Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  A lonely post

  The crucial telephone line

  VI

  The Conflict Widens

  “The scope of Operation Meghdoot has been extended”

  If India’s military leaders thought that by holding the crucial passes on the Saltoro ridge, they would be able to thwart any Pakistani advances on Siachen, they were sadly mistaken. Stung by being outsmarted and outpaced in the race to the top, the Pakistani Army widened the area of operations, and launched several attacks in the first year after Operation Meghdoot was launched.

  By 1985, Siachen had acquired political overtones in Pakistan with Benazir Bhutto—daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister who was sent to the gallows by Gen Zia—making her come back in the country’s political landscape, started taunting Gen Zia ul-Haq for having ‘lost’ Siachen to India. Within the Pakistani Army too, the loss of the tactical heights at Saltoro was being viewed as a major setback.

  Peter R. Levoy in his book Asymetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict wrote: “The Pakistani army sees India’s 1984 occupation of Siachen as a major scar, outweighed only by Dhaka’s fall in 1971. The event underscored the dilution of the Simla Agreement and became a domestic issue as political parties, led by Benazir Bhutto’s People’s Party, blamed an incompetent military government under Zia ul-Haq for failing to defend Pakistani-held territory—while Zia downplayed the significance of the loss.”

  There is no doubt that Pakistan’s 10 Corps, which had inkling about the inevitability of India occupying the passes on the Saltoro ridge, was caught on the wrong foot, kept trying to prove that it could wrest back the passes, but failed repeatedly. For India, tactically, it would have been adequate to hold the passes to deny access to the glacier. However, Pakistan’s repeated efforts to occupy the ridges, which would have given them no tactical advantage, but only helped in scoring political points, forced India’s hand to counter the moves by manning all possible heights themselves.

  Therefore by November 1984, Northern Command was putting in place the third turnover of troops on the glacier, since now it looked certain that India would have to bring in more soldiers and expand the area of deployment.

  Northern Command records of the time noted: “With the decision to occupy the Siachen region permanently throughout the year, the third induction of troops was planned. Despite extreme winter conditions with temperatures falling below minus 30 degrees Celsius, exchange of fire was almost a daily routine. Logistics problems were further exaggerated because of the increased requirements of kerosene at all posts and replenishment of ammunition. The Pakistani build up meanwhile continued unabated especially opposite Sia La and Gyong La.”

  Getting to posts like this is a Herculean task

  The glacier is snowbound throughout the year

  In November 1984, 2 Vikas located at Tangste under the 114 Infantry Brigade (which looked after the boundary with China in Eastern Ladakh) was inducted to relieve 1 Vikas, which went back to its original location at Kiari under the 70 Infantry Brigade. So one Company of 2 Vikas got deployed at Bilafond La, and two more were deployed at Gyong La by November 1984. Sia La continued to be held by Ladakh Scouts. These troops were to stay at their respective locations till April 1985.

  Meanwhile, highly-skilled ski troopers and volunteers for what was initially thought to be a short-term ‘High Risk Mission’ were also withdrawn since winter had set in and it was getting impossible to sustain them logistically. Northern Command recorded: “During the extreme cold conditions coupled with snow blizzards, we had approximately 10 clear days in a month for flying. The low temperatures reduced efficiency of the troops and weapons to a large extent. Added to this, the wind chill factor made living conditions almost unbearable.

  The forbidding Siachen

  This resulted in a number of casualties due to extreme cold and chill, further adding to logistics problems of evacuation and relief.”

  In Pakistan meanwhile, the military was coming under increasing pressure to give a befitting reply to India’s occupation of the high passes. Therefore, the build up of troops on the Pakistani side steadily increased. A Northern Command intelligence assessment at that time estimated that Task Force HQ, carved out of 62 Infantry Brigade was established at Khapalu. Elements from the Gilgit-based 323 Infantry Brigade were also pushed ahead for glacier operations. The note said: “The following units were officially part of the Siachen deployment from the Pakistani side by November-December1984: 21 POK Battalion, 1 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Battalion supported by one company of 9 NLI and one company (Shaheen) of 1 SSG Battalion. An independent mountain battery from the 452 (I) artillery regiment equipped with 105 mm guns, one battery of 88 (independent) mountain battery equipped with 120 mm mortars and an ad hoc commando company raised under the 80 Infantry Brigade.”

