Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  This is how an official report describes the first clash on Siachen:

  “After the first firing incident on 25 April 1984 Pak troops tried to evict us from Bilafond La on 23 June. At approximately 0445 hrs, own listening post located ahead of our own post for early warning, spotted 30-40 enemy troops stealthily moving up the Bilafond glacier. As the leading troops reached 300 to 400 metres ahead of the LP, L/Nk Chanchal Singh and L/Nk Govind Singh of 4 Kumaon opened up with their LMGs on the enemy. The surprise having been lost, Pak troops started firing with all their weapons-HMGs, LMGs and mortars. The fire was very effective. The accurate fire almost made it impossible to carry out any movement between LP and the main post.

  Capt Shokin Chauhan (3rd from right, back row) with

  Ski-troopers at Bilafond La, June 1984

  Unmindful of his personal safety, L/NK Chanchal Singh after engaging with the enemy withdrew. Undaunted and aware of the urgency to alert the post, he managed to reach the post, and inform the post commander Capt Kulkarni, and after informing him of the impending attack, succumbed to his injuries. With the enemy closing onto about 500 metres of the post, our own post opened fire with automatic and small arms. Caught in the open, the enemy suffered casualties. Despite losses, Pak troops made two more attempts to capture Bilafond La.

  “Pak suffered 26 casualties. Pak plans were foiled by the alertness displayed by the LP and the gallant efforts of the post of Bilafond La. This bloody nose to Pak in the first major skirmish in the region had a very salutary effect. Pak troops rolled back from their position at Ali Brangsa to about 7 km SW of Bilafond La. Our troops occupied the area Ring Countour 5369 from where they could effectively dominate the Siachen glacier.

  “On the same day, Pak troops made an attempt to move forward and close in on our post at Sia La. The attempt was foiled by bringing accurate fire on the enemy. Mortar fire on the enemy camp at Kondus glacier was effective and enemy troops were seen running from their tents. Subsequently, the camp was shifted two km south wards along the Kondus.”

  Pakistan had tried to draw first blood, but was thwarted by the alert Indian troops on Bilafond La. The first ever skirmish in fact alerted the world via the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)’s popular radio service. In fact, Gen Kulkarni remembers hearing the news on the morning of 24 June on his small transistor. “I still remember that Hindi news on BBC radio used to come on at 6 am. On 24 June, around 6.20 A M the news bulletin announced that Indian and Pakistani Army troops have clashed at a place called Siachen in the Himalayas. That’s how I think the world outside the limited circle of mountaineers, first heard of a place called Siachen,” Gen Kulkarni said.

  Indeed, no one outside the Northern Command and the highest echelons of the Indian government was told about India’s deployment at Siachen. Even the language of the citations for gallantry medals for Gen Kulkarni and his team were kept vague. Sanjay Kulkarni and L/Naik Chanchal Singh were awarded the Shaurya Chakra, one of India’s highest gallantry awards. Sanjay remembers the announcement, was made sometime in early August.

  But, for Sanjay Kulkarni there was another surprise that he remembers even to this day.

  The lonely vigil

  “Days after the first clash, Lt Col (later Brig) Pushkar Chand called me on the radio set and said, ‘Aise kar. Tu niche utar, ek kaam hai (come down, there’s some work for you).’ I refused initially, mainly because going down would have meant climbing up again! But he insisted. I had to go down to the Task Force headquarter. After all he was my Task Force Commander. He was another famous mountaineer who had climbed Everest and Kanchenjunga. As it turned out, after the news of the skirmish on 23 June, Mrs (Indira) Gandhi decided to take a look at the glacier herself. She flew over the area. Of course, she didn’t land anywhere. But when she was flying, she apparently saw a flag, our national flag flying on the glacier. At the Bilafond La post, we used to fly the tri-colour. At the base camp, she enquired about this post that had the flag flying proudly. She apparently also asked who was commanding the post. My name was mentioned. She apparently instantly said: ‘Send that officer on a fortnight’s trip to Europe!’ Pushkar Chand told me, ‘make your passport and go for this trip, all expenses paid.’ That’s how I went to Austria, Switzerland, France and Germany with the MoD team. I was included in the delegation as a user member. We went for buying snow clothing, specialised equipment etc. As a Captain, I would not have been on that delegation otherwise! That was Mrs Gandhi for you!”

