Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  Three embarkation points were allocated for the assault units. At 9.00 p.m. II./Gren.Rgt.65 was to be transported from the port of Kos, past the islands of Pserimos and Kalmynos, to rendezvous at Calolino with III./Gren.Rgt.440, II./-Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 and 1. Küstenjägerkompanie – all of which were to depart from Kalymnos harbour at 10.00 p.m. After continuing to a pre-selected point the combined eastern force was to divide into their individual landing groups for the final approach to Leros. At 11.00 p.m. the western force, namely II./Gren.Rgt.16, was to proceed from Marmari on the north coast of Kos, along the west coast of Kalymnos towards the island of Telendo, and on to a pre-selected nautical point for the final approach.

  Generalleutnant Müller had impressed upon the naval officer commanding the invasion fleet, Korvettenkapitän Dr Günther Brandt of 21. U.-Jagdflottille, the importance of continuing once the operation had started regardless of the appearance of British destroyers and irrespective of any losses. An aborted or delayed landing by any of the units could jeopardise the entire mission.

  Embarkation was carried out according to plan and completed by about 8.00 p.m. on Thursday, 11 November. At the same time, some 2 to 3 miles from Leros, BYMS 72 was on a second delivery run when she was attacked by Dornier Do 217s and struck by a remote-controlled Henschel Hs 293 glide bomb. The explosion brought down her mast and knocked out the port Oerlikon, damaged the steering and left the ship circling helplessly. Two men were killed, five were injured and one was reported missing. ML 299 and MTB 315 put out from Leros to assist. Travelling on the latter was Lieutenant Commander Frank Ramseyer. He boarded the minesweeper and assumed control and, with the steering gear temporarily repaired, managed to pilot her in to Alinda Bay.

  The Kalymnos convoy had just got underway when two destroyers were sighted between Kos and Kalymnos. Their identity could not be ascertained (in fact, they were almost certainly German), but as an hour’s contingency had been included in the planning of Taifun, Müller agreed to a request by Brandt to use this time to allow the destroyers to clear the area; Y-Time was to remain unchanged. Accordingly, the Kos convoy departed at 11.00 p.m. with R 195 leading the way. At 12.40 a.m., a caique was observed approaching from the east. As a precaution, this was intercepted, the crew was apprehended and the boat left to drift.

  At 1.10 a.m. and 1.15 a.m., two Wellingtons of 38 Squadron made several attack runs during which a total of thirty-two 250lb bombs were dropped around the Kos flotilla, albeit without effect. Soon after, at 1.20 a.m. and 1.22 a.m., Allied air reconnaissance – presumably the same Wellingtons – reported two groups of eight and seven ‘barges’ respectively steering north-west from Kappari (Pserimos), inside the minefield to the east of Kalymnos. It was assumed that the enemy was assembling in preparation for a daylight assault, but the threat posed by mines precluded a pre-emptive strike by the Royal Navy. That this was the main (eastern) force en route to Leros was not appreciated until it was far too late. It has been since argued that even if the navy had reacted, the enemy would have received sufficient warning to avoid an attack and to respond with retaliatory action. The only certainty is that the last real chance of halting the invasion was now irrevocably lost.1 The Kos flotilla reached the rendezvous at Calolino and was joined by the delayed force from Kalymnos about an hour later, at 2.20 a.m. Both units then proceeded on course for Leros. Minutes later, the convoy was again bombed, this time by a high-flying unidentified aircraft, and once more without result.

  After unloading her dead and injured at Alinda, BYMS 72 was again also underway, having been ordered to Lakki for immediate repairs. At 2.05 a.m., ML 456 was leaving Lakki when Lieutenant Thomas G. Fuller, RCNVR, hailed her and reported that the minesweeper had bypassed the port entrance and was continuing down the coast towards Kalymnos. ML 456 immediately set off in pursuit. Acording to her captain, Lieutenant Commander F.P. Monckton, RNR:

  At 0247 off Argynondas Bay considerable crossfire was observed in the bay and a short burst of answering fire. The crossfire, which consisted of a quantity of tracer from small calibre guns, continued for two minutes.2

  Having concluded that the minesweeper had been overwhelmed by superior forces and there was nothing he could do, Monckton returned to Lakki. Leading Wireman Colin Crichton of BYMS 72 later reported:

