The Liberty Incident Revealed

by A. Jay Cristol

  Less than six months after the release of the NSA tapes, the U.S. Department of State released Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIX, which declassified the last known significant American documents relating to the Liberty incident. The separate State Department summary of the volume shows the evolution of the U.S. position from the initial outrage to a final conclusion that the tragedy had been a mistake.

  On October 1, 2003, the State Department announced a conference titled “The United States, the Middle East and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War” and invited proposals for original papers on topics including “The USS Liberty Incident and Role of Intelligence.”1 Beginning on the morning of January 12, 2004, the conference took place at the Department of State in the Loy Henderson auditorium. It lasted two days and included seven panel discussions. This author was invited to participate on Panel 1, titled “War, Intelligence, and the USS Liberty.” A paper coauthored with Capt. Ernest Castle (who served as U.S. naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv in 1967) and John Hadden (the CIA chief of station in Tel Aviv in 1967) was submitted. None of the papers submitted for the conference have been published in hard copy by the Department of State, allegedly for budgetary reasons, but the above paper “The USS Liberty and the Role of Intelligence,” may be viewed at www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/liberty-intelligence.pdf.

  Included on the panel were Dr. Marc Susser, the historian of the Department of State, Dr. David Robarge, Central Intelligence Agency history staff, and Dr. David Hatch, the historian for the National Security Agency. The Liberty panel was scheduled for 10:00 a.m. until noon, while the release of volume XIX of Foreign Relations of the United States was scheduled for noon. Therefore this author was not aware during the time of the panel whether any material in volume XIX would conflict or contradict his presentation.

  The entire conference was broadcast live on C-SPAN.2 Following the keynote address by David Satterfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Harriet Schwar, the editor of Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIX, read (at 9:45 a.m.) a summary of the volume which contained the following:

  The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty

  On June 8, at 8:03 a.m. Washington time, Israeli planes and patrol boats attacked the U.S.S. Liberty, an electronics intelligence ship, in international waters, causing severe damage to the ship and numerous casualties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had dispatched the Liberty to the eastern Mediterranean on May 23, when Nasser’s closure of the Gulf of Aqaba greatly increased the likelihood of hostilities in the area. The Liberty reached its location off the Sinai coast early on June 8. Meanwhile, the UAR charges of U.S. participation in Israel’s air operations had prompted the JCS to send new orders instructing the Liberty to remain at least 100 miles from Egypt and Israel. Due to a series of errors, the message never reached the ship. (192, 199, 217) [Italicized numerical references are to documents in volume XIX]3

  At 9:50 a.m. on June 8, Walt Rostow informed the President that the Liberty had been attacked and that the attacker was unknown, and that reconnaissance aircraft from the Sixth Fleet had been sent to the scene. (In fact, the planes had been sent with orders to defend the Liberty and destroy its attackers.) (205–207) About an hour later, word reached Washington that the Israelis had informed the U.S. Naval Attaché in Tel Aviv that Israeli planes and torpedo boats had attacked a U.S. ship in error. (211) The Sixth Fleet aircraft were promptly recalled.

  President Johnson ordered a thorough investigation of the facts surrounding the attack. (269–70, 284) After extensive investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency concluded that there was “little doubt” that the attacking Israeli units “failed to identify the Liberty as a US ship before or during the attack” and that they had mistakenly identified the ship as Egyptian. Subsequently the Central Intelligence Agency repeated the conclusion that the Israeli attack was a mistake although it was “both incongruous and indicative of gross negligence.” Clark Clifford also examined the evidence at Walt Rostow’s request and concluded that there was no evidence that the attack was intentional. (284–85, 317, 373)

  Only commentator Dr. Charles Smith of the University of Arizona and author James Bamford contradicted the conclusions of this author’s paper and the conclusions of the State Department. Smith referred to a book he had written in 1988 claiming “The Israelis attacked probably in order to sink the Liberty and forestall American awareness of their plans to expand to the Jordan River on the West Bank, or, more likely, to move against Syria.”4 This author’s response to Dr. Smith’s thesis was first, that on June 8, 1967, the Israelis had already advanced on the West Bank to the Jordan River. More significant, the move against Syria has long been discredited by a State Department cable from Ambassador Wallace Barbour to Secretary of State Dean Rusk advising that at 1130 a.m. on June 8, 1967, Gen. Aharon Yariv, then chief of IDF Intelligence, had advised both Barbour and the president’s special representative, Harry McPherson, of the impending attack on Syria.5 Telling the United States of the impending attack on Syria at 11:30 a.m. and then attacking the USS Liberty at 2:00 p.m. to keep the United States from learning of the impending attack defies logic.

