Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  Just a year before Operation Meghdoot in 1983, Ladakh Scouts were reorganised into a Headquarter and two wings, “Karakoram Wing” and the “Indus Wing”. Troops of the Karakoram Wing were at the forefront of the exploratory expeditions to the Siachen glacier in 1981, 1982 and 1983.

  In the immediate aftermath of the Kargil conflict, the Ladakh Scouts underwent another reorganisation in June 2000 when it was converted into a full-fledged regiment with four infantry battalions. This paved the way for raising more battalions. The fifth battalion was raised on July 31, 2002. Now, the Ladakh Scouts is a full-fledged regiment of the Indian Army.

  Gen M.L. Chibber in 2013

  Old Comrades-in-arms, 30 years later! Gen Chibber (left) and Brig Channa

  The Nubra river in 1983

  Supplies being air-dropped for Col Kumar’s 1981 expedition

  IV

  Race to Bilafond La

  “Pet mein roti, haat mein soti, chaal chhoti chhoti”

  “That is the philosophy practiced by us, the Indian army soldiers deployed in the mountains and particularly in Siachen,” Sanjay Kulkarni tells me in his cosy sitting room in Leh on a lazy Sunday afternoon in October 2013. “If your stomach is well filled, if you have a stick in hand for support and if you follow the basic rule of taking tiny steps during the climb and not get rushed, you have mastered the art of survival in the mountains,” he says, explaining a routine that he and his mates have followed all their life in the army when deployed in the mountains.

  I had specially flown to the capital of Ladakh to visit Siachen and more pertinently to meet Sanjay, then the Chief of Staff or the No. 2 man in the 14 Corps, the Indian Army formation that was raised post the Kargil conflict in 1999, which has the unique task of guarding disputed borders with both India’s adversaries, China and Pakistan.

  The ever smiling and weather beaten Sanjay, promoted as Lieutenant General in February 2014, has mostly served in the mountains guarding the frontiers with China and Pakistan throughout his 35 year career in the army. Nathula, Tawang, Zakhama, Lekhapani, Leh—places in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Assam and Ladakh, that the average citizens don’t know much about. That is where he has fought, stood guard and honed his soldiering skills. Mountains are almost like home for this soldier, like many of his contemporaries and juniors commissioned in the Indian Army, post the 1971 war. Delhi, Udhampur and other ‘routine’ places are but an interregnum in between postings to these far off places.

  Photograph of (then) Capt

  Sanjay Kulkarni

  (Now) Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni

  Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni; the man who launched Op Meghdoot

  In retrospect, it’s only befitting that on being commissioned, Sanjay Kulkarni was allotted to one of the oldest regiments of the Indian Army, and certainly one of the most decorated – the Kumaon regiment. The soldiers belong to the Kumaon hills of present day Uttarakhand state, a mountainous region in the lower Himalayas. But officers – who come from different parts of India and get commissioned into the Kumaon regiment – adapt quickly to the demands of the mountains.

  So, when young Sanjay Kulkarni finished his training in the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in 1977, he was assigned to the 4 Kumaon battalion, a unit that had in the past produced two Chiefs of the Indian Army—Gen KM Srinagesh (1955-57) and Gen KS Thimayya (1959-1962). This battalion also has the distinction of winning the first Param Vir Chakra, India’s highest gallantry award. Maj Somnath Sharma won it in 1948 for bravery in Kashmir.

  But, learning the history of Kumaon regiment was far from my mind.

  I was in Leh to understand the events of April 1984, when Sanjay Kulkarni as a young Captain, and his platoon of soldiers were airdropped at Bilafond La signalling the launch of Operation Meghdoot that has now lasted for three decades, and is easily India’s longest running military deployment!

  Even before 4 Kumaon moved to Leh in 1982, Sanjay had already done the basic and advance mountaineering courses in the High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS). In 1981, he had in fact climbed Stok Kangri in Leh, even as Col Kumar and his team were climbing Siachen that summer.

  In 1982 and 1983, 4 Kumaon was part of the Long Range Patrols (LRPs) that India sent to the glacier in the summer months between May and August.

