in the history of the world.

  Whilst congratulating the brave and gallant soldiers, it becomes the duty of the general commanding to make special notice of the brave wounded and those killed upon the field. Whilst they leave friends and relations to mourn their loss, they have won a nation's gratitude and undying laurels not to be forgotten by future generations, who will enjoy the blessings of the best government the sun ever shone upon, preserved by their valor.

  By command of Major-General GRANT.

  John A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 57

  Grant made no official report of the entire Battle of Shiloh, although he did make a report to Department Headquarters on April 9, 1862 concerning the Army of the Tennessee.

  Head Quarters Disct of West Tenn

  Pittsburg April 9th 1862

  Capt N H McLean

  A A Genl Dept of the Mississippi

  Saint Louis. Mo.

  Capt

  It becomes my duty again to report another battle fought between two great armies, one contending for the maintainance of the best Government ever devised the other for its destruction. It is pleasant to record the success of the army contending for the former principle.

  On Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and driven in by the enemy. Immediately the five Divisions stationed at this place were drawn up in line of battle ready to meet them. The battle soon waxed warm on the left and center, varying at times to all parts of the line.