  James Bamford challenged the validity of the U.S. Navy court of inquiry findings, which concluded among fifty-four findings: “1. Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on Liberty on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity . . .”; and “6. There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U.S. ship.”6 Bamford alleged the National Security Agency tapes released pursuant to this author’s Freedom of Information Act lawsuit (see chapter 16) were false and claimed, without any supporting basis, that the NSA had other tapes that it had not released.

  Chapter 19

  CONFIRMATION

  Court of Inquiry Audiotapes

  On June 8, 1967, Ens. John D. Scott was the USS Liberty’s damage control officer. He testified under oath at the court of inquiry proceedings held on board the Liberty on June 14, 1967.1

  Fast-forward to 2006/2007, when journalist James Scott, the son of Ensign Scott, was enrolled at Harvard as a Neiman fellow. James Scott decided to write a book about the Liberty incident. For his research, he visited the U.S. Naval Historical Center (which became the next year the Naval History and Heritage Command), in the Washington Navy Yard, on May 4, 2007. There he conducted research in the public archive of declassified Navy documents, which included copy number four of the U.S. Navy court of inquiry record concerning the Liberty incident.2 The keen-eyed journalist noted eleven IBM “dictaphone” belts attached to the record. He asked to hear them and was advised that the Naval Historical Center did not have the equipment to play them and did not know what they contained. On May 7, 2007, James Scott filed a Freedom of Information Act request that the tapes be converted to a usable form that would allow researchers to utilize them.

  The center staff was taken by surprise. As they had told Scott, they had no idea of the content of the tapes and did not have the IBM equipment that could play the tapes. Although the court of inquiry record had been declassified and released on April 21, 1976, some thirty-one years earlier, because the tapes were from an obsolete and long-discarded IBM recorder the center staff had no way to listen to or transcribe the tapes. So, in an abundance of caution, they denied Scott’s request and sent the tapes to the Navy Judge Advocate General for review and instructions.

  On August 29, 2007, Scott filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina.3 In his complaint Scott alleged that the center had “retaliated” by referring this matter to the Navy’s Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG).4

  The tapes were sent to the Navy Judge Advocate General’s office in Norfolk, Virginia, where equipment was located to play them. They were then recorded onto CDs and reviewed by the OJAG. The tapes are not a part of the official transcribed record of testimony taken by the U.S. Navy yeoman, YNC Joeray Spencer, during the Jun
e 1967 court of inquiry proceedings,5 although they do contain partial testimony of witnesses Capt. L. R. Raish, USN, taken in London; Lt. (later Cdr.) M. H. Bennett, USN; Cdr. E. A. Platzek, USN; and Capt. R. L. Arthur, USN. As far as this author could identify, no testimony of James Scott’s father, Ens. John D. Scott, USNR, is on the tapes. Belt seven contains the official opening of the court of inquiry and, though the two are not identical word for word, the tape essentially tracks with the official transcript taken by and prepared under the supervision of Chief Spencer. At times Spencer is heard on the tapes saying, “You are going a little too fast.” The tapes also contain some off the record conversations during the court of inquiry proceedings, but they do not add anything new to the court of inquiry record.6

  After review of the tapes by the OJAG, they were released to James Scott. He then stipulated to dismissal of his FOIA lawsuit against the Naval Historical Center.7 The United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal in the case, dated January 3, 2008.8

  When the destroyer USS Davis reached the Liberty on June 9, 1967, Lt. Paul Tobin, USN, came on board the Liberty leading a damage control party and—it stands to reason—worked with Ensign Scott to control the damage, restore the ship’s electrical power and engines, and steam the Liberty under its own power to Malta. Lieutenant Tobin, as we saw above, was awarded the Bronze Star for his contribution. Some forty years later, retired rear admiral Paul Tobin was serving as the Director of Naval History and therefore of the Naval Historical Center, the organization sued by Ensign Scott’s son, James.