  The unit was deployed at Turtuk, ahead of the 26 Sector HQ located at Partapur, then Commanded by Brig. Vijay Channa, a Guards Officer with the reputation of being a bold and unconventional strategist.

  In 1984, the 26 Sector (equivalent to a brigade which normally has three battalions under it) was in charge of the Chorbatla-Turtuk-Tyagshi-NJ 9842 portion of the LoC but was short of one battalion. The two battalions assigned to 26 Sector were concentrated in the Turtuk-Tyagshi area. In the summer months, a contingent would carry out the LRP, but would invariably return to base by the end of August, since heavy snow and dipping temperatures would make it impossible for the troops to stay on the glacier. Moreover, till then, there was no decision to permanently deploy troops at those forbidding heights.

  The location of 26 Sector, now 102 Infantry Brigade at Partapur

  The Ladakh Scouts, as mentioned earlier, used to be the common factor in every long range patrol that climbed the glacier. Unlike today, Ladakh Scouts only had a HQ and two wings—Karakoram and Indus—to speak of. Being local residents of Ladakh, soldiers of Ladakh Scouts had an inherent advantage. They did not need to acclimatise, nor did they have difficulty in climbing the formidable mountains. So, no matter which unit was deployed beyond the Khardung La, soldiers of Ladakh Scouts were always part of the long range patrols.

  As the army turned its attention to the glacier, all incoming units were trained in the craft of mountaineering. “All of us were made to learn ice craft, rappelling, and mountaineering before going for the LRPs. In fact, some of us also learnt skiing,” Gen Kulkarni remembers. Air support was provided by the Air Force helicopters. He remembers going right up to Bilafond La and Sia La during the summer deployments. The Air Force choppers used to drop soldiers at what is now known as Base Camp, and from there on the soldiers would climb to Camp I, Camp II and Camp III. Then they would walk up to what is now known as Kumar base, named after Col Kumar. From Kumar base, patrols went to Bilafond La and Sia La. But invariably by end-August or September, the patrols would return to base, Gen Kulkarni remembers.

  As 1984 dawned, training was continuing apace, but no one except very senior officers had any inkling about the plan to go and occupy Bilafond La and Sia La. Then suddenly, by March, there was feverish activity in the 26 Sector.

  OPERATION MEGHDOOT IS LAUNCHED

  As Brig Channa returned from a meeting in Srinagar, he was instructed to launch the Operation only after thorough preparations. Even three decades later, he remembers the months in the run up to the launch of Operation Meghdoot. Sipping his favourite tea in a tall glass, Brig Channa, now an active senior citizen in Delhi’s Greater Kailash I locality, transports me back to those months and explains why the key to success in battle is planning and preparation.

  “I would say 90 per cent of the battle is won if we are fully prepared for the task at hand. Personally, I would think that if you are administratively prepared it’s a major start. Of course, the best way is to start living, eating, sleeping day in day out about your next operation. Especially, for an operation at those heights which had never been done before. No one had fought on the glacier at altitudes in excess of 18,000 feet. No one in the world had a clue how to fight a war on the glacier. So, everything that we did had to be beyond the conventional. Everything that we did had to be innovative.

  “I had a hunch that something was going to happen ‘up there’. Call it the soldier’s hunch or instinct, I had this gut feeling since taking over as Sector Commander, but more so from the end of 1983. From then on, all that we were doing was to constantly think of the possible operation. Look, I had no executive orders yet (for an operation on the glacier), but one had to be prepared. That build up in the mind was there,” he tell
s me and also explains why Operation Meghdoot was necessary.

  “In my mind this occupation (of Saltoro ridge) was a must. Suppose whatever quantum of troops, even one company of Pakistan troops, had come in and fired on our Partapur HQ, can you imagine the reaction? It is like the whole body feeling the shock, when even a small pinprick troubles your finger. It would have been akin to that. Therefore, to my mind this occupation (of the Saltoro ridge) was a must, to prevent the Pakistanis from threatening the Nubra Valley.

