Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  The proof is flimsy for those who maintained the plan was someone else’s. Badeau stated in his book, the following: "Sherman, McPherson, Logan, Wilson, all opposed--all of course within the proper limits of soldierly subordination, but all with energy." 54 It would be highly illogical that if one of these gentlemen had conceived the plan they would have later protested against that very same plan.

  On April 8, 1863, Sherman sent a letter to Colonel Rawlins offering his advice to Grant. If there was one person's opinion Grant valued, it was Sherman's.

  HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }

  CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, April 8, 1863.}

  Colonel J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant-Adjutant-General to General GRANT.

  SIR: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons which I will not name) that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of the campaign. Unless this be done, there are men who will, in any result falling below the popular standard, claim that their advice was unheeded, and that fatal consequence resulted therefrom. My own opinions are---

  First. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of the other grand armies of the United States.

  Second. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas; supplies collected there while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White, and Madison on the St. Francis River.

  Third. That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchie Rivers, as can be gained and fortified, be held, and the main army be transported thither by land and water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp-road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

  Fourth. That the line of the Yalabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Canton; and, lastly, where the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad crosses the same river (Big Black). The capture of Vicksburg would result.

  Fifth. That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point; this force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg---Haines's Bluff or Yazoo City.

  Sixth. I do doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) as a military channel, to supply an army large enough to operate against Jackson, Mississippi, or the Black River Bridge; and such a channel will be very vulnerable to a force coming from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the lower reach of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River.

  Seventh. The chief reason for operating solely by water was the season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha Rivers. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to hold it and make crops this year.

  I make these suggestions, with the request that General Grant will read them and give them as I know he will, a share of his thought. I would prefer that he should not answer this letter, but merely give it as much or as little weight as it deserves. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous cooperation and energetic support as though conceived by myself. I do not believe General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson this spring. I am, etc.

  W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 55

  This letter from Sherman is interesting for four reasons. The first demonstrates how concerned Sherman was for the failure of the proposed plan. He was concerned not only for the Union cause should the mission fail, but also for the reputation of his close friend. To put something of this nature in writing, in the military, connotes severe apprehension.

  The second reason this letter is interesting is how it established Sherman's thoughts as being diametrically opposed to those of Grant. Sherman steadfastly felt that the National forces should proceed back to Memphis and attempt another overland expedition against Vicksburg from the north using the Mississippi Central as the primary supply line.

  Here Grant demonstrated keen political insight not possessed by his subordinate. As discussed earlier in the chapter, it would have been viewed as a serious setback for the Federal cause if they were seen to be retreating from in front of Vicksburg.

  The third thing to note in Sherman's letter is what he said about Grant in the last paragraph. Grant's character, temperament and management abilities are depicted through the eyes of another. As shown in his willingness to accept others' suggestions during the bayou expeditions, here too, Sherman knew Grant would be willing to listen to other's thoughts.

  The last thing to note about Sherman's letter was his unknowing disclaimer contained in the last paragraph. He stated that whatever plan Grant finally opted for would receive the same zealous support as if it were his own plan. This obviates any later suggestion that Sherman was the one who conceived the plan.

  Sherman stated his willingness to cooperate with whatever plan Grant adopted. He was well acquainted with his friend's strength of character and determination to succeed once he embarked upon a plan of operation.

  One thing was evident and that was once Grant made his decision known to his subordinates, intense but loyal opposition was generated from all. On his shoulders rested the entire responsibility. He would sink or swim based on these plans. If the expedition succeeded, it could be hailed as one of the greatest military operations in the history of mankind. If it failed, the cause of freedom might be forever buried. The risks were high.

  Grant stated in his memoirs: "I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not be undertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start." 56

  Throughout the book it has been shown how Ulysses S. Grant could not tell a lie. It was one of his character traits. Ample testimony from others has been presented to demonstrate that such was the case. When Grant stated he had this plan in mind from the first, it must be taken as the truth. All one has to recall is his correspondence, months earlier, with Halleck where he stated he would have to get his army below Vicksburg to be effective. He may have borrowed bits and pieces of other's ideas from conversations during the previous two months, but there can be no doubt the plan was Grant's.

  Before he told his subordinates of his plan, Grant informed Admiral Porter. He needed Porter's assistance once his troops were south of Vicksburg to transport them to the east side of the river. Unlike his subordinates' stiff opposition, Porter immediately fell in with the plan and set off at once to make preparations to carry out his part.

  With Porter now working on his part, Grant notified his subordinates and began concentrating his forces at Milliken's Bend. McPherson's corps was brought back from Lake Providence and the Yazoo Pass, Sherman's corps from Steele's Bayou and Hurlbut was directed to forward every available man from his command at Memphis.

  Grant had all available barges forwarded from St. Louis and Chicago to ferry the troops across the river when they got below Vicksburg.

  On March 29th, the expedition began with McClernand leading the way from Milliken's Bend to Richmond and west of Roundaway Bayou to New Carthage. The distance was twenty-seven miles, all by circuitous roads barely above the surrounding flood waters. The wagon road was less than two feet above the swampy countryside.

  The ordeal of the previous two months had been such a struggle for Grant he wrote the following
to Halleck. "The embarrassment I have had to contend against, on account of extreme high water, cannot be appreciated by any one not present to witness it." 57

  By April 6th, McClernand reached New Carthage only to find the levee of Bayou Vidal broken and the surrounding territory entirely under water. Soon another route was discovered which emerged at Perkin's plantation some twelve miles south of New Carthage.