  We steamed for sixteen miles and were intercepted by ships which we thought were English. The ships told us to follow them in and they would show us an anchorage. We had only started to follow them in when they gathered round us and opened fire on us. There were two E-boats, four large landing craft and three trawlers. They kept up their fire until the ship caught fire. The skipper ordered “abandon ship”. Three men swam to the island and the rest were picked up by the Germans. The B.Y.M.S. 72 was seen being towed around the end of Salina Bay by the German ships.3

  In fact, the ship had been hailed in English by Oberleutnant zur See Hansjürgen Weissenborn aboard R 210 with the western landing force:

  Alarm. Ahead, a shadow which is approaching the convoy at high speed (20 nmi). As I suspect an enemy destroyer, I turn our boats towards land with the intention of covering the convoy in smoke. As there is no shooting, however, I head towards him with my guns ready. I go to 5 nmi and call out: ‘Hallo, what ship?’ He replies in English that he is an English minesweeper and readily answers all my questions.

  According to statements made later by prisoners, he thought that we were English; later, after opening fire, Italian. When told to follow me, he did so. However, as his guns, which were protected by shields, were pointing at me all the time and as his artillery was far superior to mine, I guided him to within range of the passing U-Jäger 2101 and 2102 and used morse to advise them of the situation. After a joint attack, I again drew up alongside the English in order to clarify matters. From their questions I could see that they still could not comprehend the situation.4

  Three of those aboard the BYMS had been killed and several were wounded including the commanding officer and First Lieutenant. Both officers, together with fourteen ratings, were taken prisoner. The minsweeper, apparently with code books intact, was taken under tow by UJ 2102, with UJ 2101 as escort, and beached at Kalymnos.5 Several men tried to escape, but only Crichton, Stoker Ian Yuill and Able Seaman Henry C. Mariner (who had been shot through both knees), succeeded after slipping overboard and swimming to Linaria Bay on the west coast of Kalymnos.

  Off Kalymnos at 3.30 a.m. there was further action when the British MTB 307, on passage from Kastellorizo to Leros, challenged two German destroyers, which responded with gunfire. After taking avoiding action, the MTB arrived at her destination at 4.15 a.m. Half an hour later, she joined MTBs 315, 266 and 263 in a search for an enemy vessel reported south-east of Leros. Finding nothing, the force continued northward, and off Pharmako Island misidentified as British what were probably the same two German destroyers, this time without incident, before withdrawing to lie up in Turkish waters.

  At 4:56 a.m., ML 456 sighted while on patrol the eastern invasion force 12 miles east of Leros and heading north. After warning the SBNO, the launch approached the vessels for a closer inspection. At the same time the escort/pilot vessel R 195, having also observed the motor launch, signalled the leading F-Lighter:

  M.F.P. 370 to take over navigational command. I will go ahead and attack. If attacked directly, surround landing unit in smoke and head off at 180 degrees.6

  Lieutenant Commander Monckton recalled:

  … the escorting R.boat moved ahead of the fleet and directly towards M.L.456 and an engagement commenced.

  The first burst of fire from the R.boat went over the top of M.L.456 but with the second burst which was prolonged, the midship Oerlikon received a direct hit … and the loading number [AB Joseph McRobert] was killed and gunner [believed to be AB C. King] severely wounded. The after Oerlikon loading was wounded and the gun misfed owing to Oerlikon splinters striking the magazine. The signalman on the bridge manning the G.O.Vickers .303 guns was badly hit by splinters from a cannon shell which
struck the flag locker, the coxswain was also wounded in the arm.

  With the same burst a shell hit the port ammunition locker of the midship Oerlikon gun and set it on fire and a cannon shell incendiary entered the engine room on the water line and started a fire.

  I withdrew towards Leros when I realised that my guns were not firing and my ship was on fire.7

  While the battle raged, a number of landing craft commanders, having misunderstood the message from R 195, turned their boats around and began to head south, so that the convoy ended up in total disarray. It was only after the R-Boot returned that order was restored, enabling the vessels to continue.