  “The decision wasn’t taken in haste. It was a very deliberate, conscious decision taken at the highest level. The Prime Minister was involved in it. My only regret is that they only told me to hold the crest line. They didn’t permit me to go down (towards Pakistani areas). One should have and closed the chapter once and for all. If we had gone down to Gyari, gone and held the area, you didn’t need to occupy the glacier at all because all routes are blocked by you. But, of course those are all bigger political decisions. I remember pressing for it, though I was a small fry in the whole game. Had we done that, today’s situation needn’t have arisen. Siachen ensures that Pakistan and China don’t link up on top of our head, but also makes sure that Pakistan alone does not create problems for us in the Nubra Valley. You have forestalled all that. Look at Siachen, look at Karakoram Pass and look at DBO,” he points at the map and explains. “As it is, Pakistan has given Shagksham Valley to China. Why do you allow the two adversaries to encircle you,” he asks.

  After returning from Srinagar to his HQ in Partapur, Brig Channa got down to selecting his officers and men for the operation. Sanjay Kulkarni was asked to lead the platoon of 4 Kumaon to Bilafond La. Major AN Bahuguna (who retired as a Brigadier and now lives in Dehradun), then with the Ladakh Scouts, was to go and occupy Sia La. All these troops had first concentrated at Sasoma, and later moved to Base Camp under the Task Force Commander, Lt Col Pushkar Chand.

  Brig Channa meanwhile had a major task ahead: Briefing the officers and men before they went on what looked like a high risk, if not downright suicidal, mission. He had to motivate the troops, not just by pep talk but also by action. “I had always led by example. What is motivation? Motivation is not only merely briefing. Motivation is also about establishing trust with troops and gaining their confidence, making them confident about your ability to lead them to victory. I will give you an example. Just prior to launching Operation Meghdoot, I was staying with 4 Kumaon (battalion). One morning the sentry outside my hut gave an exceptionally smart salute. I replied to his greetings, but simultaneously I kept that in mind. A day later, there was a durbar. I mentioned the smart soldier and his smart salute and as a reward I still remember, I gave them a crate of rum as reward in appreciation of the act. Troops remember these gestures.”

  There was another incident.

  “In the same durbar the SM (Subedar Major) came up to me and said the unit was facing shortage of kerosene. In those days, kerosene used to be absolutely essential to keep the living quarters heated. He asked for an extra 5,000 litres of kerosene. Now, as Brigade Commander, I always kept additional stock in the HQ. I immediately called my staff in Partapur and asked them to despatch10,000 litres of kerosene oil. My only condition: it should reach the battalion within seven days. Even as I was giving these instructions, the entire battalion was watching. It was important to deliver on the promise. So my staff ensured that the extra kerosene oil reached the battalion in four days. These are confidence building measures that go a long way in building trust with troops,” Brig Channa told me explaining his leadership style, dubbed by many colleagues and subordinates as unconventional.

  And sure enough, even in the final briefing before the launch of Operation Meghdoot, Brig Channa went beyond the rule book.

  “I personally conducted the briefing, broken into three parts: Briefing for officers, the signallers and finally for the men. The officers will tell you how unconventional the briefing was. I had said there would be no time limit for briefing. I wanted all of them to absorb every small little detail of my planned operation. The briefing was in an informal setting. Officers were allowed to smoke, have tea, take off their cap, and take off their belt! I wanted them to be relaxed. When you are relaxed, you absorb more. It wasn’t a one way talk. They were allowed to ask as many questions as possible. And they did. The briefing/interaction went on for three hours but at the end of it, I was absolutely certain that every officer had understood my Op(rational) orders. They had to, because I could not have been with them physically, and then there was to be total radio silence! With signallers, the briefing went on for an hour. We had decided to use the ‘presser switch’ on the radio set, only to convey that all was well, but there was to be no conversation. For the men, all that I had to tell them was: ‘dekho yeh tumhare paltan ki aur desh ki izzat ka sawal hai. Jeetna zaroori hai.’

  Briefing over, the troops were now primed for action.

  By 11 April 1984, 19 Kumaon (from 68 Brigade), the backup force for the operation concentrated at Leh. Ski troopers comprising 5 officers, 6 JCOs and 43 others from HAWS joined up with the task force at the base camp. Two Zu-23-2 guns, four grad P (multi barrel rocket launchers) and three detachments of SAM missiles were also at the base camp by then. The Air Force had positioned 6 Cheetah helicopters under Wg Cdr GS Sandhu, and two Mi-8 under Wing Cdr KK Sangar at Thoise for the operations.

