The Liberty Incident Revealed
Page 28
The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a June 13, 1967, top-secret memorandum for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (code word Trine) concluded, “There is no available information which would conclusively show the Israelis made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American,” and, “NSA advises that additional COMINT bearing on this subject will be available. Meanwhile, the weight of the evidence is that the attacking force believed their target was Egyptian.” On June 28, 1967, in a top-secret addendum to the memorandum for the chairman, the DIA reported, “Further information has been received concerning the Liberty incident which clarifies the sequence of events surrounding the attack. . . . This evidence fails to show that the Israelis made a premeditated attack on a known American ship. . . . [A] completed NSA translation and analysis of the intercept of transmissions between Israeli ground control and helicopters near the Liberty after the attack . . . tends to bear out the analysis offered on pages 2 and 3 of the initial memorandum.”23
After studying the NSA tapes, Clark Clifford reported to the president, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state, by means of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board report: “The weight of the evidence is that the Israeli attacking force originally believed their target was Egyptian,” and, “The information thus far available does not reflect that the Israeli high command made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American.”24
Independently, and without any access to the NSA tapes, the U.S. Navy court of inquiry presided over by Adm. Isaac C. Kidd Jr. concluded, on June 18, 1967, “Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on Liberty was in fact a case of mistaken identity . . . There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U.S. ship.”25 Adm. John McCain, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in June 1967, also without access to the tapes, endorsed Admiral Kidd’s conclusions with the comment, “The foregoing comments by the convening authority lead to an overall conclusion that the attack was in fact a mistake.”26
After almost four decades, the release of the NSA tapes confirms the independent conclusions of Admirals Kidd and McCain. Although a profusion of propaganda alleging dozens of conflicting conspiracy stories continues to this day, the NSA tapes confirm the official position of the United States. The attack was a tragic case of mistaken identity.
Chapter 17
CONFIRMATION
The Mythical Submarine
National Security Council Note NSC 5412/1 created a special group 5412, a directive on covert operations.1 On June 2, 1964 by a top-secret memo designated “National Security Action Memorandum No. 303,” the name of Special Group 5412 was changed to the 303 Committee.2 A secret-eyes-only, typed document of that body, dated April 10, 1967, states:
.............10 April 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee 7 April 1967
PRESENT: Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Kohler, Mr. Vance and Admiral Taylor
General Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 1.3
Mr. William Broe was present for Item 2.4
1. DOD Proposal
General Ralph D. Steakley briefed the committee on a sensitive DOD project known as FRONTLET 615. After a number of questions exploring alternative methods of satisfying the requirements and assessing the mission’s current priority, the proposal was approved by the committee principals.5
Submarine within UAR waters [Hand-written]
Although the memorandum refers to Item 1 and Item 2, only item 1, “DOD Proposal,” appears. A line is drawn around the text of the DOD Proposal, and handwritten across the page, as indicated above, are the words “Submarine within UAR waters.” The person who wrote these added words and the date the words were written are unknown.
Assuming that “FRONTLET 615” was an authorization on April 10, 1967, to covertly insert a submarine into UAR (Egyptian) territorial waters, this approval occurred forty-five days before the USS Liberty received orders in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to proceed to the eastern Mediterranean, fifty-seven days before the start of the Six Day War, and sixty-one days prior to the attack of June 8, 1967. Nevertheless, the submarine-conspiracy believers rely on the words “submarine within UAR waters” as proof not only that a U.S. submarine was present but that it photographed the attack and that these photographs prove the attack was deliberate.
A number of stories have grown over the years, first initiated by James Ennes claiming a U.S. submarine was within periscope sight of the Liberty during the attack. Ennes tells it this way:
Quickly poking a periscope above the surface of the water, American submariners watched wave after wave of jet airplanes attacking Liberty. Strict orders prevented any action that might reveal their presence. They could not help us, and they could not break radio silence to send for help. Frustrated and angry, the commanding officer activated a periscope camera that recorded Liberty’s trauma on movie film. He could do no more.1
[Ennes’s Footnote 1] This story first came to me from an enlisted crew member of the submarine, who blurted it out impulsively in the cafeteria at Portsmouth Naval Hospital a few weeks after the attack. The report seemed to explain the marks I had seen on the chart in the coordination center, as well as reports of periscope sightings that circulated in the ship on the day of the attack. Since the attack, three persons in positions to know have confirmed the story that a submarine operated near Liberty, although no credible person has confirmed the report that photographs were taken.6
In 1997 Ennes published an article titled “USS Liberty: Periscope Photography May Finally Reveal Truth,”7 in which he identified the submarine as the Amberjack, based on “a relatively senior member of the crew of the submarine, but he was unwilling to give his name or to talk to us except through a third party.” Through third-party hearsay Ennes claims Amberjack was only one of five submarines in the Gaza Strip area, the others being the USS Trutta, the USS Requin, a French submarine, and an Italian submarine.
