Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  Gen Chibber noted: “Our presence in this area till 1983 had been in the form of expeditions and patrols, which were considered inadequate to meet possible Pakistani reaction. It was, therefore decided to launch a sizeable force suitably equipped to operate in the Siachen glacier during 1984.”

  Operation Meghdoot was now just months away!

  The early camps on the glacier

  The forbidding Saltoro ridge

  The glacier and the peaks majestically rising above it

  The mule convoys which travelled between Sasoma and DBO

  III

  Getting Ready

  “Secure the Siachen glacier”

  As January 1984 dawned, Northern Command and 15 Corps were furiously working towards launching assault teams atop the Saltoro ridge, the prominent watershed west of the Siachen glacier.

  J&K, including Siachen and Karakoram

  Fortunately for 15 Corps headquartered in Srinagar then—as now—insurgency in the Kashmir Valley was still some five years away. Most of its deployment was along the LoC stretching from Poonch right up to NJ 9842, running through Drass, Kargil, Batalik, Chorbatla and Turtuk. Unlike today, 15 Corps was also responsible for the defence of Eastern Ladakh bordering Tibet.

  Raising another Corps to look after Ladakh or induction of another Division—the 8 Mountain Division in the Kargil-Drass-Batalik area—was not even on the horizon in 1984. The 3 Infantry Division with its HQ in Leh had two brigades (70 located at Kairi to hold southeastern Ladakh, 114 to look after North-eastern Ladakh) and a Sector Headquarter (26, headquartered at Partapur for areas beyond Khardung La) under its command. The 3 Infantry Division was thus effectively in-charge of the area east of Zoji La right up to Sasoma.

  Two years after Operation Meghdoot was launched, the 3 Infantry Division was stretched to its limits in defending both the Pakistan and China fronts. So one more formation—28 Division—was raised in 1986 at Nimu, not very far from Leh. In a peculiar arrangement, 28 Division was given charge of the Kargil-based 121 (Independent) Infantry brigade and the Siachen area.

  This arrangement continued till 1991 when 28 Division was shifted to Kupwara in North Kashmir after full-fledged insurgency gripped the Kashmir Valley starting 1989. That is the time the Siachen Brigade reverted to 3 Infantry Division!

  It was only after the 1999 Kargil conflict that the 8 Mountain Division was inducted into Kargil and 14 Corps was raised in Leh. 3 Infantry Division moved to Karu, an hour’s drive from Leh and automatically came under the 14 Corps ORBAT (Order of Battle).

  But back in 1984.

  Apart from Gen Chibber, the officers involved in planning operations on the Siachen glacier were Lt Gen Hoon, GoC 15 Corps, Maj Gen S. Sharma, GoC 3 Inf Div and the man on the ground, Brig VN Channa, Commander 26 Sector.

  The focus was on occupying Indira Col, Sia La and Bilafond La, the most prominent passes on the Saltoro ridge, as early as possible.

  One for history books: Gen Chibber with his officers in 1984

  As his Staff and Commanders on the ground prepared to launch operations, Gen Chibber wrote a detailed letter to Army Chief, Gen AS Vaidya, in January 1984 seeking his approval for the operation.

  One of the highlights of the plan was to designate 79 Mountain Brigade Group in 15 Corps as the ‘Himalayan Brigade’ for operations in the snow bound regions. The force, according to the Northern Command plan, was to be equipped with specialised clothing and skiing equipment. Gen Chibber’s note to Army HQ suggested that the type of equipment for the proposed Himalayan Brigade had to be on the lines of the ones that were being procured from abroad for troops who were to be involved in Operation Meghdoot.

  “Besides organising and tailoring a specialised task force, it is essential to provide it a dedicated helicopter unit equipped with Mi-8 and Cheetah helicopters. Fire support from armed helicopters and air photos for areas of interest is also recommended. Logistics infrastructure in the form of air maintenance and road communications from Sasoma to base camp, construction of helipads at the Base Camp and Sasoma and construction of fibre glass shelters is also planned,” the Northern Command note recommended.

  Gen Chibber followed up his letter to the Army Chief with detailed discussions of the plan with Gen Vaidya and DGMO, Lt Gen Somanna at Army HQ on 9 February 1984.

