The Liberty Incident Revealed

by A. Jay Cristol

  The stories of President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, and Admiral McDonald talking to the Sixth Fleet over a secure voice radio in 1967, as discussed earlier, are simply not in the realm of the possible. No such capability existed in 1967.

  Stephen Green’s story of U.S. Air Force RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft from Germany flying to Israel before the 1967 war began and supporting the Israelis against the Arabs was completely debunked by Ambassador Richard Parker. Parker established that no record existed to support the tale and that the source was one person who had been totally discredited by numerous contemporaries who had served with the source and absolutely denied the story (see chapter 9).

  The myth floated by President Nasser and King Hussein about U.S. and British carrier aircraft participating in the initial Israeli air strikes on Egypt on June 5, also discussed in chapter 9, has been fully exposed by numerous sources and was not believed even by the Soviets.

  Some Liberty crewmen still insist that it should have been perfectly safe to sail into a combat zone where major armed conflict was in progress. The ship’s commanding officer, other ships’ officers, the NSA, the JCS, and other senior commanders all held contrary opinions.

  The story of a promise of air cover in ten minutes from the Sixth Fleet, based on Ennes’s memory of a message that does not exist in any record, is a totally undocumented myth, simply a physical impossibility. The nearest U.S. aircraft carriers were over five hundred miles away, much more than an hour’s flight time for their jets and almost three hours for their propeller aircraft.

  The myth of F-4B Phantom aircraft armed with nuclear weapons being launched from the U.S. carriers, as described in the Ennes book (and supported by Admiral Moorer), is an impossibility. In 1967 there were no U.S. Navy or Marine F-4s configured and wired to carry nuclear weapons. Even if the F-4s had been so configured, authorization for a launch of nuclear-armed aircraft, as Admiral Moorer should know, could be issued only by presidential authority (and in some rare cases by theater commanders), and launch required three to four hours of advance preparation. There is no record of such authorization or launch.

  The story of a submarine in the area working with the Liberty, propounded by Pearson, Eveland, and Ennes is not supported by any record. The logs of the submarines allegedly involved do not reflect such activity, and the commanding officer of the submarine Amberjack denies the submarine was there (see chapter 17). The myth lingers on.

  The claim that Moshe Dayan, Israel’s minister of defense, personally ordered the attack is based on a single piece of unevaluated raw intelligence (obtained via the Freedom of Information Act). The CIA publicly denied the veracity of this story on several occasions (see chapter 11).

  Although the logs and records created on June 8, 1967, by both the U.S. Navy and the Israel Defense Force show that the air attack lasted from 1358 to 1412 (approximately fourteen minutes) and the naval attack lasted from about 1430 to 1440 (approximately ten minutes), the myth persists that the attack continued for hours.

  The pièce de résistance of these myths is the bold claim by Liberty survivor David Lewis that the president of the United States betrayed the United States and a U.S. Navy ship and its crew because he did not want to embarrass our ally, Israel. Any claim of evidence suggested to support this myth has been thoroughly and completely discredited. First, any student of history is aware that in 1967 Israel was not yet a close ally of the United States. Those who make the argument are guilty of anachronism. President Johnson was a strong and controversial president with whom many Americans disagreed on many subjects, but to charge him with betrayal, as Lewis does, suggests incredible audacity.

  The most far-reaching myth is the unmitigated falsehood propounded by author James Bamford denying that there has ever been an investigation of the Liberty incident by the U.S. government. In an interview with Geoff Metcalf for World Net Daily, an Internet site, on Sunday June 24, 2001, on page 10 of 17, Bamford unequivocally states the need to “call on the U.S. government to do an investigation—which is what they have never done in the past. . . . [T]hey never did an investigation on the Liberty.” Bamford somehow overlooked, or chose to ignore, at least ten official U.S. investigations, discussed in detail in chapter 12.

  All but the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee reports are available upon written request. Most are free. A few require payment but just to defray the cost of copying. Some sources also include the Naval Security Group Report of 1967 as an additional investigation. There are also four official Israeli reports (see chapter 13).