Various other stories claim that the submarine was the Amberjack (SS 522), the USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN 619),8 the Trutta (SS 421),9 or Requin (SS 451).10 Assuming that a U.S. submarine was indeed in the area at the time of the attack, what could a submarine have seen or heard that could have contributed evidence on the issue of whether or not the attack was a deliberate attack on a ship known to be American? Ennes writes, “Submarine photography can prove what happened.” He quotes four unnamed submarine crew members as all saying the Amberjack was “very close to” or “almost directly under” the Liberty.11 He also says, “None of these four was certain that pictures were taken.” If pictures were taken, what kind of view was available from “almost directly under” the Liberty? And if such submarine evidence exists, where is it?
Today’s submarine technology has come a long way since 1967. In those days only one person could look through the periscope on the submarine, observing only a limited field of vision of the surface of the sea or a patch of the sky. There was limited capability to take pictures (possibly movie film) through the periscope. There was no capability to listen through the periscope to noise on the surface or to intercept radio transmissions. Possibly the submarine could have projected above the sea surface an antenna that might have intercepted some VHF or UHF radio transmissions within a very limited and finite distance,12 but how a submerged submarine would have known to listen to a specific tactical channel, out of the many available,13 on which Israeli aircraft pilots were talking in Hebrew to the controllers, who were located far out of range of any possible reception capability at sea level, is not explained by the submarine storytellers. Furthermore, the water depth in the vicinity of El Arish and near to the point of attack makes it an area where a submarine captain would not operate his submarine; the court of inquiry record contains testimony of a depth of thirty-one or thirty-three fathoms, approximately 186 to 198 feet.14
What about the various submarines alleged to have been there? Their logs for June 8, 1967 reflect
:
Amberjack
Position “Special Operations”
1–8 June Special Operations15
Andrew Jackson
1–13 June Special Operations16
Trutta
Position in Port
Moored port side to starboard side USS Tidewater (AD-31)17
Requin
8 June 1967—in port
Moored to buoy no. 7 in anchorage at Souda Bay, Crete18
Since the Amberjack was in the Mediterranean and had the distinction of being identified as the mystery sub by the largest number of submarine-conspiracy supporters, this author contacted Capt. Augustine E. Hubel, who commanded the USS Amberjack on June 8, 1967, to determine if he would confirm the claim of the unnamed Amberjack sailor mentioned on page 64 of the Ennes book. Captain Hubel provided an affidavit that states:19
Augustine Hubel, U.S. Navy (Ret) who after first being duly sworn, deposed and said:
1.Affiant makes this affidavit based on his own personal knowledge.
2.In June 1967 he was on active duty with the United States Navy serving as Commanding Officer of the USS Amberjack (SS-522) operating in the Mediterranean in accordance with CTF69 (Commander Submarine Flotilla Eight) message 061140Z June 67.
3.He is aware of the incident which occurred on the afternoon on June 8, 1967 when the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces at a position near the Sinai coast off El Arish, approximately 31-23 N, 33-25 E.
4.That on June 8, 1967 the USS Amberjack (SS-522) was not within 100 miles of the USS Liberty or its approximate position 31-23 N, 33-25 E.
If, as Captain Hubel says, the Amberjack was not there, then could it have been another U.S. submarine?
In 1967 all U.S. submarine operations in the Mediterranean were under the control of Submarine Flotilla 8 (COMSUBFLOT 8), commanded by Vice Adm. Marmaduke Gresham Bayne. He provided an affidavit that stated:
Marmaduke G. Bayne, U.S. Navy (Ret) who after first being duly sworn, deposed and said:
1.Affiant makes this affidavit based on his own personal knowledge.
2.In June 1967 he was on active duty with the United States Navy and as Commander of Submarine Flotilla 8 (COMSUBFLOT 8) in which capacity he commanded and controlled all United States submarines operating in the Mediterranean.
3.He is aware of the incident which occurred on the afternoon on June 8, 1967 when the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces at a position near the Sinai coast off El Arish, approximately 31-23 N, 33-25 E.
4.To the best of his recollection, there was not assignment of any United States submarines in Liberty’s vicinity on June 8, 1967.20
On August 26, 1998, many years before this author contacted Vice Admiral Bayne, the latter gave an oral history to Dr. David Winkler at the U.S. Naval Historical Center (now known as the Naval History and Heritage Command). Comments on pages 74 and 75 are enlightening:
It was during that time LIBERTY was attacked by the Israelis. SUBFLOTEIGHT had the most complete operational plot in the whole Mediterranean, including Commander Sixth Fleet, simply because we had to let the missile boats know of all maritime traffic. This was after Ellis had left. I think Vice Admiral Bill Martin was then COMSIXTHFLT. We knew where the LIBERTY was and we knew what LIBERTY was. So everybody was coming to SUBFLOTEIGHT to view our plot. Admiral Griffin, Admiral Martin assorted operational people from Sixth Fleet, all trying to get an idea about what could have happened. It was kind of a surprise to me that that big screen it was as big as the side of this room . . . was the one place in the Mediterranean where everything was displayed. It gave us problems, too, for before we could display the plot [page 75] we had to remove the symbols showing positions of the missile submarines or we would have violated our own operational policy.