  So, as Gen Kulkarni came down to make his passport and prepared to go to Europe, consolidation of troop deployment had already begun. He never went back for any active deployment on the glacier, until he got posted to Leh in 2013 as Chief of Staff of 14 Corps.

  As I prepared to wind up the interview with Sanjay Kulkarni, I had one last query: Did he or others who were involved in the planning and execution of Operation Meghdoot in the first few months, ever think Siachen would become so big? His answer: “No, to be honest, no. We knew we were capturing something important, but we had thought it would be like Polar Bear I, Polar Bear II, Ibex I, Ibex II (the long range patrols that used to go up to the glacier between 1980-83). But no, we never thought we would stay there forever. We thought we have captured it. Ab khatam kahani (that’s the end of story). But Pakistan’s violent reaction has forced us to stay there forever.”

  Much has changed in the intervening three decades. Leh has become a thriving town, the road to the base camp via Khardung La is all weather; the comfort levels on the glacier and the base camp have improved beyond imagination, and the Indian Army has mastered the craft of glacial deployment to an extent that regiments now pro-actively seek postings for their units on Siachen!

  Meanwhile, within the first four months of launching Operation Meghdoot, Northern Command knew it had to rotate troops because of severe environmental conditions that imposed great physical and mental stress on soldiers.

  Gen Chibber wrote: “I had directed that troops deployed on the glacial posts be released periodically in about 3-4 months. 1 Vikas and 2 companies of Ladakh Scouts were earmarked for the second induction.”

  Before the first turnover began, this is how India’s deployment at the end of July 1984 looked like.

  Sia La: One Company Minus (half of the usual strength of 100 men) of Ladakh Scouts supported by a section of MMG (Medium Machine Gun), One section of Heavy Machine Gun, 81 mm Mortar, one detachement of SAM-7 missiles and Grad P(multi barrel rocket launcher).

  Bilafond La: One company Minus of 4 Kumaon supported by similar weapons as on Sia La.

  The early accommodation on the glacier

  Gyong La: One company Plus (more than 100 men) of19 Kumaon supported by 3 MMGs, One Section of HMG, 81 mm mortar, Det SAM-7 and Grad P.

  Base Camp: 19 Kumaon, short of two companies that were deployed at Gyong La and other locations and supported by one battery of 105 mm guns.

  After taking over the responsibility from 19 Kumaon at Gyong La at the end of July, 1 Vikas, made its presence felt. In no time they had established a post at Point 5955 (later named Shiv). The route through Zingrulma was also opened, thus easing maintenance problems of the post at Gyong La to a fair extent. With the occupation of Shiv, the complete area came under India’s effective observation. Not resting on their achievements, 1 Vikas continued inflicting casualties on the enemy. For the first time the initiative in Gyong La was with Indian troops.

  Meanwhile, at Sia La extraordinary Pakistani activity was seen at camp ND 6001 on the Kondus glacier. In order to pre-empt any enemy aggressive designs, 81 mm and 120 mm mortar and Grad P were lifted to the general area of Point 6630 overlooking the Kondus glacier. On 30 August, Indian troops engaged the Pakistani camp intermittently between 11.30 am and 4 pm.

  Northern Command records show that the Pakistani camp was razed to the ground and their mortar position destroyed. “The enemy suffered heavy casualties of over 20 killed/wounded. A group of personnel, many of them in their pyjamas were also seen escaping south
wards along the Kondus glacier,” the record notes. It goes on to say: “On 23 August at Bilafond La, approximately 30-40 Pakistani personnel were observed moving NE from Ali Brangsa towards our post. Own mortars and Grad P engaged the enemy. The advance elements of 8-10 personnel were killed and more casualties were inflicted when the enemy tried retrieving the bodies.”

  Perhaps enraged by the continuous reverses it had suffered, Pakistan continued its build up, especially opposite Sia and Gyong La. Logistics infrastructure was considerably improved by the acquisition of Alpine huts and by developing roads and tracks.