  Like Pakistan, India too was building up troops and infrastructure in anticipation of another assault in the summer. No one would have anticipated a major attack in the winter months. But, the attack did come in the last week of February, 1985. An air operations helicopter sortie to Sia La on 21 February spotted three Pakistani positions near a peak called Saddle which was unoccupied till then. Alerted by the intrusion, Brig Jal Master, who had taken over from Brig. Vijay Channa in November 1984 as the first Commander of the 102 Infantry Brigade (converted from 26 Sector), flew over the area and assessed the intrusion. He immediately ordered a patrol of one officer, one JCO and 20 soldiers to go and occupy Saddle NL 375003, which was strategically located near the Pakistani camp detected that morning. The post at Saddle was now ready for any eventuality, although not fully established. The only question was when would the attack come: at night or early morning?

  In memory of the Siachen soldier

  It did not come until noon the next day!

  But, for the next five hours the Pakistanis tried to break through the small Indian force at Saddle, but the just inducted force under Maj MS Dahiya of Ladakh Scouts, repulsed the attack despite not being firmly entrenched. The Pakistanis, beaten back in day time, tried to interdict the track between Sia La and Saddle that night. Alert Indian troops got the better of the attackers, and killed at least five Pakistani soldiers; three fatal casualties were confirmed by Indian intercepts of Pakistani radio chatter. Weather also turned bad at dawn, and in 24 hours only five Cheetah helicopter sorties could be launched to supply ammunition and rations to the patrol on the Saddle. On 23 and 24 February, the Pakistanis launched yet another attack, this time with support from artillery and mortar fire. Yet again, the attack was beaten back. Such desperate attacks were now being launched with increasing frequency.

  A latter day camp in the middle of nowhere

  By the summer of 1985, a year after Operation Meghdoot had begun, Northern Command told Army HQ that a larger deployment to thwart frequent Pakistani attempts to wrest control of the passes was now inescapable. Soon, what was initially perceived to be a small military presence of battalion strength at most (about 1000 men), expanded first to brigade level deployment (3,000 soldiers) and now, post-1999 to nearly division strength (6,000 troops). Northern Command, reviewing the situation in the summer of 1985, noted: “By the third week of April 1985 there had been a perceptible hardening in Pakistan’s attitude and stance as regards operations on the Siachen glacier. This was evident from the intransigent attitude adopted by Pakistan during various flag meetings culminating in their abortive attempt to evict us from Sia La in February 1985.”

  As Pakistan expanded the conflict, an ad hoc Indian response – doctrine if you will—evolved around the concept of ‘holding every height.’ As Pakistan tried valiantly to evict Indians from the peaks and passes, it became imperative to not to lose any post. Instead of a well-reasoned and well-planned operation, the deployment on Siachen was guided by political aims in those early months.

  The peaks became important to hold

  Soldiers resting in between operations

  One example of
India’s decision to occupy as many heights as possible came in June 1985. After thwarting the attacks on Saddle and Ring Contour, and despite occupying those peaks, Indian troops could barely observe Pakistani movement on the Gyong glacier. So, it was decided to occupy a nameless feature at NL 60654. Northern Command records of the time show that Naib Subedar Rinchen of Ladakh Scouts was tasked to go and occupy the feature on 17 June.

  “For the next three days the enemy was unaware of our presence in this area which gave us the opportunity to consolidate and expand ‘Rinchen’ (that is how posts came to be named, mostly after soldiers who ventured into the unknown and established Indian presence. So you have several posts—Ajay, Bhim-Sonam, Amar, to cite just a few—named after daring warriors) into a formidable locality. After establishment of ‘Rinchen’ and ‘Das’ (another post named after a soldier), we were able to completely dominate the enemy from Lake Camp to OP II. This strangulation move in conjunction with establishment of ‘Das’ completely surprised and harassed the enemy. Because of its crucially dominating location, the outpost at ‘Rinchen’ has inflicted a large number of casualties on the enemy,” Northern Command recorded.