  The opening of the court of inquiry includes the voice of Admiral Kidd: “Do you, Captain Ward Boston, Jr., U.S. Navy, swear that you will faithfully perform the duty of Counsel for the Court, so help you God?,” followed by the voice of Ward Boston saying, “I do.”9 At the conclusion of the court of inquiry the record was signed by Admiral Kidd and Captains Atkinson, Lauff, and Boston.10 Thirty-nine years later, on October 22, 2003, Capt. Ward Boston signed an affidavit prepared for him by James Ronald Gotcher, a conspiracy-theory supporter, claiming the court of inquiry findings had been falsified.11

  This author tried to locate court member Capt. Bernard J. Lauff, USN, but could not. In 1992, Capt. Bert Atkinson, USN, responded to a query by this author that everything in the record of the court of inquiry was proper and correct, except that he had some reservations as to whether the Liberty had actually been over fourteen miles offshore or inside twelve miles; the court had given the Liberty the benefit of the doubt.12 In 1991, Adm. Isaac Kidd Jr. commented to this author, “Nothing you told me, wrote to me or provided by way of documentation has been inconsistent with what we had to work with at that time. This has been reassuring to me—even after so many years. You have done a splendid job. . . . With high esteem, Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.”13 The findings of the court of inquiry were approved by endorsement of Adm. John S. McCain Jr.,14 Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Europe, who wrote, “The foregoing comments by the convening authority lead to an overall conclusion that the attack was in fact a mistake.” The findings of the U.S. Navy court of inquiry were endorsed a total of seven times.15 None of the official endorsers have ever amended, modified, or withdrawn their endorsement. Capt. Ward Boston completed his career in the U.S. Navy and retired. As an officer and a lawyer it is strange that he should close his record with an act that dishonors him, claiming to have violated his oath to “faithfully perform his duty of Counsel for the Court” by filing a false report in a U.S. Navy court of inquiry.

  In the legal arena, lawyers struggle to impeach (destroy the credibility of) witnesses’ testimony. Impeachment is accomplished by establishing a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness and then asking the witness, “Were you lying then or now?” The testimony of an impeached witness is given little consideration by courts, because it has been established that the witness is a liar. Why did Ward Boston sign an affidavit impeaching himself? Why did a man who had sworn under oath to faithfully perform his duties and who had remained silent for over thirty years suddenly swear under oath that he had not faithfully performed his duty?

  James Scott continued to work on his book. In the fall of 2007 he traveled to Israel with his father, John D. Scott, to do further research on the subject. The Scott book, Attack on the Liberty,16 was released by Simon and Schuster on June 2, 2009. It was reviewed by John Lancaster in the Washington Post on July 12, 2009. Lancaster concluded, “Scott clearly had his own suspicions, though he produces no smoking-gun evidence to support the charge of a deliberate attack, perhaps because none exists.”

  Lt. John Scott is a U.S. naval officer. On June 8, 1967, he went through a terrible ordeal. He described the ordeal most vividly to his son, and James Scott details the horror well in his book. It is understandable how, having been on the receiving end of the attack, Lieutenant Scott is unable to accept the fact that the attack was the result of a tragic mistake. As a victim of the tragedy, he is not unique in that feeling. For instance, as we have seen in earlier chapters, when, on June 2, 1967, just six days before the attack on the Liberty, U.S. Air Force planes strafed the Soviet ship Turkestan in Vietnam, reportedly killing and wounding Soviet sailors, the Soviets refused to accept the U.S. explanation that the attack was a mistake.17 On May 7, 1998, when NATO forces bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese refused to accept the explanation that the attack was a mistake, and they still claim it was deliberate.18 The families of the Canadian soldiers killed and wounded in April 2002 by a U.S. Air National Guard F-16 strike in Afghanistan still refuse to believe their loved ones died as the result of a mistake.19

  Initially, on January 11, 1990, when this author interviewed General Mordechai (“Motti”) Hod, in 1967 the chief of the Israel Air Force, the general did not wish to talk about the Liberty incident. He said that the families of those lost and the surviving crew members had suffered enough and that it was not appropriate to disturb old wounds. His initial words were, “If it gives them some comfort to believe the attack was not a mistake, then let them so believe.” After hearing some of the conspiracy stories, however, General Hod changed his mind. He said that because the conspiracy stories were so distorted, they continued to create pain rather than comfort; the truth was better than the false stories. He then cooperated with this author’s research.