  Till the end of August 1984, Pakistan did not have artillery guns or 120 mm mortars. On 8 September1984, an intelligence source reported to Northern Command that instructions had been issued by HQ FCNA (Force Commander Northern Areas) to heli-lift one 105 mm Pack Howitzer in support of Operation Ababeel. Subsequently, during mid-October 1984, two more guns were despatched. This movement of guns was later confirmed by Pakistan’s firing of ground and air burst shells at Bilafond La and Gyong La. Intelligence also reported that in September 1984, an ad hoc commando Company was raised under HQ 80 Infantry Brigade by amalgamating the commando platoons of NLI battalions. This ad hoc sub unit was to be deployed in support of Operation Ababeel. In the meantime, Pakistan acquired alpine huts for use in Siachen. Three of those huts arrived in Skardu in September 1984.

  A Pub tent at Sia La

  DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

  Four months after Operation Meghdoot was launched, the situation had somewhat stabilised, and India continued to retain the initiative on the Saltoro ridge. But by this time, it was clear that these positions would have to be held permanently. This meant undertaking huge back up and logistics efforts.

  As records of the time show, Northern Command concentrated on improving the administrative infrastructure. The operational track from Sasoma to base camp was improved, and then became possible to move a 3 tonne truck on it. Today, the road is smooth and all-weather.

  To enhance logistics, an AN-32 aircraft was inducted to lift additional supplies. “Attention was also paid for improving the material comfort of the troops. Fibre glass shelters, procured off the shelf (ex-trade is the Army term) were constructed by Army engineers at the glacial posts. Recreation facilities including VCRs and TV sets were also installed for improving the morale of the troops and keeping them engaged. Research and development activity to improve living conditions and survival on the glacier were also undertaken. The Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE), to assist in the collection of data to study environmental conditions in the region was also established.”

  Nearly three months after Operation Meghdoot began the Army Chief, Gen AS Vaidya, visited HQ 3 Infantry Brigade and the area of Operation Meghdoot. Till then, he was busy dealing with the fallout of Operation Bluestar and the mutiny in some units following Indira Gandhi’s disastrous decision to send the army into the Golden Temple, the holiest shrine of the Sikhs in Amritsar. Later, Gen Vaidya was assassinated by Khalistani extremists in August 1986 in Pune where he had settled down after retirement.

  The road to Base Camp today

  “Between 18 and 20 August 1984, I accompanied COAS (Chief of Army Staff, Gen Vaidya) and briefed him on the progress of Operation. The visit was particularly useful since we were able to put across in the correct perspective, many pressing problems which required the attention of the MoD. A month later on 19 September 1984, Air Chief Marshal LM Katre, Chief of Air Staff visited the area,” Gen Chibber indicated.

  India’s long engagement with Siachen was now well and truly on its way!

  THE THREE MUSKETEERS

  Among the ski troopers first sent out on the glacier was Shokin Chauhan, then a strapping young captain, barely five years in the Army. His unit, 6/11 Gorkha was deployed in Uri when he was asked to go and report to the 15 Corps HQ in Srinagar in April 1984, instead of going for a course that would have sent him as ADC to the President. From there, he and another colleague from the same unit, Capt AL Chavan was asked to proceed to the Northern Command HQ (at Udhampur).

  They were told the Army Commander was to meet them and 21 other young officers. “We were wondering what this is all about, specially meeting the old man (the Army Commander). No one told us. My CO (Commanding Officer) did not know either. When all of us stood at attention, the first question the Army Commander asked, ‘How many of you are married?’ Four said they were. Those four were asked to step aside. The rest 19 were told that they are going to Leh and beyond. I being the junior most was tagged along with other soldiers and told to travel by road in the Army convoy to Leh. The Zoji La pass had just opened, so we managed to cross. Capt Chavan and others were flown in to Leh. With me were specially trained ski troopers. Even I had done 15-day ski training in March that year. As we arrived in Leh and started the acclimatisation process, we still didn’t know where we were going. Siachen was still unknown,” Shokin Chauhan now a senior Major General told me in February 2014.

