Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  As the Federal forces moved up the Tallahatchie, they encountered a fort on an island formed by the confluence of the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha Rivers. This island stood less than two feet above the current water level in the river, but was fortified and manned. The name of the fort was Fort Pemberton after the Confederate general commanding the forces defending Vicksburg. The conditions surrounding the fort were such as to render an assault by infantry virtually impossible. It would be up to the navy to gain passage beyond the fort. If the navy could not render the fort impotent, the mission would be at an end.

  The navy attacked on March 11th and March 13th, both times at a range of eight or nine hundred yards. Both attacks failed and resulted in one navy vessel being disabled, six men killed and twenty-five wounded. The enemy lost one man killed and twenty wounded.

  The expedition appearing at a dead end, Ross and the fleet made their way back toward the Mississippi. By March 22nd, Ross was back at Yazoo Pass where he met General Quinby who had come to reinforce him. Quinby, being the senior commander, wished to see for himself, but upon inspection of the fort, quickly concluded the task too daunting.

  It was observed that the island upon which the fort was resting was less than two feet above the water level of the river. Therefore, an effort was made by the Nationals to cut a levee on the Mississippi near Helena, Arkansas in an effort to flood the fort. Needless to say, that effort also proved fruitless. This finished the third attempt to turn Vicksburg.

  Grant now turned his attention to an effort up Steele's Bayou toward Yazoo City. This route was thrust upon him due to his concern for Ross's forces near Fort Pemberton in the previous expedition. Grant learned that while Ross was attempting to destroy Fort Pemberton, the rebels were heavily reinforcing their forces at Greenwood near Fort Pemberton. If they proved successful, Ross could easily be surrounded from the nearby riverbanks and be unable to extricate himself without suffering heavy casualties. Therefore, Grant needed to find a way to reinforce Ross and in so doing develop another route to effect a lodgment near Vicksburg. The route Grant wanted investigated was circuitous just like the others. The route began via the Yazoo River to Steele's Bayou, then to Black Bayou, through to Deer Creek, on to Rolling Fork, then to the Big Sunflower River and finally entered the Yazoo River north of Haines Bluff.

  On March 14th, Admiral Porter reconnoitered the streams as far as Deer Creek. His report to Grant was favorable as far as explored. The next day Grant went along with Porter for a look. The route appeared practical to Grant, so he hurried back to Milliken's Bend to hurry up the necessary forces.

  The movement began on March 16th, with Porter's fleet of five ironclads and four mortar-boats. Sherman accompanied Porter with a division of soldiers. Porter's ironclads pushed on through the ever narrowing streams, easily brushing aside trees growing in the river. In some places the channel in which to maneuver was barely wider than the beam of the ships.

  As the expedition passed into Deer Creek progress was severely retarded. At one point, the fleet could only advance four miles in twenty-four hours. Eventually the soldiers had to be removed from the transports and the transports conveyed without the extra weight. Because of this, the fleet was able to advance faster than the troops in the swamps, consequently the fleet advanced some thirty miles ahead of the troops.

  On March 20th, Porter was attacked by about four thousand rebel sharpshooters. The rebels not only stopped the advance in its tracks by firing on the ships, they also cut down huge trees in the front and the rear of the fleet. The Confederates had every intention of wedging the fleet in place and destroying it. The sailors were completely helpless to ward off the sharpshooters, cannons being relatively ineffective against individual soldiers.

  Porter was finally able to send someone back to Sherman for aid. Sherman, who was then at the junction of Black Bayou and Deer Creek, immediately hurried his men forward making a forced march through the night. Sherman arrived the following morning and at once drove off the enemy. This saved the fleet, but it also very clearly demonstrated the impossibility of using this route. Porter had reached a point within a few hundred yards of success. If he had been able to reach the Rolling Fork, it would have been clear sailing from that point. The fleet had to back out of its position into navigable water, but soon it was headed back to Milliken's Bend where it arrived on March 27th. So ended the fourth attempt on Vicksburg and this had proved the most dismal failure to date.

  It was now approaching the end of March. Grant had been in front of Vicksburg for nearly two months with no apparent results. The outcry for Grant's removal from command was growing louder with the same old criticism seen earlier surfacing once again. Grant was being raked over the coals for being slow, stolid, devoid of genius and not up to such an immense task along with the never ending rumor about his drinking.

  Many politicians made the pilgrimage to Vicksburg and then on to Washington to seek Grant's removal. A number of successors were proposed: McClellan, McClernand, Hunter and Fremont, but the one person who stuck by him during this trying time was Abraham Lincoln. After being solicited by someone to remove Grant, Lincoln replied: "I rather like the man; I think we'll try him a little longer." 43

  Even though Lincoln was willing to stand by Grant, he and Stanton decided to send Charles Dana on a mission to report on Grant's situation and the prospects for success. Grant had met Dana the previous year during the Fourth of July celebration in Memphis. Now Dana was on a mission to report back on Grant's fitness to command. As it turned out, this secret mission was the worst kept secret of the war. Supposedly, Dana was on a mission to report on the pay service in the army, but before he left Memphis for Vicksburg Grant was well aware of his purpose. Dana arrived at Grant's headquarters on April 6th and in his normal cordial and magnanimous manner, Grant received him with open arms.