  FINALISATION OF PLANS

  Five days later, the planning for Operation Meghdoot went into top gear.

  As Gen Chibber returned to Northern Command HQ in Udhampur and called Lt Gen Hoon to firm up the plans. Gen Chibber’s Chief of Staff (COS), Lt Gen NS Cheema and MGGS (Maj Gen, General Staff), Maj Gen Amarjit Singh and Brig. Channa were also present during the discussions. These five officers pretty much comprised the top brass of Northern Command in 1984. After day-long deliberations, punctuated only by a working lunch, major operational decisions were finalised.

  Gen Chibber (pointer in hand) with Brig. Channa and Brig Jal Master

  None of them would have anticipated that they were about to order a military action that would turn into India’s longest running operation which had no precedent in military history!

  Among the major decisions taken at the 14 February meeting in the Northern Command HQ was the proposed composition of the force for Operation Meghdoot. The brass earmarked one company plus a platoon of Ladakh Scouts and one company of 4 Kumaon with supporting elements as the basic force for the Operation.

  Lt Col Pushkar Chand, Commanding Officer of 1 Vikas was appointed as the Task Force Commander for Operation Meghdoot. His location was to be at the Forward Logistics Base or FLB at about 16,000 feet. The Northern Command also designated a company of 19 Kumaon under its Commanding Officer to be located at Sasoma for any contingency.

  There is an interesting aside here. The Vikas battalions—in 1984, there were two of them under 3 Infantry Division in Ladakh—are part of the ultra-secretive organisation now known as Special Frontier Force (SFF). Created in 1962 under code name 22 Establishment, the Special Frontier Force remains the subject of much speculation and little concrete information.

  The SFF was supposed to keep an eye on Chinese military movements along the Indo-Tibet border, and gather as much intelligence as possible. In the event of war, operating in companies, the SFF was intended to be ‘forward screens’ for the Indian Army. It is trained in special operations, has the skills of paratroopers, and according to insiders is able to conduct conventional airborne assaults ahead of ground forces in areas such as the Aksai Chin.

  The SFF recruits both ethnic Tibetans and Gorkhas. While Tibetans can, and do become officers, regular Indian army officers on deputation provide leadership. The Inspector General, head of the organisation based at Chakrata near Mussoorie, is usually a Major General rank officer of the Indian Army.

  Currently, there are at least 2 Vikas battalions under the Leh-based 14 Corps deployed in Ladakh. Lt Col Pushkar Chand was commanding one of the two Vikas battalions in 1984, when he was designated Task Force Commander for Operation Meghdoot.

  As the designated troops got down to training and equipping themselves for what looked like a formidable task, Army HQ gave its final go ahead for Operation Meghdoot vide letter No. A/35501/XM03 of 31 Mar 84. Tasks listed out in the directive were:

  Tasks in General: Secure the Siachen glacier

  Tasks in particular: Secure Bilafond La, Sia La, Siachen, Lolofond and Teram Sehar glacier.

  Patrol up to Indira Col.

  Prevent Pakistan sponsored infiltration in the area.

  From the directive it was clear that Army HQ wasn’t looking to launch any offensive against Pakistan, but was simply planning deployment to hold on to the heights on the Saltoro ridge. There were sound reasons for this directive.

  The India of 1984 was much different from the country we see today. Mrs Indira Gandhi, after a spell out of power between 1977 and 1980 had once again become Prime Minister. Governing India has never been easy. But the 1980s were particularly bad.

  Punjab was aflame with calls fo
r a separate Khalistan; Assam was in turmoil because of the anti-foreigners agitation; insurgencies in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram were keeping a large number of Indian Army troops busy. India could not afford another war with Pakistan.

  So, when Mrs Gandhi was briefed about Pakistani intentions beyond NJ 9842, her directive was simple: secure Siachen but prevent wider escalation with Pakistan.