  In dealing with myths, one is frequently faced with the impossibility of proving a negative. How does one prove one does not have a sister? In the case of the Liberty-related myths, the problem is not a lack of records. There are thousands of pages of authentic records relevant to the event. Most of them were created at or near the time of the event. When faced with a photograph or recorded sworn testimony or a message that tends to prove a point, it is common for conspiracy theorists to claim that the photograph, record of testimony, or message was altered. Unfortunately, the hunger for theories of conspiracy, cover-up, or intrigue often results in the rejection or dismissal of fact and the acceptance of myth as fact without any effort to find out what the truth is, from the evidence available. In the formation of opinions the true story is too often ignored.

  Perhaps this is so because to search for the truth by checking all the evidence requires significantly more work and effort than inventing a story. This author has made a diligent effort to collect and review all the evidence.

  Chapter 16

  CONFIRMATION

  National Security Agency Intercepts

  On June 8, 1967, a Navy EC-121M electronic surveillance aircraft (Bureau No. 135757) assigned to a Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 2 (VQ-2) detachment took off from Athens, Greece, and flew to a patrol site clear of, but within radio surveillance distance of, the war that had been raging in the Middle East since June 5. On board, in a restricted area referred to as “the tent,” was a National Security Agency (NSA) electronic communications surveillance compartment that was sophisticated for its day. The tent was staffed with a team of communications technicians (CTs)—NSA linguists. There were Arabic linguists and two Hebrew linguists: Chief Petty Officer Marvin Nowicki,1 the supervisor, and a second Hebrew linguist, Petty Officer Michael Prostinak. The CTs were busy identifying, recording, and monitoring Arabic and Hebrew radio transmissions when, at about 1430 Sinai (1230Z, GMT), Prostinak heard something that caused him to call Nowicki, “Listen to this.” The Hebrew transmissions of interest were monitored and recorded until 1528 Sinai (1328Z).

  At 1559 Sinai (1359Z), Vice Adm. William Martin, Commander U.S. Sixth Fleet, who was monitoring the situation and had ordered U.S. Navy aircraft from the carriers America and Saratoga to the scene of the attack on the Liberty, sent a message to VQ-2 in Athens requesting that all VQ-2 flights launched from Athens be recalled and no further flights be launched until advised.2 Shortly thereafter the EC-121M turned for a straight line course back to Athens. On the ground at Athens, Nowicki and Prostinak made a rough translation of the tapes. The tapes were then sent by courier to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, where a smooth translation was made by NSA Hebrew linguist Richard W. Hickman,3 who briefed the NSA’s director, Army lieutenant general Marshall Carter, on their contents. The translations were classified top secret, code words Savin and Crayon.

  The top-secret information gleaned from the tapes by the NSA was shared with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the White House, and Clark Clifford, chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Board. The tapes remained highly classified because of the concern of the Department of Defense over compromising the means and methods of the SIGINT collection, and those of the Department of State over U.S. relations with Arab countries that had accused the United States of fighting, or being involved in, the Six Day War on the s
ide of Israel. The State Department concern was especially sensitive because the United States had stated on the floor of the United Nations on June 6, 1967,4 that it had no ships or planes within several hundred miles of the war zone and had then been embarrassed by the USS Liberty popping up in the middle of the combat area. It would have been a further embarrassment to admit that U.S. aircraft had also been close to the war zone.

  When the U.S. government made the statement “no U.S. ships were within several hundred miles,” the Liberty was actually still in the western Mediterranean sailing toward a point off the Gaza Strip. Then she was ordered to stay clear of the combat zone by at least five messages that she did not receive and thus sailed into the combat zone.5 However, the presence of the Navy EC-121M aircraft was specifically and intentionally ordered.