  Years after the war, Dana tried to describe Grant in his book. This description exemplifies the perfect paradox. Dana truly believed Grant to be a common man, certainly nothing out of the ordinary, yet his description totally contradict his beliefs. "Grant was an uncommon fellow - the most modest, the most disinterested and the most honest man I ever knew, with a temper that nothing could disturb and a judgment that was judicial in its comprehensiveness and wisdom. Not a great man except morally; not an original or brilliant man, but sincere, thoughtful, deep and gifted with courage that never faltered; when the time came to risk all, he went in like a simple-hearted, unaffected, unpretending hero, whom no ill omens could deject and no triumph unduly exalt. A social, friendly man, too, fond of a pleasant joke and also ready with one; but liking above all a long chat of an evening, and ready to sit up all night talking in the cool breeze in front of his tent. Not a man of sentimentality, not demonstrative in friendship, but always holding to his friends and just even to the enemies he hated." 44

  The words Dana used in his description plainly describe the characteristics of a great man, yet like so many who met him, came away feeling Grant was nothing out of the ordinary. Not a Washington or Napoleon, for someone with that kind of ability could ever be modest or humble. Yet he was, which partially explains why many historians have failed to recognize Grant's true place in history. Most people would find Grant exceedingly boring.

  Needless to say Dana quickly became a fixture at Grant's headquarters. With reports going back to Washington, describing Grant in terms such as those used above, Lincoln and Stanton's doubts were soon allayed and their support never wavered during the remainder of the Vicksburg campaign.

  Dana was able to soothe Lincoln's mind about Grant, but he had no effect on the negative stories which continued to flow north from Vicksburg.

  One such attack was from the editor of the Cincinnati Gazette. The editor, Murat Halstead, wrote the following to Secretary Chase on February 19, 1863. "There never was a more thoroughly disgusted, disheartened, demoralized army than this is, and all because it is under such men as Grant and Sherman. How is it that Grant who was behind at Ft. Henr
y, drunk at Donelson, surprised and whipped at Shiloh and driven back from Oxford, Miss. is still in command? Gov. Chase, these things are true. Our noble army of the Mississippi is being wasted by the foolish, drunken, stupid Grant. He can't organize or control or fight an army. I have no personal feeling about it, but I know he is an ass." 45

  Another such attack came from a former friend of Grant's, Brigadier-General C. S. Hamilton. Hamilton knew Grant from the old army and had fought under Grant at Iuka and Corinth. On February 11th, Hamilton wrote to Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin about Grant. "You have asked me to write you confidentially. I will now say what I have never breathed. Grant is a drunkard. His wife has been with him for months only to use her influence in keeping him sober. He tries to let liquor alone but he cannot resist the temptation always. When he came to Memphis he left his wife at LaGrange & for several days after getting here was beastly drunk, utterly incapable of doing anything. Quimby and I took him in charge, watching him day & night & keeping liquor away from him & we telegraphed to his wife & brought her on to take care of him." 46

  This was not the picture of Grant being painted by Dana. Dana, who did not know Grant from Adam, had no reason to paint a better picture than the one that actually existed. After the war, upon examination of all the allegations and supporting documentation, it became evident that whenever one of these allegations of impropriety was made, the accuser had somehow run afoul of one of Grant's orders. In the case of Hamilton, he felt he had been unduly passed over in favor of McPherson. Somehow Grant had always wronged his accusers.

  Later in the spring an incident like those just described occurred in Washington. Grant had assigned Chaplain Eaton the task of handling the Negroes in his department. He was in Washington reporting to Lincoln on how his efforts were going. He found Lincoln no longer believed the bogus stories about Grant, probably in no small measure due to the reports of Dana. While, Eaton was with Lincoln, a delegation of congressmen stopped by to urge Lincoln to remove Grant based on the old allegations that he drank too much. Eaton remembered the conversation as follows. Lincoln said: "I then began to ask them if they knew what he drank, what brand of whiskey he used, telling them most seriously that I wished they would find out. They conferred with each other and concluded they could not tell what brand he used. I urged them to ascertain and let me know, for if it made fighting generals like Grant I should like to get some of it for distribution." 47

  Indeed, Grant had come a long way. Not only did Lincoln and others in the administration no longer believe any of these fabrications Lincoln could even joke about them.