  Not every Liberty survivor believes the attack was deliberate. Cdr. Maurice Bennett, who was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart for saving lives on the Liberty, wrote to this author: “From the viewpoint of one who was on board . . . your account leaves little doubt that the attack was the result of a series of confused decisions made in a war setting. . . . Perhaps your account may lay to rest the many conspiracy theories which have plagued us these last 30 years. . . . I must confess that through the years I had convinced myself that the attack was deliberate. . . . You have put a lot of ghosts to rest.”20

  What was the response to that declaration? After this author published the above, a former Liberty crew member called Commander Bennett a traitor.21 For this reason, this author has not disclosed any further names of other Liberty crew members who have expressed their agreement with Commander Bennett or reject the conspiracy stories.

  James Scott should be commended for carrying out the fifth biblical commandment, “honor thy father and mother,” and writing a book in support of his father’s belief. As a talented writer with a Harvard master’s degree in journalism, he writes well. He does not resort to falsehoods. Additionally, to his credit, he does not resort to vicious attacks on U.S. naval officers or the U.S. government, as have some of the purveyors of the Liberty-related conspiracy stories. However, his book is flawed by misleading his readers through the presentation of partial information and selective facts while omitting other important, undisputed material facts that do not support his thesis.

  For example, one of the most compelling pieces of evidence confirming that the Israeli attackers believed they were attacking an Egyptian target is the
set of NSA EC-121 intercepts. They clearly establish that the Israelis did not see a U.S. flag on the Liberty until 3:12 p.m., forty-four minutes after the attack was over. This is confirmed by the Israel Air Force audiotapes. In James Scott’s book, on page 83, he writes that a Navy spy plane “dubbed the Willy Victor,” with NSA Hebrew linguist Michael Prostinak on board, was flying over the Mediterranean when Prostinak “heard something that shocked him. He flipped on the secure intercom to his supervisor. ‘Hey Chief. I’ve got really odd activity, . . . They mentioned an American flag’” (emphasis added).

  James Scott leaves it at that. He fails to mention anywhere in his book that this transmission occurred and was intercepted forty-four minutes after the attack was over, thus misleading the reader into thinking that the flag sighting occurred during or before the attack, rather than confirming that it was only after the attack that the flag was sighted.22

  What did Mike Prostinak conclude from the Israel Air Force radio transmission he intercepted and recorded? On September 25, 2009, he wrote to this author:

  FROM: Michael Prostinak

  TO: A Jay Cristol

  RE: Israeli intercepts I recorded on 8 June 1967

  Sorry, I am unable to join you at the NSA Symposium on 16 Oct. 2009. I agree with Marvin Nowicki that the intercepts clearly show the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty was a mistake.

  Mike

  James Scott refers to Michael Prostinak’s supervisor as being addressed “Hey Chief” but does not mention the supervisor by name. The supervisor was Dr. Marvin Nowicki, then a chief petty officer who retired as a lieutenant and later earned a PhD in international studies. Nowicki and Prostinak both heard the Israeli transmissions. Together they made preliminary translations of the Hebrew intercepts after the EC-121 returned to Athens. and then sent the tapes by courier to NSA headquarters in Maryland. In 2004, Nowicki disclosed the existence of the tapes to James Bamford, who wrote in his book that Nowicki had told him the tapes confirmed the attack was deliberate.23 Nowicki reacted, following the publication of Bamford’s book, with a letter to the Wall Street Journal that concluded, as we have seen earlier: “My position, which is opposite of Mr. Bamford’s, is that the attack . . . was a gross error. How can I prove it? I can’t unless the transcripts/tapes are found and released to the public.”24 This author sued the National Security Agency for the release of the above tapes, and the NSA released them on July 8, 2003.25 For this author’s conclusions based on the release of the NSA tapes, see chapter 16.