  The march from Milliken's Bend to Perkin’s plantation amounted to about forty miles over tortuous roads. Four bridges had to be constructed further reducing the possibility of success. On top of this, the plan called for shallow transports to be conveyed to carry vital supplies. The idea being that water transportation along this series of bayous would be much easier than along the muddy wagon road. Grant had been fighting flooding for months, but now, when the transports were to begin carrying supplies, the Mississippi receded, leaving the bayous much too shallow for the intended purpose. So far, nothing was going according to plan.

  During the middle of April, in an effort to deceive the enemy and disguise his true intentions, Grant had General Steele's division of Sherman's corps sent 150 miles north of Vicksburg to the Deer Creek area. Once there, Steele was to feign a movement inland and wreak havoc upon the country.

  Indeed, this was not the only diversion to be undertaken. Since the middle of February, Grant had urged Hurlbut to send Colonel Grierson on a mission through the middle of Mississippi to cut the railroad east of Jackson and the Confederate lines of communication. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the mission had failed to materialize, but was at last ready to go on April 17th.

  Grierson set off with 1800 troopers from LaGrange, Tennessee and moved rapidly through the entire State of Mississippi. He destroyed Confederate supplies, bridges and railroads, but most of all he terrified the civil population. On May 2nd, Grierson reappeared at Baton Rouge some six hundred miles south of where he started. By the time he reappeared, he had destroyed fifty miles of railroad, killed one hundred of the enemy and captured five hundred of the enemy. Grierson's total losses were three killed and seven wounded.

  These two diversions completely baffled Pemberton. He was so confused he sent Richmond a dispatch stating that Grant's principle efforts were being directed at Deer Creek and the rumors of the movement of troops south through Louisiana were not to be believed.

  Grant's diversions had worked perfectly and the movement of troops down the west side of the Mississippi continued unabated. The time had come for Admiral Porter's gunboats to run the batteries of Vicksburg.

  April 16th, was the day chosen to begin this perilous journey. Admiral Porter would command the fleet in person. He was in his flagship Benton as the advance began at ten o' clock that night. Following the Benton was the Lafayette, Price, Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh, Carondelet, Forest Queen, Silver Wave, Henry Clay and the Tuscumbia. Grant, accompanied by Julia and the children, were located on his headquarters steamer just out of range of the Vicksburg batteries where they were able to watch the entire operation. The flotilla drifted along using only the current of the Mississippi to propel them.

  For a long time, the crowd that had gathered to watch had nothing to see, but soon a large shadow drifted around the final bend in the river and appeared in front of Vicksburg. This was followed by many other large, black shadows. Finally, at sixteen minutes after eleven the Confederate sentries spotted the ships in the river and opened fire. Porter's guns roared to life and the fight was joined. The rebel pickets set fire to some demolished houses along the bank to illuminate the river. Mr. Dana, who was with General Grant, counted 525 enemy shots directed at the fleet.

  By midnight, the fleet had successfully passed the batteries and had suffered little damage. The Henry Clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. Before long she caught fire and burned. Besides the loss of the Henry Clay, no one was killed and only eight were wounded. All the vessels were damaged to some extent, but were soon repaired and serviceable. On the night of April 22nd, another contingent of steamers and barges ran the batteries at Vicksburg. This was done to carry vital supplies south of Vicksburg and help alleviate some of the congestion on the wagon road from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage. During this passage, only one vessel was lost, the Tigress. Regretfully, this ship carried the extra medical supplies needed if there was a battle. With these transports below Vicksburg, the army would be able to cross the river wherever and whenever it wanted.

  Since arriving at Perkin's plantation, McClernand had dawdled as if having no clue as to what to do next, but Grant had given McClernand explicit instructions. On April 12th, Grant wrote to McClernand. "It is my desire that you should get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest practicable moment.....I wanted particularly to see you about the facilities for getting troops from Smith's plantation to New Carthage, and the chances for embarking there." 58

  Grant continued to exhort McClernand to action and when Porter arrived on the scene after running the batteries he too tried to spur McClernand to make an attempt on Grand Gulf, but to no avail. So the day following Porter's successful operation, Grant visited McClernand at New Carthage. Upon inspection, he concluded nothing was going to happen unless he remained at the front. So he hurried back to Milliken's Bend to make the final preparations for the campaign.

  Until now, Grant had not issued orders for the campaign. He possibly was waiting to see if Admiral Porter's passing of Vicksburg was going to be a success. Once he knew he had the navy south of Vicksburg to cooperate with him it was time to publish the orders governing the objective of the campaign and how it was to operate.

  Grant issued the final orders on April 20, 1863.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,}

  MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA, }

  April 20, 1863. }

  Special Orders, No. 110.

  * * * * * * *

  VIII. The following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads.

  First.--The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A McClernand commanding, will constitute the right wing.

  Second.--The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing.

  Third.--The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre.

  Fourth.--The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left.

  Fifth.--Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency.

  Sixth.--Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.

  Seventh.--In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A.G.O., series of 1862.

  Eighth.--All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army.

  Ninth.--As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.

  Tenth.--Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage.

  Eleventh.--General hospitals
will be established by the medical director, between Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. Each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. The force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to Milliken's Bend. They will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.

  Twelfth.--The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders.

  Thirteenth.--Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. All such irregularities must be summarily punished.

  Fourteenth.--Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is called to General Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of date March 20, 1863.

  By order of

  MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT 59

  Grant left Milliken's Bend for the front on April 22nd, but before he left he took time out to write his father a letter which again depicted perfectly his honesty, humility and optimism.