  Gen. Raghavan later noted in his book: “The summer of 1985 left no doubt in the Indian military mind about the inevitability of maintaining a strong, long-term presence on the Saltoro. That meant additional forces—in fact more than expected—an extraordinary logistics chain and the use of artillery to maintain control. The glacial terrain notwithstanding, the Saltoro needed to be held on the pattern of the Line of Control. That meant no part of the ridge line could be left unguarded. The hue and cry in Pakistan about the Siachen debacle found an echo in India, and the defence of the area got embroiled in the discourse of national honour and self-respect.”

  In 1985 itself, Gen Chibber was convinced that the Pakistani attacks would continue, since they had logistical advantage over India. “For example, from the road head to Gyong La their (Pakistan’s) turnaround time is four days; ours is 10 days. To Sia La, they can reach in six days; we take 15 days,” he wrote.

  The guns brought a lot of cheer

  Crowding the peaks meant more combat troops, and of course more personnel from support arms. Those who have fought and perfected the art of mountain warfare point out, it takes a full company (about 100 men) from the support arms to equip and supply a platoon (30 men)! In Siachen, where no army had ever been deployed or fought, it was doubly difficult.

  Guns had to be hauled up in difficult terrain, men from the artillery, signals and EME (Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) branches had to be trained and acclimatised to stay and survive on the icy heights. As Northern Command came to grips with the enormity of the deployment and the logistics challenge, even a small accretion cheered the troops. Snow mobiles, bought off the shelf from Europe made their debut in mid-1985. “Induction of two snow mobile scooters marked a sea change in the concepts of infantry mobilisation. Both utility snow mobiles are functioning efficiently and further induction of these vehicles is being met by imports,” Northern Command reported to Army HQ.

  Aware of the Indian disadvantage, Gen Chibber had already recommended enhanced deployment and strengthening of air defence, as two important elements that required immediate attention. Additional combat troops were now needed since the Pakistani attacks were relentless. Service arms like the Army Supply Corps, Ordnance and Signals had to have more presence now. Medical attention was becoming an absolute necessity, given the brutal weather conditions.

  In a note to Army HQ, Gen Chibber confessed: “Earlier, basically because of problems of logistics and air maintenance, we had taken a decision to adopt ‘summer’ and ‘winter’ postures in the area of Operation Meghdoot. The Pakistani attempt to dislodge us from the weakened Sia La position in winter, which had to be rapidly reinforced, gave us anxious moments between 21 February and 1 March. With a much shorter turnaround of Pakistani troops from their road head, we could not take the risk of thinning out during the winter. There could be no summer or winter postures, barring pulling back of some posts established in the summer months on the heights which were untenable in winter.”

  Therefore, he recommended the following enhancements of troop inductions:

  Artillery: One Air Defence Battery; one Grad P (multi-barrel rocket launcher); one light regiment; one field regiment of 105 mm guns and one battery of medium calibre guns

  Engineers: One field company

  Signals: One line section; half radio section and two mobile detachments

  Infantry: Two infantry battalions

  Air Force: Six Cheetah helicopters; two Mi-8 helicopters; four AN-32 aircraft.

  Army Service Corps: Composition platoon; 2 motor transport (3 tonne capacity) platoons.

  Army Medical Corps: Advance dressing station; technical support platoon.

  EME: Advance workshop detachment.

  The Mi-17s headed to the glacier (top and bottom)

  By the summer of 1985, all uncommitted reserves of the 3 Infantry Division were exhausted. More troops and support elements had to be brought in immediately. The increased number of troops was a logistical nightmare. Unlike in most other places in India, where troops are deployed, there is no civilian habitation anywhere close to the Siachen base camp, leave alone the glacier. On the glacier itself, there are no natural resources. Not even drinking water. Only ice, mud and rock are strewn all over. Every small item, from toothpaste to a tablet of medicine has to be brought in from the outside.