  Of the seventeen-man crew aboard the British vessel, six had been wounded and one killed. On arrival at Alinda Bay, the launch landed four of the more seriously injured and the body of Able Seaman Joseph McRobert before making for the Turkish coast. ML 456 was barely 2 miles from Leros when she was targeted by the island’s shore batteries. As the launch zigzagged and made smoke in an effort to avoid the fire, she was hit in the tiller flat by a shell and severely damaged. Nevertheless, the battered little vessel struggled on to arrive in Turkish waters at 7.45 a.m. The ferocity of the brief action may be gauged by the reaction of the survivors, two of whom were reported to be ‘in a very serious nervous condition’. A third ‘had lost his best friend and had had his workmate severely wounded … He got over it in five to six days …’8

  The Royal Navy suffered an additional loss after three motor launches were ordered to proceed from Leros to the safety of Turkish waters. MLs 299 and 461 reached their destination without mishap but at 5.15 a.m. the latter received a signal from ML 358 that she was being fired on by a convoy. She was not heard from again. Possibly she was been caught between the crossfire of the invasion fleet and the shore batteries. Further clues to her fate may be found in German after action reports. The commander of R 195, Leutnant zur See von Zatorski, recorded that at 5.00 a.m.:

  Position 4 nmi off Alinda Bay. A Schnellbootrotte [fast boat section] sighted approaching the convoy. Again, navigational command is passed to M.F.P 370. R 195 heads towards the S-Booten. It seems the enemy mistakes us for his own units, as he signals the letter X as ID and shows multi-coloured lights. R 195 repeats X a number of times. The enemy units can be made out clearly as they are lit by the moon. Approached to 100 m and opened fire with all weapons. Due to the short distance almost all shots landed on target. Heavy damage observed. It was not seen to sink, as enemy disappeared in fog. No own casualties.9

  A second boat fled the scene, apparently unharmed. Before engaging the enemy, the commander of R 195 had ordered the rest of the flotilla to stay on course. This failed to prevent further chaos:

  Confusion ensued. All the boats headed in every direction, surrounded themselves with smoke and came close to ramming each other. The sharp intervention of the convoy leader was again required for a second time. This meant that a considerable amount of time was lost.10

  To make matters worse, the assault craft had missed the next navigation point, so new courses had to be plotted for each coxswain. It was already 6.21 a.m. and nearly daylight when the eastern force began to land. On nearing Leros, it had split into three groups, with Kampfgruppe Dörr making for Palma Bay, Kampfgruppe von Saldern heading towards Grifo Bay and Kampfgruppe Schädlich steering for Appetici. When the latter reached the rocky shore below the imposing heights of Point 180, the Küstenjäger scrambled from their assault boats, out of sight and virtually unopposed by the Italians above. However, an I-Boot, forced to take up the rear due to engine trouble, came under heavy artillery fire from the battery on Mount Vigla. With no other option, the coxswain manoeuvred the craft inshore. No sooner had the troops disembarked than the vessel was hit and caught fire. This resulted in the Küstenjäger losing their entire stock of spare ammunition. With the burning hulk emitting plumes of swirling smoke behind them, and with the grey cliff face towering above, the troops prepared to ascend Appetici and assault Battery Lago. The Italians manning the coastal batteries have since been criticised for putting up a poor performance. Clearly, such accusations are not entirely justified.11

  At dawn, II./Gren.Rgt.65 (less two Züge of 5. Kompanie), 131 officers and men of II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 and 2./Pi.Btl.22 (less one Zug) came ashore near Pasta di Sopra Point (6. Kompanie of II./Gren.Rgt.65 having already suffered losses when an F-lighter took a direct hit). At Grifo Bay, landing craft shot up a battle-damaged British ‘gun boat’ (probably ML 358) and captured the Italian MAS 555 and MAS 559. At Alinda, the Germans also seized the British LCM 923. MAS 555 was commandeered with her crew to ferry troops and ammunition to Appetici. It is alleged that the skipper, Sottotenente Calabrese, attempted the short but perilous passage using auxiliary engines, thus presenting the guns with a slow-moving target that resulted in the troops having to disembark at Santa Madonne, only a short distance from Grifo Bay. The vessel was eventually sunk, either by fire from shore or as a result of air attack by the Luftwaffe. MAS 559 was lost a day later after she was boarded and scuttled by her commander, Nocchiere Alberto Baldelli.