  As a result of the web of secrecy cast over the incident, dozens of conspiracy stories developed. By some estimates there are as many conspiracy stories about the Liberty incident as about the assassination of John F. Kennedy. The conspiracy stories vary greatly, from notions that the Liberty was there fighting with the Arabs against Israel to her fighting with Israel against the Arabs. Over the years, stories developed about the existence of audiotapes of intercepts of Israel radio transmissions. The story of these tapes was told again and again, claiming was that these audiotapes would prove that the Israeli air and naval forces intentionally attacked the Liberty with full knowledge that she was a U.S. ship.

  For example, as described earlier, George Golden, the engineering officer on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967, believed the Liberty had recorded intercepts of Israeli aircraft communications. He said in an interview: “Some of that could have counted also for the fact that Lieutenant [Maurice] Bennett brought some information and gave it to me. He said they had taped it, concerning the planning of the attack and I gave that to a member of Admiral Martin’s staff the next morning and nothing came of that. I wish I was in a position to make a copy of it myself.”6 It should be noted that neither Bennett nor anyone else on the Liberty on June 8, 1967, was a Hebrew linguist. Ultimately the NSA did provide a definitive confirmation. The NSA 1981 report “Attack on a SIGINT Collector” confirms that “the Liberty had no specific mission against Israeli communications” and that “Hebrew language tapes produced by USN-855 the NSA detachment on Liberty . . . did not contain information on the forthcoming Israeli attack.”7 The NSA, however, kept this portion of the 1981 report classified until July 2, 2003, when it was declassified and released as a result of this author’s Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.8

  A lead to the actual existence of the EC-121M tapes was given to author James Bamford by Nowicki, the Navy Hebrew linguist who had been the supervisor on the EC-121M surveillance aircraft. Although Nowicki clearly told Bamford the tapes showed that the attack was an accident, Bamford insisted that the tapes proved the attack was intentional and that the leadership of NSA was unanimous in that belief.9 An almost unprecedented press release by the NSA stated, “Mr. Bamford’s claim that the NSA leadership was ‘virtually unanimous in their belief that the attack was deliberate’ is simply not true.”10 Nowicki himself responded to Bamford’s claim with a letter to the Wall Street Journal stating that the tapes proved that the Israeli attack was a gross error. Nowicki closed his letter with the question, “How can I prove it? I can’t, unless the transcript/tapes are found and released to the public.”11

  This author’s Freedom of Information Act appeal to NSA for the tapes dated July 6, 2001, was denied,12 and this author then filed a federal district court lawsuit to obtain them.13 This suit resulted, on July 2, 2003, in the release of the NSA EC-121M audiotapes and translations of transcripts of intercepts. Along with the transcripts of the tapes, a secret message of the National Security Agency to the White House dated June 22, 1967, titled “Aftermath of Israeli Attack on USS Liberty, 8 June 1967,” was also released. It contained the following opening paragraph: “1. General. The following activity is based on Israeli plain language VHF/UHF voice communications intercepted on 8 June 1967 between 1229Z and 1328Z. This activity deals solely with the aftermath of the attack of Israeli jet aircraft and torpedo boats on the USS Liberty (GTR 5). There are no COMINT reflections of the actual attack itself” (emphasis added).

  The NSA also declassified and released the English translations and the audiotapes in Hebrew and further declassified a portion of the NSA 1981 report that reads: “While these reports revealed some confusion on the part of the pilots concerning the nationality of the ship, they tended to rule out any thesis that the Israeli Navy and Air Force deliberately attacked a ship they knew to be American.”14

  On September 19, 2005, in response to another of this author’s FOIA requests, the oral history of Richard W. Hickman, the NSA Hebrew linguist who translated the tapes at NSA headquarters, was released and further confirmed that the tapes show the attack was a mistake.15 Hickman’s interviewer (William Gerhard) stated, “The transcripts tend to show that the Israelis were confused as to the nationality.” Hickman replied, “That’s right . . . I would tend to say that the Israelis did not know they had attacked a U.S. vessel.”

  In 1986, at the request of Thames Television,16 the Israel Air Force released transcripts of tapes of their communications during the attack that showed considerable confusion about the Liberty, what she was, and where she was. The Israeli Hebrew transcripts and rough English translations of the tapes were released to this author in 1993 and are presented in appendix 2, along with the NSA EC-121 tape translations.