  No army in the world has stayed and fought at such altitudes and in sub-zero temperatures. A new doctrine had to be evolved for fighting on the glacier. Officers and soldiers not only had to go beyond their own experience, but had to constantly think on their feet to innovate methods and ensure troops got some basic comforts.

  Many uninitiated people have remarked that the Indian Army could have learnt lessons from mountaineers and even early pioneers like Francis Younghusband and the Workman couple in the 19th and 20th century, who climbed the glacier and even passed through it to travel to Yarkand and beyond by surviving in the harsh conditions. But, most forget that mountaineering teams rarely number more than 50 at a time, and the climbers do not have to stay put on the glacier for any prolonged period and fight the enemy, as the Indian Army has been doing at altitudes in excess of 18,000 feet for the past three decades!

  Climbing towards Khardunga La

  Keeping the troops supplied with essentials is a huge challenge in Siachen even now; in 1984 it was a nightmare, with tenuous road links and primitive transport arrangements. Siachen, it must be noted, lies at the very end of the long road that connects Ladakh to the rest of the country. And unlike today, in 1984, the road beyond Khardung La-- in itself a fearful obstacle at 18,340 feet—was rather basic. Only three tonne ‘Shaktiman’ trucks could rough it out on the tracks that existed beyond Khardung La. Today, on a good day, it is a 7-hour drive in a light vehicle from Leh to Siachen base camp, a luxury the early troops never had.

  The logistics chain is long, arduous and dependent on weather conditions. High mountain passes like Zoji La, Baralacha La and Khardung La are formidable bottlenecks. Even today, Zoji La and Baralacha La are closed for six months because of heavy snow. It is only the determination and innovative spirit of the Army and the workers of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) that Khardung La is sought to be kept open throughout the year. Even their best efforts sometimes fail, and the pass gets blocked by heavy snow for three-four days at a time, disrupting the continuous flow of supplies that are needed to be ferried across for the Siachen brigade. In 1984, the logistics chain was yet to gear up to meet this new challenge.

  BRO workers: Braving all odds

  So, as Operation Meghdoot completed a year, many changes had taken place in both the political and military leadership. Mrs Indira Gandhi was assassinated on 31 October 1984; India had a young and untested Prime Minister in Rajiv Gandhi. Lt. Gen Hoon moved on to become Director General Military Operations; Brigadier Vijay Cha
nna, the man who headed 26 Sector at the time of the launch of Operation Meghdoot, finished his tenure and was transferred to Kamptee near Nagpur to head the Brigade of Guards Regimental Centre.

  The changes notwithstanding, India’s deployment at Siachen was only set to increase. As Gen Chibber noted in July 1985: “The scope of Operation Meghdoot has been extended to the ‘physical’ domination of the Saltoro watershed, from Sia La in the North to NJ 9842 in the South.”

  Thus began Indian military’s long tryst with Siachen. The Indian Air Force, which played a stellar role right from the start, with insertion of the 4 Kumaon platoon under Capt Sanjay Kulkarni on 13 April 1984, was now called upon to get involved on a much larger scale, performing unbelievable feats that remain unparalleled in aviation history.

  Since those early, uncertain days, when neither the Army nor the political leadership knew how the conflict would pan out, Siachen is now firmly embedded in Army plans, just like its presence along the rest of the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir, giving its troops and officers unmatched experience of operating at the highest altitudes possible, an envy of ground forces around the world.

  In the initial months of Op Meghdoot, when the glacier wasn’t completely mapped nor so many posts established, it was the derring do of Army Aviation and Air Force pilots, which allowed India to take a firm grip on Siachen.

  Joseph Samuel, one of the co-founders of Deccan Aviation with the famous Capt CR Gopinath, was a helicopter pilot and instructor with the Army’s Air OP Organisation in 1984 when he was posted in Leh.