  Others who saw Grant during this relatively inactive period were also coming to a similar conclusion. One such person was Mary Livermore, who met Grant for the first time during the winter of 1863. Mrs. Livermore came down the river as part of the Sanitary Commission. She wrote the following about Grant. "Grant was not a drunkard--that was immediately apparent to us. This conviction gave us such a joy that had we been younger we should all, men and women alike, have tossed our hats in the air and hurrahed. As it was, we looked each other in the face and said heartily, 'Thank God!'.....The clear eye, clean skin, firm flesh and steady nerves of General Grant gave the lie to the universal calumnies then current concerning his intemperate habits and those of the officers of his staff. Our eyes had become practiced in reading the diagnosis of drunkenness." 48

  Mrs. Livermore was not the only one beginning to see Grant in another light. A correspondent for the New York World, which had been a big critic of Grant's, sent in the following report. "Gen. Grant still retains his hold upon the affections of his men. His energy and disposition to do something is what they admire in him and he has the remarkable tact of never spoiling any mysterious and vague notions which may be entertained in the minds of the privates as to the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He confines himself to saying as little as possible before his men. No Napoleonic displays, no ostentation, no speech, no superfluous flummery. Thus distance lends enchantment to the view of the man." 49

  Another incident happened during the winter of 1863 which manifested Grant's changing status within the administration. Sherman had a confrontation Mr. Tom Knox a reporter from the New York Herald. Knox had written highly critical articles about Sherman's failure at Chickasaw Bluffs. Knox renewed the charges about Sherman's sanity which emanated from Sherman's days in Louisville, so Sherman had Knox court-martialed for espionage. The court refused to convict Knox of espionage, but the court banned Knox from the vicinity around the army. The press stood by Knox and on March 20th, a press delegation appealed to President Lincoln. Lincoln issued an order revoking the ban and allowing Knox to return to the Vicksburg area, if General Grant approved. Grant did not approve, but told Knox to make his peace with Sherman. Needless to say, Sherman and Knox could not agree, so the ban remained in force.

  Sherman was obviously way out of line in this case, but the important point to remember was not that Grant would not overrule Sherman, but that Lincoln refused to overrule Grant. The days of Grant falling under a cloud had ended. From here on out, the administration was going to stick by Grant no matter what was alleged.

  As April approached, Grant was literally mired in front of Vicksburg. Much of the surrounding country was underwater from the Mississippi overflowing its banks and Grant found himself still searching for dry ground on the eastern bank of the Mississippi. In addition, the Union state of affairs at this time was not good. In December 1862, Burnside had been beaten severely at Fredericksburg and Rosecrans was stopped at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. No doubt, much of the carping being directed at Grant's seeming inactivity was due in part to the anxiety being suffered by Union loyalists.

  On April 2nd, Halleck informed Grant that President Lincoln was becoming anxious about the lack of progress on the Mississippi. On April 9th, Halleck again wrote Grant: "You are too well advised of the anxiety of the government for your success, and its disappointment at the delay, to render it necessary to urge upon you the importance of early action.....I am confident that you will do everything possible to open the Mississippi river." 50

  Remember from earlier in this chapter, in a letter from Grant to Halleck dated January 17, 1863, Grant had advised Halleck he would have to move his forces to a place south of Vicksburg in order for his forces to be effective. Therefore, it became evident early on that Grant was going to have to develop a plan which would accomplish that goal.

  It also was explained earlier in this chapter that Grant had been willing to try any of the other proposed expeditions in an attempt to secure a lodgment on dry ground east of the Mississippi. He did not believe these proposed schemes would work but was more than willing to take full advantage of any success that may be gained if they did.

  By the beginning of April, Grant had developed his plans and was about ready to put them into effect. His plans were to involve experimental approach number five on Fuller's list. Grant detailed his plans in a letter to Halleck dated April 4, 1863. "There is a system of bayous running from Milliken's bend, also from near the river at this point (Young's point) that are navigable for large and small steamers, passing around by Richmond to New Carthage. There is also a good wagon-road from Milliken's bend to New Carthage. The dredges are now engaged cutting a canal from here into these bayous. I am having all the empty coal-boats and other barges prepared for carrying troops and artillery, and have written to Colonel Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to tow them. With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage, and any point south of that.

  My expectation is for some of the naval fleet to run the batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army moves through by this new route. Once there, I will move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the latter. From either of these points, there are good roads to Jackson and Black river bridge, without crossing Black river. I will keep my army together, and see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beat in any other way than a fair fight." 51

  This route was more than just
another of the experimental approaches attempted earlier. Grant mentioned this route as early as February 4th in another letter to Halleck. "There is no question but that this route is much more practicable than the present undertaking, and would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country." 52

  Grant suffered great indignity from the press and politicians during the previous two months, but had suffered in silence biding his time. He touched on the subject in his memoirs answering the critics in his accustomed businesslike manner. "Because I would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty as I understood it, to the best of my ability." 53

  Ulysses had a sensitive side behind the quiet outward appearance. It is evident from the above quotation, written twenty years after the fact, that this criticism hurt him. Even with the pressure coming to bear upon him, he was able to keep focused on his objective and quietly develop his plans.

  As it turned out, not only did the failed attempts to turn Vicksburg work to keep the men healthy and busy, they confused the enemy regarding his true intentions. This worked to Grant's great advantage later.

  Running the Gauntlet

  After the Vicksburg campaign proved a resounding success, there were many who attributed the plan to Sherman or James Harrison Wilson of Grant's staff. Whether he pieced the eventual plan together from conversations with others or conceived the plan entirely on his own is unknown, but one thing is certain and that is Grant did not divulge any of the details of his plan to anyone until the last possible minute.