  Since the directive was limited, Northern Command too planned the operation on a limited scale. The brass was clear that the key to success would be the Indian Army’s ability to occupy Sia La and Bilafond La in particular, before Pakistani columns could. The planners were also fully convinced that troops for the initial deployment in these locations had to be heli lifted and maintained by air. Significantly, Northern Command records of the time show that the initial plan was to withdraw troops from those altitudes around 31 Aug 1984 ‘unless the situation warranted otherwise.’

  Now we indeed know that the situation did warrant troops staying on in these passes not only for the duration of that winter, but round the year for the past three decades!

  There is another school of thought, which, with the benefit of hindsight, argues that India could have held on to three main passes on the Saltoro ridge instead of extending its deployment and widening the conflict. But Pakistan’s counter-offensive—named Operation Ababeel—and two major attacks on Indian positions at Sia La and Bilafond La between April and June 1984, forced India’s hand. Northern Command records of the time have complete details of how it became necessary to station troops on those murderous altitudes after Pakistan made it a prestige issue to try and wrest back the Saltoro.

  As Northern Command and 3 Infantry Division mulled over the likely date of launching the Operation, the task force under Lt. Col Pushkar Chand was busy acclimatising.

  It moved to Sasoma by 28 March 1984. The task force concentrated at base camp by 3 April and commenced ice training. By that time, the infrastructure required for the launching of the operation was being steadily built, and high altitude huts to cater to essential accommodation at the base camp were nearing completion. The helipad for Mi-8 helicopters was also being constructed. Dumping of aviation turbine fuel (ATF) was among the top priorities, since helicopters would play a major role in sustaining deployment on the glacier.

  According to records of the time, the Indian Air Force in the meantime was busy transporting supplies. It was tasked to lift 461 tonnes of material by fixed wing aircraft. Out of this, 73 tonnes was to be airlifted from Srinagar to Thoise between 19 March and 7 April. The remaining 389 tonnes was planned to be lifted from Srinagar to the Dropping Zone during April to August 1984.

  An Mi-8 helicopter at the Base Camp in the early days of Op Meghdoot

  Mi-8 on the glacier

  Mi-8 helicopters were entrusted to airlift 74 tonnes of goods and drop them at the base camp in the period between April and August 1984.

  The lighter Cheetahs were made responsible for lifting 30 tonnes from Sasoma to FLB and 79 tonnes from base camp to assault camp.

  The logistics were getting organised systematically. For an operation that had no precedent in the world, every small decision had to be weighed carefully before being implemented. Supplies in place, everything seemed ready for Operation Meghdoot, except the specialised snow clothing for the first assault teams that were to be airdropped at Bilafond La and Sia La!

  LADAKH SCOUTS

  Ki Ki So So Lhargyalo (Victory to God)

  The Ladakh Scouts are the Indian Army’s youngest regiment but one of its oldest allies.

  Raised in 1963, in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 war with China that witnessed some of the most intense fighting in Ladakh, the Ladakh Scouts was initially a para-military force that worked directly with the Indian Army in the high Himalayas. Nicknamed ‘Snow Tigers’ for their swiftness and bravery in the most inhospitable terrain, Ladakh Scouts are one of Indian Army’s most decorated regiments with over 300 gallantry awards to their credit, including one Ashok Chakra (India’s highest peace time gallantry award), 10 Mahavir Chakras and two Kirti Chakras.

  In 1999, while reporting the Kargil conflict, I came across the gentle but hardy warriors of Ladakh Scouts for the first time in the Batalik sector. They were, I remember, in fact, one of the first units to successfully launch a counter strike against Pakistani incursions in the Kargil operations. Major Sonam Wangchuk, the handsome and soft-spoken officer became a household name for his heroics in the battle of Chorbatla in 1999. He won India’s second highest award for bravery—the Mahavir Chakra—for his exploits. Now a Colonel, Sonam Wangchuk, a Buddhist from Ladakh, is originally a Short Service Commission Officer who was selected to join the Assam Regiment after year long training at the Officers’ Training Academy. Later he was seconded to the Ladakh Scouts. His citation for Mahavir Chakra reads:

  On 30 May 1999, Major Sonam Wangchuk was leading a column of The Indus Wing, Ladakh Scouts as a part of ongoing operations in Op VIJAY in the Batalik sector. The column was tasked to occupy Ridge Line on the Line of Control in a glaciated area at a height of about 5,500 metres. This was essential so as to pre-empt its occupation by the enemy and any subsequent infiltration.