  As Shokin Chauhan and his ski troopers climbed up the glacier gradually, from Camp I to II to Camp III and so on and then finally to Bilafond La, they were deployed to patrol the ridge after they were placed under Capt Sanjay Kulkarni. One more party of ski troopers under one Capt Amit Sareen was deployed on Sia La to patrol up to Indira Col. As they reached Bilafond La in their basic high altitude clothing (see photos of the ski-troopes on page 86), and replaced the first batch of Kumaonis, the ski troopers were handed over the special imported snow clothing by the departing troops. There was so much shortage of special imported clothing in those initial months.

  The make shift dining table

  Shokin remembers: “We did not have kerosene either, so there was no heating. The only protection from wind and snow was the tent under the parachute (see picture). We ate only tinned food for weeks and ate it out in the open on a makeshift dining table! Since there was no heating, there was no question of even changing clothes. For three months that I stayed there, I couldn’t change my underwear! Neither did others. Most of us got chilblains on our feet since the socks would remain wet in the absence of any heating,” Chauhan recalls vividly now, even three decades later.

  “Those initial days and months were full of firing from the Pakistani side besides primitive facilities. Many soldiers suffered, some died but we were young and came out unscathed. We were also lucky to have in Sanjay Kulkarni a natural leader. He dealt with every crisis smilingly. In Lt Col Pushkar Chand (the task force commander) too we had a leader who trusted and stood by youngsters,” Shokin Chauhan tells me. He also remembers individual acts of kindness. “My instructor in IMA, an education officer, realising I had no money, gave me thousand rupees and said, son keep this, you will need it. Then there were helicopter pilots. A guy named Anshuman Kumar Mata, was a daredevil. He would come whenever required and the weather be damned.”

  In November 1984, after four months of deployment at Bilafond La during which they took on the Pakistanis in the first attack on 23 June, Shokin Chauhan, AL Chavan and the ski troopers came back to their respective units. Sanjay Kulkarni had departed for Europe in August. When Shokin came back to the unit, colleagues asked him, ‘kahan gaya tha? What is bloody Siachen? You must have had a ball.’ “That hurt. We had gone into one of the most risky missions blindly and here we were treated so shabbily. They didn’t even give us the high altitude allowance at that time saying we have been given the avalanche allowance instead. We should logically have got both!” But things have changed now.

  Another incident is etched in Shokin Chauhan’s mind even now. Helicopter pilots used to be the lifeline for those deployed on the glacier, more so then, than now where facilities have improved way beyond imagination. When the time for Shokin Chauhan to go back came, he was to be airlifted and brought back to Leh. But for three days after his lift was planned, the weather didn’t permit any flying. So when Sqn Ldr Naqvi finally managed to come to pick up Chauhan he remarked in half-jest: “You are my Jona (jinx
in the Game of Housie that is typically played on Sundays and holidays in armed forces gatherings)!”

  Wing Co Yunus, perhaps just before his last flight

  Two days later, Sqn Ldr Naqvi was to fly back to Hindon, near Delhi and Chauhan was to hitch a ride back, but the arrival of some senior Air Force officer forced a change. Naqvi took off in his Mi-8 for the glacier never to return! His chopper crashed somewhere between Khardung La and the base camp killing everyone in it! Chauhan still has the last photo of Naqvi and the Mi-8.

  Shokin Chauhan’s Siachen stint ended on that sad note.

  His colleague from the same unit, AL Chavan had also come down a few days before him, and Sanjay Kulkarni had of course returned to Leh and gone for his all-expenses paid Europe trip sanctioned by Mrs Indira Gandhi herself! It was not until 29 years later, that all three, now Major Generals, came together in a common area of operation!

  In September 2013 when I visited Ladakh and travelled to the Siachen base camp, Maj Gen Sanjay Kulkarni was Chief of Staff in the Leh-based 14 Corps. Maj Gen Shokin Chauhan was commanding the prestigious 8 Mountain Division that is deployed along the Line of Control in Kargil-Dras-Batalik sector, west of NJ 9842. Maj Gen Chavan was commanding the neighbouring 3 Infantry Division that guards India’s contested border with China in Ladakh!

  The Ibex in the wilds of Siachen

  The much needed supplies!