  Maj Gen Shiv Sharma, GoC, 3 Infantry Division and Brig Channa’s immediate boss had by then established his tactical HQ at Partapur.

  During discussions on the possible D-day and H-hour for the actual launch of troops, there were several suggestions. Of course, the operation had to be launched in the timeframe of 10-30 April, 1984 set by the Northern Command. The final day had to be chosen by the Sector Commander, Brig Channa. He finalised 13 April. Why? Many have asked him for the rationale for choosing 13 April. Brig Channa has always kept mum. But talking to me in the winter of 2013, he finally revealed the reasons for deciding to launch Operation Meghdoot on 13 April 1984 although many had said the date ‘13’ could be unlucky.

  Recalling those days: Gen Chibber and Brig Channa

  WHY 13 April?

  Brig Channa says: “Well, what I say may sound controversial, but the fact is that both the Pakistani Army and us, follow the legacy left behind by the British. When the British planned, they used to be very cautious in their approach, very slow, erring on the side of caution. They were not prone to take risks. But, in such an operation I had to take a risk. And go up when they (the Pakistanis) least expected it. I was proved right.

  “If you read Gen (Pervez) Musharraf’s book, he says India pre-empted us. What does it indicate? That they (the Pakistanis) were preparing to occupy those passes too. I also know that when our team went abroad to buy snow clothing, the Pakistanis were already doing so; when we were collecting quotations, they had already bought the snow suits outright!

  “So it was a race against time. You see the operating season on the glacier is generally end-May/early June when they say it is comparatively safe to operate. So, one had to choose that time frame. Pakistanis had a much shorter distance to cover, had lesser logistical problems. I would say no more. It was one of those intuitions where I said let’s do it early. I was asked about it. When would I like to launch? I mulled over it and thought about Baisakhi (a harvest festival observed with much fanfare in North India, and even Pakistani Punjab). Now, Baisakhi is celebrated with equal fervour on both sides. People are in a joyous mood. Their guard is down. It was also the most unlikely date to launch a military operation. So there you are. 13 April it was. I would concede that it was risky. Some called it suicidal. But that is exactly why we had to do it that day. Rest is history!”

  Once the date was set, Northern Command HQ was informed.

  The Saltoro and the Cheetah helicopter

  Reconnaissance of the area of operations by senior officers prior to the actual launching was considered essential. So on 12 April, Lt Gen Hoon, Air Marshal MSO Wollen, Commander-in-Ch
ief, Western Air Command, AVM A Dayala, Air Officer Commanding of Jammu and Kashmir and Maj Gen Shiv Sharma visited the base camp, and carried out an aerial survey of Sia La and Bilafond La.

  Meanwhile, a snow storm was building up. Fresh snowing had taken place in the higher reaches.

  5.30 am, 13 April 1984: The first Cheetah helicopter, carrying Capt Sanjay Kulkarni and one soldier, takes off from the base camp. Then another follows. Then one more.

  By noon, 17 such sorties are flown by Sqn Ldr Surinder S. Bains and Rohit Rai. Capt Sanjay Kulkarni, one JCO and 27 soldiers are heli-dropped at Bilafond La.

  With this OPERATION MEGHDOOT WAS OFFICIALLY LAUNCHED.

  Three decades after he jumped from the Cheetah at Bilafond La, to signal the beginning of Operation Meghdoot, Gen Kulkarni vividly remembers the scene. “Four of us jumped one by one, as the first two helicopters hovered just short of Bila around 6 am that day. I remember throwing a 25 kg atta bori (gunny sack full of flour) to test the depth and hardness of the snow. It was quite hard. We jumped and then constructed a helipad of sorts to allow the latter sorties to land for half a minute or so, and then return for another trip,” he laughs and recalls now.

  “The most abiding memory of that day is of course of extreme cold. It must have been minus 30 degrees Celsius. We were to be deployed by ‘vertical envelopment’ (heli-dropped) at Bilafond La and another platoon led by Maj. Bahuguna was to be dropped at Sia La, but they couldn’t be sent until 17-18 April, because the weather turned bad and remained bad for the next three days. Extremely bad weather.