  While moving towards the Line of Control, the enemy ambushed the column by firing from a vantage position. In the process, one NCO of the Ladakh Scouts was killed. Major Sonam Wangchuk held his column together and in a daring counter ambush, led a raid on the enemy position from a flank, killing two enemy soldiers. The officer also recovered one heavy machine gun and one Universal machine gun, ammunition, controlled stores and three dead bodies of the enemy personnel.

  Sonam Wangchuk

  Thereafter, the officer took stock of all forces along the Chorbatla axis in the Batalik sector and cleared the axis up to the Line of Control of all enemy intrusions at great risk to his life.

  Major Sonam Wangchuk displayed exceptional bravery and gallantry of the highest order in the presence of enemy fire and in extreme climatic conditions in the glaciated area.

  But Sonam Wangchuk is not the first hero from Ladakh. That honour goes to the legendary Col Chewang Rinchen, twice winner of Mahavir Chakra besides a Sena Medal for gallantry!

  In fact, I can’t think of anyone who can come close to Col Rinchen’s exploits on the battlefield against extremely heavy odds. His heroics began as a 17 year old in 1947-48! In the first of the three wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, there was a determined Pakistani thrust to capture Ladakh. One attack came from the West. Well armed irregulars assembled by the Pakistanis, occupied the strategically located Zoji La to cut off Kargil and Ladakh from the Kashmir Valley. The other thrust was along the Shyok river towards Nubra. The irregulars crossed the Ladakh range, wedged between Shyok and Indus rivers and reached the Kargil-Leh road. They also put pressure on the Nubra Valley.

  It was at that time when the 17 year old Chewang Rinchen became the first of the volunteers who raised a local militia force which was subsequently to be called Nubra Guards. Chewang Rinchen along with 28 local volunteers attacked a Pakistani post at Chumik La and captured it. This area was to later become the Central glacier.

  In 1947-48, Rinchen and his colleagues held off a Pakistani offensive for a year and were involved in the capture of Lama House, Takkar hill, Tebedo hill and other operations to halt the intruders at Terche, just five km short of Thoise village in Sep 1947-48. For his contribution in the defence of Shyok valley in the 1947-48 Indo–Pak war, he was awarded the Mahavir Chakra and given the rank of Jamadar in the 7 J&K Militia.

  As the 1971 war began, Rinchen was posted with 14 J&K Militia then located at Ferozepur in Punjab. He volunteered to join the Ladakh Scouts and got posted to Ladakh as the deputy commander of Partapur sector under Col (later Brig) Udai Singh. After reaching Partapur, he immediately enlisted 550 volunteers into four companies of newly raised Nubra Guards known as the Dhal force. A short training of 15 days later, the Dhal force led by Maj Rinchen not only stopped Pakistani aggression, but also won back
the Chalunka complex, Turtuk, Tyakshi and Pachathang.

  By 15 December 1971, the Nubra Guards had liberated 800 sq km territory from Pakistan’s grip. This in fact was the largest area captured by any unit on the Western/Northern front during the entire 1971 war. The entire operation was conducted without artillery or air support. For his contribution in recapturing the Turtuk-Tyagshi area, Maj Rinchen was awarded his second MVC.

  Thirteen years after recapturing Turtuk, its importance became apparent, as the Indian Army prepared to deploy troops on the Saltoro ridge to prevent the Pakistanis from getting onto the Siachen glacier. Turtuk, south-west of the southern end of Saltoro ridge gives the Indian Army the necessary depth to hold off any flank attack by Pakistani troops. If Turtuk wasn’t in India’s possession, holding on to the Saltoro ridge would have become that much more difficult for India. Today, one full battalion under the 102 Infantry Brigade is deployed along the LoC ahead of Turtuk.

  Maj Rinchen was promoted as Lt Col and retired in September 1986. On 26 January 1990, Lt Col Rinchen was given the rank of Hony Col in Nubra Guards!

  Maj Chewang Rinchen (left); in his younger days

  Weapon training classes for the volunteers