  In the past, skeptics have claimed that the Israel Air Force tapes cannot be relied upon, alleging that they were manufactured by the Israelis after the fact.17 This could have been a challenge to the authenticity of the Israel Air Force tapes prior to the release of the NSA tapes, which dovetail with and confirm the veracity of the Israeli tapes. It must be remembered that when the Israel Air Force tapes were released, the existence of the NSA tapes was not generally known.

  The Israel Air Force tapes are a combination of VHF/UHF radio transmissions between aircraft and their controllers, aircraft and motor torpedo boats, and closed-line telephone conversations between Israel Air Force controllers. The NSA EC-121M intercepts begin at 1430 Sinai (1230Z) with the Israeli control tower at Hatzor air base (call sign “Tribune”) telling Super Frelon helicopter 815 by radio, “Pay attention. There was a warship there which we attacked [one word garbled] the men jumped from it into the water, you will try to rescue them.” The Israeli tapes of a few minutes earlier contained a report by Royal Flight leader that “people are jumping into the water” and an order by air control to send search and rescue helicopters to the scene.

  At 1432 Sinai (1232Z) the NSA intercept records Tribune telling helicopter 815, “Pay attention. This ship is now identified as Egyptian . . .” Two minutes later at 1434 Sinai (1234Z) the Israeli tape has Israeli air control reconfirming, “Robert . . . it’s an Egyptian supply ship.” At 1459 Sinai (1259Z) on the NSA tapes helicopter 815 informs Tribune that he has “visual contact with a vessel straight ahead 12 miles.” At 1501 Sinai (1301Z) air control tells IAF headquarters on the Israeli tapes “He is 12 miles from them now. He has eye contact with the ship.”

  At 1506 Sinai (1306Z) NSA tapes, “It’s not men in the water it’s boats.” At 1510 Sinai (1310Z) Israel Air Force tapes give, “There are no people. He sees boats but no people.” Finally, and most conclusive, at 1512 Sinai (1312Z) the NSA tapes have Tribune asking helicopter 815, “Check once more if this is really an American flag,” and the Israeli tapes at 1512 Sinai (1312Z) have, “Kislev, there is an American flag on board.”

  An examination of the NSA tapes and the Israeli tapes shows that the identical events are being described on both sets of tapes at near or exactly the same time. Minor discrepancies of a few minutes between other segments of the tapes are easily accounted for, by not only different clocks or watches and different translators of Hebrew to English but also by the natural time lag of information being passed eithe
r up or down the Israeli chain of command.

  A careful, attentive comparison of the NSA tapes and the Israel tapes authenticates the accuracy of the Israel Air Force tapes. Israeli officials were not aware of the existence of the NSA tapes until thirty-five years after the attack. If the veracity of the Israeli tapes is not accepted and the Israel Air Force tapes are disregarded, then the only tape-intercept evidence remaining is that of the NSA tapes, which state that the American flag was not identified until 1512 Sinai (1312Z), approximately forty-four minutes after the attack was over. The NSA concluded, without any reference whatsoever to the Israeli tapes, that “the tragedy resulted not only from Israeli miscalculation but also from faulty U.S. communications practices.”18 The NSA tapes “tended to rule out any thesis that the Israeli Navy and Air Force deliberately attacked a ship they knew to be American.”19

  Specifically, a Central Intelligence Agency intelligence memorandum of June 13, 1967, stated, “None of the communications of the attacking aircraft and torpedo boats is available, but the intercepted conversations between the helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hatzor leave little doubt that the Israelis failed to identify the Liberty as a U.S. ship before or during the attack.20 A CIA memorandum of June 21, 1967, stated, “The Israelis presumably thought the vessel they were attacking not to be the Liberty for it is also clear that when the initial attack took place the ground controllers and the pilots believed the ship to be belligerent.”21 The CIA restated its official position in 1978: “It remains our best judgment that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was not made in malice toward the United States and was a mistake.”22