  The remainder of Kampfgruppe von Saldern attempted to force a landing in the Blefuti Bay area, directly under Clidi and the Ciano coastal defence battery. This was equipped with four Italian-manned 152mm artillery pieces (three of which were operable). Additional firepower could be provided by the four 25-pounder field guns under the direction of a Forward Observation Officer of the Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Harold Price. Also located about the position were fifteen men of ‘B’ Squadron LRDG under Captain John Olivey. At dawn the British and Italian crews had stood-to and followed the engagement between the invasion fleet and ML 456. While waiting for the enemy to approach to within effective range, Captain Olivey was able to make out several vessels including two destroyers:

  All the ships were making zigzag courses and gradually coming towards the cove which was below our gun depression.

  There was suddenly a tremendous bang and number 2 gun had fired its first round at the destroyer which was close in by now. This boat immediately turned about and went out to sea as fast as it could, putting down smoke as it went. The enemy’s objectives were obvious, the cove below us already mentioned [Blefuti Bay] and the dead ground behind the hill to our N.E. [Pasta di Sopra]. All guns were now firing and we could hear the 25 pounder shells as they whistled overhead. Our own Italian guns were doing splendid work and the shells went away with a tremendous rush, one could watch them for some way, they seemed to travel so slowly. It was all very exciting and we could only watch as everything was still well out of our range. I think the Italians had the first hit and sank a landing craft just as it was about to disappear out of sight behind the headland. This made the enemy hesitate and one or two of the landing craft then turned about.12

  Pionierlandungsboot H was damaged by shell fire and drifted close to the islet of Strongilo, just off the north coast. Those on Clidi could hardly believe their luck, for the gunners had ranged their 25-pounders on the rock just days before:

  There was a tremendous explosion and in a few moments there was no sign of a craft where this one had been. I think this boat must have contained transport of some sort, as it was obviously making for a small road which comes in close to the shore a few hundred yds further up the beach. I do not know if anyone was saved from this boat, they may have reached the shore of the island as they were close enough.13

  Two officers and fifty-one ORs of II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 were on board the Pi-La-Boot. At least two ORs were killed and four were wounded. One officer and thirty-one ORs were taken prisoner. Most, if not all, were from 8. Kompanie. (Four other ranks were accounted for after the fighting was over.) Another landing craft entered Palma Bay and landed two Züge of 5. Kompanie – within Bren gun range of Olivey’s force atop Clidi. For Feldwebel Gustav Wehrs and his comrades, the invasion of Leros was to be altogether different to that of Kos:

  We steamed up and down at a safe distance from the coast when suddenly a Schnellboot r
ushed past and we were told through a megaphone: Head for shore and follow the lead boat! We immediately turned 90° and headed towards the island. Instantly, we were bombarded with heavy defensive fire. The enemy guns were in part openly visible on the rocky heights with the crews who were operating them. Our brave Pioniere with their twin 2-cm machine guns fired back in turn but of course could not ‘deal with’ all of them at the same time. Consequently, our landing craft was struck a number of times. One of our men appeared to be hit, but the blood he was splattered with was that of the [pack] mule which had been standing behind him. Unfortunately, the heavy fire caused our boat to veer off course and away from the main group of our assault fleet. We took cover behind the boat’s bulwark and temporarily gave up our cover only when we fired our rifles, MPi and machine guns; then the boat beached briefly and we jumped overboard on to land. The radio operator was in front of me – I gave him a nudge as he was not moving: he had been hit, and to top it all, our second radio operator also got his when he jumped. So all contact to the battalion was cut off. Apart from these two, other comrades had fallen victim to the enemy defences. When I tried, as requested by the Komp.Führer, Lt. Drabant, to assess our numbers I could account for only 16. However, in the heat of the moment I had missed a few as each man had to look out for himself and find cover behind little rocky ledges. Our Fährprahm withdrew and we were left behind – a small group in a small rocky cleft of this inhospitable island.14

  The situation was critical. Leutnant Drabant and his men were without wireless communications and a mile from their comrades further east; less than a mile to the west was ‘D’ Company of the Buffs, and above loomed the dominating and heavily defended feature of Clidi.