I will believe always that the attack on LIBERTY was a mistake. It was not deliberate. I am not a great admirer of the conduct of the Israelis today; they are far too internal and unreliable in their international cooperation, but what happened with LIBERTY was a mistake made during the change of an operational commander watch.21
On January 13, 2003, in a letter to this author, Vice Adm. (retired) Marmaduke Bayne wrote the following:
I was Commander Submarine Flotilla Eight in the Mediterranean for two years ending in July, 1967, just after the Liberty incident. This was early in our deployment of Polaris (later called SSBN’s) submarines into the area. The operational policy for moving the submarines around that relatively restricted body of water was to inform the submarines of everything possible about the movement of other ships, and to tell others nothing about the movement of the submarines. In that way the Commanding Officers could be given the maximum opportunity to remain undetected during their time in the Mediterranean Sea. As a consequence ComSubFlot Eight maintained the most complete US operational plot of maritime activities in the region. The physical size of the plot covered an entire wall, about 15 by 12 feet. We were informed of the Liberty’s movements, knew what she was, and marked her on our plot with a special symbol.
In a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit dated January 21, 2003, A. Jay Cristol v. National Security Agency, paragraph 2 of the complaint requests three specific items. Specifically, plaintiff filed a request with the NSA pursuant to FOIA by letter dated April 26, 2001, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit “A.” Plaintiff’s request sought access to tapes, recordings, or other electronic or paper recordings of surveillance of common voice radio transmissions made or intercepted on June 8, 1967 by the USS Liberty, the USS Amberjack, and a U.S. EC-121 aircraft during a deployment in the eastern Mediterranean. Importantly, plaintiff did not seek the disclosure of information pertaining to the type of equipment used in, or the manner of making, the documented transmissions. Rather, plaintiff’s requests were exclusively limited to identifying and reviewing transmissions that either had already been disclosed to the public through the open radio and/or materials that demonstrate the existence of such transmissions—neither of which are exempt from disclosure.22
The answer to plaintiff’s complaint filed by the United States Attorney on behalf of the National Security Agency on July 3, 2003, confirmed release of the “actual recordings and English translations (including summaries of those translations) that relate to the USS Liberty incident” and responding to the other two requests, stated:
21. Defendant admits that the USS Liberty did not locate, receive, or record on June 8, 1967, any transmissions to which Plaintiff refers . . .
25. Defendant admits that the NSA has no tapes, recordings, or other electronic or paper records of surveillance of VHF/UHF or high frequency voice transmissions made or intercepted on June 8, 1967 between 1100Z and 1300Z and collected by the USS Amberjack.23
Is it possible that the periscope was on a Soviet submarine? There is a published story that there was a Soviet submarine hull number K-172 (NATO classification Echo II) in the eastern Mediterranean.24 The writer is Nikolai Cherkashin, who is described as a captain in the Russian navy and a marine writer. The article format is that of an interview with reserve Vice Adm. Nikolai Shashkov, described as the commander of the submarine, who is quoted as placing his submarine “near the shores of Syria that was my main positioning area.” The “shores of Syria” are almost two hundred miles from the site of the Liberty incident, which would exclude Captain Shashkov’s submarine from being on the scene. He further stated that the Americans “were looking for an entire underwater Soviet screen, while in fact all there was my one K-172.”
Shashkov’s story raises more questions than it answers. He said he was near the shores of Syria and dangerously close to three U.S. aircraft carriers—the America, the Forrestal, and the Enterprise, all of which he describes as nuclear carriers.25 In fact, in June 1967 the carriers of the Sixth Fleet were five to six hundred miles west of the “shores of Syria,” and neither Forrestal nor Enterprise were there. Only America and Saratoga were in the Mediterranean at that time. He can perhaps be excused for believing the carriers were “nuclear
,” although in fact neither USS America nor USS Saratoga were nuclear powered. Nevertheless, he described his mission as to launch eight P-6 (SS-N-12) missiles with nuclear warheads into Israel and destroy Israel with “a minimum of eight Hiroshimas” in the event of an American or Israeli attack on “friendly Syria.” On June 10, 1967, Israel did attack Syria and captured the Golan Heights, but obviously Shashkov did not launch eight nukes into Israel.
Also, the writer, Cherkashin, describes the events as occurring “on the eve of or during Passover 1968.”26 This is almost a year after the 1967 war. Is it possible that Cherkashin is remembering an event from the 1973 war? He describes 1967–68 as “then the most troubled region of the planet, the eastern Mediterranean, scene of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”27 It is thus respectfully suggested that the Shashkov story does not provide evidence that a Soviet submarine was in sight of the Liberty on June 8, 1967. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove a negative, namely, that there was no U.S. submarine in the area. It is respectfully suggested that the burden of proving that a submarine was actually there, and the burden of producing the “evidence”—tapes, pictures, videos, intercepts—is upon the proponents of this claim, which over the last forty years has been supported only by hearsay stories. To date, the only credible piece of documentary evidence on the subject is the single-page Committee 303 memo, which falls far short of proving anything. All available evidence establishes that there was no submarine in the area of the attack on the Liberty on June 8, 1967.
Chapter 18
CONFIRMATION
Department of State